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I" th 
e  study  of  economic  progress,  more  especially  in  relation  to 
capital,  the development  of  the  joint-stock  system  occupies  an 
important place.  This method  of  organization  became  prominent  at 
an early  period  in  England,  and  the  investigatio~  of  it has all the 
fascination arising out of  the small beginnings of  a type of  association 
which eventually attained great magnitude.  In a number of  ways  this 
enquiry contains much both of interest and romance which would scarcely 
be  expected  in  a  work  that necessarily  includes  a  large  amount  of 
statistical  material.  At the present  time joint-stock  management  has 
been  standardized.  In the sixteenth and seventeenth  centuries methods 
were still to be discovered, and the conflict between  different practices 
is suggestive and instructive.  Not only were the methods  new, but the 
system itself  was  applied to enterprizes  which  were then novel.  Thus 
early companies were  concerned in voyages  of  discovery,  privateering, 
foreign trade, the exploiting of  new inventions  and the financing of  the 
government.  In these early ventures there is a  remarkable freshness in 
the point of  view  of  the shareholders, and their speech and writings are 
characterized by vigour and directness. 
r~  lhe  enquiry, of  which the results  are given  in the following pages, 
is confined to a period which is  comparatively  self-contained ;  but, even 
in this epoch, no attempt has been made to treat the whole life-history 
of  the joint-stock  system.  A  complete account of  its organization, in 
its entirety, would have required much more space than that available in 
this and the remaining two  volumes.  Accordingly, certain  aspects  of 
the system have been selected for treatment.  These include the internal 
management of  companies in relation to their corporate character, the 
means by which capital was collected ad  eonirolled and the methods by 
which  those who  provided  it participated in the profits  or losses.  It vi  Preface  Preface  vii 
would appear that this enquiry, when  carried  on  over a period  of  less 
than one hundred and seventy years, ought to be capable of compression 
into a shorter space than that which  has  been assigned to it; but there 
arise many cognate problems for which  solutions must be  found, unless 
the results are to be left incomplete.  Indeed, to  preserve a due  balance 
between the different sub-divisions of  the subject, it has  been necessary 
to omit altogether or merely to suggest much information that is not at 
present  available  save  in  manuscripts  or very  rare  pamphlets.  The 
detailed working of  many of  the companies or the particular  kind  of 
improvement  in  production  they  attempted  to accomplish  is  often 
exceedingly valuable ;  but, instead of  describing either of  these in full, 
an effort has been made to convey a sufficient impression of its character 
to  indicate  the ~rofit-earning  capacity,  without  entering  into a  full 
discussion of the many technical issues involved.  Even when the subject 
has been limited to this extent, there remains the question of  the best 
method of  presentation  to the reader.  The material must be regarded 
from  two  ~oints  of  view,  which are distinct  but complementary.  On 
the one side there is the comparative method  of  treatment, and on  the 
other the history of  each company as a distinct  unit-the  first, in fact, 
regards  the  phenomena  during a  very  short period,  as it were,  from 
above;  while the second follows  out a series of  events in a direct  line 
along a horizontal plane,  taking the enterprizes  one  by  one  from  the 
foundation  till their end,  or  in some cases to the time at which  this 
investigation  closes.  Considering the number  of  companies to be dealt 
with,  I  am  convinced  that  nothing  would  have  been  gained  by 
attempting  to combine  these  two  points  of  view.  For  an  under- 
standing of  the joint-stock  system,  one requires  a  knowledge of  how 
it was related to other activities at a certain time and how it developed 
afterwards:  one also needs to be able to follow the history of a company 
throughout.  Both objects are secured by treating each aspect separately. 
NO doubt this method involves some repetition, but the amount of  it 
will,  I think,  be found to be  less than might have been  expected.  It 
has  sometimes happened  that the same events  must  be  referred  to in 
each part of  the work, but  it has  frequently  turned  out  that "the 
values:'  in  an artistic sense, are quite different-circumstances  may be 
important in the separate history  of  a company and only deserve 
the  merest  passing  mention  in  the  comparative  treatment  of  the 
System as a  whole.  After much consideration, 1 decided to place the 
comparative portion in the first volume, assigning to the second and the 
third the accounts of  the individual  companies.  Accordingly, the first 
part of the work collsists of an attempt to record the beginning and the 
development of the joint-stock system during the first important stage 
in its history, namely till the year 1720.  Stated in this way the enquiry 
seems a  simple  one,  but  a  little consideration  will  show  that it is  in 
reality exceedingly complex.  Early companies were affected  by, and in 
their turn affected the national  life  at so many points that, in  order to 
a  reasonably  complete  view  of  the evolution,  it is  necessary 
to  the environment  in  which  the system  worked  and  to 
notice contemporary  types  of  joint-stock  activity  in  other  countries. 
When one looks beneath  the merely surface view  of  things, it will  be 
found that early companies were influenced by a vast number of circum- 
stances, such as the trend of trade, the state of  the Crown finances, the 
general social conditions, the economic and foreign policies of  successive 
governments and  the ethical  standard  of  the time.  All  these,  with 
other events, constituted  the external influences which  affected the rise 
of  the joint-stock  system in Great Britain;  and, as it progressed, the 
form  it assumed  was  determined  also  by  causes arising  mainly  from 
within.  To arrive at these, a comparison of  the methods and results of 
the chief companies, existing at a given time, is needed ; and these data 
are  collected  from  the accounts  of  the  individual  companies in  the 
second and third volumes.  Thus in one sense the first part consists of a 
general introduction, ~roviding  a summary of  the early years of  joint- 
stock organization ;  while  in another sense, through the comparison of 
company with  company,  it also aims at presenting  conclusions.  It is 
hoped that, taking the two parts together,  the rise  of  the system,  in 
spite of  a seeming mass of disconnected particular instances, will be seen 
to evolve gradually  a  delicately balanced  causation  of  its own,  and, in 
the end, to develo~e  according to a  comparatively simple and precise 
method. 
Though in the order of  arrangement this volume comes first, owing 
to the number of  paged references to the other two, it is the last to be 
issued; and, while apologising to my readers for the apparent anomaly, 
the value of the system of cross-references may perhaps be held to justify 
the  delay.  I  am  glad  to thank  the  Secretary  of  State  for  India 
in  Council,  the  Syndics  of  the  University  Press,  Cambridge,  the 
University  Court of  the University  of  St Andrews  and the Carnegie viii  Preface 
Trust for the Universities of  Scotland for providing for the publication 
of  the whole book.  I am  greatly indebted to Prof.  W. J. Ashley  for 
valuable  suggestions arising out of  his reading of  the MS.  of  the first 
two  chapters. 
My  thanks  are  also  due  to the  officials  at many  libraries  for 
favourable opportunities for prosecuting my  enquiries.  It  was  through 
these facilities that several important authorities were discovered. 
THE  UNIVERSITY 
ST ANDREWS 
4th July  1912 
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PART  I.  THE  GENERAL  HISTORY  OF  ENGLISH, 
SCOTTISH  AND  IRISH  JOINT-STOCK  COMPANIES 
TO  1720. 
CHAPTER  I.  THE VARIOUS  LINES  OF ECONOMIC  DEVELOP- 
MENT  WHICH  CONVERGE  IN THE FIRST ENGLISH  JOINT- 
STOCK  COMPANIES. 
The earliest English joint-stock  companies might have been evolved either 
from the medieval partnership or from the idea of  a c~rporat~ion.  (a)  The 
Soeietas or Commenda-the  societas was  extensively used  by Italian financiers 
in England during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.  Italian influence 
declined after the failure of the Bardi in 1346.  (b)  The development of  the 
Corporate idea-traces  of  the conception  of  perpetual  succession implicit in 
the Saxon gilds.  Brotherhood inside the gild  resulted in exclusiveriess out- 
side, and from the latter the monopoly of early trading societies was derived. 
The government  of  gilds, feasts and processions involved the ownership and 
management of  property by the gild, and also general meetings and audit of 
accounts.  The monopoly of the gilda mercatoria led to collective bargaining. 
Government  of  the gild  merchant  became  established  as consisting  of  a 
governor with a council to assist him, or to be associated with him, whence 
was later derived the governor and assistants of the regulated company. 
The internal organization of  the Staple and of  the hlerchant Adventurers 
-by  the  sixteenth  century  groups  of  members  had  been  formed  within 
regulated  companies,  who  traded  "in  joint-stocke,"  and  transactions  are 
recorded  which  approximate  to the early joint-stock  type  of  a  corporate 
Purchase followed by a commodity-division.  When this stage was  reached 
the transition to a joint-stock  company would soon follow, and the same result 
was  possible by  an extension of  the societas.  A third  possibility  was  the 
transplanting  of  a joint-stock  constitution from the Continent-instances  of 
the latter tendency are wanting, though allowance must be made for foreign 
influences in early English joint-stock  companies as determining some minor 
points in their organization  ..........  1 
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CHAPTER  IJ.  FROM  THE BEGINNING  OF THE RUSSIA 
COMPANY  IN 1553 TO  THE CRISIS  OF 1569. 
From the economic point of  view the Reformation  involved a dislocation 
of production in England.  After the dissolution of the monasteries there came 
a period of extravagance which resulted  in the contraction of  a large Crown 
debt, amounting in 1555 to %148,526 at 14 per  cent.  These loans were due 
abroad,  and the payment of  the interest constituted a serious drain on the 
commerce of the country.  One direction in which efforts were made towards 
development of commerce was the use of capital in new foreign trades, which 
were  carried  on by  the joint-stock  system.  The Russia  company  and the 
Adventurers to Guinie were started in 1553.  The constitution of  the Russia 
company under the charter of  1555-the  three orders of officials in the court 
and the origin  of  the office of  consuls.  While the Russia  company was a 
development  of  the regulated  company,  the Adventurers  to Guinie repre- 
sented an extension of the societas-the  position of  the "  under-adventurers," 
the initial capitalization of  these two companies and the profits obtained. 
The eommercial depression  at the end of  the reign  of  Mary delayed the 
benefits  which  would  otherwise  have  followed  from  the  opening  of  new 
trades.  The finances of the Crown were in an unsatisfactory condition-the 
debt being £226,910 in 1559 ;  estimates of the Ordinary Revenue and Ordinary 
Expenditure in 1560-1.  An expenditure of 5300,000 was required for national 
defence;  the difficulty in financing the debt when  foreign  lenders refused 
advances  and voluntary  loans  could  not  be  raised  in England.  Gresham 
operated on the foreign exchange in order to meet the financial emergency. 
The political  and  diplomatic anxieties connected  with  Scotland reacted  on 
English credit abroad, and in 1560 there was a panic amongst the creditors of 
the Crown at Antwerp.  Both  trade and the credit  of  the Crown improved 
between  1560 and  1563.  The Russia  and Guinie  companies were used to 
aid in the carrying out of  Elizabeth's  policy-the  former by supplying naval 
requisites on credit, and the latter by relieving the Exchequer from the cost 
of  maintaining a ship-of-war which was  employed by the ~dventurers. The 
reform of the coinage was begun, also schemes for the production of ordnance. 
The grant of  the privilege  of  mine  royal,  which  formed  the basis  of  an 
important mining  company. 
An  outbreak  of  plague  in  1563 caused  a  serious  dislocation  of  trade, 
followed by a crisis.  English goods were prohibited in Flanders ;  and again 
the foreign creditors of the Crown pressed for payment of their loans, causing 
great anxiety in the administration of  the finances.  The effects of  the crisis 
on the companies-the  Guinie company came to an end about 1566, mainly 
through the slave-trading of  Hawkins' syndicate; the Russia  company  was 
forced to increase its capital.  The Russia company endeavoured to establish 
a European wax-monopoly-its  difficulties with interlopers arid the settlement 
of  1566 on the basis of admission of independent traders on equitable terms. 
The franchises  of  the company  in  Russia  were  suspended  in 1570.  The 
development of mining was carried out in connection with the national policy 
of  the time,  and  the societies  of  the Mines  Royal  and  the  Mineral  and 
Battery  Works  were  begun  in 1564 and  received  charters in  1568.  The 
total capital,  invested in joint-stock  companies in 1570, may be  estimated  at 
S100,000,  the relation  of  this amount to other statistical data of the period. 
Considerations  pointing to the general trend  of  profits of companies at this 
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time  and the results of joint-stock  activity.  The early conception  of  "the 
share,"  the number of which was  regarded  as fixed, while  the amount paid 
up varied.  As calls increased,  fractional shares came into existence.  Hence 
the share was understood as a "  part " in the business.  In this respect the 
early company was  related  to  the partnership ; but,  at the same time,  its 
corporate character is clearly marked by its by-laws and by the early appear- 
ance of a comparatively free market for shares  .  .  .  .  .  .  15 
CHAPTER  111.  THE CRISIS,  1569  TO  1574. 
There  were  several  causes  tending  towards  a  crisis-(a)  the political 
dangers  of  privateering,  (h)  the situation  in Scotland, (c) internal troubles 
in Flanders prevented  the renewal  of  loans to Elizabeth, (d) the seizure of 
Spanish bullion in 1568, (e) Alva seized English goods in the Low Countries 
in 1569. 
The interruption of trade with Flanders marked the beginning of a crisis, 
which  was  intensified  by  Norfolk's  Rebellion  and  by  bad  harvests.  The 
crisis caused many failures and much  embarrassment in the Crown fiuances. 
A  Parliament was  summoned  in 1571,  in which  complaints were made  of 
monopolies,  usury  and  abuses  in  the  Treasury.  The  legislation  against 
usury  failed. 
The crisis affected all the chief  joint-stock  companies.  The Russia com- 
pany was  reorganized  and a new  stock  was  formed.  A "farming"  system 
was  adopted  by  both  the Mines  Royal  and  by  the  Mineral  and  Battery 
Works.  Farming caused  dissensions  in the Mineral  and Battery  Works. 
Capital,  at this period,  was  not distinctly  understood-various  uses  of  the 
term  "stock."  Capital,  as a  term  in  accountancy,  appears  as  early  as 
1569.  The financial  results of  joint-stock  management from  1569 to 1574 
were poor.  The only new company, formed during the period of depression, 
was the society for the New Art of  making Copper-its  analogy to a modern 
private company  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  47 
CHAPTER  IV.  FROM  1575  TO  1586-THE  ELEVEN  YEARS 
.OF  GREAT  PROSPERITY. 
The recovery  from  the crisis  began  in 1575 and was  the beginning  of 
a period of  prosperity.  The Crown credit was  good.  The effect of  better 
times  on the joint-stock  companies-improved  position  of  the Mineral and 
Battery Works ;  the Mines Royal worked  at a profit  in 1586, its policy was 
enlightened;  the  reorganized  Russia  company  developed  "a  new  trade" 
from  Persia via  the Caspian  Sea and the Volga, which was  profitable from 
1573 to 1581-possible  competition between the Russia arid Levant companies; 
the Russia company and the discovery of a north-west passage. 
The  importance  of  privateering-(a)  the political  motive,  (h)  English 
Progress in shipbuilding.  Privateerimg  syndicates were joint-stock  bodies. 
This  method  of  organization possessed  the financial advantage of  enabling 
the capitalist to distribute his  risk,  and the political  one of  escaping legal 
complications.  The accounts of  privateering  companies  were  kept secret, 
but those of the Adventurers in Frobisher's Voyages afford a basis for calcula- 
tion.  Capital  was often provided  in the form of  commodities, e.g.  ships or 
b 2 xii  Contents 
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stores : ratio  between  the tonnage  and  number of  crew in a privateering 
expedition.  This  mode  of  calculation  fixes  the capital-outlay  on  Drake's 
voyage round the world at about $35,000.  The captured bullion was  said to 
have been between $1,500,000  and £1,750,000.  A comedy was arra~lged  to 
deceive the Spanish Ambassador as to the amount,  by  la~lding  the greater 
part  of  it  secretly  prior  to the official  inspection.  Out  of  the secreted 
bullion,  the adventurers  received  a  division  of  4,700  per  cent.  or  about 
g250,OOO;  while  Elizabeth  obtained  the  uncustomed  bullion,  valued  at 
%250,000 to $3300,000.  These funds improved  the position  of  the Crown 
finances and enabled Elizabeth to give assistance  to the Netherlands. 
Good trade and the success of  privateering  resulted in a general spirit of 
optimism.  The standard of  living was raised, and it was  estimated that the 
wealth of England had trebled since 1558.  The boom in privateering was an 
appearance,  rather  than the reality  of  prosperity.  Its temporary  success 
depended  on secrecy, which was not maintainable to the same extent when 
the expeditions became more numerous.  Several of these made some attempts 
at colonization.  As the privateering  expeditions became larger,  the profits 
were smaller.  By 1586 the reprisals  of  the Spaniards occasioned depression 
of trade,  which was increased by a bad harvest in 1587.  The crisis of 1586-7 
affected  the joint-stock  companies-the  second  joint-stock  of  the  Russia 
company and the subsidiary companies of  the Mines Royal in Cornwall and 
Cumberland were wound up. 
The crisis  of  1586-7  made  the financing  of  the  struggle  against  the 
Armada  very  difficult.  The subsidizing  of  Flanders  had  involved  a large 
outlay.  When money was needed suddenly in 1588, the foreign loan-market 
was closed to Elizabeth; and,  owing to the crisis,  she found it difficult to 
borrow  enough  at home.  Hence  funds were  wanting  to drive  home the 
victory,  which  had  been  obtained at an outlay  of  only $161,185  .  .  64 
CHAPTER V.  THE DEPRESSION  FROM  1587 TO 1603. 
War expenditure increased  greatly after 1588, and the burden of  direct 
taxation W;  heavier,  even  when  allowance is made for the easy methods of 
assessment.  Yet the parliamentary grants only paid half of the Extraordinary 
Expenditure from 1588 to 1603, the other half  being met from the surplus 
ordinary Revenue and other sources.  Much of the increase in the Ordinary 
Revenue  was  due to augmented duties or to a more rigorous collection of 
existing indirect taxes, which eventually involved a further burden on trade. 
By  1591 many  ships  had  been  captured,  and  foreign  trade  was  greatly 
restricted.  Privateering  was less profitable, and expeditions  became fewer. 
The decline in privateering, added to the error in a disproportio~late  outlay on 
land operations,  tended to prolong the war with Spain. 
Trade was  also  depressed  by  the bad  harvests  from  1594 to 1597, and 
there was great distress in 1597.  Privateering  revived ;  this,  however, was 
offset by  losses of  shipping.  The maximum  of  the depression  was reached 
during the  plague of 1602-3.  The Levant company suffered from the war and 
was reorganized,  but as a regulated  company.  The foundation of  the East 
India  company  in  1600.  The Russia  company  was  in  difficulties through 
want of capital and internal disputes-its  profits.  Operations of the Mines 
Royal were impeded  by scarcity of  funds.  The society of  the Mineral and 
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Battery  Works was  unfortunate in  the letting of  its iron-works, but well- 
established  in its legal  position  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ,  .  93 
CHAPTER  VI.  THE DISCUSSION  OF MONOPOLIES,  1597-1604. 
The preoccupation  of  the government during the war with  Spain caused 
a relaxation  in the supervision  of  home affairs.  By 1597 there were com- 
plaints  of  "the  enormities "  of  monopolies.  Elizabeth  promised  that 
monopolies should be tried  by  law.  Coke's  opinion  on  the prerogative  in 
relation to monopolies.  Many  patents  were defensible  as grants, but there 
had  been  abuses  by  the  agents  of  the  patentees  in  certain  instances. 
Difficulties had been placed in the way of  trying some patents ;  and, in 1601, 
the Commons considered  monopolies a grievance.  Monopoly defined as an 
exclusive  grant  to  an  individual,  hence  there  was  no  enquiry  into  the 
privileges of  the ~Mirleral  and  Battery  Works and of the Levant company. 
The report  of  the Committee dealt with-(a)  licenses relating to home and 
foreign trade, some of  which were relaxations of  existing restraints of  trade, 
(h) copy-rights,  (c) privileges to sow hemp, flax and woad,  (d) grants relating 
to munitions of war,  (e)  luxuries, (f)  manufacturing privileges, (g) grants for 
personal  reasons-Raleigh  and  tin-mining.  The  gun-powder  patent  was 
objected  to on  the ground  of  the  inconvenience  it  caused  householders. 
The gold and silver thread  and dice patents-the  latter had  beer1  tried at 
law  in  1597,  but  Elizabeth  intervened.  The industrial  monopolies-the 
starch  patent, how  financed,  arbitrary action  of  searchers;  the Aqua  Vita 
patent ;  the paper patent and the supply of rags, Bacon arbitrated.  Alleged 
rise of  prices through patents for drinking glasses,  stone bottles and steel. 
These were  newly  established  industries,  hence  there was  an  element  of 
protection  in  the encouragement  of  them.  Summary  of  the position  of 
monopolies in 1601. 
The parliamentary  enquiry of  1604 related to monopolies granted to cor- 
porations for foreign trade.  Sandys' "Instructions " for "the  free exercise 
of  industry"  and  against  "a  monopolizing  foreign  traffick."  The  bona 
$des  of this document discussed in relation to Sandys'  part in the proposed 
tobacco monopoly of  the Virginia  company.  Many of the statements in the 
<< Instructions " are false or perverted.  This document favoured the regulated, 
as against the joint-stock company.  Monopolies for the life of the discoverers 
of a new trade were approved-application  of  these principles to the Levant 
company.  The case of the Spanish company.  The state exercised its super- 
vision of foreign trading monopolies in a wrong direction.  Sandys attacked 
the  Russia company-its  legal  position  and  discoveries;  the points  in  its 
favour and against  it  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  106 
CHAPTER  VII.  BRITISH  COMMERCE  AND FINANCE  FROM 
THE PEACE  OF  1604 TO THE CRISIS  OF 1620. 
Trade began  to revive  in  1604  after  the peace,  when markets,  closed 
during the war, were re-opened.  Returning prosperity  showed itself in an 
increase of population and a rise in the standard of  living, also in an advance 
in the receipts from  Customs.  The progress  of  jointrstock  companies-the 
East India and Russia companies were making large profits, the African trade xiv  Contents  Contents 
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was  re-opened  in 1618.  In colonization,  two  Virginia companies were in- 
corporated in 1606, the Bermuda  company in 1611, the Guiana company in 
1619, the New  England  company in 1620 and the New Scotland company in 
1621.  In the home  trade there were  the beginnings  of  the Irish  society 
in 1609, the foundation of the New River company and large silver discoveries 
in Wales by a subsidiary company of the Mines Royal society. 
The provision  of  capital  for  commerce  was  largely conditioned  by  the 
state of the Crown finances.  James I. often showed considerable insight, but 
he was  deficient in the more practical qualities.  The Crown spent more in 
his reign, when the country was at peace,  than Elizabeth had needed in time 
of  war.  By 1606 the debt was  2735,280.  The increased  expenditure was 
caused in part by  payments to courtiers;  and,  in addition,  privileges  were 
granted to individuals which gave rise to new and objectionable monopolies. 
In 1608 the debt had  grown to 21,400,000,  and the attempt  to reduce  it 
involved the new impositions.  Parliament investigated these,  together with 
other burdens on trade,  such  as  the taxes  on  coals,  currants,  wines and 
hides.  The East India company and the pepper tax.  Failing sufficient grants 
from Parliament,  there were various projects to improve the revenue. 
The activity  of  trade  culminated  between  1613 and  1615-money  was 
plentiful  everywhere  except in the Exchequer.  Loans were  obtainable by 
the chief  companies at 9 per  cent. and sometimes at 8 per cent.  Foreign 
trade was flourishing-from  1609 to 1613 the East India company made total 
profits of  121;4 per cent. to 234 per cent. ;  while, in 1613 and 1614, the Russia 
company paid two dividends of 90 per cent. each.  There  were two hindrances 
to the continuance of  the prosperity-the  competition of  the Dutch and the 
condition of  the Crown finances.  James I. attempted to obtain revenue from 
the cloth trade by the export of dyed, instead of undyed cloth.  The promoters 
of  the scheme anticipated  a profit  of  2,600,000  a year, of  which the Crown 
was promised 2300,000.  The great gamble in the cloth trade was begun by 
the establishment  of  the New  Merchant Adventurers in 1613.  The scheme 
failed totally, exports of cloth declined, and this trade experienced a crisis in 
1616.  This crisis did not become  general, partly owing to the re-establish- 
ment of  the Merchant  Adventurers,  partly through the success of  the new 
foreign  and  colonial  trades.  From 1608 to 1615 the Russia  company dis- 
tributed 339 per cent.,  while the First Joint-Stock of the East India company 
divided  814 per cent.  from profits,  making a total  estimated  profit,  since 
1600, of 21,028,281.  These results compared with those  of  the Dutch East 
India company.  The rate of  the English company per cent. was higher, but 
the Dutch company had a larger capital,  and besides it expended undivided 
profits in improving its trade-a  policy which could not be carried out by the 
English company owing to its terminable stocks. 
The Scottish whaling and India company received  a  Scottish charter in 
1617-the  legal position as between  it and the East India and Russia com- 
panies.  The two  latter purchased the assets  of  the Scottish company and 
formed a joint-adventure  for whaling.  The Second Joint-Stock  of  the East 
India company was floated successfully in 1617.  Capital in 1618 was apparently 
plentiful, but the real reason of the quantity of funds seeking investment was 
the depression  in the cloth trade.  The repayment  of  advances  by  Holland 
produced  a temporary  improvement in the Crown finances.  The grants of 
James I.  were becoming a  serious burdell  on industry,  through the sums 
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exacted  from  the mercantile  classes by  courtiers.  Some of  the patentees 
began to use  their privileges  in compelling persons  in allied trades to com- 
pound  with  them.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  129 
CHAPTER  VIII.  THE ORGANIZATION  OF THE JOINT-STOCK 
COMPANY  FROM  1600 TO 1620. 
Early in the seventeenth century there was a standard type of  incorpora- 
tion.  Most  companies  were  controlled  by  governors  and  assistants,  the 
number  of  the latter being twelve  or a multiple of  twelve.  There were 
several points of  contact between regulated and joint-stock  companies.  The 
struggle between  a temporary and a  permanent capital  in  companies-the 
of  the former explains the payment of  divisions, as distinguished 
from dividends out of profits.  This method was convenient in the plantation 
companies, where the shareholders received a division in land.  Even in the 
East Iudia company, there was a tendency against a temporary capital,  while 
companies for the home trade bad a permanent capital.  There was difficulty 
in obtaining capital owing to the fixing of the number of  shares-attempt  of 
the East India company to procure subscriptions.  Shares of small denomina- 
tions were introduced and also of  different values, but without  urioritv a=  +n 
0  U" 
dividend-progress  towards  the idea  of  a  capital-stock  in  the East  India 
company  1613-17. 
Methods of  deciding the distributions to be paid to shareholders and the 
formulae by  which  they were described.  The meaning  of  a  division of  "a 
capital" by the East India company and the magazine  of the Virginia com- 
pany.  The introduction of  the term capital into accountancy is  probably 
traceable to Italian influence.  The need for a special name became clearer as 
the ambiguity of  "stock " was recognized.  Divisions, in terms of "capitals," 
must be regarded from the contemporary point of  view. 
How far were there  public  subscriptions of  capital and a free market in 
shares?--sales  of  shares  "by  inch  of  candle"  and  the prices  obtained  in 
relation to the divisions.  Peace or dissension in the management of  com- 
panies  depended  on  the state of  the finances.  Regulations  determining 
voting qualificatiolls and the quorum.  Payments made to the governor and 
assistants.  In 1609 the goveruor of  the East India company threatened to 
resign  unless  his  honorarium  was  reduced  by  more  than  one-half.  The 
mutual relations of companies-monopolies  were, in reality, often confined to 
the trade-route, hence at one time,  in some respects, the Russia, Levant and 
East India companies were in  competition.  On the other hand, there were 
cases of  community of  interest--(U)  the Mines Royal and the Mineral  and 
Battery Works, (b) the Russia, Levant and East India companies in relation 
to the proposed discovery of a north-west passage, (c) the proposed amalgama- 
tion  of  the English and Dutch East India companies, (d) the absorption of 
interloping expeditions by chartered companies  .  .  .  .  .  .  160 
CHAPTER  IX.  THE CRISIS  OF 1620-1625. 
The disturbance of  the cloth trade might have caused a crisis in 1616-17. 
The activity of new foreign trades tended for a time to postpone the depres- 
sion.  By  1620 the colnpetition of the Dutch had  reduced  profits, and the xvi  Contents  Contents  xvii 
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East India and  Russia companies could not pay their debts.  The crisis was 
marked  by  great depression  in the cloth trade and in  agriculture.  There 
was much unemployment, a high rate of interest and numerous bankruptcies. 
Popular  opinion  regarded  the crisis  as a monetary  one,  but this analysis 
was superficial-the  true position of international indebtedness.  The deferred 
effects of  the interference with the cloth trade and the reaction  on trade of 
the bad state of the Crown credit. 
Parliament sought to remedy <'the scarcity of  money"  by various recom- 
mendations.  The scheme to prevent export of  bullion by importing tobacco 
from the plantations, instead of from Spain.  That "an  Imperial preference" 
was not intended is shown by contemporary proposals for restricting imports 
from  Scotland  and Ireland.  Investigation of  grants made by the Crown- 
patents for the delegation of administrative functions, e.g.  registration of ale- 
houses--increase  of  licenses  and at the same  time hardships  inflicted  on 
inn-keepers.  Industrial monopolies-the  iron-smelting  and glass  patents, 
lighthouses, the lobster grant, the  linen-printing company, the  gold and silver 
thread patent.  The latter resulted  in very  many  abuses.  A "bill  against 
monopolies"  introduced in 1621.  The East lndia company criticized for ex- 
porting bullion.  The position of the  African company from 1621  to 1624.  The 
finance of the Russia conlpany was described as involving "gross  juggling." 
Partial failure of the harvests of 1622 and 1623, followed by the plague in 
1625, tended to delay a recovery of  trade.  Industry was burdened through 
the financial mistakes  of  the Crown and the monopoly  of  the  Merchant 
Adventurers.  The crisis of  1620-6  marked  a  stage in the history  of  the 
plantation companies.  By 1626, many of them had made land-divisions, and 
some  had  come to an end.  The capital outlay to 1624,  on founding the 
British  Empire  in America,  may be  estimated at ;E300,000;  while  share- 
holders in the companies obtained land at about 26.  6d. an acre .  .  .  166 
CHAPTER X.  FROM  1624  TO THE CRISIS  OF 1630. 
By the summer of 1626 trade had begun to improve.  The years 1626-30 
were only fairly good, the cloth trade was better, bat it had not regained the 
prosperity of  1610; the East India and African trades,  while showing some 
recovery, remained depressed.  Reviving trade was  checked  by the state of 
foreign politics, which  caused a fresh strain on the finances.  The views of 
the Crown and Parliament, as to the scope of  the projected hostilities,  were 
essentially divergent-James  I. asked #ths  and  ths; but Parliament only 
granted hths  and &  ths.  Charles I. failed to obtain sufficient parliamentary 
grants for  the war, and in 1626 he levied  a compulsory  loan, but in 1628 
there  was  a  deficiency  of  over  a  million  on  the  war-expenditure.  The 
subsidies of  1628 and other receipts would have reduced  this deficit, had  it 
not been  that part of  the  Ordinary Revenue was  precarious,  through the 
effect  of  the tonnage and poundage dispute on the finances.  Position  of 
companies in 1629-30-the  Russia company, having re-adjusted  its finances, 
was  more  prosperous,  the  development  of  colonization,  new  plantation 
companies, the Second Joint-Stock  of  the East India company,  the Mines 
Royal,  the Mineral  and Battery  Works. 
Disputes  about  tonnage  and  poundage  tended  towards  depression  of 
tracle-waut  of  employment in the cloth trade in 1630.  A  short crisis in 
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1630 came to an end on the announcement of  the peace with  Spain.  The 
dividends,  paid by the English  and Dutch  East India companies  from  1618 
to  1630, compared.  The consequences  of  their respective financial policies 
reacted on the question of  monopolies for foreign trade.  It is  possible that 
the financial methods of  the English  company  were due to its relation  to 
the Stuarts and the pressure  exerted  on  it by  the Crown  .  .  .  186 
CHAPTER  XI.  THE DELEGATION  OF INDIRECT  TAXATION 
BY  THE CROWN TO MONOPOLISTIC  COMPANIES,  163040. 
In 1631 the prospects for  investment  were  considered  favourable.  The 
Greenland  and Russia  companies  were making profits;  the position  of  the 
East India  company and the foundation  of  a  new African company.  Colo- 
nizing was  progressing-the  Massachusetts Bay company, the settlement of 
the West  Indies,  the Mosquito  Islands company.  In the home trade the 
Mines  Royal  and Mineral and Battery Works were  still in existence,  and 
several companies were formed for the drainage of  land.  A British Fishery 
society  was  established  in  1632,  to  which  subsidiary  associations  were 
affiliated. 
The personal  government  of  Charles I. had  consequences  which tended 
towards  the  restriction  of  commercial  activity-religious  disputes  caused 
emigration  and  the tonnage  question  remained  unsettled.  The  Crown 
finances  became  involved,  owing  to  the  cessation  of  subsidies.  Various 
plans were devised to create revenue to meet the deficit.  Companies, being 
exempt from the Monopoly Act, were  formed  to a considerable  extent, on 
condition they should  pay substantial sums to the Crown-the  coal, the salt 
and the soap monopolies.  These were expected in 1635 to produce 2280,000 
a year for the Exchequer, but that amount was obtained at  a cost of  between 
8200,000  and  22300,000  to consumers.  This method was essentially waste- 
ful, indirect taxation.  By 1636 trade had become dull-the  soap monopoly 
affected the Greenland company, while the salt monopoly injured the Fishery 
society.  The East India and New  River  companies were prejudiced  by the 
encouragement of rival undertakings by Charles I. 
In 1637 trade was depressed-the  parallelism between 1610-20  and 1630- 
40-  Further attempts to obtain revenue from monopolies-the  Soap-makers 
company, the wine, currant, starch and coal monopolies.  From these 8200,000 
a Year  was  payable  to the Crown,  which  cost tax-payers at least 8760,000 
a  Year  in  a  rise  of  prices  and  aroused great indignatiou.  By  1640 the 
government of  Charles I.  was  bankrupt-the  seizure  of  pepper  from  the 
East  India  company  and  of  bullion  from  the Mint,  the latter caused a 
serious crisis. 
Summary of  the position  of joint-stock  companies from 1630 to 1640- 
the  East  India  company made  smaller  profits than the Dutch  company. 
Failure  of  the African,  Greenland, Fishery and Russia companies.  A sub- 
company of  the Mines Royal  was  succeeding,  progress  of  the New 
R1~r  compny, state of  the Mosquito Islands company.  The nature of the 
interual organization of  the monopolies-its  points of  contact with both the 
regulated  and  joint-stock  company.  Subsidiary  associations  were  consti- 
tuted  without  charters,  and the style  "A.  B.  and  Co."  began  to appear. 
In the Fishery and Mosquito Islands companies there was an approximation xviii  Contents 
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towards  a  species of  limited  liability.  The controversy  between  votes by 
ballot and votes by  shares became acute.  Charles I. intervened in favour  of 
the latter.  Questions of  policy were  keenly  debated in the courts of  the 
East  India company-an  attempt to appoint a committee of  inspection,  and 
shareholders forbidden "to  dive" into the accounts  .  .  .  .  .  199 
CHAPTER XII.  THE DEPRESSION  FROM  1640  TO  16.50. 
Political  unrest precluded  a trade-revival  after the crisis  of  1640.  In  ' 
1642 the cloth trade was very depressed, and the situation became worse on 
the outbreak of  the Civil War.  The finance of the struggle involved a great 
drain on the capital of the country.  The appointment of finance committees 
led to waste and a grave burden of debt.  Parliamerlt was prepared to grarlt 
encouragement to the  Merchant  Adventurers,  the Levant and East India 
companies.  Hence  it appears there  was  a consensus of  opinion,  between 
1640 and  1650,  in  favour  of  monopolies for foreign  trade.  But the com- 
panies  favoured had  lent money to the State-others,  that made no loans, 
received  no  privileges-e.g.  the  Russia  company.  The  great  monetary 
stringency resulted  i11  an  economizing  of  currency  and  the  organization 
of  credit  through the rise  of  banking about  1645.  This  phenomenon  is 
evidence of  a mitigation of  the depression, but in 1646 there began a great 
dearth,  and,  at the same time,  foreign  trade suffered by  the depredations 
of  privateers.  The disorgallizatiorl of  production  had  reacted  still  further 
on  the wool  trade,  and  there  was  widespread  poverty  and distress.  The 
Civil War and bad trade made  this period  one of  great  depression  for the 
joint-stock  companies-the  Russia, African, Greenland, Mines Royal, Mineral 
and Battery Works and East India companies.  The financial  difficulties of 
many  companies were  attributable  to the want  of  reserve  funds.  Conse- 
quences  of  the expulsion  of  "delinquents"  from joint-stock  and regulated 
companies and the slower recovery of the latter  .  .  .  .  .  .  230 
CHAPTER  XIII.  JOINT-STOCK  COMPANIES  UNDER  THE 
COMMONWEALTH  AND  THE PKOTECTORATE. 
The beginning of  a revival in trade manifested itself  in England in 1650 
and somewhat  earlier  in  Scotla~ld. The  United  Joint-Stock  of  the  East 
India  company  was  floated  in  1650.  Financial  difficulties caused  sales of 
land  by  the  government-the  low  price  obtained.  The number  of  unin- 
corporated companies increased.  The Committee of  Trade inquired into the 
position  of  the Greenland and African companies-the  settlement by limited 
reserved areas.  The reasons for the passing of  the Navigation Act in 1651, 
and its reaction  on the carrying trade.  The chartered  cornparlies and the 
Dutch War.  Losses of  shipping and dissensions in the East India compaily. 
The war caused general depression of trade and a great strain on the finances- 
the recurring  deficits,  a great  debt  and the sale of  public property.  The 
Protectorate was compelled to reduce expenditure or else to find new sources 
of  revenue-the  adventure of  the Spanish War and its failure as a financial 
expedient.  The relation of  the necessities of  the government to the charter 
of  the East India company-its  profits compared  with those  of  the Dutch 
company.  The  New  General  Stock subscribed.  The  government  was  on 
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the verge  of  bankruptcy  in  1658-'(the  public  faith"  had  become  "the 
public despair."  The burden of taxation contrasted with that under Charles I. 
There were many causes of  commercial  depression  in 1659, and the distress 
was great.  Parliament had reached the end of  its credit, and tax-resistance 
was common  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ,  ,  .  244 
CHAPTER  XIV.  INDUSTRIAL  RECUPERATION  AFTER 
THE CIVIL  WAR  (1060-71). 
After the Restoration attempts were made to recover previous losses, the 
first step towards which  was  a  national  stock-taking-Petty's  estimates  of 
the National  Wealth and National  Dividend;  calculations of  imports  and 
exports ;  reports of the Committee of Trade relating to (a)  bullion, (b) fishing, 
(c)  the Merchant  Adventurers,  (d) the Levant  company.  The  position  of 
the  joint-stock  companies  in  1660-the  Russia  company  and  Greenland 
Adventurers had  ceased to trade,  the African  company  had  suffered from 
losses of  ships and a  new  company  was  formed  in  1662.  The East India 
company was  making a fresh  start.  Developments  of  joint-stock  organi- 
zation-an  act of  quasi-limited  liability  (1662).  Opinion began  to be  con- 
centrated on certain  aspects of  monopolies for foreign trade.  - 
Reviving commercial activity showed itself in new schemes.  The shortage 
in the settled revenue led to an increase of  banking transactions.  Scotland 
and the Plantations were developed.  With the beginning of  the Dutch War 
there came a crisis, which was intensified by the Great Fire and the appear- 
ance of  the Dutch fleet in the Thames.  The financing of  the war  injured 
the credit of  the Crown.  The run on bankers  resulted  in a panic in June 
1667-magnitude  of distress after the crisis-"the  infinite wants of all men." 
Effects of  the  crisis  on  joint-stock  companies-difficulties  of  the African 
and  Fishery  companies,  reasons  for the large dividends  of  the East India 
company.  -. 
Revival of trade after the war-an  insurance office and a mining company 
founded, Scottish companies established.  Various indications of  commercial 
progress between 1667 and 1671.  The African  company  reconstructed, the 
position  of  the East  India company  shown  by  its dividends  and prices  of 
stock, comparison with  the Dutch company.  Development  of  the internal 
affairs of  companies-form  and methods of  transfer of stock, the principle of 
a maximum vote. 
The Crown finances again reacted on trade-the  growth of  the debt, and 
Crown property sold to obtain funds.  The advisers of Charles 11. planned to 
commit  England to a war with  Holland by seizing  the Dutch Levant  fleet. 
In order to procure funds, payments out of  the Exchequer were  stopped  in 
1671, with the result of a crisis in 1672 involving the failure of many bankers 
and widespread ruin  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  263 
CHAPTER  XV.  FROM  THE STOP OF THE EXCHEQUER 
TO THE CRISIS OF 1686. 
ne  stop of the Exchequer caused a depression in trade till early in 1674. 
The  Crown  finances were  disorganized-continued  shortage of  the settled 
mvenue, reduction in Customs-revenue during the war, excess of expenditure Contents  Contents  xxi 
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above the estimates, the cost of  bribery in the House of  Commons.  A pro- 
posed retrenchment of expenditure caused a brief crisis. 
After the Peace with Holland there came a great trade revival.  Existing 
companies were more  prosperous  and several new inventions were made-a 
discount-bank in existence in 1676 and a land-bank proposed.  The rebuild- 
ing of  London  had aided  the water-supply companies-position  of  the New 
River company and the foundation of  the York Buildings company.  Petty's 
Political Arithmefick showed the progress made since 1665. 
Different  views  of  Charles 11. and Parliament on foreign policy affected 
the  finances,  and the revenue was  heavily  anticipated,  while  salaries had 
fallen  into  arrear.  Fears  of  war  with  France,  together with  disclosures 
concerning the Popish Plot,  caused a minor crisis in  1678.  The attempt  to 
rehabilitate the finances was  aided  by  the advance  in the settled  revenue 
through  the activity  of  trade-new  inventions  and  the  pro$ess  of  the 
Milled-Lead  Adventure.  Statistical  data  showed  industrial  progress-the 
development  of  credit  and banking.  The East India  company  borrowed 
at 3  per  cent.,  reasons  of  a low  rate of  interest when  trade  was  active. 
A private fire insurance  undertaking  transferred to a joint-stock  company, 
and a postage  company established (1680), scheme for  infant insurance  by 
the State, the Shadwell water company founded.  In Scotland a cloth manu- 
facturing company was  started in 1681-its  minutes,  differences as between 
England  and  Scotland  in the organization  and  privileges  of  companies. 
Position  of  companies already established-the  Royal  Fishery company had 
sold its remaining assets, but it was succeeded by an unincorporated company. 
The East India, Royal African and Hudson's Bay companies had made large 
profits.  The  dividends  of  the  English  and Dutch East  India  companies 
compared,  also  the  quotations  of  their  stocks.  The East India company 
divided a scrip-bonus of  100 per  cent.  in  1682-the  danger of  this course 
was shown during the crisis of 1682, when the company was forced to suspend 
payment. 
Since  1678  trade  had  been  less active-dissatisfaction  concerning the 
decline in  exports of  cloth  and the increase of  imports from France.  The 
Merchant Adventurers and Levant companies were in difficulties;  the attack 
of  the latter on the East India company.  In 1686 the cloth trade experi- 
enced  a crisis, which was  intensified by the failure of  the City bank, which 
involved "the  Orphans' Fund,"  whence there was great distress  .  .  .  288 
CHAPTER  XVI.  FOREIGN  TRADING  COMPANIES,  1682 TO  1697. 
The  political  situation  from  1682 to 1688 had  different  effects on the 
foreign  and  home  trades,  respectively-the  dissolution  of  the  Bermuda 
company (1684).  The attitude of  Parliament kept the Crow11 expenditure 
relatively  low,  and the restoration  of  credit was  helped  by  the continued 
improvement  in the settled  revenue,  independently  of  the new duties on 
French goods.  The arrival of  the Huguerlots  made  great additions to the 
immaterial and material wealth  of  the country-foundation  of  the White 
Paper, Linen and Lustring companies (1685-7).  The City and Friendly Fire 
lnsurances  started,  also  the  company  for  making  Salt  Water  fresh  and 
the Convex  Lights  company.  Summary of  progress  in 1688 according to 
Davenant,  Gregory King and Petty. 
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The prosperity  to 1088 was  largely due to foreign trade-from  1683 to 
1692 the East  India company divided  400 per cent.  on the original stock. 
The position of an adventurer of 1658 reconstructed in each of the chief foreign 
trading companies.  This result was important in the parliamentary struggle 
from 1689 to 1608 with reference to privileges for foreign trade.  The oppo- 
nents  of  the East India company received an accession of  strength from dis- 
~entient  stockholders, who sold out at  high prices with a view to buying back at 
par or less, and of deposing Child from the position of governor.  Up to 1693 
the opposition was apparently successful, but it failed in securing a sufficient 
modificatio~l of  the  voting  power  for  its purposes.  Hence the campaign 
developed in the direction of  the overthrow of  the company, and in 1698 the 
New Company was incorporated;  but the Old Company took up stock in the 
former and was  thus entitled to a reduced  trade.  These events,  together 
with the foundation of  the Darien company, resulted in a great depreciation 
in the price of stock of the Old Company-the  total capital of foreign trading 
companiesanditsmarket-value1680-94  .  .  .  .  .  .  ,  311 
CHAPTER  XVII.  THE BOOM  OF 1692-5  IN THE STOCK 
AND  SHARE  MARKET. 
A  period  of  speculative  activity  began  with  the success of  the Phipps 
treasure-seeking  expedition of  1687-8,  the shareholders in which  received  a 
division of 10,000 per cent.-the  organization and finance of similar ventures. 
Up  to 1695 about  150 companies  are  known  to  have  been  formed.  The 
causes of  these  promotions  are connected with  the French war-(a)  to pro- 
duce  commodities  which  could not  be  imported,  (b) to provide  munitions, 
(c)  to aid  in financing the government.  From  l092 prices  of  stocks  were 
regularly  quoted,  description  of  the different  types of  Houghton's  list-its 
peculiarities  and  ambiguities.  The  total  capital  invested  in  companies, 
existing in 1695, is estimated  at 44 millions-the  relation of  this figure to 
that of  wealth  employed  in trade. 
Houghton's  description of  a typical promotion  of  the period shows that 
the obtaining of a charter was  not essential;  but, in special instances,  these 
instruments were  sought,  and acts of  Parliament  obtained.  The English 
and Scottish  models  of  company-government  differed; numbers  of  officials, 
of the quorum;  amount of qualification.  The rival principles of a maximum 
vote  and the sliding scale.  In industrial companies the capital was divided 
into shares, the usual denominations of these.  Some typical promoters' profits 
analyzed.  The remarkable reluctance of shareholders to pay calls.  Relations 
between  the  governing  body  and the shareholders  were  sometimes  very 
cordial, but there are cases of  abuse of  trust.  Exceptional characteristics in 
Promotions, e.g.  the promising of  dividends to charity or of  limited liability. 
The glamour of  "a  fund of credit" misled certai~l  companies.  Exami~lation 
of  the general level of prices of ma~iufacturing  comparlies' shares, from 1692 
to  1694. 
As the pressure of war-taxation grew greater, markets became less active- 
the adverse state of the foreign exchanges, the re-coinage, the run on bankers 
and  the suspension  of  the Bank  of  England (1696).  The crisis  continued 
till March, 1697, owing to pressure of  war-expenditure, which  resulted  in a 
dangerous  addition  to the unfunded  debt.  The engraftment of  tallies into xxii  Contents  xxiii 
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Bank of  England  stock  transferred the discount on these  to Bank  stock. 
The severity of the crisis measured  by  the fall in  representative  securities 
between  1692 and 1697  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  326 
CHAPTER  XVIII.  JOINT-STOCK  COMPANIES  FROM  THE 
CRISIS  OF  1697  TO  THAT  OF  1708. 
Credit improved on prospects of  peace-rise  in the stocks of  the Bank of 
England and the Hudson's Bay company.  The chief  causes which led to the 
failure of  many of  the companies founded before the crisis, out of  the whole 
number 28 per cent. to 29 per cent. are known to have  been  in existerlce in 
1698.  "The  perllicious art of  stock-jobbing"  was  condemned  by the Com- 
missioners of Trade,  but the available information does not justify the charge 
against promoters or dealers in stocks.  While dealings in stocks had become 
highly orgallized (e.g.  bear  sales  and options were  comn~on)  the movements 
in shares of  manufacturing companies are to be assigned to causes other than 
market-manipulation.  Nor  is there evidence of  fraudulent promotions;  on 
the contrary most  of  the founders  of  companies held their  shares.  Stock- 
jobbers,  in fact, were made  scape-goats, and their business  was subjected to 
several restrictioas. 
A  time of  prosperity began  in 1697 and continued till 1700-agriculture 
and  shipping  were  good,  while  foreign  trade  expanded.  Attempts  were 
made  to settle the African and East India trades.  In  the former  a system 
nf licenses  was  adopted; while in the latter the act of  1698 (founding the  -- -..  . 
New  Company) was  virtually  a  compromise,  giving  scope  for  the  inde- 
pendent trader, the regulated  cornpally and the joint-stock  company.  New 
enterprize  from 1697  to  1700 ma~lifested  itself  chiefly in the direction  of 
provident schemes.  As a contrast, the Mine Adventurers company was floated 
by an ingenious lottery.  The gradual emergence of different classes of shares, 
so that by 1700 the division of  capital into debentures, preference and ordi- 
nary shares had been, to some extent, anticipated. 
Early in 1701 fears  of  war  and  the struggle  between  the East  India 
con~yanies  resulted  in a crisis, when  several bankers  failed, and stocks fell 
34 per cent. to 53 per cent.  Since  l698 the Old Company had impmved its 
position, and in 1702 an agreement was signed, which was intended to bring 
about an eventual amalgamatiorl of the companies.  In 1702 the Sword Blade 
company  had  started  its land-development undertaking,  and  in  l703 the 
London  Bridge water  works and the City  Conduits  were  amalgamated. 
Trade and credit were good from the summer of 1701 till 1704.  Though 
the number of  companies was  smaller, the capital was larger than in 1695- 
in 1703 the share capital was 8$ milliom,  with bonds it may be calculated at 
10 millions.  The strain of  the war  made itself  felt at the end of  1704-in 
Scotland  there  was  great  depression  through  the  failure  of  the  Darien 
company and bad harvests, hence the Bank of  Scotland suspeoded  payme~lt. 
Friction  between  England and Scotland produced  an unsettling effect, and 
the dividend of  the Bank of England was reduced in 1705 and 1706, while in 
the latter year its stock was below par.  The crisis of 1706 affected the bank- 
ing activities of  the Mine Adventurers and the Sword Blade company;  while 
the African company, after having paid  dividends out of  capital,  was unable 
to meet the interest on its bonds  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  352 
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COMPANIES,  THE  RE-ORGANIZATIONS  OF  THE  ROYAL 
AFRICAN  COMPANY  AND  THE MINE  ADVENTURERS,  AND 
THE CRISIS OF 1710. 
Hopes of  an early peace and relief  from  anxiety concernillg the situation 
in Scotland brought about an improvement in credit.  The Union  produced 
striking consequences  on  Scottish companies-cloth  factories suffered,  but 
the Bank of Scotland was successful, while the repayment  of  the capital  of 
the  Darien  company was  beneficial.  The  better  times  enabled  importallt 
financial operations to be  carried out-the  extinction of  the engrafted stock 
of  the Bank of  England and a new issue of  capital.  In the East India trade 
no less than seven distinct stocks were merged in that of the United company. 
Reliance on "a  fund of  credit"  had  diminished  the working  capital  of  this 
trade, since the funds subscribed  were  used by the State.  The outcome of 
an investment  in India stock  depended  on  the time when a purchase was 
made-the  gains and losses of various classes of  investors.  The re-organiza- 
tions  of  the African company  and the Mine  Adventurers were related to 
peculiarities  in  the  finance  of  these  bodies-the  position  of  an  original 
investor  in the former. 
The prosperity from  1708 to 1710 is shown by the increase of  dividends 
of  the Bank  of  England and the East India company,  but the war  forced 
enterprise into new channels,  the chief of  which was  speculative insurance. 
The Amicable Society and the Sun Fire Office were founded in this period, 
and  in  addition  a  very  great  number  of  dividend-societies.  The  latter 
encouraged  gambling and led  to fraud.  The government  objected  to  the 
diversion of capital from its own lottery-loans, and the  prohibition of  gambling 
insurances was one cause of  the crisis of  1710.  Also, the cumulative burden 
of war expenditure was now making itself felt, and there was a large addition 
to the floating debt.  Prices of government stocks fell heavily, until,  in sonle 
cases, the discount was 40 per cent.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  376 
CHAPTER  XX.  FROM  THE RETURN  OF  CREDIT  IN 1711 TO 
THE CULMINATION OF THE BOOM  IN JUNE 1720. 
Prospects  of  peace and  the funding of  the floating  debt,  through the 
foundation of the South Sea company in 1711, tended towards a restoration of 
credit.  An  unfounded  rumour  of  the death  of  Anne resultetl in a small 
crisis early  in 1714-comparison  of  the fall of  stocks in  1710 and in  1714. 
For the year, August 1714 to August 1715, trade was active; but a check came 
through  the Rebellion-fall  in  stocks.  Business  was  good till  the end of 
1717.  The  capital of  companies  in  1717  was  208 millions.  Fears  of  a 
rupture with  Spain  led to two minor  crises  in  1717 and  1710. 
The  check  to  activity  made  capital appear  plentiful,  and the  rate  of 
interest  was  low.  The importance  assigned to "a  fund  of  credit,"  tended 
towards  speculative  activity  in  the  form  of  financial  operations.  Law's 
Mississippi  scheme was at once a consolidation of  French foreign trade and 
a conversion of the debt.  Through expectations of great profits on the series 
of  operations,  the shares of  the company advanced immensely.  Though the 
South  Sea conversion  and the speculatiou  in  the  shares  of  this  compaily xxiv  Contents 
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appear to be a reflex of the French rrsystem," it developed, to a large degree, 
independently.  As  early  as  October  1719, there  was  considerable  specu- 
lation  in London;  and,  before  the end of  the year,  several  large fishery, 
insurance and finance companies had been promoted.  In November plans 
were under discussion for the conversion of  the Natiotral Debt into the stock 
of a trading company-the  rivalry of the Bank of Ellgland and the South Sea 
company, in which the latter was the victor. 
system  of  conversion  by  the South  Sea company depended  for  its 
success in the obtaining of  a surplus of  issuable over  iss?ced stock;  and the 
amount of  that surplus was determined by the premium on the stock.  The 
growth  of  speculation in the shares of  fishery arrd  insurance companies in 
January and February 1720 made  the directors of  the South Sea company 
apprehensive  that the available  capital  and credit  would be collsumed  by 
these ventures,  and steps were  taken to check  new  promotions.  In May 
the terms for the first  series of  conversions were announced, and South Sea 
stock was quoted at 400,  while  there was great activity in new promotions. 
The boom  culminated  in June, when South Sea stoclt touched 1,050.  The 
market was  then an artificial one, the company having made large advances 
on its own  stock.  New companies were  still floated in large numbers-the 
capital,  offered  from  June 4th  to llth, being  estimated at 224  millions. 
Companies  were  prohibited  from  acting  without  a  charter  or  under  an 
obsolete  one,  with  the  result  that  speculation  became  concentrated-in- 
stances of  great premiums on popular stocks, some of  which were 10, 15, 20, 
26,  35 or 60 times the amou~lt  actually paid up  .  .  .  .  .  . 
CHAPTER  XXI.  THE COLLAPSE  OF THE BOOM  OF  1720. 
The intensity of  speculation in the summer of  1720 had subjected credit 
to a severe strain.  The inflation  was  maintained  till  August  when  further 
conversions were made.  In order to divert capital from new promotions, the 
South  Sea  company caused  a  writ  of  scire facins  to be  issued  agairlst the 
Royal  Lustring,  the English  and Welsh  Copper,  and  the York  Buildings 
companies.  The issue  of  the writs  resulted  in a great fall in the shares of 
these and other new companies, which reacted  on South Sea stock-the  fall 
in  a month (August 20 to September  19) being  450.  The attempt  of  the 
Bank of  England  to arrest the panic  was  frustrated by  the failure  of  the 
Sword Blade bank.  In the last days of  September the panic was at its worst, 
and the fall of  stocks continued-the  amount of  the depreciations from June 
to December. 
The crisis affected different  groups of  companies in different ways.  Finance 
companies suffered most-effects  on the Million bank and the York Buildings 
company, the position  of  the South Sea company, where  the nature of  the 
settlement was the touchstone of  the  national honesty.  The Bank of England, 
too,  was influenced by the fund of  credit fallacy.  The Royal Exchange  and 
London Assurances experienced a period  of  financial stress,  while  the Sun 
Fire Office rearranged its capital.  An attempt was made to force the Bank of 
Scotland to engraft equivalent debentures into its capital.  Of the companies 
named  in the writ  of  wire fucias,  the York  Buildings,  the English and the 
Welsh  copper  companies  continued to transact business-the  fate of  other 
mineral  companies  after  the  boom.  Water  supply  companies were  little 
affected by  the panic.  The boom  involved the directors  of  the East India 
company in  many anxieties,  while the African and  Hudson's Bay companies 
issued further capital, the one too early and the other too late. 
The panic of 1720 determined the position of the joint-stock system during 
the ensuing century.  The cause of  the break-down of  credit was found in 
stock-jobbing  and efforts were  made  to suppress it.  After 1720 companies 
were required to obtain a charter, and these ir~strurnelrts  were granted rarely. 
Hence the inflow of  capital into industry by means of  the joint-stock  system 
was restricted, until unchartered companies were permitted early in the nine- 
teenth century  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
CHAPTER XXII.  REVIEW OF THE JOINT-STOCK  SYSTEM FROM 
1553 TO 1720: WITH  A  NOTE ON THE CRISES DURING THAT 
PERIOD. 
The increase in the amount of  capital employed by  the joint-stock  system 
was striking.  From 1553 to 1560 it was  under  $10,000,  while in 1720 the 
sum actually paid  in may  be  estimated  at 50 millions.  The ratio of  these 
figures to the national wealth and to trading capital estimated.  The progress 
of companies is closely connected with the progress of  English marine enter- 
prize,  with early colonization, with the extension and consolidation of distant 
foreign  trades, with  the organization  of  credit  and with  the prosecution  of 
new manufactures. 
The  reasons  for  the success  of  the joint-stock  system were (1) that  it 
broke down  the quasi-monopoly of  mercantile capital, as such, (2) member- 
ship  of  a joint-stock  was  more easily  obtainable than that of  a  regulated 
company-the  relatively  free market  for shares,  (3) the advantage of  the 
union  of  different  classes  in early joint-stock  undertakings,  (4)  the com- 
paratively high  profits which were  earned on the whole.  Adam Smith held 
that  there  were  serious  counterbalancing  disadvantages.  Adam  Smith's 
historical data examined-his  charges of  "waste  arrd  profusion"  agaiust the 
East India company, errors in hisaccount of the early history of the company, 
and his  tendency to assume financial failure,  when  profits were made.  The 
assumption-that  the interest of  the managers was  not sufficient to induce 
care and attention-investigated,  and shown to be erroneous in the case of the 
early history of  the East India company.  A.  Smith corrfused the ratio  of  a 
qualification to the whole capital with that of  a qualification to the manager's 
total wealth.  When A.  Smith compared joint-stock  with individual manage- 
ment in  interloping  expeditions, he was  ignorant of  the fact that important 
ventures of the latter type were organized by joint-stock companies.  A. Smith 
admitted  the necessity of fortifications in some foreign trades, but  the plea 
for liberty of  trade, which be endorses, was  ofterr a  disingenuous  effort  by 
the unscrupulous to obtain the benefit  of outlay by others without making 
any return.  In several distinct ways there  was  scope  for  an enterprising 
merchant  in  a foreign trade where  there was  a n~onopoly. The possibility 
of  defence of  a foreign  trade  being  undertaken  by  the  State  and  of  the 
compensation of  the fourlders  of  it-various  co~rsiderations  show  that this 
course was impracticable in the seventeenth century.  The problem-whether 
England was "ripe"  for the East India trade early in the seventeenth century 
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-discussed.  While several considerations point to this trade having  been 
perhaps opened too soon, there was conlpensation in a reduction in prices. 
A.  Smith  considers the joint-stock  system only applicable  in industries 
where there was a routine, e.g.  banking, insurance, water  supply and inland 
navigation.  But from 1694 to 1720 banking and insurance were in a purely 
experimental condition and routine was impossible.  On the contrary, joint- 
stock companies were found applicable in new industries,  in those where there 
W=  a large risk  or where large capital or large credit was required.  The 
development of the system in dealing with these was marked by the evolution 
of methods for managing the capital and for representation of the members. 
The charge-that  the formation of companies increased the risk of crises- 
examined.  There is an apparent symmetry in the crises from 1559 to 1720 
which  is interesting, but does not represent the whole truth-a  more com- 
p  l  of  is.  Traces  show themselves  of  an incomplete decennial 
periodicity,  but  these  are too broken  to be of  value.  Theories of  crises 
examined in relation  to the period  1559 to 1720-"  sun-spots,"  agricultural 
scarcity,  over-speculation,  over-production,  the Psychological theory.  Early 
crises  are  assignable  to  the concurrence of  objective and subjective  con- 
ditions.  The necessity  of  forecasting the future.  An  inaccurate forecast, 
on a  sufficiently large scale, oflen led to a crisis-instances  of  this.  Once 
a tendency towards good trade or towards bad trade had established itself, it 
tended to persist.  At first the development of  banking and the extension of 
credit made crises more frequent, the publication of  commercial intelligence 
in the  Press  produced  similar  effects.  In the sixteenth aud seventeenth 
centuries the objective causes of  crises  were, on the whole, more important 
than the subjective causes, but this was a temporary condition, and at a later 
period the latter influences have become more powerful  .  .  .  . 
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PART  I. 
CHAPTER  I. 
THOUGH  it is  not possible  to  discover  instances  of  the joint-stock 
conipany  in  England  before  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century,  it 
must, at  the same time, be  recognized  that before that date there were 
tendencies which would make its ultimate establishment inevitable.  In 
the  Italian  states,  organizations  of  a  similar  character  had  been  in 
existence  early  in  the  fifteenth  century,  if  not  before  that  time1. 
Prominent  amongst these  was  the Banl< of  St George at Genoa, which 
had  been  constituted  by  1407:  When  the  inlportance  of  Italian 
finance in England at an early ~eriod  is remembered, allowance must be 
made for  the possibility  that, when  the time  was  ripe, the method  of 
constituting  a  company  might  have  been  copied,  and  that, when  an 
organization of this type was  at length founded, it would be, in its main 
essentials, an importation from abroad and not an indigenous product. 
Further,  should  the  whole  mechanism  not  be  transported  bodily 
from outside, there were two main lines of  development, which by their 
union, or again  by the gradual extension  of  either, might  result in the 
formation of  a joint-stock body.  These were the medi~val  partnership 
and the growth  of  the idea of  a  corporation.  With reference to the 
first of  these, the canonist  doctrine  on the use  of  capital discouraged 
loans, while it encouraged partnership3.  There were the Commenda and 
Uniwrsalgeschichte  des  Handelsrechts,  von  L.  Goldschmidt,  Stuttgart,  1891, 
pp.  293-7 ;  Studien in der  Romanisch-Kanonistischen Wirthschafis-  urd Rechtsdehre, 
von W. Endemann, Berlin, 1874, r. pp. 432,433.  In Germany mining partnerships, 
with transferable shares, were common in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. 
Histoire de la Banpue de Saint-Georges de Genes, par le Prince A. Wiszniewski, 
Paris,  1865, p.  22. 
The  Growth of  English  Indwtry  and  Commerce  during  th.e  Early  and  Middle 
Ages, by W.  Cunningham, Cambridge, 1905, p.  367. 
S.  C.  I.  1 2  The  Commenda  and  Societas  [CHAP.  I. 
the Societasl,  both  of  which  were  in  frequent  use  on  the Continent. 
In England the latter, at least, must  have been understood, since there 
are numerous references which  point to associations of  this type having 
been  introduced  by foreigners  in their financial transactions.  Thus in 
1284 there  appeared  in  London  Simon  Gherardi  della compagnia  di 
Messer  Thomaso Ispigliati  e  di  Lapo  Ughi  Spene,  in  1296 Boniface 
recommended to Edward I. certain  merchants  de  societate Riezardorum. 
In the fourteenth century mention  of  the societas Bardorum and of  the 
aocietas Per~lzxmrn  becomes frequent, while the context shows that this 
term was  not used  in a vague general sense, but as implying distinctly 
that these societates were partnerships.  For instance, in 1312 Stephanus 
Peruzzi undertook  certain obligations, nomine  suo et ceterorurn sociorum 
de societate Peruxzolr~m"  It might be  supposed that, when there came 
a  time at which  English  capital  began  to be  used  in  enterprizes  of 
magnitude, the model of the socktas would be adopted; but, before that 
stage had been reached, the influence of  Italian bankers in London had 
greatly declined, through the failure of  the Bardi and some other firms 
in  13453.  It  follows  that,  when  a  considerable  capital began  to be 
needed to derelope English industries about the middle  of  the fifteenth 
century, it was unlikely the methods, adopted in the management of  it, 
would  be  copied from the Italian societas.  By that time the corporate 
idea had  developed  in  such  a  manner  as,  temporarily,  to check  the 
extension  of  partnership,  with the result  that the union  of  the two 
principles  was  postponed. 
To understand the reaction of  the corporate idea on that of  partner- 
ship, it is necessary to trace with some detail the growth of  the former. 
The beginnings of  this development are to be found in the Anglo-Saxon 
and Anglo-Xorman  gilds.  From these bodies a number of  institutions 
have been derived by a gradual process of  differentiation ;  and, in many 
cases, the stages of  the evolution  have been  carefully traced.  Accord- 
ingly, it will  be necessary to bring to light only those characteristics  of 
the gilds,  which  reappear  in the early  joint-stock  companies.  First 
Both were forms of  the medieval partnership.  In the commenda, in its earlier 
form which is traceable in foreign trade, the comnzendator provided  the capital and 
the commendatari~is  managed  the investment.  In the societm, the commendatariw 
contributed a portion of  the capital.  The  development of the system is explained in 
An Introduction to English Economic History and  Theory,  by W.  J. Ashley, London, 
1893, I.  (Pt.  11.) pp.  411-21. 
2  Federa,  edited  T.  Rymer, London,  1705-8,  11. p.  705, IV.  p.  387 ;  Historical 
and  Chronological Deduction  of  the  Origin of  Commerce,  by A.  Anderson,  Dublin, 
1790, I.  p. 411 ;  Goldschmidt, Handelsrechts, p.  275 ;  H. Sieveking, Die kapitalistische 
Entwicklung  in den  itulienischen  Stiidten  des  Mittrlalters,  in  Vierteljahrschrzyt fur 
Socictl-  und  Wirthschaft~geschichte,  vxr. p. 78. 
3  Alien Immigrants to Englund, by W.  Cunuingham, London, 1897, p.  76. 
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amongst  these  is  that of  the germ  of  the conceptioil  of  "perpetual 
succession."  In  a  gild,  established  before  the  Sorman  Conquest  at 
Abbotsbury by Orcy, property was  granted  for the gildship "to possess 
now  and hence-forth," thereby implying that the body was  to continue 
indefinitely  as the owner  of  the premises  devised1.  Subsequently, the 
ideal of continuity becomes more explicit, some fellowships were founded 
"  evermore to lasten " and others "  to abyde, endure and be maynteyned 
withoute elide"."  Visible expression was given to the corporate character 
by the use  of  a common seal.  It seems probable that this usage grew 
gradually.  Some method was  required  by which  the act of  the whole 
body  could  be  identified.  At first  the seal  of  some  well-known  per- 
sonage was appended to documents-as  for instance, in  the case  of  the 
Fullers' Gild  of  Lincoln, which  is said to have been  founded  in  1297, 
the ordinances, approved  in  1337, were, "  at the special request  of  the 
bi-etheren and sisteren,"  sealed with the official seal of  the Deanery  of 
Lincoln, in order "to have the greater proof  thereof  in time to come3." 
In another early gild-that  of the Blessed Virgin Mary at  Chesterfield- 
the charters were kept in a box, under the private seals of  the officials, 
to which later the common seal of  the gild was  added4.  At the end of 
the thirteenth century  and in  the fourteenth,  several fellowships had 
common  seals-as  for  instance the gild  of  the Trinity  at Worcester, 
that of  the Holy Cross at Birmingham, that of  Corpus Christi at York 
and that of  the Palmers at  Ludlow5. 
From one point of  view early gilds or "  fellowships " were marked by 
the analogy  to the  family.  The members  were  usually described as 
"bretheren"  and "sisteren."  Whether there was any conscious reference 
to an artificial  family  is  not  clear; but,  on  the other  hand,  there  is 
ample  evidence  that there  was  a  decided  tendency  to strengthen the 
solidarity of  the members in every way that was possible.  This tendency 
again  was  not  only  positive-it  acted  also  negatively,  in  fostering a 
spirit of  exclusiveness towards all outsiders.  Even in those gilds that 
were  purely social, in many cases, candidates for admission had to swear 
not to betray their affairs6.  Thus the conception of  the separateness of 
the fellowship grew up, and thence emerged the monopolies exercised by 
certain of  the trading gilds. 
l Diplomatarium  Anglicum  Aevi  Saxonici,  edited  by B. Thorpe, London,  1865, 
p. 605. 
Shipmanes  Gild, Lynn; Gild of the Purification  and  Gild  of St Lawrence, 
Bishop's  Lynn ;  Gild of  St Katharine, Stamford ;  Ordinances of  Early  English (Gilds, 
edited by Toulmin Smith, London, 1870, pp.  53, 89, 91, 188. 
Ibid., p.  181.  Ibid., p.  168. 
Ibid., pp.  193, 207, 250. 
0  Cf.  Gild of  the Holy Trinity, Cambridge : Ibid., p.  267. 
1-2 Government of  early  Gilds 
One element  in the organization of  the social gilds, was  the series 
of  regulations  as to the management  of  their business and the control 
of  members  at the  convivial  and  other  meetings.  As  a  rule,  the 
government  of  these  gilds  was  committed  to an alderman,  who  was 
the chief  one or  more  wardens  or  stewards, who  had  charge 
of  the property,  a dean or clerk, who  summoned the brethren  to the 
meetings  and  kept  the  register  of  members1.  This was  the  general 
type of  organization,  but there were  a  few  exceptions.  The gild  of 
the  Holy Cross  at Stratford-on-Avon  elected,  not  one  alderman,  but 
two aldermenz-a  case  of  special interest,  as  it will appear that some 
of  the  early  joint-stock  companies  had  two  chief  officials3.  In  this 
gild,  instead of  the subordinate  officers,  there were  selected  six  other 
brethren, to manage the affairs of  the gild with the aldermen.  Again, 
in the gilds of  the Young Scholars and of  Corpus Christi  at York, the 
head  in each case was described as the Master4.  In two fraternities at 
Lincoln,  the  leading  officer  was  named  "the  Graceman5," while  it 
appears that, in the gild of  the Holy Trinity at Lancaster, the govern- 
ing body consisted of  "twelve good and discrete men,"  elected annually6. 
This mode of controlling the affairs of  the body suggests the beginnings 
of  some species of  committee or council, in addition to the officials, and 
further evidence is afforded by references to the choice of  "two  of  the 
most  discrete  men  of  the gild to help"  the alderman  and stewards'. 
There is another form in which a group of this kind is common amongst 
the social gilds, namely as elective.  While, in some cases, the alderman 
and stewards  were chosen by the fraternity as a whole, in many others 
the procedure  was  more complex.  The outgoing alderman nominated 
four or eight of  the members, and these appointed the new officialss. 
Two of  the main  activities of  the gilds have some bearing on the 
early joint-stock system.  They organized feasts and convivial meetings, 
and it will be found that this characteristic persisted.  Thus-at  times 
of  rejoicing-the  East India company was noted for its festive gatherings; 
and, on  these and other occasions, there was  a system of  penalties  for 
absence or for disorderly behaviour9.  Then, in some instances, the gilds 
1 Toulmin  Smith,  English  Gilds, pp.  3, 7,  9, 14,15, 17, 19, 45, 47, 49, 54, 58, 
60, 62, 64, 65, 67, 69,71, 74,78,80, 83, 86, 89, 91, 95, 97,100, 103,106, 108, 114, 
116, 119, 121, 122, 148, 149, 156, 160, 161, 165, 174, 176, 187, 263. 
2  Ibid., p. 217.  3  Vzde infra, 11. pp. 38, 78, 386, 415. 
4  TOulmin Smith,  English Gilds, pp. 52, 141. 
5  Ibid.. PP. 174, 176.  Ibid., p. 164.  7  Ibid., p. 156. 
8   bid.; pi.  64, 74,  83, 89, 91, 97, 100, 119. 
Q  Vide infra, 11.  p. 96.  The same custom was  followed by  the Sun Fire Office 
(vide infra,  111.  pp. 381-8).  The sum allocated  for  the  dinner  in  1712  was  30s., 
which amount had been increased to $6  in 171.5 ; in  addition to this it was ordered 
that "what is drunk in the court room  be payd  for out of the public stock."  In 
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arranged  processions  with  no  little pomp and ceremony, and the same 
feature  reappears at the beginning  of  the history of  the Russia  com- 
l any-there, just as in the social fraternities, at  the funeral of  a memberl. 
It  is to be noted also that, in another aspect of  gild-life, there is some- 
thing that was  a  remote preparation  for  the joint-stock  body.  This 
arose  out  of  the benefit-side  of  these  fraternities.  Such  activities 
involved the collective ownership of  property by  the gild,  vested  in, 
and managed  by  its elected  representativesa.  That property  was  not 
necessarily used  as  capital,  but  in  certain  cases  the gilds had a  fund 
designed  for  loan,  in  the fonn  of  stock, to the brethren  who  were in 
need of  such assistance, and much  of  the business at the Morgespreche 
(the prototype of  general meetings) consisted of  reports on  the progress 
of  these loans, over the employment  of  which  the officials of  the gild 
exercised a general  supervision.  As a consequence of  this, the audit of 
accounts was a prominent characteristic of the proceedingsa. 
Very soon  after the Norman Conquest there appears a new develop- 
ment of  the gild-idea, in the institution known as the gilda mercatoria. 
This type of  fellowship is distinguished from the social gilds in so far as 
it was directly related to trade, whereas in the latter such reference was 
accidental, rather than essential.  In the gild  merchant the conception 
of  the corporate  character  becomes  sonlewhat more explicit, though it 
must be  recognized that, while social gilds, as  far as  is  known, existed 
before the gilda nzercato&a in England, later the two types of fellowship 
flourished side by  side. 
In view of  the exceedingly narrow views on freedom of  exchange of 
goods in the eleventh, twelfth  and thirteenth centuries4, it was natural 
that the idea  of  exclusiveness, which  has already been  shown  to have 
been  inherent in the gild5, should  result in the giUa mercatoria in the 
formation of  bodies, which confined trade within the circle of  their own 
members.  Thus, in the gild  merchant there was  involved a  monopoly, 
which  came  to be  implied  in  the grant  of  the  privilege  of  gilda 
1714  it was  necessary to make  a  rule,  "to  prevent  feuds and  quarrels,"  that  no 
healtlls should be drunk at the dinner, with the exception of one for the prosperity 
of the office.  The last official dinner of the company was  held in 1873-The  Early 
Days of the Sun Fire Ofice, by E. Baumer,  London,  1910, pp. 22-4,  44. 
The  Diary  of  Hen~y  Machyn,  edited  by  John  Gough  Nichols (Camden Soc., 
1848), pp. 166, 170, 173, 236, 237. 
lndustrial  hgankation in the  Sixteenth  and  Seventeenth  C'enturies,  by  George 
Unwin, Oxford, 1904, p. 153. 
Tolllmin Smith, English Gilds, pp. 59, 60, 63, 66, 70, 76, 79,81,83,87, 92, 96, 
98, 106, 109, 161, 174, 266. 
An Introduction  to  English  Ecomic Hirlay und  Theory,  by  W.  J. Ashley, 
1893,  I. (Part I.)  p.  102. 
Vide supra,  p. 3. Corporate Purchases  by Gilds 
mercatoria, and  which  was  jealously  guarded  by  the officials of  these 
fellowships.  Moreover  the gildsillen  were  forbidden  to "colour"  the 
goods of  unfreemen, or to enter into pal-tnership with them1.  It thus 
becomes  obvious that the development  of  the gild  system  acted  as  a 
check  on  the extension  of  partnership,  which  would  otherwise have 
followed from the canonist  teaching  on usury.  Indeed, at this period, 
there were  immense  obstacles to the association of  capitals  owned  by 
different persons.  The inhabitants  of  distant places were  cut off  from 
each other by  artificial restraints.  Even  though these  were  mitigated 
subsequently by  the system of  the affiliation of  the gilds  merchant of 
certain groups of  boroughs, the disabilities remained considerable2.  In 
the same town  a member  of  the gild merchant  might not join  with  a 
non-member  for the prosecution  of  any enterprize.  Thus there was  a 
tendency, during the period  the gild merchant was most flourishing, to 
separate capital  into what might  be  called water-tight  compartments, 
each  of  which  could  not communicate  with any  other.  This was  the 
situation as between the members of any gild merchant and all outsiders. 
Within  the fellowship  strong  efforts  were  made  to encourage  joint- 
action.  As  traders,  the inenibers were  possessed  of  some capital, and 
they were now associated by their membership of  the gild.  The prin- 
ciple of  collective working extended a little further than this.  A gilds- 
man  was  required  to share  any  purchase.  he  had  made,  with  other 
members  who  might  wish  to participate  at the same  price3.  In  the 
fifteenth century this principle had been widened, and the gild appointed 
certain officials to make the purchase  on  behalf  of  the gild  and they 
subdivided  it amongst the members*.  Transactions  of  the latter type 
are scarcely to be  distinguished from a certain  species of  dealing that 
was obviously of a joint-stock  character.  Some of the early companies, 
instead of  paying what would now  be called a dividend, made a division 
of  commodities to the members.  This was  proposed  in the case of  the 
society of  the Mines Royal  (1571),  it was  a  common  practice  of  the 
East India colnpany in  the first  half  of  the sixteenth  century,  and it 
was the rule of  the Ayr and Newmills cloth inanufactories from 1670 to 
17135.  If  it be  supposed  that the officials of  the gild  collected  the 
funds from  the members  before  the goods were  delivered to them, the 
transaction resolves itself  in its essentials into a joint-stock  followed by 
a commodity-division. 
1 The Gild Xerchant,  by Charles Gross, Oxford, 1890, I.  p. 48. 
2  Ibid., I. pp. 242-67. 
3  Ibid., Ir. pp. 46, 150, 161, 185, 218, 219, 226, 290, 352. 
Ibid., 11. p. 67. 
5  Vide infra, 11.  pp 110, 127 (~iote  ll),  128 (notes 2 aud  5), 139, 178, 390, 391, 
111.  pp. 126, 141, 112. 
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As compared  with  the social  fraternities, the gild merchant  had a 
greater variety of  affairs to control, and therefore it is to be  expected 
that the organization of  the government in it would  be more complete. 
At first, the model of  the social gilds was followed, and there are many 
cases of  gilds merchant with an alderman, stewards and a dean or clerk 
to which other subordinate officials were added.  But as administration 
became  more complex, there are signs of  the beginnings  of  a  change. 
At Ipswich, besides the alderman  (who was  elected to govern  the gild 
faithfully and well), there were also chosen four members, who should be 
associated with  him  (associentur ei)'.  By  1325 there were  two  alder- 
men,  and the gild  house was  to be  in gubernaciont: of  these officialsz, 
while by the reign  of  Henry VII. the heads of  the body are spoken of 
as aldemnanni az~t  gubernato?-es3. As  early as 1446, the men, who were 
associated with the alderman, were named associantes4; and, in the time 
of  James  I.,  they  were  known  as  '"die  twenty-four5."  Similarly  at 
Great  Yarmouth  there  is  mention  of  "the  four  and twenty  and the 
eight and forty6," at Andover in l485 there were twenty-four forward- 
man~%i,  which had been referred to as early as 1R6R7.  From this type of 
organization,  there  was  subsequently  evolved  the  governor  and  his 
assistants  of  the  regulated  conipany-the  aldermannus,  magister  or 
gz~bernator~  becoming the governor, and the men, selected to help him 
or to be associated with him, the assistants.  This type of  constitution, 
while  it occurs  frequently, was  not by  any  means  the only  one.  In 
many gilds merchant there is no trace of  the select group appointed to 
help  the alderman.  Sometimes, too,  the head  of  the fraternity  was 
known as the master, the mayor or the rector9.  The alderman and those 
associated  with  him  were  for  what  might  be  termed  the 
business-management of  the gild  in  general.  In  addition  there  were 
other officers, called stewards, skevins, ferthingmen, levelookers, heynerslo, 
most  of  whom  discharged  specific functions ;  and it would appear that, 
as the corporate organization became developed and was applied to more 
specialized  types  of  industry  and  commerce, such  duties,  or  the new 
ones that emerged, were  performed  by  the servants  of  the later  com- 
panies-these  being appointed  by  the governor. 
The increase in the commercial affairs of  the gilds merchant gave 
increasing importance to the framing of  by-laws, many of  which related 
1 Gross, Gild Merchant, 11.  p.  119.  This gild was in existence in 1200. 
Ibid., 11. p. 126.  Ibid., 11.  p. 128.  Ibid.,  11.  p. 127. 
5  Ibid., 11.  p. 131.  "Ibid.,  11.  p.  277.  Ibid., 11.  pp. 5, 10. 
8  In the case of  Cirencester (temp. Henry IV.)  the phrase magister sive gubernator 
occurs.  Ibid., 11.  p. 364. 
9  Ibid., 11.  pp. 25, 45, 49, 167, 207, 245. 
10  Ibid., I. pp. 27, 28. The Staple  and  Nerchant  Adventurers  [CHAP.  I. 
to the exercise of  the monopoly.  These records were  of  greater value 
to the members,  in  that the privileges  of  these fellowships were to a 
large degree customary;  so that written evidence could only be ~rovided 
in this way, since the privileges of  a gild merchant were not specified in 
the early charters.  It follows that the process of  framing and recording 
by-laws was  another step in the development  of  the corporate  idea, in 
so far as it provided a mechanism for expressing the will of the members 
as a community.  Like the social gilds, the gilda mercatoria often  used 
a seal, and audits of  the accounts were held1. 
With the progress of industry it began to appear that circumstances 
had  rendered  the  gild  merchant  rather  a  hindrance  than  a  help  to 
trade.  In the fourteenth century this institution  was  beginning to be 
replaced by specialized associations of traders, such as the craft gilds and 
companies of  merchants.  When the latter became  further specialized 
in  relation  to  foreign  trade,  the  evolution  towards  the joint-stock 
company will be found continued.  But, in the order of  time there is a 
gap,  occasioned  by  the early  dominance  of  foreigners  in  the external 
trade  of  England.  This  interval  is  bridged  to some  extent by  the 
appearance of  the organization, partly commercial, partly fiscal, which 
later was  incorporated  as the Mayor,  Constables and Fellowship of  the 
Merchants of  the  Staple of  England.  This body  is said to have been 
in  existence  in  1248,  and  there  are  clearer  traces  of  its activity  in 
1266-Y2.  The claim  of  the staplers,  as  the first  organized  body  for 
over-sea trade, was disputed by the fellowship of  Merchant Adventurers, 
which asserted, in the most circun~stantial  manner, that it had received 
concessions from John, Duke of  Brabant, as early as 12163.  It was not 
till nearly two hundred years later that recognition  from the Crown of 
England  was  obtained.  In the last  years  of  the fourteenth  century 
and during the first years of  that following, several grants were  sealed 
which inay be taken as the official recognition  of  the beginnings  of  the 
regulated  company  for  foreign  trade.  These  grants  relate  to the 
countries bordering  on the North  Sea and the Baltic.  The earliest is 
that to the merchants trading to Prussia (mercatores in terra Pruciae  et 
in partibzcs de  Liscone,  Sounde et  in dominiis de Hansa commorantes). 
By 1391, these traders had already elected a governor; and, in that year, 
the King granted them the privilege of  assembling together each year, 
on the feast of  St John, to make choice of  a suitable person to serve in 
this office.  The governor was given powers of  executing justice  amongst 
English  merchants in the territories  described and of  protecting the 
Gross, Gild Merchant, 11.  pp.  14, 34, 61, 304. 
2  Enqlische Handel.vpolitik gegen Ende des Mittelalters,  von Georg Schallz, Leipzig, 
1881, I. p. 329. 
8  Ibid., 11.  pp.  582, 583; Stowe MS. (Brit. Mus.) 303, f.  99. 
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concessions they had already obtained1.  In 1404 a further charter was 
signed  on  behalf  of  the  same  body.  The privilege  of  assembly  was 
extended-the  merchants now  being  authorized  to meet, not on some 
fixed  day,  but  as  often  as  they  pleased.  They  might  also  elect  a 
governor  or governors,  and  provision  was  made  for  the functions  of 
these being discharged  by deputies.  Further, a new clause was  added, 
granting  powers  of  making  statutes  and  ordinances  for  the  better 
government  of  the body, while  the governor  was  permitted to punish, 
"rationally,"  any  English  subjects,  who  disobeyed these  rules2.  From 
this  it followed  that  a  way  was  opened  for  the  establishment  of  a 
monopoly.  The merchants  could  meet, and, by  passing an ordinance, 
determine that participation in the franchises, they had procured,  was 
limited to certain persons, who  had complied with  specified conditions 
as  to their  occupation  or  by  making  a  money-payment.  Thus the 
question  of  the freedom  of  an  association  of  this  type soon  became 
important. 
In  1407 a  similar  grant  was  made  to the merchants  of  Holland, 
Zealand, Brabant and Flanders, the only variation  (and that of  minor 
importance) being the inclusion of  the term "  domini," as an alternative 
to "gtihernatores,"  in the title of  the chief officials3.  In the following 
year  a  charter in the same terms, save for the names of  the privileged 
merchants,  was  sealed on  behalf of  the merchants trading to Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark4.  The latter patent was  the foundation of  the 
Eastland  company,  that  of  l407 recognized  another  regulated  body, 
which  became celebrated as the Fellowship of  the Merchants Adventurers 
of  England, which title was sanctioned by the charter of  1505.  Between 
1407 and 1505 the corporate character, which was  implicit in the grant 
of  the former year, becomes  more explicit, and by  1498 the fellowship 
had received a grant of  arms6.  This progress  is marked in the charter 
of 1505, which records the development of the constitution of  the fellow- 
ship.  Besides the governor, or governors, there were also to be elected 
four and  twenty  of  "the  most  sadd,  discreet  and  honest  persons. ..to 
be called and named assistants to the governor."  Of  this court, com- 
~osed  of  the governor  and assistants,  thirteen  members constituted  a 
quorum.  Vacancies,  through  illness,  were  to be  filled  by  co-option ; 
while  assistants,  who  refused  to serve,  were  subject  to a  fine  of  .PRO. 
The fellowship received the moot ample powers of  making ordinances, 
on condition  that these were not contrary to the laws of  England, and 
l Federa, VII.  p.  G94.  Ibid., VIII. p. 360. 
Ibid., VIII.  pp. 464-6.  Ibid., VIII.  p.  611. 
Schanz,  Englische  Handel8poltik,  11.  p.  675.  An  engraving  of these  arms 
forms  the  frontispiece  of  Tk  Early  Chartered  Companies,  by G. Cawston  and 
A.  H. Keene,  London,  1896. 10  Organization of  regulated  Companies  [CHAP. I. 
that applicants should be admitted to the freedom on payment of a fine 
of  10 marks1. 
In the charter granted in 1505 to the Merchant  Adventurers, the 
idea of a trading corporation had reached a form closely resembling that 
in which  it appears in the first joint-stock  company, established by an 
instrument of  this kind fifty years later.  An  association of  those, who 
made their living "by grete aventour2," acted as a body in the forming 
of  by-laws governing  their commerce with  the country where they had 
obtained privileges.  These ordinances were put in force by the governor 
and assistants, which titles will be  found to repeat  themselves in many 
of  the  early  joint-stock  undertakings.  Moreover,  the  elected  repre- 
sentatives of the members were empowered to direct the conduct of each 
individual,  who  acquired  the freedom, in  very  many  ways.  Not  only 
were  minute rules framed, as to the times and the manner  of  trading, 
but also as to the details  of  social and family life.  How far-reaching 
some  of  the ordinances of  the latter class were  may be  realized by the 
citation of  one of  them, which  forbad any member to marry  an alien 
under  penalty of  the forfeiture  of  his  freedom3.  On  the other hand, 
there are traces of  the survival of  the benefit  side of  the early gilds in 
the provision that help was  to be given  to those of  the fellowship who 
required it  4. 
The  organization  of  the  regulated  company  in  many  directions 
approached that of  the early joint-stock enterprize.  It formulated and 
defined the principle  of  corporate  action  in relation  to foreign  trade, 
and provided a type of  government, by which control could be exercised. 
Though each  freeman  remained  relatively  isolated,  as a  capitalist,  he 
was  compelled to employ his  resources according  to the ordinances  of 
the fellowship.  Not  only so, but the regulated company,  as  a  whole, 
became possessed  of  a  certain  amount  of  corporate  property,  arising 
from the fines  for  admissions and from  special levies.  In some cases, 
these funds were used in providing loans to British or foreign sovereigns; 
and, as a result of  such assistance, the privileges of  the companies were 
increased from  time  to time.  There are traces also of  the formation of 
groups  within  the  main  body.  This  process  was  governed,  in  some 
instances, by considerations that were altogether local.  Thus the Mer- 
chant Adventurers and the Eastland company had "  residences"  at the 
l  Schanz,  Englische  Handekpolitik,  11.  pp.  549-53;  Cawston and  Keene,  Early 
Chartered  Companies,  pp.  249-54. 
The  MerchailtrGild  of Kingston-upon-Hull  (1499)-Two  Thousand  Years  of 
Gild Life, by J. M. Lambert, Hull, 1891, p. 158. 
Stowe MS. (Brit.  Mus.) 303, f. 101. 
The Lawes,  Customes and  Ordinances of the Fellowshippe  of  Merchantes 
Adventurers of the Realm of  England,  Add. MS. (Brit. Mus.) 18,913,  f.  6. 
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chief  English  towns,  which  participated  in  trade  with  the respective 
countries in which  they were interested;  and inany  of  these residences 
were constitutionally quasi-independent, in so far as they had charters1. 
In addition, there was  a further subdivision, where the freemen in small 
bodies entered into partnership2.  Some such development was rendered 
necessary by the universal  rule, that members might not join  with non- 
members and also to the antagonism between the ideas of  the regulated 
company and the commenda.  It is recorded that amongst the Merchant 
Adventurers of Newcastle-upon-Tyne (an affiliated body of  the fellowship 
of Merchant Adventurers), by the middle of  the sixteenth century, it  had 
become common for a freeman,  who  owned  a  ship,  to take  a  mariner 
into partnership, the latter receiving a share in the profit of the voyage. 
It  was natural that the sailor or supercargo (who was in fact the tractator, 
portator or commendata?-ius  of the cornmenda thus established) should "not 
only practys the fetys of merchaundrese, in as large and ample maner as 
many and sondrye  marchaunts  of  the saide feloshipe  do,  but also  for 
thar  mor  singuler  prophet  doo  occopye  the  forsaid  shipe  and  take 
frawght from  divors partes beyonde the see of  merchauntes strangers3," 
both these practices  being contrary to the whole spirit of  the regulated 
company; and so it follows that, once these bodies had been  organized 
and were able to enforce their rules, the cornmenda could not flourish in 
the trades they controlled.  In another  direction,  also,  the Merchant 
Adventurers of  Newcastle-upon-Tyne tended to limit partaership.  The 
regulated  companies laid  great stress  upon  apprenticeship, and it was 
by this device that membership was  confined to what were  called  later 
"legitilllate  merchants,"  namely those who had been apprentices.  About 
the middle of  the sixteenth century, a  practice had come into existence 
in  this company  for freemen to permit  apprentices  to employ capital 
66 under clocke and cover of  theyr mayster's trade";  and it was ordained, 
in  1554, that no apprentice  might  enter  into any  venture during the 
first five years of  his indentures  and, for the remainder of  his term, to 
the extent  of  g10 only.  By  a further statute these  rules  were  made 
more precise.  When an  apprentice had been bound for five  years,  he 
was  permitted to employ 220 "in joi~zte-stocke  with his  maister,"  after 
three years more (and  to the end  of  his  term) his investment might be 
increased to 240, subject to the proviso that the use of  it should be also 
in joint-stock  with the freeman to whom he was indentured4.  A further 
l  Acts and Ordinances of the Eastland  Company, edited by Maud  Sellers,  London 
(Royal Hist. Soc.), 1906, pp.  xiv, xix, xxvii, lxi, lxiii, lxvii. 
Extracts from the  Records  of the  Merchant Adventurers of Newcustle-upon-Tyne 
(Surtees Soc., 1895), I. p.  2. 
Ibid., I. p. 41.  This ordinance  is dated 1553, and  it may be taken as  typical 
of  what happened elsewhere at an earlier date.  Ibid., I. pp.  6, 7. Joint-Stocks in regulated  Companies  [CHAP.  I. 
extension  of a similar principle, which  may  have happened in the gild 
merchant,  is  explicitly  recorded.  In 1599 an  offer  was  made  to the 
Newcastle company  of  80 fother of  lead  at 27  per  fother.  This was 
~urchased  by  the fellowship as a  whole,  and  provision  was  made  that 
a  committee  should  determine  the quantity  to be  assigned  to  each 
member, collecting the price of  it from him at this rate and discharging 
the debt of  the c'ompany to the original  seller'.  This was  in fact  a 
joint-stock  purchase,  followed  by  a  commodity-division.  When  such 
bargains  became the rule, instead of  the exception, the regulated  com- 
pany would be transformed into a joiat-stock  body, as the latter will be 
found  to have  existed  during the sixteenth  century;  and, when  this 
stage in the evolution was  reached, all that was  necessary to effect the 
change  was  an  occasion which,  in  some  new  enterprize,  would  make 
it seem  to be  desirable. 
Such then  is  one line of  development,  which  would  inevitably lead 
to the formation  of  the joint-stock  company  in  its primitive  form- 
a tendency which might be expected to manifest itself in the prosecution 
of  distant  foreign  trades.  There  remains  another  to  be  considered, 
namely the extension of  the societas.  In an  industry,  which  was  long 
continued or which was growing  rapidly, there would  be  a tendency for 
additional  partners to be  assumed;  so  that, in time, the undertaking 
would grow from n societas  to a  type,  which  might  be  more  correctly 
described as a company.  In several cases of  this character, which  will 
be noticed below, the transition is  marked  by the grant of  a  charter to 
the enlarged partnership.  But growth, of the kind indicated, could only 
arise when  there was  a need  for considerable employment  of  capital in 
industry.  Prior to the beginning of  the fourteenth century, there was 
l Extracts from  the  Records  of  the  Merchant  Adventurers  of  Neweastle-upon- 
Tyne,  I.  pp.  104,  105.  In view  of  the long  disputes  in  the Virginia,  Somers 
Islands, and East India compariies as to whether votes should be taken  by show of 
hands or by ballot (vide infra,  11.  pp.  106, 269-85),  the followiilg ordinance of the 
Merchant Adventurers of  Newcastle,  dating from 1563, is of  interest.  "  Wharas 
dyvers and somdrie offencis haythe ben cornyttyd and don by dyvers of the Fellyshype, 
and ther falts beirlge provyd before the governor arid the Felyshype,  yett nevertheles, 
for so moche as yt haythe ben allwayes accustomyd that all suche deffalts haithe ben 
refferred to the Felyshype and to be tryed  by  holdinge up their handes, by reassinge 
wherof eyther by effection, or for fer of  the parents of  the partye,  yt haithe ben 
juged and thowgth  by  some of  the Felowshypp that the falts and fyns don to the 
Fellyshype  haithe  nott  ben  well  haridlytt  for  the  profeatt  of  the Howse  and 
Fellyshipe,  for reforemacion wharof be it enactyd ...  That alldowtts, falts, treaspas 
or fynnes. ..shal he tryed by the boxe accordinge to the most dyscreatt and indifferende 
means,  so thatt no man, doinge accordinge  to his conscience, shal be juged  of  no 
partye nether to do ytt of  bearinge no of dysepleasur."  Ibid.,  I.  p.  69. 
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little room  for the investment of  capital in  England by  Englishmen'. 
From this time onwards, there are traces of  a capitalistic  organization 
of mining in Cornwall" and in the last quarter of  the fifteenth century 
there are references to large partnerships for the working  of  the Mines 
Royal3.  These were  the forerunners  of  the first joint-stock  company, 
incorporated for a  home  industry.  Then, in the time of  Edward VI., 
there is an account of  a partnership for the smelting of  iron4.  At that 
time, the increasing  importance  of  capital in  industry was  marked  by 
the development of  the textile industries by its aid5.  It may have been 
that  in  this  movement  there  were  partnerships  conlprising  a  large 
number  of  members;  but,  if  so,  particulars  of  them  have  not been 
discovered.  It is  significant  too  that, during the first  century  of  the 
joint-stock  system,  it did not aff'ect  the cloth  trade. 
In addition to  these two streams of tendency towards the formation of 
joint-stock bodies, there is the possibility that the method of constituting 
them  might have been copied from similar institutions on the Continent 
and, more especially, in Italy or Germany.  There are two main reasons 
which  explain the absence of  any direct influence of  this character  on 
the earliest English joint-stock  undertakings.  Just at the period when 
they  came  into  existence,  Italian  commercial  and  financial  relations 
with England6 had declined, and therefore there would  not be the same 
disposition  to borrow  a  constitution  from  Genoa  or  Venice.  Besides, 
the development  of  the idea  of  a  trading corporation  from  the  gild- 
merchant  to the regulated company was  so complete that there was no 
need  to go beyond  it; while the prevalence of  the gild-system,  in  its 
various later developments (such as the livery company and the regulated 
company), showed that these were  suitable to the temperament  of  the 
merchants of the period.  Indeed the change from a regulated company 
or a societas of  the middle  of  the sixteenth century to a joint-stock, as 
the latter existed  in the second  half  of  that century, was so  small that 
it was  one that would  come almost insensibly by  the normal  course  of 
commercial and industrial development.  At the same time, while there 
l  An Introduction  to  English Economic History  and Theory,  by  W.  J. Ashley, 
London, 1892, 1.  (Part I.) p.  155. 
Victoria  County  Histories-Cornwall,  I.  p.  550;  The  Stannaries:  a Study of  the 
English Tin Mines, by George Randall Lewis, Boston,  1908, pp.  180-91. 
3  Vide infra,  11.  p.  384 (note 2).  Vide infra,  11.  p.  463. 
6  The  Growth  of  English Industry  and  Commerce,  during the  Middle  Ages,  by 
W.  Cunningham,  pp.  524, 525. 
6  The connection of the Italian societas with Scotland cor~tinued  till the Reforma- 
tion.  For instance from 1518 to 1521 there are references to transactions with the 
Bartli,  the Gualterotti  and  other bankers-"'l'he  Formulare"  (MSS.  Univ.  Lib. 
St Andrews),  ff.  36,  44;  The  Archbishops of  St  Andrews,  by  J.  Herkless  and 
H.  K.  Hanuay,  11.  p.  40. 14  Foreign htjluences  [CHAP. I. 
was no direct adoption of  foreign  types of joint-stock  bodies, allowance 
must  be  made  for the occasional  presence  of  influences,  derived  from 
abroad,  in  determining  some  points of  detail.  If,  as  suggested  else- 
where',  certain peculiarities  appear in particular joint-stock  companies, 
and  it is  found  that  foreigners  were  prominent  in  the promotion  of 
these,  while  again  those peculiarities  were  usual  in  the bodies of  this 
type in the native countries of these men, it may be concluded that such 
special variations from the normal English type of  constitution are to 
be assigned to a definite influence from the Continent. 
Vide infra, p.  20, 11.  pp.  38, '78. 
CHAPTER  11. 
FROM  THE BEGINNING  OF THE RUSSIA  COMPANY  IN  1553 
TO THE CRISIS  OF 1569. 
THE  appearance of  the fully  constituted  joint-stock  company  was 
the product of  two different lines of  development.  As already shown1, 
on the one side, there were  the diverse forms of  mediaeval partnership ; 
and, on the other, the organization of  corporate activity, which originated 
in the gild.  The former practice effected a synthesis of the capital, owned 
by  a few persons, but the undertaking, started in this manner, was tem- 
porary in its nature, and no  lasting plans  could  be made  for  its con- 
tinuance.  Moreover, should events require the utilization of  considerable 
resources, it would be necessary to introduce a large number of partners, 
and  the mediaeval societas had not a  sufficiently elaborate organization 
for  the  government  of  an  extended  membership.  Yet  the necessary 
system had been developed in the gild-merchant and the early regulated 
companies, and it only  required the stimulus of  a  suitable  occasion to 
graft the company organization on to the partnership. 
The precise date, at  which this union  was  effected in England,  was 
conditioned by a number of circumstances connected with the religious, 
social and industrial condition of the country.  The progress of maritime 
discovery  was  extending  foreign  trade  at the  commencement of  the 
sixteenth  century, and it was  in this branch  of  commerce that capital 
was  of most importance.  But the attitude of  the Church to capital was 
on the whole not a progressive one.  How far the canonist doctrine of 
usury was justified by the circumstances of  the time, how far, in countries 
where there was  no  Reformation, the Civil  Law, derived  from  Roman 
jurisprudence,  enabled companies to be formed  with  a joint-stock,  are 
questions beyond the scope of  the present work.  I11  England, in many 
respects, the Reformation, in liberating capital from the position it had 
occupied under the Church, forced this country to  work out the corporate 
organization of  capital independently. 
Vide auljra, pp.  2-10. The Crown Debt  1552-5 
If the Reformation be regarded, not alone in its religious and political 
aspects, but also  from  the social and economic  point  of  view,  it had 
a  marked  effect  upon  the  distributioil  of  capital in  England.  The 
Church was  the  pivot  of  medi~val  activities,  and not the least  of  its 
functions was  its economic agency.  At the Reformation, in the general 
upheaval, soille of  these economic functions disappeared, while the form 
of  the remainder was  changed.  The transference  of  ecclesiastical pro- 
perty on  an enormous  scale1 meant, for  a  time,  an economic  loss.  A 
considerable amount of  dislocation in national ~roduction  was  inevitable, 
and  the  release  of  hoarded  and  unproductive  wealth  caused  great 
extravagance. 
To turn  the economic loss of  the Reformation  into national  gain 
required  a  period  of  reconstruction, but  this was  not reached  till the 
reign  of  Elizabeth.  Henry VIII.  wasted  the wealth  that reached  him 
from the monasteries, and his extravagance resulted  in  the debasement 
of the coinage and the contraction of  a  debt, which involved an annual 
charge on the revenue of  the Crown of 240,000 a year.  Partly through 
an  adverse balance  of  indebtedness,  partly  by  the  debasement  of  the 
coinage  the  exchange  at Antwerp  was  so  low  that &l sterling  only 
realized  16s. Flemish"  In  155%  the debt abroad  was  2108,000,  and 
three years  later it had grown to 2148,526. 5s. 8d., while the interest 
was  about  14 per  cent.3  How  onerous this rate was  may  be judged 
from the fact that in 1407 the bank  of  St George was  able to convert 
existing  obligations,  borrowed  from  10 per  cent.  to 8 per  cent.,  into 
a  new  security at 7 per  cent.4  Therefore,  from  1550 to 1570, there 
was a continual drain on  England, through  the interest  payable on the 
loans contracted abroad.  Moreover, not only was the interest high, but 
the form of loan was especially onerous.  All these debts were contracted 
for short periods, and if, through any cause, the principal as well as the 
interest was  not forthcoming, a renewal  could only  be  erected on  still 
more disadvantageous  terms.  It may be  urged that, after all, the pay- 
ment of  interest might be off-set against the pre-Reformation remittances 
to the Pope and to foreign ecclesiastics, who drew revenues from English 
benefices.  But to take this view  is to conJider the economic disadvan- 
Stevens, in The Royal  Treasury qf England  or an Historical Account  of all Taxes, 
London,  1725, pp. 213, 214, gives the gross annual value of the religious houses in 
England and  Wales,  suppressed by Henry VIII.,  as  2152,517. 18s. lotd. and the 
nett annual value as 2131,607. 6s. 42d. 
The Lives of the Professors  of  Gresham College,  by John Ward,  London,  1740, 
p. 9; The Liye and Times of Sir Thomas Gresham, by John William Burgon, London, 
1839, I. p. 68. 
Burgon, Life of Gresham, I. pp. 93, 182. 
4  Histoire de la Banqzle de Saint-Georges de GGnes, par le Prince Adam Wiszniewski, 
Paris, 1865, p. 7. 
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tages  of  the medieval  Church  as  stereotyped,  through  regarding  the 
Crown  debt  as  a  kind  of  charge  on  the benefits to accrue from  the 
Reformation.  Just at the time that the interest pressed most heavily, 
it is probable that the national production was  less than it had been in 
the first  thirty years of  the sixteenth century;  so that, on  the whole, 
there appears every reason  to believe  that, about  1550, the capital  of 
the country was  being depleted.  Under these circumstances, attempts 
would be made to secure a higher return on that capital which was free 
to seek for it.  Thus the more enterprizing  merchants would  be  forced 
to give greater attention to foreign trade.  Already, however, the exist- 
ing regulated companies-the  Merchant  Adventurers, the Staplers and 
the Eastland  company1-were  in  possession  of  the chief  known  trade 
routes,  and  those,  who  wished  to extend  English  foreign  commerce, 
would  be  forced  to go further  afield.  To provide  funds  for  voyages 
to distant places would require considerable capital, and therefore, once 
such  enterprizes  were  undertaken,  some kind  of  joint-stock  company 
would  naturally  be  formed.  It  may  indeed  be  asked  why,  at this 
juncture,  supposing foreign trade were  about to be prosecuted in a new 
direction,  such  trade  might  not  have  been  organized  by  a  regulated 
company ?  The regulated  company  had  a  complete  constitution-it 
had perpetual  succession and a permanent body of  officials, but, subject 
to the rules of  the governor  and assistants, each rnember might  use  his 
own  capital  as he thought best.  But to do this,  it was  necessary that 
the trade should  be  carried  on with  a country, not too  distant, which 
was civilized.  Moreover,  the trade, suitable  for a regulated  company, 
must be  one of  some magnitude following well-defined lines, in order to 
facilitate  the provision  of  shipping.  In trading to a  distant  country 
larger vessels would be needed;  and, if such an expedition were managed 
by a regulated company, the loading of the goods of a number of adven- 
turers in one ship, accompanied by the factors in charge of  them, would 
produce almost  inextricable  confusion.  Therefore,  when  a  trade  was 
opened to Russia or to Africa, it was  almost inevitable  that it should 
be founded on a joint-stock  basis. 
If  then  the joint-stock  company  be  distinguished  from  the  mere 
partnership by some corporate character and fixed methods of  procedure 
in  the conduct  of  business, the first  English joint-stock  company  of 
importance was  that founded  in 1553, and which may be described, for 
the sake of  convenience by the name it was  comn~only  known  by later, 
as the Russia  company.  It is significant  also that, in  the same year, 
another joint-stock enterprize was established to trade to Africa.  Prior 
to the Russian and African companies, there were several ventures which 
Vide suyra, pp,  PJ 9. 
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stand on the border-line between the company proper and large partner- 
ships.  As  early  as  1485 a  number  of  noblemen  and  gentlemen  of 
England  were  granted rights of  mining the precious metals in  certain 
districts  and  were  constituted  "governors  of  the Mines  Royal1."  A 
somewhat similar grant was  made for Scotland to a group of  foreigners 
in  1526%. Then  in  1540  it  is  recorded  that  several  merchants  of 
Southampton joined  in  sending a  trading expedition  to Africa3.  So 
little is  known  of  the internal affairs of  these undertakings  that it is 
difficult to determine how  far they might be characterized as companies, 
how far as partnerships. 
Failing sufficient data relating to earlier ventures,  the two trading 
expeditions of 1553 may be taken as the beginnings of  important English 
joint-stock enterprizes.  Each is the complement of  the other, in so far 
as the Russia  company represents the evolution of  the joint-stock, from 
the regulated company ;  while, in the case of  the African  Adventurers, 
the same goal is reached from the partnership.  It is significant that, in 
both cases, the enterprize is characterized as  one for  the discovery  of 
places  unknown,  or  not previously  frequented  by  Englishmen4.  This 
note is very  clearly  sounded  in the title by  which  the voyage  (which 
resulted in the opening  of  the maritime route to Russia) was  described. 
This was  the Mysterie and Companie of  the Marchants Adventurers for 
the discoverie of  regions,  dominion.^, islands and  places unknown.  Sebastian 
Cabot was  one of  the founders  of  the venture;  and it may  have  been 
through  his  knowledge of  the joint-stock  system in  Italy  that it was 
decided there should be "  one common stocke of  the company," and that 
no member or servant might trade on his own account.  The adventurers 
subscribed  &6,000  by  calls  of  225  on each  share,  and this  sum  was 
devoted  to the  purchase  of  three  ships and  some  goods, suitable  for 
trade.  The expedition started with the idea of  discovering new countries 
to trade with, along the north-eastern passage to China  and the East. 
Two of  the three ships  were  lost in the ice,  but the third  succeeded 
in reaching Archangel ;  and Chancellor, who  was  in command, set out 
overland  to make  a  commercial treaty with  the ruler  of  the country. 
He obtained the promise of  extensive privileges and concessions for the 
agents of  the company, since it was to the advantage of  Russia to open 
a  maritime  trade-that  country  at this time having no  port  on  the 
Baltic.  Thus in  1554 the position was  that the adventurers had pro- 
cured important franchises in Russia  at an expenditure which was con- 
siderable for  the time.  In order  to secure the benefits  of  the "new 
trade"  to the discoverers of  it, a charter was  signed on  February 6th, 
1555,  which  reserved to the company  the  sole  right  of  trading with 
1  Vide infra, rr. p. 383. 
S Ibid., 11.  p.  3. 
2  Ibid., 11.  p. 384. 
4  Ibid., 11.  pp. 4, 37, 41. 
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Russia, or with  any  other countries that might  be  opened  up  by  the 
adventurers in the future and which had not been  commonly frequented 
by Englishmen.  This grant clearly bases the monopoly of  trade on the 
ground of the right of discovery ;  and the promptitude, with which such 
~rivileges  were granted, is to be ascribed in part to the national import- 
ance of  the branch  of  commerce now  made available.  Not only would 
a  new  market  be  found  for  English commodities, but, what  was  more 
important, England  obtained direct access to materials  of  the greatest 
possible importance for the shipping trade, such as cordage and timber 
for masts. 
The charter also prescribed with  considerable detail the constitution 
of  the undertaking,  which  is  described  as  '$one bodie and perpetual1 
fellowship and  communaltie."  This  characterization  gathers  up  the 
various lines of  development  leading to the establishment of  corporate 
life-suggesting  the description of the contemporary regulated and livery 
companies; while, as already shown1, the term "  fellowship " was common 
in  the early  gilds.  The explicit  reference to "the  one  bodie"  shows 
that greater emphasis was being laid on the idea of a corporation.  The 
charter  is  not  explicit  on  the specifically joint-stock  character  of  the 
concern, which  shows  itself  rather in  the ideas of  the founders and in 
the actual working out of  the enterprize, and hence, in the written con- 
stitution, the development  of the idea of  partnership is less prominent, 
though it was precisely this side of  its activities which differentiates this 
company from others already incorporated. 
There could  be  no clearer  example  of  the tentative nature of  the 
incorporation  of  a  company  than the lengthy  title given  to this one. 
Probably in the middle  of  the sixteenth century, the practice  that was 
later  enforced-namely  that  no  corporation  could  act legally,  except 
under the full title by which it was established2-had  not been accepted. 
Evidently, just as in the case of  treatises in the following century, it was 
supposed that the name of  a  company  or  of  a book  should be  at the 
same time a concise epitome of the whole objects of  either, and therefore 
the Russia  company began  its career  as  the  Marchants Adventurer8 of 
England  jbr  the  discovery  of  lands,  territories,  ides,  dominions  and 
.seig-no&  unknowlz,  and not  before  that  late  adve~iture or  enterprize 
cornmonly frequented.  The inconvenience of  this extended title was  so 
marked that in  1566 it was  shortened, under  the authority  of  an act 
of  Parliament, and thenceforth  the undertaking was  known  officially as 
the Fellowship ?fSEnglisk  Merchants for  discoztery of  New  TradesS. 
1  Vide supra, p.  3. 
2 Reports of  C'ases adjudged  in the  C'ourt  of  h'ing's Bench from 1  Will. and Mary 
to 10 Anne  by William Salkeld, Londoxl,  1708, 111.  p.  102. 
3  Vide infra, 11.  pp. 37, 42. 
2-2 20  Bovernment  of the  Russia  Company  1555  [CHAP. 11. 
The charter prescribed with some minuteness the internal constitution 
of  the body.  The members  had  the right of  assembling and making 
elections of  officials.  At first there was to be  one  governor,  and this 
position was  to be held  by  Sebastian  Cabot for life.  After his  death, 
two  governors  might  be  elected.  In  addition  to  the  governor,  or 
governors,  the fellowship was  empowered to choose  annually  twenty- 
eight  persons,  of  whom  four  were  described  as  "consuls"  and  the 
remaining twenty-four as "  assistants1."  Several points of  interest  arise 
in the constitution of  this court.  In the gild-merchant, originally,  the 
chief power lay in the hands of the governor with whom, as time went on, 
other subordinate officials became associated to assist him3.  The same 
order of  evolution  prevailed  in the livery and the regulated  company, 
and gradually the court became constituted as consisting of  a governor 
and  assistants3.  Possibly  through  religious  influences,  the number  of 
assistants was  almost  invariably either twelve or a  multiple  of  twelve. 
In fact, in almost all cases where details are recoverable of  early  com- 
panies, the assistants and the shares were counted by dozens, not by tens. 
It  will be noted that in the court of the Russia company, besides the 
governor and assistants, there is an intermediate order, namely the four 
consuls.  This office was the prototype of  that of  deputy-governor, but 
the name given to it is rare in English companies.  The only other case 
is  that  of  the  Cornpanye of  Kathai,  iilcorporated in  1577, which  was 
formed by members of  the Russia company.  There can be little doubt 
that this temporary introduction  of  the term  "consul,"  as  applied  to 
a deputy-governor, was  of  Italian  origin.  From  the beginning  of  the 
debt of  Genoa, consuls had been appointed to superintend the administra- 
tion  of  the  finances.  In  the  complex  organization  of  the  Bank  of 
St George,  four consuls  were  nominated  by  the chief  officials or  Pro- 
tectors4.  That English  merchants, trading in Italy, were influenced by 
the local nomenclature  is shown  by the fact that, when  in 1486 a grant 
was  made  for  the internal government of  these traders, instead of  the 
person nominated being  named  governor (gubernator) as in other cases, 
he is called consul or president5. 
The idea of  three  orders  in  the management  of  the affairs of  the 
Russia  company  was  developed in the  constitution  of  the quorum  at 
court meetings.  Out of  the twenty-nine  or  thirty officials as  the case 
might be, the normal quorum was  formed by the governor, two consuls 
and twelve assistants.  If, however, during the lifetime  of  Cabot (when 
1 Vide infra, 11.  p. 38.  Vide supra, p.  7. 
3  Ibid., p. 9; Some  Account of the Worshipful Company of Grocers by J.  B. Heath, 
London, 1829, p. 58. 
4  Essai sur Zorigine et L'organisation de La Ranquc de Saint-Georges,  par  M. Moland, 
pp. 33, 43.  Vcedma,  XIII.  p. 314, 
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there was only one governor), he should be absent through illness, it was 
provided that a court might be constituted by three consuls and twelve 
assistants. 
It will thus be seen that the Russia company came into existence with 
a complete internal organization, which in the main was transferred from 
the previously existing type of  incorporation.  No  provision was made 
in  the charter  for  any  of  the functions that would  arise  out of  this 
company  being  formed  on  a  joint-stock  basis.  Thus  there  were  no 
regulations, relating to the votes  of  members or to their other rights or 
obligations.  If  any attention was  given to such problems, it may have 
been considered that any powers necessary were  conveyed by the clause, 
common  to this  charter  and those  of  the  regulated  companies,  that 
orders might  be  made for the governing of  the trade; and it will  be 
found  one  of  the points of  interest,  in the growth of  the joint-stock 
form of organization, how, when such difficulties had arisen, attempts to 
deal with them are introduced into the charters of  later companies. 
It would be erroneous to conclude from the existence of  the charter 
of  the  Russia  company  that  this  was  the  sole  type  of  joint-stock 
organization  for foreign  trade.  In the same year  (1553) the African 
trade was re-opened, and was conducted for a number of  years, without 
a charter or a  monopoly.  The African  expeditions were  promoted  by 
five  "chief  adventurers,"  who  had  each  of  them  partners  under  him. 
This undertaking,  although not incorporated, was  frequently described 
as a  "company,"  and, in 1564, the calls on  the shares were  sanctioned 
at a  meeting,  of  which  a  formal  minute  was  kept'.  Several reasons 
may  be discovered for the different form in which the African trade was 
organized.  First of  all, the Portuguese  were  established  on the coast 
of  Guinea, and they endeavoured to prevent the ships of  other nations 
from trading.  Thus there was  something  furtive  in the first  English 
expeditions, and it was advisable to advertize them as little as possible. 
In  the  second  place,  although  the  agents  of  the  Adventurers  had 
established friendly relations with the native chiefs, they did not obtain 
privileges  from  them  that could  be  compared  with  those  granted  the 
Russia company in that country.  It is true that, on the grounds of  re- 
discovery, the Adventurers to Gfrinie  were entitled, on existing precedents, 
to a  moriopoly  of  the trade to some  part, or even  the whole  of  the 
known  African coast line ; but, in the confusion existing during Mary's 
reign, it may have been that it was not considered desirable to ask for a 
charter.  This conjecture  is  confirmed  by  the  fact that some  of  the 
"  chief  adventurers " were  prominent during the time of  Elizabeth, and 
therefore it is unlikely that they would  have obtained  favours froln her 
predecessor. 
Vide infra, 11.  p. 7. 22  Capitalization of  Companies  1553-60  [CHAP. n. 
In the mode of  capitalization, adopted by these two companies, there 
were  certain  important  differences.  The Russia  company  owned  its 
ships,  while  the African  Adventurers  hired  those  which  carried their 
goods.  Thus the latter ~indertaking  was  in coinplete continuity  with 
the medizval cmmenda, and indeed  it might be  described either as an 
intricate form of  san'etas, or as a joint-stock company.  There is no in- 
formation as to the arrangements, made with the owners of  the ships in 
the first voyages ;  but, later, the price of  the charter was  discharged  by 
a  share of  the protits.  Therefore, the capital required  for the African 
company  was  less,  in comparison  with  the volume  of  the trade,  than 
that needed by the other undertaking, which had to provide ships, trade- 
goods,  besides  building  residences  for  its factors  and  making  costly 
presents  to  influential  persons  in  Russia.  These  different  practices 
account  for  another  variation  in  the  financial  history  of  the  two 
organizations.  As  far as  can  be  determined,  each  African  expedition 
was  financed  by  a  separate  capital;  and,  on  the completion  of  the 
accounts, the venture was  finally wound  up, and a fresh series of  calls 
made for the next voyage.  This illethod was the simplest, where there 
were  no assets of  doubtful value to realize,  and where the subscribed 
capital  was  represented,  at the end  of  a  given  voyage, by  a few  com- 
modities readily saleable.  In the case of  the Russia company, a similar 
plan  would  not  have  been  equally  equitable ; since,  in  a  few  years, 
expenditure had been  made on property in Russia and in acquiring the 
good-will of  persons there, and so the capital of  this undertaking con- 
tinued as a permanent one for a considerable period. 
Possibly what strikes the modern reader most is the meagre amount of 
the capital employed.  In either case, it is doubtful if, at  any given date, 
the floating capital  employed in trade, would  materially exceed &5,000 
for each company as invested in English goods.  The single case in which 
the amount of  the outlay of  the African Adventurers has survived was 
exactly  that sum1, and  in  several  cases  the cargoes  of  ships  sent  to 
Russia  in one  year  came to lessz.  It  seems  almost  incredible  that a 
turn-over of &10,000 a year or thereabouts should have made a material 
addition to the foreign trade of  the country, yet there are several indi- 
cations which point in this direction.  About this period, a shipment of 
woollen  goods  by  the  Merchant  Adventurers  was  valued  at some 
&60,000 a year, so that these two "  new trades" represented  an increase 
of  about 16 per cent. on the value of  the staple product of  the period. 
Moreover, the profit  on  the African  trade was very great, and that on 
1  Vide infra,  11. p. B. 
2  As stated above the cost  of  ships and cargo for the first  voyage was  26,000. 
111  1591 two ships out of  five carried an adventure which  had cost  23,000-State 
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sorne of the early voyages to Russia may have been equally remarkable. 
With regard to the former, the expedition, which sailed in 1553, brought 
back  no  less  than  400 lbs.  weight  of  gold1, 250  ivory  tusks,  besides 
large  quantities of  spices,  and,  during the next  four  years,  there are 
frequent  references to considerable quantities  of  gold  and  ivory being 
obtained"  There are no figures available as to the results of the Russia 
trade at this period, and early accounts are contradictory ; but, judging 
by the alacrity with which English merchants, who were not members of 
the company, availed theinselves of the capture of Narva by the Russians 
in  1558-the  argument  being  that  this  port,  not  being  within  the 
Russian dominions  when  the charter  was  signed,  was  not covered  by 
that charter-it  must  have  been  thought  that this  trade  too  was  a 
lucrative  one3. 
Under more favourable  circumstances the impetus given to trade in 
England,  by  producing  for  new  foreign  markets  and in  re-exporting 
tropical  products, joined  with the accretions to the national capital out 
of  the profits  made, would  have aided in producing a great industrial 
revival.  Unfortunately,  however,  the disorganization  of  the previous 
system of production, through the dissolution of the monasteries followed 
by the entanglement with Spain, as well as the religious troubles, resulted 
in  a  serious  unrest  which  was  as detrimental to material as to social 
progress.  Even had more been accoinplished in opening up new  foreign 
markets, the demands of  Philip would have drained England of  capital, 
just as Spain had depleted the resources of  other countries  which  had 
fallen under her influence.  Added to all these depressing influences, the 
last years of  Mary's  reign had  been marked by famine and pestilence at 
home  and  by  a  disastrous  war  abroad.  In  1558,  not  only  was  the 
treasury empty, and the country bare of  munitions, but the Crown debt 
had almost reached the limit to which it could be pushed.  In 1552 the 
total  borrowings,  both  at home and abroad,  amounted  to 2220,000; 
and, even after allowing for sales of  Church lands and  plate, there was 
a  balance  of  289,000  which  remained  as  a  deficiency4.  In 1559 the 
liabilities  were  slightly  increased, being  returned  in  that year  at the 
'  Accordi~ig  to figures given by Atkinson  in  The  Di8coverie and Historic  of  the 
Gold Mynes  in Scotland (Edin. 1825, p. 20), in 1567, 400 lbs.  weight  of gold  would 
have  been  worth  %22,500; and  since  this was  after  the  reform  of  the coinage, 
ill  1554,  the nominal  value  would  have  been  greater. 
Vide  infra,  11. pp. 4, 5.  Ibid., 11. pp. 41,  42. 
Debts due abroad  ...  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  gi11,ooo 
,,  ,,  at home  ...  .  .  .  .  .  io9,ooo 
2220,OOo  Available from sales of land, plate and bullion  ...  .  £131,000 
Deficie~lcy  ...  ...  .  .  .  .  .  289,000 
State Papers, Domestic,  Edward VI., xv. 42; Calendar, 1547-80,  p. 46.  Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, ccxxxvrI1. 129. Finances  of  the  Crown 1559-60 
sun]  of  P22G,9101.  These figures only acquire  meaning,  when  viewed 
in  relation  either  to the  national  wealth  or  to the Crown  Revenue. 
There are  no  data  for  determining  the  former  at this  period,  but 
fortunately there  is an estimate of  the latter for the year 1560-1.  It 
may be  premised that the income from  land, from Customs and feudal 
privileges  was  expected  to  suffice  for  the  normal  expenses  of  the 
sovereign.  This was  often  described  as  "the  Ordinary  Revenue:'  to 
which  were  added,  under  exceptional  circumstances,  parliamentary 
grants and other extraordinary receipts, such as proceeds of  the sale of 
lands  or  of  loans.  Now,  in  1560-1,  this  estimate  of  the  Ordinary 
Revenue (which  appears to be an optimistic one) gives a gross total of 
2327,267, and, after allowing for expenses of  collectiorl and other pay- 
ments made by the receivers and collectors, a  nett total of  &276,182'. 
The latter sum  cannot  however  be  taken  as the average  nett main- 
tainable  Ordinary  Revenue  for several reasons.  In the first  place,  it 
included  an exceptional  credit of  &30,000, under the heading of  "the 
Tower."  Also  several  branches  were  greatly  over-estimated;  and  it 
turned  out that, through interruptions  of  trade and other causes,  the 
Customs  yielded  much  less  than  the amount  estimated"  For  these 
reasons, it may be calculated that the average nett Ordinary Revenue at 
the beginning of  the reign was rather under than over 2200,000 a year. 
Drastic reductions had been made in the sums allowed for the Ordinary 
Expenditure, which it was hoped could be brought down to P134,0004. 
This left an apparent surplus of  865,000 a year, out of which provision 
had to be  made for interest on the foreign  debt  and for  other  extra- 
ordinary  charges.  Some of  these,  however,  were  of  such  magnitude 
that they could  not  be  defrayed  from  this source.  It was  estimated 
that the re-arming and fortifying of  the country, with further outlay on 
the  navy,  would  require  P300,OOO.  It was  proposed  to defray  this 
charge partly by the grant made by Parliament in  1559 of  two tenths 
and two fifteenths, which realized &191,0005, and partly by the surplus 
Ordinary Hevenue  which would  have been required for this purpose, if 
the sum  estimated  were  spent,  until  the  end  of  1560.  It  was  un- 
fortunate that, while this scheme was in course of  realization,  it became 
necessary  to undertake  warlike  operations in  Scotland  in  1559 which 
cost 2178,820R.  The strain on the finances is shown by the increase of 
the Crown debt abroad froin &106,649 in 1559 to as much as 2279,565 
in the following year7.  This was  an immense sum for the period, and 
the irony of the situation lay in the fact that the political complications, 
1  Vide irtfra, III. p. 510. 
3  Ibid., III.  pp. 494, 512, 513. 
6  Ibid.,  111.  p. 526. 
7  Ibid., 111.  p. 496. 
2  Ibid., 111.  612. 
4  Ibid., 111.  p. 512. 
"Ibid.,  111.  p. 527. 
CHAP. n.]  Aoans  unobtainable abroad  1559-60 
which  made a  rapid  arming imperative,  at the same  time  caused the 
foreign financiers to incline towards calling in their loans, rather than to 
suffer them  to be increased.  Therefore, it soon  became clear that the 
initial steps,  towards the re-establishing  of  the credit  of  the English 
Crown,  must  be  taken  from  within,  not from  without.  But  at this 
~edod  voluntary,  as  distinguished  from  forced  loans,  could  only  be 
negotiated abroad.  In England the mercantile classes, while to a large 
extent  in  favour  of  Elizabeth,  were  not  prepared  to support  her  by 
~roviding  large sums of  money-indeed  it is doubtful whether it would 
have  been  possible to have  collected sufficient free capital  to liquidate 
the  external debt.  Moreover,  it must  be  admitted that the security 
was  not attractive.  Needless to say the loans, even  though guaranteed 
by  the collateral  security of  the City  of  London, constituted  a  Crown 
debt, not a  national one.  At the beginning  of  the year  1559, it was 
impossible  to tell  whether  Elizabeth  could  maintain  her  position  or 
not--certainly the Spanish Ambassador thought she was  "  on  the high 
road  to lose  her  throne'."  Thus  a  voluntary  loan  could  be  secured 
neither  abroad nor at home.  At this stage, a temporary relaxation of 
the financial  strain  was  obtained  by  the Merchant  Adventurers being 
compelled  to find  220,000,  which  was  used  to discharge some  of  the 
most  pressing  obligations  in  Flandersa.  This  sum  however  did  not 
represent ten per  cent. of  the whole  foreign  debt, and to deal with the 
rest  more heroic  measures were  necessary. 
The method  adopted was  a somewhat intricate one, which depended 
0"  the state of  the foreign  exchanges at this  time.  As a  rule,  regu- 
lations prohibiting  the export of  coin  or bullion were in  force in most 
countries ; and, for this reason, 'l the specie-point " in foreign exchange 
was  theoretical, rather than practical.  The sovereign, however, was able 
to export bullion to meet his debts, and therefore he had this advantage 
Over  the subject, that he could pay either by bills or bullion : while the 
merchant, if  he acted  legally, could only pay by bills or goods.  In this 
way, from the appointment of  Gresham  as "  King's agent" in the time 
of  Edwsrd VL, a  practice had grown up of  operating on the exchange, 
and Gresham claimed that he had succeeded in materially reducing the 
discount  at which  it had  stood  in  the closing  years  of  Henry  VIII. 
His original  idea seems to have been  to keep the merchants  bare  of 
money ";  and, by taking advantage on the one hand  of  the discount on 
English bills at Antwerp and on the other of the monopoly of  exporting 
bullion  on  the royal  account,  to buy  English  bills  cheap  and  to pay 
1 Froude, History of England, VII.  p. 69. 
Das  Haus  Fugger,  m seinen  Anflingen,  von  A.  Stauber,  Augsburg,  1900, 
p. 25 ;  Burgom, Li.e of Gresham, I.  p. 258; Heath,  Comwny of  Grocers, p. 63. 26  .Iwggling  with foreign  Exchange  1559  [CHAP. 11. 
thew  against  the  Crown  debts  as  they  maturedl.  This  plan  broke 
down, through  the home  government sending insufficient quantities of 
bullion;  and then  a  more  drastic  method  was  adopted.  When  the 
Merchant  Adventurers  made a  large shipment  of  cloth, a considerable 
sum  would  be  due to them  at Antwerp,  when  the goods  were  sold. 
Gresham  conceived the idea  of  diverting this credit of  the individual 
merchants to relieve the royal  necessities.  When the ships were loaded 
and on the eve of  starting, an order was made to "  stay them ";  and no 
release could be obtained, until the Adventurers contracted to pay to the 
creditors  of  the Crown  in Flanders a certain  amount of  the proceeds, 
obtaining in  return a  promise for repayment  in London.  Up to this 
point, the scheme was  arbitrary,  but not wholly  reprehensible.  There 
was however another side to it.  The obligation  of  reducing the heavy 
discount  on  the exchange was  thrown  on  the Merchant  Adventurers. 
When each of  them  individually  had paid  his quantum of  the Crown 
debt  in  Flanders,  he  remained  in  possession  of  a  discharge from  the 
Flemish house for a certain sum of  Flemish  currency.  Now  in making 
the repayment  in  London,  the 8  sterling  was  rated  higher  and the 
shilling Flemish  lower than in the original transaction.  It was  for this 
reason that Gresham, in his  report to Queen  Elizabeth, said  that "  as 
the exchainge is the thinge, that eatts ought  all princes  to the who11 
destruction of ther comon well, if itt be nott substantially loked unto, so 
likewise the exchainge is the chieffest and richist thinge only above all 
other."  G This thinge,"  he adds, "  is only keppt up by artte and Godes 
providence2,"-the  art was  plain  enough, for by this device a fictitious 
value was given to the P sterling, which was rated in such exchange at 
considerably more than twice its intrinsic value3-where  room was found 
for  God's  providence  is  somewhat  of  a  conundrum,  unless  in  the 
merchants being able to bear the loss involved !  It was  admitted that 
the exporters  of  cloth  lost  considerably,  many  manufacturers  had  to 
retire from the trade altogether, so that the real cost of  the transaction 
to the country must have been very great.  This was offset, but only to 
a small extent, by the reduction  in the price  of  foreign  commodities4, 
indeed it may  well  be doubted whether  this was  material;  since  the 
reduction  of  the trading  capital,  available  for  the  purchase  of  goods 
l  The royal monopoly of the foreign exchange was considered of such importance 
that in twelve urgent matters noted in "The first paper or memorial of Sir William 
Cecil"  in the  reign  of  Elizabeth,  the eleventh  was  the issue of  a  proclamation 
prohibiting all subjects from  "the making over any money by  Exchange " unless 
authorized by the Crown-Somers'  Tracts (1748), I.  p. 169. 
2  Printed by Burgon, Life  of  Gresham,  I. p. 485. 
3  It was probably for this reason that Gresham strongly urged the restoration of 
the currency in the same paper. 
4  Burgon, Life  aresham, I.  p.  261. 
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at Antwerp,  would  have  tended  to restrict  the  supply  brought  into 
England. 
Doubtful  as  the policy  was  of  juggling  with  the foreign  debt  by 
means  of  exchange transactions of  this kind, it is clear that the scheme 
served Elizabeth  in the hour of  her need.  In March  1559 this device 
was  again adopted; and,  by  the aid  of  the funds  extracted from  the 
Merchant  Adventurers,  partly  by  the  direct,  partly  by  this  indirect 
loan, it was possible for Gresham in April 1559, by paying off  a part of 
the loan, to obtain a  renewal of  the remainder, and also to have funds 
in  hand  to purchase  powder  and  arms.  Probably  Gresham's  mission 
had  been  facilitated  by  the conclusion  of  peace  with  France  in  the 
previous  month,  and it turned  out that the financial negotiations had 
been  concluded at the most  favourable moment;  since the assumption 
of  the Royal  Arms of  England by Mary Queen of  Scots foreshadowed 
fresh  complications. 
In July  1559,  the diplomatic situation  had  changed  with  almost 
dramatic  suddenness.  During  the  first  six  months  of  the  reign  of 
Elizabeth,  her  government  had  been  embarrassed  by  payments,  made 
by  foreign powers, to malcontents  in England.  Now  the opportunity 
came for Elizabeth to retaliate.  It was believed that France would use 
Scotland as a base, whence to  invade England; but the Scottish Reformers 
were in arms against the government of  the Queen-Regent, and applica- 
tion was made to Elizabeth to intervene in their favour.  The apparent 
inconstancy of  the action  of  England was  due as much to financial, as 
to  political  reasons.  It was  money  the Scots needed  most,  and  this 
kind  of  aid  could  be  given  in  a  form  which  it would  be  difficult to 
trace.  France might  suspect, but could  not prove  the unfriendly  act. 
Money  however was  exceedingly difficult to obtain.  A11  that could  be 
raised was already ear-marked for making good  the deficient armanlent 
of  England.  Therefore from July to November Elizabeth could do no 
more than send occasional remittances of  23,000, to keep  the Scots in 
the field.  In August Cecil had considered the question of  mobilizing a 
small English force on the Borders, and had come to the conclusion that 
it was  "pitiful"  to recognize how unequal the finances were to bear the 
burden.  Meanwhile, by November all that was  possible had beell done 
in turning  as  much  as could  be  borrowed  into  arms  and gunpowder. 
The arrival of  reinforcements from  France and the laxity of  the Scots 
compelled  Elizabeth  either  to acquiesce in  French domination  in  the 
north,  with  all that was  involved  in it, or else to take  more  decisive 
steps than she had done hitherto.  Finally, at the close of  the year  it 
was  decided to dispatch the fleet under Sir William Winter to prevent 
the landing  of  reinforcements  from  France, and at the same  time  to 
authorize  Gresham  to borrow  2200,000.  Some  of  this  was  sent  to 28  Panic amongst Creditors of the Crown  1560  [CHAP. 11. 
England  ill  bullioil, but the greater part ill munitions.  'fie need  for 
haste was considered to he so great that the same precautions that had 
been  adopted earlier could not be  observed, and Gresham was  seriously 
coilcerned  lest  his  shipments  should  be  detected  and  seized.  Such 
rumours  tended  to make  lenders  look  doubtfully  at loans,  made  to 
Elizabeth;  and,  at the end  of  February  1560, Gresham  reported "  a 
great rarsity of  monny upon  the burse"  at Antwerp1, *and efforts were 
made to induce the Staplers to lend 215,000  or 220,0002.  In April 
220,000  was  required  for the service of  the English  troops  who  were 
besieging Leith and for those in reserve on the Borders, but it not only 
became  increasingly difficult  to negotiate new  loans,  but there  was  a 
marked disinclination to renew those already in existence.  Towards the 
end of  the month  the rumour that Philip of  Spain intended to use his 
army in Flanders for service in Scotland resulted in a panic amo~lgst  the 
creditors of  Elizabeth.  Those, who  held  her obligations,  immediately 
prepared  to seize  English goods  in the Low  Countries, to be  held  as 
security  for  the  moneys  due  them\  These  expectations  had  "clean 
alteryd  the credit  of  the Queenes  Majestie  and  of  all  the  nacione." 
Most  of  the creditors pressed to be paid what was owing them, as soon 
as the due date arrived,  and Gresham  could  only  secure  six  months 
grace, by engaging that sufficient cloth should be exported to answer the 
whole outstanding debtd.  Fortunately the extreme tension was relaxed, 
when  it was  known  that, owing to the defeat  of  the Spanish  Fleet  in 
the Mediterranean, Philip had given orders for the recall  of  his army 
from the Netherlands.  This was  in June,  and the arrangement, by the 
'Freaty of  Edinburgh in the following month for the withdrawal  of  the 
French troops from  Scotland,  was  another circumstance favourable  to 
the maintenance  of  Elizabeth's  credit. 
This relief  came at a time when the financial situatioll was  critical. 
Owing to the renewal of  loans in the early part of  1560, no less than 
2150,000 (out of  a total of  about &280,000) fell due on August 20th5. 
Negotiations had been far advanced for a new  obligation of  275,000 at 
10 per  cent.,  out of  which  it was  proposed  that 225,000  should 1x 
devoted to satisfying the most importunate creditors and the remainder 
remitted to England, either in the form  of  specie or munitions.  Two 
very different circumstances made it eminently desirable  that, a5  far as 
possible, the finances should be in a sound condition.  In October there 
1  Burgon, Lve of Gresham, I. p. 287. 
2  Ibid., I. p. 288.  3  Ibid.,  I. p. 292.  -  - 
Ibid.,  I. pp.  298, 299. 
6  {bid., I.  pp. 344, 490.  In  the two years  1560-2,  accordirlg  to the estimates, 
provision  was to be  made  for the repayment  of 2216,954 of debt-vide  i?fli.a, 111. 
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were  threats  of  a  fresh  French  expedition  on  a  larger  scale, and the 
reform of  the currency had been  decided on.  Local events  prevented 
the French  from  proceeding  with  the ~roposed  invasion, and early  in 
1562 Elizabeth  was  able to retaliate by countenancing the Huguenots 
in  France.  In September of  the same year  she assisted Condti by the 
loan of 100,000 crowns, which was followed by the English expedition to 
Havre-carefully  prepared,  hut  not  countenanced  officially1.  These 
fresh political complications caused Gresham to write in August that the 
alteration of  credit, adverse to England, was  such as "  this pen cannot 
wryte  you2,"  and  a  few  days  later  he  says  that  every  merchant  at 
Antwerp was  glad  to be "  quit of  an  Inglishman's  bill3." 
On a hasty inspection  of  the position, on the eve of  the expedition 
to Havre, it might appear that the financial outlook was  no better than 
it had  been  in  1560, since at both dates  Elizabeth  could  not borrow 
abroad.  But, underlying the apparent similarity, there was  a striking 
advance at  the later period.  It is true that the external debt was  some- 
what increased, and that lenders were not for the moment disposed to add 
to their commitments.  Still Elizabeth had better credit than her rivals 
in Spain or France, for she had obtained a reputation for paying interest, 
although  she could  not.  always  repay  the principal  when  it had  been 
promised.  Moreover, what  was  still  more  important, the country  in 
1562 was  fairly well provided with  munitions of  war, as compared with 
the state of  depletion that existed  in  155g4.  This improvement  was 
the effect of  rigorous economy, accompanied by vigorous reconstruction. 
Although there was  the drain of  the Scottish and French expeditions 
on  the finances, the demands  for  men  had  not  been  great,  and  the 
example of  the Queen and her  ministers  in economy and industry was 
beneficial to the whole nation.  Trade was  more vigorous than it could 
have  been  in  the time of  Mary.  The new  sources  of  commerce were 
increasing  the  turn-over  of  the  country,  and,  still  more  important, 
Cecil  was  disposed  to be  sympathetic to any scheme  which  would  in- 
crease the industry  of  the nation.  The Russia  company, as far as is 
known, had not been  drawn upon  for a forced loan during the first five 
eventful  years  of  the reign  of  Elizabeth.  At the same  time,  it was 
serving  the  State in  two  different  ways.  This undertaking  was  per- 
forming  a  function for the navy,  similar  to that done by Gresham for 
l  Bu~ghley's  Notes in A  Collection of State Papere relating to Afairs in the &ign  of 
&ueen  Elilizaboth  from  1571  to  1596,  transcribed...by  William  Murdin,  London, 
1759,  p.  7.53. 
~ur~on,  Lye of  Gresharn, rr.  p. 10. 
Ibid., 11. p. 13 ;  Augshurg, Siirnberg und ihre Handekfiireten imfiinfzehnten und 
8echzehnten Jahrhunderte, von A. Kleillschmidt, Cassel, 1881, p.  31. 
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the army,  in  providing  equipment.  Indeed, the Russia  company had 
this advantage, that while  Gresham  had to smuggle the munitions  he 
obtained  out  of  Flanders,  the  company  brought  its  naval  requisites 
from Russia with the good-will of  the Cxar.  Moreover gunpowder had 
to be paid  for on delivery, while the Russia mmpany, being an English 
body, was  induced, or compelled, to give the Queen  long credit.  It is 
probably  for this reason  that the great increase in its capital (to be 
referred  to below1)  was  necessary.  Thus the situation  resolved  itself 
into this that, over and above the debt due at  interest, there was a further 
running amount owing to this body.  Elizabeth  had become interested 
in  the African  company  by  1561, and nothing  could  afford  stronger 
evidence of  the want of  money at that date than the fact that she lent 
the Adventurers four men of  war (which would be absent from England 
for nine months or a year, when  relations with  France were so strained) 
on condition of  receiving a third of  the profits.  This partnership with 
the Queen  accounts  for a  peculiar  feature in  the organization of  the 
African  Adventurers.  It  was  to  the  interest  of  Elizabeth  that  a 
sufficient quantity of  trade goods should be sent to Africa,  and there- 
fore the five  "chief"  adventurers were bound, under a bond  of  &1,000 
each, to provide  sufficient and suitable commodities2.  It is  plain that 
there  would  have  been  difficulties in transferring  sub-divisions of  the 
liability,  and  so  the chief  partners remained  nominally  liable for  the 
whole capital  and for the bond to the Queen, while in reality they had 
parted with a  portion  of  their interests to others, who became partners 
"  under"  them.  This expedition  was  not so successful  as  the earlier 
ones,  still  Elizabeth  received  21,000  in  cash  and,  in  addition,  was 
relieved  of  the cost  of  maintaining her ships for nearly  n year.  The 
adventurers  obtained  a  profit  of  from  40  per  cent.  to 60 per  cent." 
In this way Elizabeth utilized the two joint-stock organizations which 
had  been  established  in  the time  of  Mary.  But, in the vigorous ad- 
ministration  of  the first  years of  the new  reign, much  more was  done. 
It is highly  creditable  that, in  spite of  political  dangers,  as early as 
the end  of  1560, steps were  being  taken  towards industrial  progress. 
Allusion  has  already  been  made  to the reform  of  the coinage,  which 
may be collliected to some extent with the inconvenience of a foreign ex- 
change, which co~lld  be saved from an enormous discount only by artifice. 
The effects of  the debasement of  the currency had been felt by the people 
in  the rise  of  pricea:  it was  recognized  by  the  sovereign in  making 
Vide infra, 11.  p. 40. 
State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, xxv~.  44; vide infra, 11. pp. 6, 7. 
3  There is some doubt as to how  the figures, in the account between  Elizabeth 
and  the adventurers,  are to be  il~terpreted. This point  is  dealt  with infra,  11. 
payments abroad'.  Such payments  moreover, as already shown2, were 
in fact purchases  of  munitions on long credit.  Even after the financial 
difficulty  had  been  surmounted,  there  remained  the strategic  one  of 
obtaining delivery of  the arms and powder in  England.  Therefore it 
was  eminently  desirable  that  a  number  of  commodities,  needed  for 
national defence, should be produced to some extent within the country ; 
so that, at  a great national crisis, the arsenals might be replenished.  The 
chief  requisites  were  gunpowder  and  brass  for cannoi~. As  early  as. 
October  1560, Cecil was  superintending experiments in  the mixing  of 
pwder3; and,  in  1569,  a  petition  was  presented  from  a  group  of 
partners, who undertook to make it within the realm4.  The production 
of  guns in England was  a problem  of  considerable  complexity.  First 
of  all  copper  was  required,  then  zinc  ore-at  this  time  known  as 
calamine-must  be found ;  and lastly, when brass had been made, it was 
necessary to have it cast into the proper shape.  The realization  of  the 
whole  scheme  extended  over  about  ten  years  beginning  from  1561. 
Whether this object was  kept in view  from  the commencement is  u11- 
certain; and, at all events, a start was  made in  the mining  of  copper 
and lead.  From an early period the Crown had claimed the right of  all 
precious  metals,  and  by  an  instrument,  signed  on  July  16th, 1561, 
Elizabeth  granted  this  right  of  mine  royal  to an  Englishman  and a 
German,  on  condition  that  one-tenth  of  the metals  won  should  be 
rendered to the Crowns.  The miners claimed all ores, showing traces of 
silver, as royal, and therefore Elizabeth was certain, as long as operations 
were  continued,  to obtain  considerable  quantities of  copper,  without 
having  to pay anything for it.  Up to 1563, as far as can  be  gathered, 
the work consisted chiefly in prospecting, but after that date, on copper 
being found in Cumberland, an influential and important company was 
formed. 
From 1560 up to the middle of 1563, rapid progress was  being made 
in the reconstruction  of  illdostrial life in the more progressive parts of 
England.  The removal  of  some  of  the most  acute causes  of  anxiety, 
that had distracted the country during the reign  of  Mary, was  in itself 
an  influence  for  commercial progress.  With a  settled  government at 
home, there came renewed  hope, which  showed  itself  in  increased pro- 
duction  for  the domestic and foreign  markets.  The revival  in  trade, 
however, was  far from  being unchecked.  It has  been  shown  how  the 
The Summark of Certaine  Reasons  which  have  moved  Quene  Elizabeth to procede 
in Reformations  of  her  base  and  course  monies,  in Harleian Miscellany (l  746), vIIr. 
pp. 67-9.  - - 
Vide suyra, pp.  24-7. 
3  State Papers,  Domestic, Elizabeth, XIV.  3;  Cadendar, 1547-80,  p.  160. 
Ibid., XXI. 56; Calendar, 1547-80,  p. 195.  Vide infra, 11.  p. 384. 32  Causes of  the  Crisis of  1563-4  [CHAP.  11. 
necessities of  the State tended to absorb capital, that would  have been 
of  great advantage in trade ;  and, although some of  the most  pressing 
political  troubles  had  been  avoided,  there  remained  many  causes for 
anxiety.  As  often  happens,  the  indirect  or  accidental  effects  of  the 
,iteation  were  more  important  than  those  to which  the attention  of 
statesmen was directed.  No  one could have  predicted that the expedi- 
tion, sent to Havre at the end of  1562, would have resulted  in a panic 
in London after the soldiers had returned.  Yet this happened, thro~lgh 
the men coming back to England infected by the plague.  The pestilence 
broke out in London on August 2nd, 1563, and it spread with alarming 
rapidity.  At the same time  the harvest  was  bad,  so  that  there  are 
many  allusions  to  the country  being  afflicted by  famine.  In  some 
districts the price  of  grain advanced  by  nearly 900 per cent.',  and the 
distress  was  most  serious.  In addition to the blow, dealt to the wool 
trade by scarcity of  labour for attending to the sheep, the government 
of  Philip in Flanders took advantage of  the existence of  the plague to 
prohibit  imports from  England, and it became necessary to remove the 
mart  of  the  Merchant  Adventurers  from  Antwerp  to  Emden.  In 
London, according to Stowe, there was ''  great scarcity of  money?  and 
Gresham  describes the crisis in  almost  the same words-"  this plague 
tyme  there  is  noe  money  nor  creadit  to  be  had  in  the  Streat of 
London$."  The pestilence was  still raging in August 1564 ; and, in the 
following November,  it became  necessary  to re-assure those  who  held 
obligations under the Privy Seal for loans, promising eventual payment4. 
When England was  recovering from this crisis, the financial horizon  in 
the Low  Countries became  seriously overcast.  The attempt of  Philip 
to statnp out the Reformation there resulted  in  great suffering to the 
people, culminating in an insurrection.  The joint-effect of  the troubles 
abroad  and  the crisis  at home  was  that  in  August  the creditors  of 
Elizabeth at Antwerp demanded payment  of  the sums, owing to them, 
under  threat  of  proceedings  by  process  of  law  against  Elizabeth 
personally  and of  seizure of  English  merchandise5.  The interest  paid 
at this time averaged 18 per cent., so that, apart from the special cir- 
cumstances of  the moment, English  credit was  better than it had been 
in the time of  Mary6.  Hut,  in the existing  state of  Flanders, accom- 
modation was  no longer  a question of  interest, for the financial houses 
had not the money to lend, and in 1566 Gresham wrote that loans could 
be had "  at  no price7." 
1 A  History of  Agriculture and Prices, by J. E. T. Rogers, IV.  p. 265. 
Survey, p. 26.  3  Burgon, Life  of  Rre.~hnm,  11. p. 26. 
Burghley's Notes in Murdin, State Papers, ut supra, p. 756. 
6  Burgon, L$e  qf'  Greshan~,  11.  p. 28. 
"bid.,  11. p. 33.  Ibid., 11. pp.  141, 158. 
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From  1560 to 1566 the financial  situation  was  one  of  exceeding 
difficulty.  There were several elements tending towards disaster.  The 
loans abroad were  all current for short periods  and had been  borrowed 
on the collateral security of the city of  Losdon.  Therefore, any failure 
on the part of  Elizabeth to pay either the interest or the principal, on 
its being demanded after the due date,  would  result  in  the seizure by 
the creditors of  English goods in Flanders as satisfaction  of  the debt. 
Since  the  lenders  were  unwilling  to  renew  the  obligations,  over  a 
quarter of a n~illion  had to be found to pay off  that amount of  foreign 
debt.  Further, the Newhaven  expedition  had  cost a  like  amount,  so 
that  altogether  half  a  million  had  to be  found  to  meet  these  two 
extraordinary  charges.  The situation was  further complicated  by the 
decline  in  the  Ordinary  Revenue,  owing to the interruption of  trade 
during the plague1.  The emergency was  met by sales of  Crown lands, 
extending  from  1561  to  1563,  and  in  this  way  over  &170,000  was 
obtained2.  In the Parliament of  1563-3,  two-tenths and two-fifteenths 
were voted, and the clergy gave a subsidy of  three-tenths, all of  which 
together produced  about &245,0003.  By  means  of  these  receipts  the 
foreign debt was reduced from 5279,565, at  which it had stood in 1560, 
to between 217,000 and 225,000 in 156Ei4. 
The  impossibility  of  borrowing  abroad  explains  the  failure  of 
Elizabeth to adopt a more vigorous foreign policy, and it is probably to 
this cause and the falling off in the Ordinary Revenue that the summon- 
ing of  a  Parliament in 1566 is to be assigned,  when  one-fifteenth and 
one-tenth were voted5. 
Towards  the close of  1564 there were  some signs of  the beginning 
of  a  revival in trade, but the crisis left traces on the existing companies 
with  the possible  exception  of  the African  Adventurers,  whose  trade 
was  curtailed  through  other  causes.  The original  African  trade had 
depended on a very profitable exchange of  English commodities against 
l  Vide infra,  III. pp. 494, 497. 
Audit  Office  Declared  Accounts  59311.  The  Account  of  Thomas  Gardiner 
(1661-3))  State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, xxvIr1. 66.  Vide infra,  III.  p. 626. 
Ihid.,  III.  pp. 196, 511. 
Cost of Newhaven Expedition  ...  .  .  .  3246,380 
Poreigllloan1560  ...  .  .  .  3270,565 
,,  ,,  1565  ...  ...  ...  ...  17,000 
Balance paid off  .  ..  ...  ...  .  .  .  262,665 
.  .-  Extraordinary expenditure ...  ...  ...  608,945 
Sale of Crown Lands  ...  ...  ...  171,866 
Subsidy clergy and laity  ...  .  ..  ...  245.000 
Extraordinary Receipts  ...  ...  .  ..  3416,866 
This grant  was  strictly speaking  more than one-tenth and  one-fifteenth  wide 
infra,  111. p. 526. 34  Digergent  Ad  of African  Cos.  1562-6  [CHAP. D. 
gold, ivory and spices.  The voyages were made fiom England to  Guinea 
and  home again.  The Adventurers  had no dealings in slaves, but it is 
to be  remembered  that,  unlike  the  Russia  company,  they  had  no 
monopoly,  and  therefore  other  Englishmen  might  touch  at African 
ports.  Accordingly, in 1562 John Hawkins seized 300 negmes by force 
and  shipped  them  to the Spanish  plantations.  This expedition  was 
and two  others  were  undertaken  in  1564 and  1567'.  But 
beyond  the immediate profit to Hawkins and the adventurers who were 
in partnership with him in the first two voyages (the third was a failure), 
there were remote consequences, both political and financial.  Owing to 
the Spanish royal monopoly of  the negro trade in the West Indies, the 
"  cargoes " of  the ships could not be sold, except under the guns of  the 
fleet, and it  was only to  be expected that collisions, between the Spaniards 
and the English, would  occur,  As affecting the existing  Adventurers, 
the expeditions  of  Hawkins  produced  an impossible  situation.  The 
seizure of  so many negroes by force resulted in a panic on the African 
coast, and the news  spread with  great rapidity.  Hitherto the English 
had  been  distinguished  amongst  Europeans  by  a  comparatively fair 
treatment of the natives.  Now,  when an English ship appeared, instead 
of  being  welcomed,  it was  received  with  hostility,  and trade became 
exceedingly  difficult.  Moreover, at this period  each  voyage  was  con- 
ducted against a  time  limit; for, so as to avoid the unhealthy season, 
every effort was  made to return within nine or ten months=.  This left 
a  short  time  for  the  actual  trading;  and,  when  the  natives  were 
frightened, there  was  great delay.  For these  reasons,  the last voyage 
mentioned, with which the Adventurers can be connected, was  in 1566 ; 
and, after the final expedition of  Hawkins in the following year, there 
is no record of a regular African trade until 158B3. 
Although  there  is  little information  recoverable,  as  to the  early 
history  of  the Russia  company,  there are indications  which point  to 
certain conclusions about its position at this period.  While it did not 
aid, in relieving  the financial  strain  at the beginning  of  the reign  of 
Elizabeth, by furnishing a direct loan, there is reason to believe that by 
giving long credit  for naval stores it lessened the calls on the resources 
of  the administration.  The original capital had been  only 26,000 in 
shares of  B5  each, and by 1563 a further amount of  2115 had been 
paid  in on each share.  Therefore, at that time the whole  capital was 
233,600.  It was  probably  due  to the  crisis  of  1563-4  that it was 
necessary to call up an additional 260 per  share (making 2200 in all) 
and increasing the capital to about &48,0004.  It may  have been that 
1 Vide infra, 11.  pp. 8, 9.  State Papers, Colonial, XI.  15. 
3  There was a proposed  expedition in 1582, vide infra, 11.  p.  10. 
4  Vide infra, 11.  p.  40. 
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up  to 1559 very  large  profits  were  made,  in  spite of  the occasional 
losses of  ships1.  The aim of  the company  was  an ambitious  one.  It 
not only possessed  the monopoly of  exportil~g  Russian  commodities to 
England  arid  of  importing English  goods into Russia,  but,  under  its 
concessions in  Russia,  it had  the  sole  right  of  bringing  wax  out of 
the country.  Therefore it had  the monopoly  of  this commodity, not 
only for England  but for the whole  of  Europe and to a certain extent 
that of  cordage also2.  In such  circumstances  the injury, done by the 
Reformation to the fishing trade, would not apply to that in wax, since 
any deficiency in the consun~ption  in  England would  be  made good  by 
exporting to Catholic countries. 
Unfortunately  for  the  company,  the  capture  of  Narva  by  the 
Russians in  1558 opened a  way  for English and other  interlopers3 to 
participate in this highly profitable trade.  The new route was not only 
shorter,  but very  much  safer  than  that discovered  in  1553.  In the 
midst of  the troubles, due to the political situation up to 1562, all that 
the company could do was to hold  its own.  But, when  Parliament had 
leisure to attend to minor  matters,  the question  of  the English  trade 
to Narva was  raised ;  and in 1566, as a reward for its assistance to the 
navy, the company obtained an act of  Parliament, which  was  designed 
to effect a settlement.  The occasion was one of  no little interest in the 
development  of joint-stock  enterprize, since it affords an instance  of  a 
problem, that became of  importance later, namely  how  far Parliament 
was  prepared  to recognize any  trading privileges  conferred  by  a royal 
charter.  At this period the involved discussion  of  monopolies had not 
begun4, and the Russia  company was  more fortunate than many later 
undertakings in obtaining Parliamentary sandion of  the privileges, pre- 
viously granted by the Crown.  The reasons determining  this decision 
may be  traced.  By giving long credit, at a critical time, the company 
had deserved well of  the State.  Besides, it had not only past claims, but 
it could promise future benefits.  The policy of naval power  had been 
definitely enunciated5, and one essential in the programme was a ready 
supply of stores, such as cordage and timber for spars.  It was required, 
too,  that  such  a  supply  should  be  permanent, .not  intermittent. 
l According to the account of the company, it was  unfortunate up to this date, 
having  experienced  a  "hard  beginning,"  vide  infra,  11.  p.  44.  The  members 
however had somewl~at  extreme expectations-cf.  i6id., 11.  pp.  44, 4.5. 
Ibid. pp. 40, 41. 
The term interloper (" interleapers,") as applied to a person  who invaded  the 
privileges  of a trading corporation, occurs in a petition of  the Merchant  Adventurers 
drawn up in the reign of  Elizabeth-Schanz,  Englische Handelspolitik,  11.  p. 587. 
Vide infra, Chapter vr. 
The development of  this policy is admirably stated  by Dr Cun~lingham  in  The 
Growth  of  Engglish  C'ommerce and  Industry  in Modern  Times  (Cambridge,  1903), 
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Now  independent  traders  rere the  precursors  of  the  owner  of  the 
modern tramp steamer.  They sent their ships to certain ports, only as 
long as they saw a clear profit on the voyage.  If the returns diminished, 
the ships went  elsewhere;  and,  although  it is  clear  that in time the 
lean pears would have been  followed by profitable  ones, what doubtless 
weighed with the legislature was that, in the doubtful condition of  the 
relations of  England with  other powers, with  an open trade to Narva, 
in the circumstances indicated,  the country  might  be  unable  to have 
efficient  ships,  when  these  were  most  needed.  Therefore  Parliament 
confirmed  the monopoly, at the same time  expressly forbidding  other 
English  merchants  to  trade  either  northwards,  north-eastwards  or 
north-westwards  to any  country  that  had  not  been  "commonly  fre- 
quented" prior to 1553'.  At the same time, the position  of  the inde- 
pendent  traders was  deserving of  consideration.  The government  was 
anxious to encourage maritime enterprize, and an unsympathetic attitude 
to those, who had made a practice of  sailing to Narva for several years, 
would  have tended to check  similar ventures.  These men, too, had in 
all  probability  performed  a  public  service  in  reducing  the price  of 
Russian commodities.  Therefore, if the interlopers were to be sacrificed 
to a real or supposed political necessity, it was  the object of  Parliament 
to save them from actual loss.  To carry out this idea, several provisos 
were  added  to the confirn~ation  of  the  company's  monopoly.  It was 
enacted  that  the  independent  merchants  might  enter  the  company 
up to Christmas  1567, by contributing  to the capital  of  the company 
as much  as  members,  who  had joined  in the beginning,  had  paid  on 
their shares2.  Unfortunately,  beyond  the wording  of  the act, there is 
no information as to how the financial details were arranged.  At this 
period, and indeed  for long afterwards, the connection between  capital 
and commodities was  much less disguised than it is at present.  Capital 
was  sometimes  subscribed  in  the  form  of  goods,  and dividends  were 
distributed in the same manner.  A striking instance of the former may 
be  noticed  in the case  of  a  Scottish  gold  mining  company, which was 
floated at this time, in which, according to a contemporary account, the 
shareholders met together, and  some provided  corn, some malt, meal or 
other kinds of  food and some money3.  Probably what happened in the 
case  of  the Russia  company  was  that the ships of  the interlopers and 
their goods were valued, and  shares given to the amount, so estimated. 
Whether this transaction was  carried out by the creation of  new  shares 
or  by  the purchase  of  a  sufficient number  by  the company  and  the 
transfer  of  these,  in  exchange  for  the goods  taken  over,  is  unknown. 
Judging by what happened much later in similar cases, it is  roba able that 
the latter and more cumbersome  method was  adopted.  The reason was 
1  Vide infra, 11.  p.  41.  2  Ihid.,  11.  p.  42. 
3 Ibid., 11.  408. 
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that, in  the evolution  of  the joint-stock  company,  the estimation  of 
capital has  become  more flexible than it was  at the beginning.  The 
number  of  shares-almost  invariably a  multiple of  twelve-was  quite 
rigid, and there are few cases discoverable, until after the Revolution, in 
which the parts or portions, as they were called, were  increased.  If  the 
sum  paid  up became inconveniently large, the shares were  divided into 
fractions,  but the original number remained  unaltered.  If  the settle- 
ment was  carried  out in this manner,  it accounts  for the fact that the 
company appears to have borrowed money after this date.  Such funds 
would be  used  in  paying for the shares purchased  for the persons, who 
were to become members under the act. 
The fact of  such  a  settlement having been  made shows that at  this 
period  the company  must  have been  making  profits, exceeding 12 per 
cent.  Obviously it would not be to the advantage of  the new  members 
to exchange their trading capital for a  security,  which  would  return 
them less than that amount, since, owing to the closing of  the foreign 
money-market to Elizabeth, she would have been  glad to pay this rate, 
or  more,  to  obtain  a  loan.  Probably  the actual  return  was  more, 
perhaps  considerably  more,  but  if  the explanation  suggested  above, 
concerning the manner of adjusting the financial part of  the settlement, 
is correct then it is plain that, if  the profits  exceeded the standard rate 
very materially,  shareholders would not have been willing to sell.  On 
this hypothesis, then, there is  a hint of  an upper  limit, and it may be 
conjectured that in 1566 the dividends had been, or were expected to be, 
between 12 per cent. and R0 per cent. 
In making  such  an arrangement, the company gained not only by 
the parliamentary confirmation  of  its monopoly, but also by  the actual 
removal of  competition.  The outcome  of  the agreement for  the new 
members,  apart  from  unforeseen  circumstances,  would  depend  on  the 
conlparative  efficiency  of  joint-stock,  as  compared  with  independent 
management.  No  judgment  can  be  formed  as to the result,  since  so 
many  new  factors were  introduced  into the situation  in  the next  five 
years  that  methods,  which  would  have  made  a  profit  at the earlier 
period, might have resulted  in loss later.  Lastly there was  the eflect  of 
the settlelneilt on the consunler.  Since the governnlent  used  the com- 
modities,  imported  by  the  conlpany,  to a  large  extent,  it is  to  be 
concluded that it would not acquiesce in the crushing of  the independent 
trader, unless there were  compensating  advantages.  The conditions  of 
foreign trade have changed so much, since the time of  Elizabeth, that 
it is exceedingly difficult to see  events  in  their  true relations.  Some 
circumstances were  so universal that men  of  affairs scarcely mentioned 
them,  accepting  them  as  axiomatic.  Thus  it frequently  happened 
that conditio~~s,  ~hich  have passed  away, were  scarcely alluded  to, and 38  Russia Company's Trade prohibited 1570  [CHAP. II. 
it was  just  such  conditions  that were  of  prime  importance.  Chief 
amongst these was the fact that the right of  entry into a country, such 
as Russia,  depended wholly  011  the will of  its ruler.  To placate him, 
large sims had to be paid, and the company came under certain  obliga- 
tions.  Independent  traders  were  forced  to  outbid  the  established 
organization,  and it was  easier  to do  this  in  promises  than  in  per- 
formances.  When the promises were  not made good,  a  man  like  the 
Czar  of  Kussia  was  likely  to visit  his  displeasure,  not  only  on  the 
offenders, but on all Englishmen.  To prevent such an interruption  in 
the supply of  naval stores, it  was considered best to  confirm the company's 
monopoly.  There was  no limit in time attached to this  confirmation, 
. 
but it was  enacted  that,  in the event of  the company not trading to 
Russia by the northern route for a  period  of  three  years, the trade to 
Narva  should be open to all, until the company again made voyages to 
Archangel.  The effect of  this clause was to provide at  least a theoretical 
limit to the n~onopoly. 
After the act of 1566, the unauthorized trade to Russia from England 
increased.  Dutch  merchants,  too,  began  to find  their  way  into  the 
country, and by 1569 the trade of  the company was less prosperous than 
it had  been.  Moreover  the undertaking  began  to lose  the support, 
hitherto given it by  the Czar.  Unfortunately,  it is  impossible to de- 
termine whether  this was  due to the machinations  of  rival  merchants, 
or  whether  it is  to be  attributed to malpractices  of  the  company's 
agents in Russia1.  In 1570 all its privileges in Russia were suspended. 
If  it could be shown that the company had given the Czar no cause for 
complaint, this fact might be adduced as evidence in  favour of  the view 
that, since the right  of  Englishmen  to enter the country was  at the 
mercy of  the ruler, any offence by one of  then1 would be visited  on all 
the rest ;  and therefore,  in addition  to the encouragement  of  the dis- 
coverers of a new  trade, it was necessary that there should be a company 
with the monopoly of  that trade.  But, there is ample evidence that the 
company  was  exacting  very  high  prices  for  English  commodities  in 
Russia,  and so  it might  be  contended,  on  the other  hand,  that the 
sentence of  exclusion was  to be assigned to its own  short-sightedness, 
and that the trade would have been more satisfactory had there been no 
monopoly  at this time.  Thus it would  appear, as  far  as  events  had 
developed up to 1570, that the withdrawal  of  the company's  franchises 
in Russia  might be due either to its own  fault or to the abuses of  the 
independent traders, each of  which causes would have sufficed to produce 
the effect.  It is riot  impossible that, although the company cannot be 
acquitted  of  blame,  the  weight  of  censure should  be  assigned  to its 
1  Vidc i7lfi.u)  11.  pp. 42, 46, 47. 
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rivals, but the evidence pointing in this direction  belongs to the next 
chapter. 
Mention has already been made of the project to  obtain some control 
of  the production  of  cannon, and that in 1561 a grant of  the privilege 
of  mine royal  had been  made to two partners1.  The crisis of  1563-4 
left its mark  on this venture,  as well  as on  most  of  the contemporary 
undertakings.  The partners found themselves in want  of  capital, and 
in 1564 the undertaking was divided into twenty-four shares.  As funds 
were needed, half  of  these were  sold in Germany and half  in England. 
The reports  of  the discoveries of  gold  in Scotland2 raised the highest 
expectations of  the profits  likely to be made, and it is recorded that, in 
some  cases,  as  much  as  &1,200  was  paid  as  a  premium  in  order  to 
obtain  admission to the company.  Copper  ore, containing  silver, was 
discovered  in  Cumbedand, calls were  made on the shares, and by  1566 
a  considerable  quantity of  work  had  been  done3.  This  undertaking 
may  be regarded from two different points of  view.  The object of  the 
shareholders was to obtain as much  of  the precious metals  as possible. 
Should  this  object  be  achieved,  the Crown  would  benefit  under  the 
royalty  of  one-tenth  reserved  by  the original  grant.  On  the  other 
hand  Elizabeth  was  also interested to a  further extent, since the pm- 
duction of  copper  within  the country  would  be  a  possible benefit  for 
her  arsenals. 
The great use  of  copper,  however, was  not in its original form, but 
as brass for cannon.  But to make the mixed metal, zinc was  required, 
which  had  not been  discovered as yet  in England.  It was  no doubt 
satisfactory to the Queen  and her ministers  that in  1565 a  group  of 
partners offered to make the search ;  and, if they succeeded, to establish 
brass works and also mills for drawing the wire, used  in making  wool- 
cards.  By November 1566 wire  was  successfully drawn, but at first the 
search  for  calamine  was  unsuccessfill, and in  1565 it was  necessary to 
import it4.  However by June of  the following year, the necessary ore 
had been found, and the erection  of  works was  pushed  on as rapidly as 
possible.  As in the case of  the Mines Royal it was found imperative to 
procure capital, by dividing the whole  privilege into shares, upon which 
calls were made as required5. 
One  point  of  interest about this undertaking should not be  over- 
looked.  At first sight it would seem  that its operations-namely  the 
making of  brass  and wire-were  disconnected, but this was  not so  in 
reality, since both  were  used  in  the production  of  wool-cards.  What 
l  Pride supra,  p.  31 ;  cf. infra, 11. pp. 384, 411. 
CTide  infru, 11.  p. 407.  Ibid., 11. p. 385. 
State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, XLI.  12. 
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is  more  striking  is  the  existence  in  this  undertaking  of  an  "in- 
tegrated  industry."  It  owned  "  calamine  mines " in  Somersetshire. 
Thence the ore was  conveyed to Nottingham  or London  (the company 
had brass factories at both ~laces),  copper was ~urchased  from the Mines 
Royal  society, and brass was  made.  In Monmouthshire  the company 
was  possessed  of  iron  mines, whence it obtained ore to make "  Osmond 
iron,"  which  was  drawn  into wire.  Finally, the wire  (whether  of  iron 
or brass)  was  used  in the manufacture  of  wool  cards1. 
Both  of  these  undertakings, at the inception,  were  in a  somewhat 
unsatisfactory  legal  position.  Ample privileges had  been  granted  by 
Elizabeth to the founders  but, by  the sale  of  shares, their respective 
interests  had  been  diminished.  Moreover, in  so  far  as the brass  and 
wire works  had to do with  the woollen  industry, it was especially open 
to the interference  of  Parliament.  An  effort was  made  to regularize 
the position,  by the promotion  of  an act in  1566, but this met  with 
opposition  in  the House  of  Lords;  and later two  bills  were  brought 
forward,  but,  since  it was  probably  known  that  Cecil,  Leicester  and 
a  number  of  other  prominent  courtiers  were  interested,  there  was 
opposition,  and the proposed  measures were  withdrawn.  On the same 
day-May  28th,  1568-charters  were  signed  incorporating  the  two 
undertakings, the one as the  Governors, Assistants  and Comrnonalty of 
the Mines Royal, and the other as the Governors, Assistants  and Society 
of  the Mineral and Battery  Works.  Comparing the character of  incor- 
poration  with  that of  the Russia  company,  drawn  up fourteen years 
earlier, it may  be  noticed  that, while  the latter described  itself  as a 
company2,  this word  is  not applied  to either of  the mining ventures. 
The term "  mysterie,"  too,  is  not used,  nor  "fellowship,"  while  com- 
monalty, which appears in the body of  the Russia charter, is taken into 
the title of  the Mines Royal.  The description of  the remaining under- 
taking  as  a  "society"  is  of  interest,  as  recalling  the societas.  It  is 
noteworthy  that,  although  the word  G company"  had  been  used  to 
describe other  organizations,  as  yet  this term  had  not  been  applied 
officially  in the four  titles  of  joint-stock  bodies,  namely  those  of  the 
Russia  company,  in  its  charter  and  act,  and  in  the  charters  now 
described.  In the grant to the Mineral and Battery Works  it is  ex- 
pressly stated that the incorporation  was  granted, so  as to prevent the 
great inconvenience which  might otherwise arise  on  the deaths of  the 
l  Vide infra, XI.  p.  413.  It is assumed here that the company made wool-cards, 
although this is nowhere expressly mentioned.  But unless this was  so,  the state- 
ment of Pettus that the factories (other than the wire  and  iron works) maintained 
8,000 persons is inexplicable. 
2  The  Mysterie  and  Comnpanie  of  Merchants  Adventurers  +.-the  title  of the 
syndicate before  it was  incorporated by  charter-cide  infra,  11.  p.  37. 
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then existing partners.  With regard to government, both these charters 
revert to what may be described as the English model,  in making pro- 
vision  for the election  of  governors, deputy-governors and assistants- 
the deputy-governor  taking  the place  of  the "  consul"  of  the Russia 
company.  The management in each case consisted of the same number, 
namely  twelve  persons,  but  the division  of  offices  differed.  In  both 
there were powers to elect two  governors, but while  the Mines Royal 
had four deputy-governors and six assistants, the Mineral and Battery 
Works might choose two  deputy-governors and eight assistants.  It is 
not a little singular  that in  bodies where,  even  with  a  subdivision  of 
shares, the membership  would  probably  be  small, provision  was  made 
for two  governors.  A  duality at the head  of  the organization  was  a 
characteristic  which  had  existed  in  some  gilds,  but,  in  view  of  its 
obvious inconveniences, it soon  disappeared.  Finally  the charters re- 
capitulate  and  confirm  the  privileges  granted  under  the  original 
agreements1.  - 
These two companies were closely associated, several persons owning 
shares in  both.  As capital was  required calls were made on the shares, 
and in 1569 a sum  of  &S50 had  been called up on each of  the twenty- 
four  shares  of  the Mines  Royal.  At that time little, if  any, copper 
had been actually sold, so that much expense had been  incurred in  the 
payment  of  wages since 1564.  As very often happened  in the case  of 
early  companies, there  was  great delay  in  the actual payment  of  the 
calls, and hence it cannot be concluded that in 1569 the whole 220,400 
had been actually received. 
The capital of the society of  the Mineral and Battery Works cannot 
be fixed with absolute precision.  It was more fortunate than the related 
undertaking in reaching the producing stage earlier, and in 1568 it was 
calculated  that a call  of  &2OO,  on  each of  the thirty-six shares, would 
suffice  for  the capital  outlay.  This would  give  &7,2OO.  At a  later 
date there is  the important information that the expenditure, either on 
the brass works or on the iron works, was 10,000 marks or 26,666.13s. 4d. 
The interpretation  of  this statement is discussed  in  the account  given 
elsewhere of this company2; and, for the purposes of  the present chapter, 
it is  unnecessary to say  more  than  that about  1568 the capital  was 
between  210,000  and 26,000. 
These  figures enable  some  estimate  to  be  formed  of  the  capital 
subscribed to joint-stock  companies before  1570.  Trade with  Africa, 
whether  for gold  or  negroes,  had come  to an end  for a time in  1567. 
The Adventurers had a capital of  25,000, and probably that employed 
in the voyages  of  Hawkins was  about the same amount, so that the two 
ITide infia, 11. pp.  388, 387, 415.  Ibid.,  11.  pp. 416-18. 42  Total Capital ofjoint-stock Conqanies 1569  [CHAP.  11. 
together required some 210,000.  When these expeditions ceased, there 
was  an increase in  maritime ventures, which were  on the border-line of 
piracy.  Some of  the more reputable  of  these  were  joint-stock  enter- 
prizes ;  and, for purposes of  a  rough calculatio~l,  it might be estimated 
that the increase in such voyages consumed an amount of capital, roughly 
equal  to that withdrawn  from  the  African  trade.  Then  the  Russia 
company had called up 248,000 in 1564, and additions to the nominal 
capital may or may not have been  made to carry out the settlement of 
1566.  In  1569 the  capital  of  the  Mines  Royal  and  Mineral  and 
Battery Works, taking both together, was about 227,500.  SO  that the 
three  most  important  companies  had  an  aggregate  capitalization  of 
some  275,0001.  Making  allowance  for  small  industrial  undertakings 
and for  shipping  expeditions,  it might perhaps be  estimated  that the 
whole amount, invested in con~panies  (as distinguished from partnerships), 
was somewhat more than 2100,000. 
Importallt  as  it is  to obtain  a  rough  approximation  to the total 
capital, employed during the first  fifteen years of  the joint-stock  com- 
pany, such an estimate is devoid of  all reality, unless it can be brought 
into contact with industrial phenomena, subject to a quantitative state- 
ment.  Failing any reliable particulars of the total wealth of  the country 
at this  time,  all  that is  possible  is  to take  certain  illustrative  data. 
A single shipment of  cloth by the Merchant Adventurers seems to have 
been  from  &?50,000 to &?60,00O2, so that roughly the capital, invested 
in  companies, was  double  this sum.  If,  as  recorded  by  Camden,  the 
whole annual  export of  cloth by this fellowship was valued at 5 million 
ducats, or a  million and a quarter sterling, the capital, so far invested 
in  companies,  was  only  one-tenth  of  that sum3.  The nett Ordinary 
Revenue  in 1571-2  was  &?209,912.  10s. lOd.,  so that the ratio to this 
sum  was  about  50 per  cent.4 
When capital was  so scarce, much depended  on the success or failure 
of  these early companies.  Yet the iilvestigation  of  this question is one 
which fails to yield satisfactory results, if treated by the usual statistical 
methods.  It must  be  remembered that, where  there was  a  monopoly 
Russia Company, 1564  ...  ...  £48,000 
Mines Royal,  1569  .  ..  .  .  .  20,400 
Mineral and Battery Works, 1668  7,200 
%76,600 
"urgon,  Life  of  Gresham, 11. pp. 325, 338,  340. 
S  Camden, Elizabeth, ut supra, I. p. 108. 
4  Vide infra,  111. p.  514 ;  cf. An Abstract out of  the  Records of  the  Tower, touchiny 
the   king'^ Revenue, by Sir ltobert Cottoll, p. 2.  This account is without the income 
from the Duchy of Lancaster and Court of Wards.  Sinclair (History of  the  Public 
Revenue  of  the  British  Enipire,  1803,  1.  p.  209),  by  very  greatly  overestimating 
these,  obtains a total  which  is  much too large. 
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and any particular  trade or industry was  profitable, the gains from  it 
were  carefully  concealed.  On  the other  hand,  when  an  undertaking 
became  involved  in difficulties, information,  more  or  less  accurate,  is 
almost always forthcoming.  Therefore, as a general rule, it is fairly safe 
to assume that any company, concerning  which  there is no information 
for a  number of  years,  was  doing fairly well.  Keeping this proviso in 
mind,  it is  possible  to form  some  estimate  of  the general  trend  of 
From this point  of  view,  the history of  the Russia  company 
may  be  divided into three nearly  equal  periods.  From  1554 to 1559 
profits may have  been  exceedingly large1, from  1560 to 1566 the trade 
was  only fair, from 1566 to 1570 it appears on the whole to have been 
bad.  As  already shown2, the gains of  the African  trade were at first 
enormous, and a profit of  from 40 per cent. to 60 per cent. was counted 
poor in comparison.  The first two of  Hawkins'  expeditions conformed 
,  to about the same standard, yielding a profit of a similar amount.  The 
Mines  Royal  up to 1570 had given  no  return  whatever,  but there  is 
reason to believe that the Mineral and Battery Works had already begun 
to make  a  considerable  gain.  It is clear then that, on the whole, the 
profit  from joint-stock  management  was  increasing  the capital of  the 
country.  Perhaps the position  might be stated more accurately in the 
following terms.  During the period  under notice, interest paid abroad 
by the Crown  varied  from  14 per  cent. to 12  per cent.  This rate is a 
more  satisfactory  criterion,  with  which  to  start,  than  the  interest 
mentioned in the various acts, dealing with usury.  If  then the investi- 
gation be  not extended  beyond the year 1570, taking the companies all 
over,  if  they were  successful financially, the original  capital must have 
been either intact or returned  to the shareholders at that date and in 
addition  interest of  about 13 per cent. must have been paid, during the 
time  the capital was  actually risked.  By 1570 it seems probable that 
the assets of  the Russia  company were worth considerably less than the 
nominal capital,  but there is no  means  of  knowing  how  much  of  the 
original  subscription  had  been  returned  in  the form  of  dividends  or 
divisionss.  The  issued capital increased slowly between 1554  and 1558-9; 
and, if  the accounts of  the early  successes of  this undertaking can  be 
As stated above (p. 35 note) this interpretation of the situation is contrary to 
the account given by the company; but, irl  that statement, attention is concentrated 
on the unfavourable aspects of the trade, such as losses of ships.  The eagerness of 
interlopers is evidence that, occasiolially, large profits could be made. 
Vide supra, p. 23. 
For  instance,  it is  known  that  the  Persian  Voyage  of  1578-81,  which  was 
described  as  unsuccessful,  returned  a  division  of  106  per  cent.-vide  infra,  11. 
p.  45. 44  Pro$ts  of joint-stock  Compa~~ies  to  1570  [CHAP.  11. 
accepted, it would  necessarily follow that, durillg these years, very large 
profits were distributed.  It never was  the policy of the Russia company 
to form a reserve fund, and so the large profits, made at the beginning, 
would be  divided.  The subsequent calls would only represent a part of 
these, and therefore, even  if  the whole  capital called up in 1570 were 
lost,  it is possible that there may  have  remained, not only the original 
investment,  but  interest  at the  standard  rate  thereon.  The  Mines 
Royal company had been  in  existence  at the same time for about six 
years, and  had  made  no  profit,  while its assets had suLred some de- 
terioration; but on the other hand the Mineral and Battery Works had 
increased its plant out of  profits, besides  paying  dividends.  Therefore 
the loss of  the former would probably be balanced  by the profit of  the 
latter.  As shown  above', it is probable that the Russia  company may 
have more than held its own on this basis of calculation, and finally very 
large returns had been made by the African trade. 
Thus the direct effect on the accumulation of  capital was important; 
but there was the indirect one, which was  probably greater, in the sub- 
sidiary  trades,  which  grew  up as a result  of  the new  developments in 
industry.  For instance the Mineral and Battery Works, in so far as it 
made brass and drew wire, had introduced in the former an altogether 
new  trade  and  in  the  latter  a  new  method.  These  two  industries 
together maintained over 10,000 persons2; and in addition there would 
be all those, who  worked  up brass for any purposes, not undertaken  in 
the company's  factories. 
It is  to  be  noticed,  further,  that in  all  these  cases  the  capital 
was  divided  into  shares.  To urlderstand  the position,  it should  be 
noted  that the share,  "portion,"  or "part"  was  dealt  with  in a  less 
complex  form  than  is  customary  at the present  time.  In a  modern 
company, owing in part to the limited liability acts, what is fixed is the 
denomination of  the share,  while the number  of  shares will  vary with 
the progress of  the undertaking.  In the first Elizabethan  companies, 
on the contrary, what was fixed was  the number of  shares ;  and the sum, 
called up on each of  them, increased from time to time.  Thus, if further 
capital were needed, it  was  provided in the early company by adding to 
the sums already called up ;  whereas, in the modern one, as a rule, once 
shares  have  been  fully  paid,  developlnents  are  provided  for  by  the 
creation and issue  of  new  shares. 
This method  of  capitalization had two consequences.  In  the first 
l  Vide supra, pp. 37,  43. 
2  I.e. 8,000 in the brass works (Pettus,  Fodinae  Regnles,  p. 
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place it might happen, as in the case  of  the Mines Royal, that it was 
necessary to call up an unexpectedly large amount.  Therefore, in some 
cases, shareholders had not capital available to make the necessary pay- 
ments; and,  if  only a  single  share  was  held,  it became  necessary  to 
divide  it into fractions,  and,  by  selling  a  part,  to realize enough  to 
pay the calls on  the remainder.  Besides, a share,  such  as  that in  the 
Mines  Royal  with  g850  paid  up,  would  be  difficult to. sell,  so  that 
there was  a  second cause tending towards subdivision, and, so early as 
1571, halves, quarters and even eighths had come into existence1.  When 
it is remembered  that there was  an important group of  German share- 
holders  in the Mines  Royal,  it is  possible  that this  process  of  sub- 
division may be traced to foreign influence; since, early in the sixteenth 
century, shares in German mines had been split up into small parts2. 
In the second place,  the share" at  this time was used in its natural 
sense, namely as an appreciable part of  the whole undertaking, not as a 
multiple of  units of  the capital.  The person, who  owned one share in 
the Mines Royal  considered himself  as an owner  of  one twenty-fourth 
part of the whole, and similarly, if  he had two shares, he thought of his 
property as a  twelfthJ.  In this way the Elizabethan conlpany  n~ay  be 
regarded as an extended partnership, in which each participant possessed 
a considerable portion  of  the business ; and this idea was strengthened, 
in the rare but by no means isolated case  of  the African  Adventurers, 
where  there were  chief adventurers,  with  others under them.  At the 
same time, the distinction  between the company and the partnership is 
sufficiently clear.  The shareholders in the former were capitalists, con- 
trolling the business, but not taking part personally in the management. 
Moreover, the company  had  rules  for  the  transaction  of  its  business 
through orders of general meetings, as distinguished from the prompter, 
but less formal decisiorls of  a partnership.  Within certain limits, there 
was  another difference, namely that there was  some approximation to a 
free  market  in  the shares.  This freedom  of  sale  was  relative  rather 
than absolute.  In the Mines Royal, for instance, no one could become 
a member, unless  he held a certain amount of  real  property.  Most of 
the early  companies  probably  began  by  being  exclusive,  in  the sense 
that shares were  sold  amongst persons, known to each other.  Hut with 
the calls required, the sale of  shares or parts of  shares would  be  made 
to those, who  would  offer  most, and, to that extent, there would  be  a 
comparatively  free  market,  although  the  transactions  might  not  be 
Vide infra, Ir. p. 387 ;  cf. p. 414. 
A. Zycha,  Zur  neuesten  Literatur  iiher  die  W'irthschafls-  und  Rechtsgeschichte 
des  deutschen Bergbaues in  Vierteljahrschrjft fiir  Social-  und  Wirthschaftsgeschiehte, 
V. p.  284. 
Cf. the passage quoted iizfra, 11.  p. 39.5 (note 5). 46  Corporate Character of  Companies 1560-70  [CHAP. 11. 
numerous.  In this way  men  like Cecil, Leicester, Mountjoy and Pem- 
broke became associated with an Italian such as Benedick Spinolal or with 
merchants, who had capital to invest, or again with persons, who though 
they could only purchase a fraction of  a share, had special knowledge of 
mining  or of  the smelting of  iron.  Finally, it may be added that the 
incorporated  company  was  distinguished  from  the partnership  by  its 
perpetual  succession  and  common  seal,  in  fact  many  of  the  more 
important  undertakings  were  granted  elaborate  coats  of  arms  with 
supporters,  mottoes  and crestsz. 
1  Cecil and Spinola were two of  the largest shareholders in the Mines Royal, 
each owning two whole shares-vide  infra,  11. p.  387. 
2  The exigencies  of  space have  precluded  the  inclusion  of  the  arms  of  the 
companies in Part II., Division x~v.  Those of the more important enterprizes are 
engraved in A New  View  of  London  by  Edward Hatton,  1708, and are described in 
The  General Armoury by Sir Bernard  Burke and  The  Scottish  Ordinary of  Arms  by 
James Balfour Paul. 
CHAPTER  111. 
UNDERLYING  the great  material  progress  made  by  England  from 
1564  to  1569,  there  were  many  causes,  which,  while  temporarily 
increasing the wealth  of  the country,  led  inevitably  to a  crisis.  The 
political  exigencies of  the  early  years  of  the reign  of  Elizabeth  had 
made the employment of  privateers necessary.  These vessels, by preying 
on  the Spaniards, increased the wealth of  the country, but it was  only 
to be  expected  that,  when  the  inconvenience  to Philip  became  in- 
supportable,  he  would retaliate. 
Such were  the essential  elements  of  the crisis which began  at the 
end  of  1568.  The steps leading  to it were  a stage in the diplomatic 
contest which involved  the fate of  England and Scotland.  Although 
the  French  had  been  ejected  from  Scotland,  Mary  believed  herself 
sufficiently strong  to make  headway  against  Elizabeth,  and  Scottish 
emissaries  were  in  frequent  contact  with  Elizabeth  on  behalf  of  the 
Protestants,  and with the English Catholics on behalf  of  Mary.  Then 
came  the Darnley marriage in 1565 and the defeat  of  the Protestant 
forces  by  Mary.  At this  time the  prospects  of  England were  more 
critical than any but the most far-seeing statesman recognized.  Should 
Mary  be  able to crush the Reformed  Religion,  there was  the danger 
that  Scotland  might  be  made  the base,  whence  either  a  French  or 
Spanish army could invade England.  With regard to Scotland  again, 
which  from  this point of  view  might  become  the strategic key to the 
whole European situation, neither Queen nor Congregation had sufficient 
resources to keep an army in the field for the period necessary to bring 
the quarrel to an absolutely decisive issue.  The whole balance of power 
was  too delicate to be disturbed by the overt act of  any one country, 
without  others  becoming  involved.  Thus,  no  aid  in  men  could  be 
sent to either side, but Elizabeth followed her former policy  of  being 
prepared and of  sending subsidies to the Protestant leaders, while Mary 
succeeded in obtaining 20,000 crowns  from  Philipl.  Matters  dragged 
1 Do~lment8  from  Simancm, edited by  Spencer Hall, London,  1865, p. 97. E$ects  of political  Tensio~~  1568  [CHAP.  JII. 
on  for over a year, by staving off  any actual conflict outside Scotland. 
Spain  was  occupied  in  the  attempt  to  suppress  heresy  in  the  Low 
Countries,  France  was  distracted  by  religious  wars,  England  was 
paralyzed  by  the  fear  of  a  Catholic  insurrection.  For  the time  the 
position of  England  was  surrounded by dangers, and safety  lay in the 
preoccupations  of  France and Spain and their jealousy  of  each  other. 
Fortunately,  from  the point  of  view  of  the interest  of  England,  the 
policy  of  delaying  an  actual  conflict  was  justified  by  events.  The 
murder  of  Darnley  indirectly  strengthened the position  of  Elizabeth, 
owing  to the suspicions, entertained  by  many,  of  the  complicity  of 
Mar,y.  Her  marriage  with  Bothwell,  not  only  caused  trouble  in 
Scotland, but alienated her supporters in  England.  Finally, when  she 
was forced to take refuge at Carlisle, although many troubles remained 
to be  faced,  the immediate  risk  of  the situation  was  averted  for  the 
time. 
No doubt, for a number of  years up to 1568, the most pressing and 
immediate danger was  to be  expected from  Scotland;  but, in the pre- 
occupation  of  English  statesmen  with  this,  there  were  other  menaces 
which  could  not  be  ignored.  The condition  of  Flanders  reacted  in 
several  ways  upon  England.  In  so  far  as  the  stubbornness  of  the 
burghers, in refusing  to give up at the fiat  of  Philip the religion they 
had adopted, kept  Spain engaged  in  the Low Countries, the effect was 
favourable  to England.  Moreover, the arrival of  skilled  refugees was 
most beneficial in introducing the secrets of  several important industrial 
processes.  These  tendencies  constituted  the  gain  of  the  situation, 
against which the losses must be allowed for.  The confusion in Flanders 
had  for  the  time  destroyed  the  money-market at Antwerp,  and  the 
result  was  most  serious  to  the  finances  of  England.  In  spite  of 
economies,  Elizabeth  had  been  unable  to  escape  from  debt.  When 
the  country  had  been  rearmed,  subsidies  had  to  be  given  to  the 
Protestants in France and Scotland.  Therefore, the increasing difficulty 
of  renewing the Crown  loans reacted on the whole policy of  Elizabeth, 
and  tended  to limit  her  powers  of  initiative.  In fact  many  of  the 
complaints  against  her  parsimony,  as  well  as  much  of  the apparent 
vacillation  in  her  public  actions,  are  to  be  attributed  to this cause. 
Moreover, the theory was accepted, at the Court of  Philip, that England 
was  a rallying point for heretics, and the obstinacy of  the Protestants 
in the Low Countries was  assigned to the example of  England.  Thus 
Philip was  hostile to Elizabeth  as  a Protestant sovereign, not only on 
general grounds, but even  more  through the encouragement, which her 
example gave to his own revolted subjects. 
Another  related  phase  of  the  same  political  problem  was  the 
existence of  the English privateers.  The unsettled condition of  Europe 
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had  diverted  merchants  from  their  former  routes ; and,  at the same 
time,  the great profits  of  distant trading voyages had induced persons 
owning  ships  to desert  the  older  and less  profitable  trades  for  these 
more  adventurous expeditions.  In such  enterprizes  the merchant and 
the man  of  arms could  unite.  But the accession  of  the latter tended 
to add to the risks of  such  voyages, for he had not the trader's  respect 
for law,  and he  was  prepared  to seize  wealth  where  he  could  find it, 
irrespective of  payment.  This train  of  events  might  be  described  as 
the purely econon~ic  element  in  the new foreign  trade.  But that trade 
was  far  from  being  conditioned  by  economic  causes  only.  At the 
beginning  of  the reign  of  Elizabeth, she  was  glad to avail  herself  of 
the services of  armed vessels,  which  received letters of  marque.  These 
ships  occasioned  great  inconvenience  to  the  French  in  aid  of  the 
Huguenots;  and, in the diplomatic situation, such  a  policy  possessed 
the  advantage  that it could  be  disowned, should  events  require  such 
action.  Great as were the services rendered, and even  allowing for the 
inestimable value of  privateering, as a training-school for a naval power, 
it  must  be  recognized  that  these  ventures  possessed  certain  incon- 
veniences.  The procession of  Spanish ships, sailing to Flandeis through 
the  Channel,  was  too  tempting  to  the  privateersman,  and  frequent 
captures  were  made.  The  men  of  Devon  were  not  skilled  in  the 
subtleties of  diplomacy, and they seized Spanish vessels, even in English 
waters.  Naturally  Spain  retaliated,  and  English  crews  taken  were 
handed  over to the Inquisition.  As  the news  of  the sufferings  of  the 
captives  was  circulated  amongst  the shipping  population,  a  spirit  of 
revenge came into existence; and the seamen were bent as much  upon 
destroying  Spanish  ships  as  on  seizing  their  cargoes.  In  June 1567 
the ambassador  of  Philip  described the losses  as  without  remedy  and 
without end1,  while the annual damage was estimated at 300,000 ducatsz. 
The following year  the issue between the two countries came to a head. 
Alva had found it impossible to maintain his army in the Low Countries 
out of  the resources obtainable  there, and it became  necessary to find 
funds to pay  the troops.  Philip  negotiated  a  large loan3, which  was 
remitted  in  bullion,  carried  by  a  number  of  vessels.  The  English 
privateers, acting as  they  claimed under  commissions from  the Prince 
of  Condk,  attacked  the  fleet,  some  of  which  were  taken  and  the 
remainder  driven  into English  ports.  What \\-ould have  happened  is 
difficult to determine, and, in  any case, an altogether new element  was 
introduced into the situation.  While the Spanish ships were sheltering, 
Froude, History of &gland  (Reign of Elizabeth), 11.  p. 482. 
Ibid., III.  D.  326.  .. 
According to Sir John Sillclair  (History  of  the  Pr~hZic fivenlle  of  the  British 
Empire,  Lonrlon,  1803,  I.  p.  217)  amounting  to 400,000  crowns. 
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news arrived from Hawkins.  Mention has been  made elsewhere of  his 
third voyage1.  At one stage of  the expedition, he  calculated  that he 
had bullion and goods of  very great value.  Unfortunately for himself, 
his  crew  and  the adventurers,  all  this was  lost in  the encounter with 
the Spanish  Fleet at St Jean  de Luz,  and  many  of  the  sailors  were 
captured.  The arrival  of  the news  of  this  disaster,  at a  time  when 
England held  in her grasp the Spanish treasure-ships,  inevitably  pro- 
voked  schemes of  retaliation.  There seems  little doubt that, had  the 
ships been  allowed  to sail,  nothing  could  have  saved  them  from  the 
privateers.  Elizabeth  dared  not allow a  Spanish  fleet  to come  as  a 
convoy, and she could scarcely be expected to lend her own.  Eventually, 
the whole  treasure  was  taken, as it was  said, for  safe  keeping, until  it 
could be handed over to the rightful owners.  For some time, Elizabeth 
and her ministers played the rBle of the honest banker;  but the political 
and financial situation rendered  it almost impossible to maintain  more 
than a  show of  honesty.  At this period  money was  a  most  important 
element in war.  Few princes could obtain sufficient funds to drive home 
their  victories.  Time  must  elapse  before  Philip  could  secure  fresh 
resources;  and,  meanwhile,  Alva would be  impeded  by the discontent 
of  his  men  and Orange proportionately  encouraged.  These  were  the 
chief  political  reasons  for  preventing  the treasure  from  reaching  its 
destination.  From the financial point of  view, even stronger arguments 
could be  urged, not only to retain  the money, but even  eventually  to 
divert it altogether.  The terms  of  the loan to Philip were  such that 
the  Genoese  bankers,  who  found the bullion, engaged  to deliver it to 
Alva.  Therefore, Philip's liability did not begin, till delivery was made 
in Flanders.  This being so, Elizabeth could argue, plausibly, that the 
retention  of  treasure,  which  was  imperative  owing to the presence of 
Condgs privateers, was  no real loss to Philip.  Moreover, owing to the 
practical closing of  the Antwerp loan-market, the arrival  of  the money 
was  a  god-send  to Elizabeth.  She  was  in  an  excellent  position  to 
bargain with the owners.  Should any political crisis arise, the treasure 
could be  used  immediately.  Meanwhile, questions  of  ownership  could 
be  raised,  which  would  require  time  to  settle,  and,  in  the interval, 
Elizabeth  was  in  the  happy  position  of  possessing  a  "  war-chest," 
without having to pay interest on  the capital that formed it.  Finally, 
should it be necessary to use  the bullion, it would  be ~ossible  to obtain 
favourable  terms from the owners of  it, since the debtor, who gets his 
loan  before  agreeing  to  terms,  can  usually  make  an  arrangement 
moderately  satisfactory  to himself.  From  the point  of  view  of  those, 
who  found  the  money-faced  as  they  were  by  innumerable  legal 
questions,  and  by  the  practical  impossibility  of  getting the bullion 
1  Vide infra,  11.  p. 9. 
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out of  England-it  would  be  more  advantageous to accept  any  rate 
of interest obtainable, than to run the risk of  ultimate loss of the whole. 
By  August  1569  overtures  had  been  made  by  the  bankers,  and 
dresham gathered the in~pression  that they ~vould  be  right glad"  to 
receive  interest  for  a  loan  of  such  part  of  the bullion  as  might  be 
withdrawn  from  the Tower1. 
The detention  of  the Spanish treasure  might  be  described  in  the 
language of  diplon~acy  as a  necessity, but it was  plain  that the motive 
wa  to impede  the  operations  of  Alva  with  a  view  to assisting  the 
Protestants in  the Low Countries.  Therefore, it lay with  the Spanish 
administration  there to exact  reprisals  in any manner  open to it, short 
of  a declaration of  war.  Alva acted promptly, and in January,  1569, 
he  gave  orders  for the seizure of  all  English  goods  within  his juris- 
diction.  Elizabeth countered this stroke by confiscating the merchandize 
of  Spanish subjects  in  England, so that by  February, 1569, commerce 
with the Low Countries was interrupted. 
It needs little consideration to discover that the effects of  these pro- 
hibitions  constituted a dangerous dislocation  of  trade.  Contemporary 
writers, viewing events on the surface, congratulated themselves  on the 
excess of  goods, so obtained, over the losses2.  Possibly this may have 
been  so; although, owing to England  being a  debtor country, over a 
period  of  years there would necessarily be  an excess of  visible exports3. 
In any case, even if there were a balance of seizures in favour of England, 
allowance must be made for the loss of  an important market and for the 
disturbance  of  production  over the whole  country.  Already,  owing to 
the close relation of  the English wool trade with that of  Flanders, both 
had suffered from  the troubles in the latter place.  In addition to this, 
after the edict  of  Alva, the cloth-making industry was  reduced in out- 
put; although, owing to the even greater stoppage of  Flemish weaving, 
the price of  a smaller volume of  sales may not have diminished as much 
as might have been anticipated.  Moreover, at a time when  capital was 
scarce, the resources of  traders were locked up for a considerable period. 
Burgon, Lijk  of  Gresharn,  11.  p. 304. 
E.g. Camden, Annales Rerum Anglienrun~,  regnante  E'lizabetha, 1717, I.  p.  177. 
The following "men~oranda"  by Cecil give the values ascertained  up  to April 
1569- 
Goods of the Merchants Adventurers,  seized ill 
Low Countries  ...  ...  .  .  S112,456  7  1 
Goods of Merchants of the Staple  ...  ...  17,994  9  10 
Goods of English Merchants in Spain  ...  59,78315  7 
S190,234 12  6 
Goods of strangers, seized at Londoll ...  .  .  .  37,486  0  0 
(The details of seizures elsewhere are not tilled in.) 
~dmdur,  i%&  Papers, Foreign, 1669-71,  p. 67. 52  Failures of  Merchants  1569  [CHAP. m. 
The English  merchant, whose  goods were  seized, might  be reimbursed 
eventually out of  the property of  Spaniards in England;  but,  in the 
meantime, his business was at a standstill.  The reduced  foreign market 
lessened  the consumption  of  wool,  and so  the purely  domestic  trade 
began  to feel the effects  of  the check.  Moreover the good years, from 
1564 to 1568, had encouraged a spirit of  enterprize, and many merchants 
had  pledged  their credit.  The disturbance  of  existing commercial re- 
lations caused numerous traders to be unable to meet their engagements, 
and  thus failures  became  frequent,  with  the  result  that  it was  not 
long before the beginnings  of  a crisis were in existence.  Then political 
events gave a further shock to mercantile  credit.  The Catholic party 
formed  a  plot,  in conjunction  with  Alva,  for  the seizure  of  the fleet 
of  the Merchant  Adveaturers,  which  was  carrying  a  year's  supply  of 
cloth and yarns, valued at about 2100,000, to Hamburg, whence they 
had removed  their mart, so as to be outside the jurisdiction  of  Alval. 
It was anticipated that, should  these ships be  captured, there would  be 
great  discontent  in  England.  Probably  the  noblemen,  who  were 
responsible  for  this  scheme,  relied  on  the  distress  of  the mercantile 
classes;  still, if  these  were wholly or mainly  on  the side of  Elizabeth, 
the attainment of  this contingent object  of  the plot would have been 
doubtful.  It may be one of  the numerous inconsistencies in the British 
character  that traders, whose  sole  motive  appears to be that of  gain, 
can yet, in the hour of  a great emergency, subordinate their individual 
interests to the national  welfare.  Happily for  the merchants,  already 
sorely tried, their loyalty was  not  subjected  to further strain, for  the 
fleet arrived  in safety. 
During the latter half  of  the year 1569, further Catholic plots were 
simmering, which culminated in the insurrection of  Norfolk in November 
and December.  In a country, where production has reached some degree 
of complexity, even the danger of  revolution injures the ramifications of 
commerce.  This rebellion,  short as  it was,  increased the crisis which 
had  already  begun.  Failures  became  more numerous,  and the Crown 
finances were  again  strained by the expenses, connected  with  the sup- 
pression  of  the insurrection,  added  to which  there  was  the outlay on 
Ireland, which for some time had been  considerable2.  The Crown debt 
in Flanders,  which  may  have  been  as low  as  &17,000  in  15653, was 
returned at as much as 2192,500  in the following year4.  As already 
1  Die Entzoicklung und  Organisation der Merchant-Adventurers,  by S. van Brakel, 
in VierteGahrschri$t fiir Social- und  Wirthschaf'tsgeschichte, V.  pp. 425-7. 
2  Vide infra, 111.  p. 527.  Up to August 31st, 1570, the total charge of  the Army 
in the North is returned at £20,140.  16s. ;  whereof £8,616  had  been raised  by loan 
(Calendar, State Papers, Foreign,  1569-71,  p. 328).  The whole cost was £92,032. 
3  Vide infra, 111.  p. 511.  4  Culendar, State Papers,  Foreign,  1566-8, p. 21. 
CHAP. 111.1  D(ficu2ties of the Crown in borrowing 1570  53 
shown',  the situation in the Low Countries made lenders disinclined to 
furnish  Elizabeth with  funds,  and the increase in her  borrowings was 
only  obtained  by  an  addition  to the  rate  of  interest.  Though  the 
political  outlook  had  improved  in  1566-7,  the new  loans  were  made 
at a  higher  rate of  interest  than had been given earlier  in the reign; 
and  it appears,  at this time,  as much  as  sixteen  per  cent. was  paid2. 
The subsidy, granted  by  Parliament in  1566, was  payable  in the two 
following  years;  but,  against  this,  there  were  the  expenses  of  the 
rebellions  in  Ireland  and  in  the  North.  To meet  the  exigency,  it 
was  proposed  to raise  money  by  means  of  a  lottery;  but, before  the 
drawing  was  made,  the  Spanish  treasure  had  been  detained,  and the 
prizes were not distributed until 156g3. Meanwhile, although the Spanish 
bullion was  in the Tower, it had not  been  drawn  upon; and, not only 
were there the expenses of  the army, as well as the need for being ready 
for  any  naval demonstration  made by  Philip, but the revenue derived 
from the Customs had declined seriously, owing to the embargo on trade 
with Flanders4.  Gresham  had been  sent to try to borrow in Germany, 
but  was  unable  to report  any  success.  He returned to London  and 
made  efforts  to obtain  capital  there,  but  was  forced  to  confess,  in 
October  1570 that  he "never  saw  the scarcity  of  nlonny  as ys  here 
now  in the Citys."  Under these circumstances, Elizabeth was compelled 
to summon a  Parliament which  met  in April  1571.  While  the need 
for  a  subsidy  was  admitted,  some  attempts were  made  to  use  the 
opportunity to obtain a reform  of  certain grievances.  References were 
made  to the abuses of  "  licences and promoters,"  whereby "  a  few only 
were  enriched  and  the  multitude  impoverished6";  and  hints  were 
dropped,  which  pointed  to the Queen's  favourites  in  this  connection. 
It was also urged that there had been  fraudulent bankruptcies amongst 
certain  high  officials in  the Treasury.  These  men,  it was  said,  "had 
become  bankrupts,  like  so  many  others  at this  time,"  but  had  been 
found to have  purchased  estates, which  were  concealed,  when  only  an 
instalment  of  the  debts  due  was  paid.  Eventually  the  subsidy  was 
panted by  the House7. 
The prevailing distress engaged the attentioil of  Parliament, and an 
act  was  passed  to amend  the law  relating to bankrupts,  the preamble 
Vide supra, p.  32. 
C'alendar, State Papers, Foreign,  1566-8,  p.  271. 
A History @'English Lotteries, by John Ashtori,  London, 1893, pp.  5-24. 
The Journals of all the Parliaments during the Reign oJ'  wen  Elizabeth, Collected 
by Sir Siinoiids  D'Ewes, Loildo~i,  1682, p. 139. 
Burgon, Lzye  ofGresham, Ir. p. 419. 
D'Ewes, Jou/./tals,  ut supru, p.  1.58. 
7  This amouiited  to &ths  and  hths (Statutes, IV.  p.  568) realizing  2116,000 
(State Papers,  L)oniestic,  Elizabeth,  CCXLIV.  51). Parliament  and  Usury 1571 
of  which  stated  that  "bankrupts  doe  still  increase  into  greate  and 
excessive numbers and are lyke  more to do'."  Somehow or  other, the 
members connected the existing crisis with  the taking of  interest,  and 
there  was  an  important  debate  on  this  subject  on  April  the  19th. 
It was  evident there were  two  quite distinct  points  of  view.  One of 
which, relying on Scripture, Aristotle, Canon Law and other authorities, 
denounced usury as a "  canker,"  an "  asp,"  a "  serpent " and a "  devil." 
It was argued  that this practice resulted in loss to the Queen and State. 
The loss to the Queen arose from "  men not using their own money, but 
finding great gain in usury, do imploy the same that way,  so that her 
Customs must decrease.  To the commonwealth, for  that, whoso  shall 
give hire for money, is to raise the same in  the sale of  his commodity. 
All  trades  shall  be  taken  away,  all  occupations  lost;  for  most  men 
seeking  most  ease  and greatest gain, without  hazard  or venture,  will 
forthwith  imploy  their  money  to  such  use."  This  standpoint  had 
weight  in  the act  which  was  eventually passed,  in  which  "the  utter 
undoing  of  many  gentlemen, merchants and others"  was  attributed to 
usury.  But the opinions  of  the more  moderate  party were  embodied 
in  the  last  clause,  which,  instead  of  prohibiting  the  taking  of  all 
interest,  declares contracts,  at a  rate exceeding ten  per  cent.,  should 
be void.  The justification  of  interest was  well  expressed by a member, 
named  Molley,  who  said  that the  "mischief  was  of  the excess,  not 
otherwise.  Since to take reasonably, or so that both parties might do 
good,  was  not hurtful;  for  to have  any  man  lend  his  money  without 
any  commodity,  hardly  should  you  bring  that  to  pass.  And  since 
every  man  is not an occupier who  hath money,  and some which  have 
not  money  may  have  skill  to  use  money,  except  you  should  take 
away  or  hinder  good  trades,  bargaining  and  contracting  cannot  be 
[hindered]'."  It  is  a  curious  comment  011  the debate of  1571, that 
Elizabeth had to pay about 13 per  cent.  in  the following year.  This 
is sufficient testimony both to the inefficacy of  the measure and to the 
necessities of the Crown. 
The subsidy  of  the laity  in  1571, partly  through  the  depression 
in trade, partly through  other causes, produced  a lower yield per tenth 
and per  fifteenth than  those  of  1563 and  15663.  Early  in  the year 
it was  necessary for  Gresham to ~rolong  the existing  debt, which  was 
then  returned  at &59,584.  8s.  8d.'  of  which  less  than half  was  out- 
standing at  London  and the remainder  in Antwerp4.  The statute of 
usury,  which  had  just  been  passed,  was  evaded  by  the  loan  being 
1 Statutes, IV. p. 539.  D'Ewes,  Journak, ut mpa,  pp. 171-3. 
3  Pride  infra, 111.  p. 526. 
4  Ibid., nr. p. 511.  These figures relate to the debt under the management  of 
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described as for  six  months  at 6 per  cent.,  with  an additional 1 per 
cent. commission, making  the total charge a minimum of  13 per cent.' 
In all probability,  the great reduction  in debt from  nearly  ~!200,000, 
due in Flanders in 1566, to under 260,000, owing both in Antwerp and 
London  in  1570 and  1571, is  to be  ascribed to the use  made  of  the 
captured treasure.  Statements of  the actual amount in the Tower vary, 
owing to inventories being taken sometimes of  the coin only, sometimes 
of  coin and bullion, and in some of  the accounts the value is expressed 
in  Spanish  or  Flemish  currency.  On  the whole,  the  totals  tend  to 
diminish.  Thus in a  statement, apparently drawn  up in  1569, there 
was  over  890,000  in  coin  and bullion,  and by  1571 there remained 
887,457.  16s.  4d.'  Possibly,  before  the  first  account  was  taken,  a 
considerable sum had been  borrowed, and there is  evidence  of  a  great 
pressure on  the finances  of  the Crown, since  the repayment  of  sums, 
that had been borrowed in London about 1569, was two years overdues. 
Apparently, although the total debt of  Elizabeth had been reduced, the 
reduction  on  balance was  less than would  appear, being rather effected 
by  the incurring  of  new  liabilities  elsewhere,  partly  to the  Genoese 
bankers,  partly to merchants in  Hainburg4. 
Elizabeth,  having  secured the bullion  intended  for  Alva,  was  not 
indisposed by  the month  of  May  1571 to open  negotiations  for  the 
removal  of  the embargo on  English  goods in Flanders.  The political 
objects, gained by  the seizure, had cost a serious decay of  trade; and, 
even though Spain may have  suffered more in goods lost, the southern 
commerce  of  that  country  was  continuing  with  comparatively  little 
disturbance.  Therefore, if  the percentage of  loss be  taken  as affecting 
on  the  one  side  Spain  with  the Low  Countries  and England  on  the 
other hand, the latter was  at the greater disadvantage in the reprisals. 
Granting  that Spanish merchants had  had  goods  valued  at 3,000,000 
ducats  seized  or  destroyed,  England's  trade was  at a  standstill,  and, 
being the poorer country, the loss was  all the more felt5.  The rumours 
of  a  projected  Spanish invasion,  as  well  as  the Catholic plot  towards 
the end of 1571, made an agreement all the more necessary.  Eventually, 
in  April  1573  an  arrangement  was  made,  under  which  trade  with 
Flanders  was  reopened. 
Apart from the Massacre of  St Bartholomew in August of  the same 
year (1573), the ~olitical  causes of  the crisis had  ceased to exist; and, 
had  it not  been  for  other  reasons,  the depression  would  have  passed 
away.  It unfortunately happened that, beginning with  1571, there was 
l  Calendar, State Papers, Foreign, 1669-71,  p. 463. 
Ibid., pp. 163, 523.  ;3  Burgon, Lijk of  Gresham, 11.  p. 421. 
Ibid., 11.  p. 418. 
Vroude,  History of England (Elizabeth), IV. p. 242. 
.  - 
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a  run of  exceptionally bad  seasons, which  lasted until 1573-4.  In the 
latter years the price  of  wheat was  nearly three times as great as it had 
been in 1570'.  But, although this time of  scarcity delayed  the process 
of  recovery, the crisis was  passing away ;  and, towards the end  of  1574, 
the country  began  to emerge h111 the period  of  depression, while  in 
1575 the material progress, that had  been  interrupted  since 1569, was 
resumed. 
The severity of  the crisis of  1569-74  is attested by its effects on the 
existing  joint-stock  companies.  Allusion  has  already  been  made  to 
the wailt  of  flexibility in the capitalization of  early companies.  Under 
a system whereby the number of  shares was  rigidly  fixed, fresh  capital 
was  most  readily  obtainable  by  making  calls  as  required.  But  in  a 
time of  crisis, it would almost certainly happen that some of  the share- 
holders  could  not  make  the  necessary  payments,  and  the  system  of 
sub-division of  shares came into existence.  Still, even with  this modi- 
fication  of  the original  rigidity  of  the  system,  the  undertakings,  in 
existence  at the time  of  the  crisis,  found  it difficult  to weather  the 
storm ; and  methods  had  to  be  devised  to  meet  the  exigencies  of 
the  case.  These  took  different  forms  as  originated  by  the  various 
companies. 
The privileges of  the Russia  company in Russia were  suspelrded in 
1570. but the disorganization of  English and other merchants there was 
such that, in 1571-2,  the Czar was  prepared to renew the former grants 
to a  group of  tradersa.  In connection  with  the question  discussed in 
the previous  chapter3, as  to the issue  between  the company  and the 
interlopers, this fact tends  to show that, although  both  sides  were  in 
fault, probably the lesser blame is to be assigned to the company.  Thus 
about  1572, the situation  of  this  undertaking  was  that  it was  in  a 
positioi~  to make  a  fresh  start, but this was  by no  means easy at the 
close of  a long contirrued crisis.  Much  of  the subscribed capital had 
been  lost, and more funds would  be  required.  It would be impossible 
to collect a call on the existing stock, and therefore it was determined 
to start a  "new  stock,"  or, as we  should say now-a-days, a reorganized 
company.  It  seems  possible,  as  suggested  in the detailed  account of 
this enterprize4, that those who  were prepared to go on agreed  to pay 
a certain sum to the members of  the old company for its privileges and 
assets.  This amount would be available to discharge the debts, and any 
balance remaining would be divisible amongst the former members. 
1  A  History of  Agriculture  and  Prices, by J.  E. T.  Rogers, rv. p.  267; Chronicm 
Preciosum  or an Account of. English Money, the  Price  of  Corn and  other Cotnmoditieo 
[by Bishop Fleetwood], 1707, p.  123. 
Vide ilzfra, 11.  p. 43.  3  Vide supra, p.  38. 
Vide infra, 11.  pp.  44-6. 
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The  same  effect of  the  crisis,  in  separating those  who  were  able 
to  continue  to  support  the  undertaking  from  those  who  were  not, 
showed  itself  in  a  difkrent  manner  in  the case  of  the Mines  Royal. 
This company was  caught by  the crisis in the difficult position  of  not 
being fully established.  Moreover, of  the calls of  2850 made on  each 
share,  about  82,500  was  in  arrear  in  1571.  There was  the  further 
difficulty that,  owing  in  part  to the depression,  some  of  the copper 
made  could  not  be  sold.  Any  arrangement  for  the future  would  be 
colnplicated by two eletnents.  Ill  the first place, about ten shares were 
owned  in  Germany1,  and  there  would  be  delay  in  agreeing  upon  a 
common  line  of  action.  Secolldly, at this period, the operations of  the 
society were  being carried  on  only in  the Keswick  district, while  there 
remained  a  number  of  other  counties,  included  under  the grants and 
charter,  which  had  not been  examined.  The first  recorded  step was 
to  frame  a  valuation  of  the assets, which  were  actually  in  existence 
in  1571, and a  full  summary  and analysis  of  this doculllent  is  given 
elsewhere2.  The  whole  recorded  value  comes  to  over  &12,000,  as 
against  capital  actually  subscribed  by  the  shareholders  of  about 
£18,000S,  or  an apparent depreciation  of  one-third.  As  against  this 
deficiency,  there  were  several  unvalued  assets,  chief  of  which  were 
281,424 quintals  of  unessayed  ore4.  If  allowance  be  made  for  these 
additional portions of  the company's  property, and it be assumed that, 
including  them, there were  assets against the capital actually paid  up, 
it is quite plain  that, as things  were  in  1571, those shareholders.  who 
,  ~  gave a  premium  of  81,200 for their holdings, had made a great mis- 
calculation. 
The  main  question,  however,  was  what  cvuld  be  done.  If  the 
copper could not  be  sold nor the outstanding calls  collected, it would 
not  be  long before the fidirectors6"  at the mines would  be  unable  to 
pay wages, and the whole undertaking would collapse.  In this exigency 
lt was  proposed that the English  shareholders should purchase each his 
mteable  proportion  of  the stock  of  copper,  at the  price  at which  it 
was  usual to value it in the accounts  of  the company.  This proposal 
l  In the thirteenth and  fourteenth centuries  mining  companies  were known in 
Germany, arid, early in tlie fifteenth  century, there was extensive speculstio~~  in the 
shares of  these ventures-G.  H. Lewis, The Stannaries, pp. 178, 182. 
Vide infra, 11.  pp. 387-9. 
I.e.  24 shares at 2850  ...  .  .  .  .  £20,400 
less  3 shares with calls wholly or partly  in arrear, say  S2,400 
Vide infra. 11. D. 390. 
. 
Cash received  by society  &!18,000 
-,  .-- 
K  The term director appear~  to have  been of Dutch origin-De  Hollandsche  Han- 
kkcompagnie?n der  Zeuenthde  Eeuw,  door  S. ran  Brakel,  'S-Gravenhage, 1908, 
p.  XXIII. CHAP. 111.1  creation of  szhb&dia)y  comnpnluiea  1571 -4 
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constituted in fact a method of obtaining more capital from the English 
shareholders,  giving  them  the security  of  an  equal  value  of  copper 
against the advance.  But the shareholders would have been forced to 
run the risk  of  finding a  market  for the copper, and   rob ably some of 
them  had not the capital available,  though there is no doubt several 
were in a sound position financially, since the names  of  two members of 
the society occur amongst  those who  made a loan to Elizabeth  at this 
time,  and  these  two-Benedick  Spinola  and  Lionel  Duckett-lent 
between  them  &4,1001. 
This proposal  having failed, it was  suggested that Elizabeth might 
be  induced  to accept  the royalty  of  one-fifteenth,  reserved  to her,  in 
kind, not in cash.  At another time this method  might have answered, 
since a  considerable  amount  of  copper  was  required  to replenish  the 
supply  of  guns for  the fleet, but at this ~eriod  the Queen needed the 
money,  owing  to  the  impossibility  of  arranging  new  loans  to  any 
considerable extent abroad.  It follows then  that this way  out of  the 
perplexities of  the society was closed.  Finally, as the copper was made, 
it was  sent to London  and deposited  as  security against a loan, which 
by  157B had  grown  to  &1,3502.  Even  though  by  that  time  the 
crisis was  over, capital could not be  obtained  from  the members, and 
Elizabeth, who  was  receiving about 2400 a  year  for her royalty, was 
induced  to lend  22,500.  This loan,  however,  was  only  a  temporary 
one, for the Queen  could not afford to be  out of  the money for long; 
and, if  the undertaking was  to continue, fresh resources must be found. 
The system adopted was  an ingenious  one.  The society, as a  whole, 
"  farmed"  or leased the Keswick mines to one of  the members at a rent 
and royalty.  In this way  a  subsidiary  company  was  formed  and the 
partners in this venture would find the capital  required. 
The same system of  farming a part of  the property to a subordinate 
partnership had been adopted by the Mineral and Battery Works ;  but, 
as far as can be learnt, from different reasons.  The iron and wire mills 
were at some distance from the other factories ;  and, either because they 
did not pay or because it was difficult to obtain adequate supervision, in 
1571 these were leased  to three shareholders for three years  at  a rent of 
P150 a  year.  One  of  the partners,  Sir  Richard  Martyn,  purchased 
more shares in  the parent  undertaking; and, when the time came for a 
renewal of  the lease, he owned seven or eight-that  is between a quarter 
and a fifth of  the whole business.  He used his voting power, supported, 
1 State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, uxve.  29 (l)  ;  Burgon, Lye of m8bflb 11. 
p. 343.  In 1573 Spinda was  repaid  811,000-State  Papers,  Domestic,  Elhbeth, 
kc~.  57. 
2  The Extract  of  the  Mines Royal  at Christmas anno 1575.  British Museum, 
Lamd. MS. 22 (5); cf. infra,  Ir. pp 390-3. 
it is alleged, by  fraudulent accounts, to obtain in  1574 a reduction  in 
the rent  from  P150 to 640.  This event  brings  to light one  of  the 
great  dangers  of  the  farming  system  between  parent  and  subsidiary 
companies.  As  matters  were  arranged  in  the  sixteenth  celltury,  a 
conflict of  interest  was  inevitable.  It was  the interest  of  the original 
company  to obtain  as much  rent  or  royalty  as  it could, it was  the 
interest  of  the lessees,  provided  their share in  the subordinate  under- 
taking was  the greater, to pay as small a  sum as possible.  The result 
would be that the men, who were  interested in both, would  be  strongly 
tempted  to use  indirect  means  to effect  their objects.  It might  be, 
' 
as in the case of  the court meeting of  the Mineral and Battery Works 
in  1574, by  framing  accounts  which  showed a profit  only one-seventh 
of  the actual  one1:  or  as was  proposed  to (but not accepted by) the 
governor  of  the Mines  Royal  at a  later date,  that, if  he  would  use 
his influence on  behalf  of  a person wishing a lease, when a subordinate 
company  was  being  formed,  he  should  receive,  without  payment,  a 
number of shares in the new  venture2.  When one recollects the amount 
of  discussion  that has  centred  round  ''eontroliing  interests"  and  the 
shifting of responsibilities from one company to another of an associated 
group in  recent  years, it is  not  uninstructive  to notice how  soon  the 
evil  manifested  itself.  At the same time, certain  points  of  difference 
between  the Elizabethan  and  the inodern  problem  should  be  noted. 
The  "farming"  was  always  the  result  of  financial  pressure.  To 
understand  the  circumstances,  the great  scarcity  of  capital  must  be 
remembered.  When  crises  were  so  frequent  and  so  severe,  even  a 
profitable undertaking might find itself in temporary difficulties.  There 
was  no banking system in  E~lgland,  and those members  of  a company, 
who  could furnish it with  funds when  these were  most  required,  could 
exact a high price for the service rendered. 
-  - 
Heference was made in the previous chapter to the manner in which 
capital  was  regarded  in  the early joint-stock  company3.  A  series of 
accounts  of  the Mines  Royal  enable that statement  to be  developed 
further.  These documents are dated  1575-6,  and so, in  strict chrono- 
logical order, they belong to a period after the crisis ;  yet, since in many 
respects they reflect the influence of  that time of  stress, it will be mor; 
convenient to deal with them at the present stage4. 
It should  be  premised  that in  none  of  the docume~lts  relating  to 
English companies in the sixteenth century has the word  capital " been 
A  Summary  of  Auenant's  Bill  of  Complaint  on  Her  Majesties  behalf  ex- 
hibited in the Exchequer  Chamber: Brit. Mus.  Lansd.  MS.  66 (17) §$ 6,  7; ai& 
infra,  11.  p.  419. 
Lansd. MS.  28 (6). 
Vide suppa, p. 45.  These accounts are summarized infra,  11. pp. 392-3. 60 Early uses of  G Stock " and " Capital " 1564-9  [CHAP. In. 
discovered1.  The tern1 stock  is  used  in  a general  way, as CO-extensive 
with the whole  property, but more frequently to apply to what  might 
be termed trading or floating capital.  For instance, in the inventory of 
the mines at Keswick there are two headings, the first  of  which is  "the 
stock  remaining  at the mines."  This "  stock " includes copper,  silver 
and  lead  (either  finished  or  partly  made),  fuel,  horses  and  wagons, 
furniture and bedding,  plate, debts due to the society, payments made 
in  advance,  tools  and  implements,  also  a  brew-house  and  windmill'. 
'These  items  could  all  be  included  under  floating-capital  except  the 
brew-house and windmill.  Possibly, as having to do with the feeding 
of  the work-people,  it seemed  to the framers of  the account  not un- 
natural  to classify  them  in  this  manner.  The  second  part  of  the 
account,  which  is  added  as a  kind  of  appendix  and which  is  treated 
as  distinct, includes buildings  and plant. 
At this period  there was  no  need  of  a term to describe the whole 
outlay.  As yet, the company stood in this respect too near the partner- 
ship for the want of  a capital account to be felt.  The idea of  capital, 
as sonlething which should be kept intact, was  unknown, and very much 
later the payment of  dividends out of  capital was  quite usual.  In fact 
the temporary  joint-rtock,  such  as  that  of  the  African  expeditions, 
made  this  method  of  procedure  unavoidable.  As the goods brought 
home  were  sold,  the  adventurers  received  payments  pro rata;  and, 
when  the voyage  had  been  a  success,  they  obtained  more  than  they 
had paid in, if  it was  a failure, they might get less.  For such circum- 
1 This statement must  be  confined  to  the accounts of  companies.  The word 
capital does occur in other connections, e.g. as early as 1564 a grant was made of the 
capital messuage and park of  Copthall in Essex-State  Papers,  Domestic, Eli~abeth, 
xxx~v.  44.  The term also appears iu  accountancy as early as 1569, when  it was 
used by James Peele, who taught the "art  of  Italian merchants'  accounts."  In a 
dialogue  between  "the  scholemaster  and the scholler,"  the latter  describes  "an 
inventorie for trafique"  as "a  note to be  taken in writinge of  all thi~lges,  founde 
and  remayninge  in  the house  apperteyl~inge  to  trade  of  merchaundise,  thereby 
to knowe a mans estate and doth consist of  ii kindes:  the one whereof, is that a 
man  hathe or  ought to have  in possession, to say0  in  readie  monie,  debtes  and 
goodes : and tllother  kiode, is that which he oweth to other men  being his creadi- 
tours,  and by  comparinge  of  the total1  somme  of  the readye nlotlie,  debtes  and 
goodes,  with  the totall  somme of  the creaditourr,  the estate  of  that accompte  is 
presentlye  perceyved(t11at is to saye) so  muche  as the monye debtes and goodes 
sormoullte the creaditours, so  muck apperteyneth to  thowner  (?f  that accompte for  hi8 
proper  atocke or capitail in tru$que  "-The  Pathewaye  to Perfectnes, in th'  Accompte of 
Dehitou~  and  Crenditour :  if'  nrtanmr qf' a Dialogue,  aery  pleasaunte  and profitable for 
Merchau,rtes,  by Janles  L'eele,  Lolltlon,  16 August,  1569.  In Murray's Dictionary 
the followii~g  references are given : 1588, J. Melliu's Briefe  Ii~str.  B.  11.  b. "The 
remaine  is  the net  rest,  substance or  capitail  of  the owner" ; 1611,  "Capital- 
wealth,  worth,  a stocke,  a man's  priuciyall or chief0 substance." 
Vide infia, 11.  p. 388. 
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stances the view, commonly held, of  the nature of  stock  was  sufficient. 
The ease was different where  the sums adventured remained represented 
by  the  same  kind  of  acknowledgement  from  the  company-that  is 
where the member, in return for his  payments, had a right to a certain 
proportion of  the whole.  It is here that the relatively small number of 
shares becomes important.  Martyn,  for  instance,  had  eight shares  in 
the  Mineral  and  Battery  Works;  and  therefore  the  quarter  of  the 
undertaking,  he  owned,  was  represented  to his  mind  6y the price  he 
had  paid for those shares.  If, as time went  on, he could sell them for 
more, the excess was  profit, and conversely.  A few cases occur where it 
is necessary to speak  of  the whole cost of  establishing an undertaking, 
that is what, in  modern  language,  would  be  called the capital outlay, 
and in two cases this is described as "  the charge " or  At 
the same time,  occasionally  the writer  drifts  from  the standpoint  of 
regarding the undertaking as a single unit and expresses the whole cost 
in  terms of  the amount paid on each share, which  is to be understood 
as multiplied  by the number  of  shares.  Thus, in describing  how  the 
Mines Royal ''  begun and went forward," the outlay is given in terms of 
the calls 011  each share2.  Therefore, as far as the joint-stock  company 
of  this period was  concerned, there was no need for the word "capital," 
since the shareholders were unconscious  of  any necessity to describe the 
thing.  Even the "  stock" was still vague in their minds.  What really 
concerned  them  was  that there should  be  sufficient funds to carry on 
their enterprize and to leave a surplus.  Before this profit was  arrived 
at, it may  have  happened  that,  as  in  the  case  of  the Mineral  and 
Battery Works3, expenditure had been  made on additions to the under- 
taking-that  is, in fact,  that the funds, according to modern practice, 
available  for  dividend,  had  been  diminished,  and  capital  outlay  was 
provided from  revenue.  But conversely, should  the trade decrease, the 
resources, which  would thus take the form  of  cash, would be treated as 
divisible and paid away to the shareholders, as if  the whole were  profit. 
Most  of  these  characteristics may be seen in the accounts of  the Mines 
Royal in 1575 and 1576.  In these documents the whole preoccupation 
of  the  shareholders  is  to obtain  a  sufficient  amount  of  income  over 
expenditure.  It is true that, in this case, such  excess was  devoted  to 
l E.g.  Mineral and Battery Works-"The  societie  had  been at charges  in the 
premisses to the value of 10,000  marksu-Lamsd.  MS.  56 (47)  4: e.g. in "Notes  of Kichard Leedes, Keeper of the books of account of the Royal Mines in the Nonh," 
it is stated the whole charge of the general conlpny and their farmers had been" &C., 
State Papers,  Domestic, Elizabeth, cc~xxv.  14.5. 
"ecord  of George Bowes and Francis Needhanl,  sent to take view of the Mines 
Royal at Keswick:  MS.  Lister,  17, BodIeian Library. 
Vide infra, 11.  pp.  417,  418. 62  Ambiguities  of  the  ternz "  Stock " 1569-76  [CHAP. 111. 
the paying  of  interest  and the extinction  of  debt ;  but, had the society 
not been in difficulties at the time, the surplus would  have been, from 
the point  of  view  of  the times,  available  for  dividend.  As a  matter 
of  fact it is shown, in the analysis of these figures, that the profit, which 
appeared to be made, was obtained by diminishing the reserves of  ore1. 
This fact indicates  one of  the ambiguities which  arose from the vague 
use  of  "stock."  The "stock  of  the mines"  might  mean  either the 
metal smelted, ores  on hand, tools and provisiolls or the provision\ and 
cash  available  for  wages  and  dividend.  Now  it is  plain  that,  since 
it was proposed to divide the copper to the shareholders, no  distinction 
was  made between these  two points  of  view ;  yet, supposing  a dividend 
had been made out of  the cash, it follows that "  the stock"  remaining 
would have decreased.  Further, when  the term  stock was  used  later in 
the precise  meaning  of  capital  subscribed-that  is  where  the  capital 
consisted  of  "stock,"  not  of  shares-the  confusion  would  become 
intensified.  "  Stock " might then mean  the whole "  charges " or total 
outlay ; or it might mean, in a  narrower  sense, the sums provided  by 
the shareholders,  or again, in a still narrower  sense,  only  the floating 
capital.  It will be shown below how an effort was  made to escape some 
of  these ambiguities, by distinguishing a "  quick " and a  "dead  stocky 
but even  so  some confusion remained,  and,  once  this was  redognized, 
the need  of  a new word would  be  felt and hence the use  of  the term 
capital.  In the sixteenth century, however,  the predominant  type of 
company was  the temporary undertaking, divided  into a  comparatively 
small number  of  shares.  Such were  the African  expeditions and the 
trade to Russia.  Indeed, as has been  shown, this idea, that a "  stock" 
should be something terminable  at an early date, prevailed  in the cases 
of  the Mines Royal and the Mineral and Battery Works, resulting  in 
the formation  of  subsidiary  companies or  partnerships.  Therefore, as 
yet,  for  all  practical  purposes  the  prevailing  vague  use  of  "  stock " 
sufficed, and it lay with  the course of  future  development  to bring to 
light the ambiguities,  involved in  the term. 
To complete the history of  companies during the crisis of  1569 to 
1574, a few words  may be  added as to the financial results during this 
period.  Of  the three important companies the only one that may have 
made profits was the Mineral and Battery Works',  both the others were 
in difficulties, and all of  them emerged from the depression in an altered 
form. 
In view of  the severity of  the crisis, new  enterprizes were not under- 
taken.  There is only one instance of  a fresh departure, which deserves 
mention from  some peculiarities in the organization of  the partnership. 
1 Vide i?$~a,  11. pp. 393, 394.  Ibid., 11. pp. 138, 145, 147, 270, 173, 185. 
Ibid., 11.  p.  418. 
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-- 
This was a project  of  Sir Thomas Smith (who had been Ambassador  to 
France and, later, Secretary of  State) for transmuting iron into copper. 
He began  his  experiments  in  1571 and there were  in all  five  persons 
concerned  in  the  venture,  the  whole  capital  of  which  was  no  more 
than 21,000.  In  January  1574  a  patent,  incorporating  the persons 
interested as the Societyjbr the New Art in Making Copper, was  sig~led. 
This  instrument  provided  for  the  election  of  one  governor  and  one 
deputy-governor, and that the whole undertaking was  to consist of  five 
shares.  At the same time there was  a  clause limiting the membership 
to twenty persons1; so that, had any partners  beyond  the original five 
been admitted, it would have been necessary that (as in the case of  the 
African Adventurers) these should have been "  under " the chief  share- 
holders2.  The reason  for  this  arrangement  seems  to have  been  the 
existence of  a  personal  liability for P1,000,  entered  into by  the pro- 
moters,  on  obtaining  a  lease  of  certain  buildings  for the making  of 
experiments3. 
The explicit limitation of  the number of  members is an interesting anticipation 
of the provisions,  relating to "private companies," in the Companies Act of 1908. 
Vide supra, p. 30. 
Calendar,  Side Papers,  Domestic,  Addsnda  1566-79,  p.  47; The  Lifs of Sir 
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CHAPTER  IV. 
ONE  of  the peculiarities  of  a new  country in its industrial develop- 
ment, such as England was  in the sixteenth century, is the elasticity of 
its recovery from a crisis.  Beginning in 1575 there were  eleven  years, 
which  despite  ten~porary  disturbing  influences,  as  for  instance  many 
political  uncertainties  and  localized  outbreaks  of  the plague  (1577, 
1583), may  be described as  exceptionally  prosperous.  The harvest of 
1575 was  excellent-indeed,  in  Scotland more particularly,  it was said 
that wheat  had never  been  more  plentiful1.  Crime had  decreased, as 
was shown by the fact that at the London sessions of  1575 there were 
no prisoners to be tried..  Partly by rigorous economy, partly no doubt 
through  the use  made  of  the "Spanish  treasure:  the  Chancellor  of 
the Exchequer was able to state in Parliament that, "  within the realm, 
her Majesty hath most carefully and providently  delivered this kingdom 
from a great and weighty debt, wherewith it hath been long burdmed- 
a debt begun  four  years,  at the least, before the death of  King  Henry 
the Eighth and not cleared, until within  these two  years."  That the 
State was  at last freed from ''  the eating corrosive of  the interest"  was 
proved by  the fact that the Queen's  bonds,  issued  with  the collateral 
security of the City of London, had all been paid off' and cancelled3.  At 
the same time, it may be doubted whether  the foreign, as distinguished 
from the domestic debt was altogether paid  off.  Some  of  the Spanish 
treasure was retained in England, for which  Elizabeth became liable to 
the  bankers  of  Genoa.  Eventually  Benedick  Spinola  purchased  this 
obligation from  the original lenders ; and just  a month before  it was 
atsted in  the House  of  Con~mons  that the debt had been extinpished, 
1  A  Collection of State Papers,  1571-96,  transcribed by William  Murdin, London, 
1759, p. 285. 
2  A  History of London, by William Maitland, IJondorr, 1756,  I. p  263. 
U'Ewes, Journals, p. 245. 
he wrote pressing for payment of  the balance which was then still out- 
standing'. 
It was  no doubt true that,  owing in  a large measure  to Elizabeth 
paying interest regularly  and returning at least a part of  the principal 
when due, her "credit,  both at home and abroad, was greater than that 
of  any other Prince2."  Philip of  Spain, for  instance, had been  forced 
sonletimes to pay l2  per cent. and 18 per cent. on loans, the interest on 
which was  in arrear3.  Since Elizabeth was practically free from debt, it 
is difficult  to obtain any quantitative estimate of  the value of her credit. 
As, however, she lent money in  1575 to the society of  Mines Royal at 
8 per cent.4, it may be assumed that she herself was  not paying, or would 
not have been required to pay, more.  This estimate of  her credit is con- 
firmed by the fact that her envoys discovered in  1576 that, at Hamburg, 
100,000 guilders could be borrowed for two years at 8 per cent. or 9 per 
cent.5  Indeed,  at this period  there is  mention  of  an offer being made 
of  P200,000 or &300,000 from Cologne at between 5 per cent. and 6 per 
cent. ;  but, when investigation was made, it was found that this offer was 
conditional on the renewal of  all the former privileges of  the Merchants 
of  the Steelyard in London ; and, supposing the loan were  needed, the 
saving in  interest  would  have  been  bought  at a  high  price, when  the 
loss in Customs was taken into account6. 
The reduction  in  the rate  of  interest  is  strong testimony to the 
sound  state  of  the  Crown  finances  and,  indirectly,  to the  thriving 
condition of  the country.  As compared with France and Spain, England 
had enjoyed a lengthy period of comparative peace, yet internal troubles 
had  made  themselves  felt.  The  danger  of  a  Catholic  insurrection 
still  remained  and,  beginning  in  1574,  there had  been  a  revolt  in 
Ireland.  As  arising  out  of  this  period  of  comparative  peace,  the 
benefits of  the Reformation  and of  a government.  good on  the whole, 
had  had  time  to  make  themselves felt,  and  the spirit  of  enterprize 
adapted itself to the changed  conditions, which were  manifesting them- 
selves more and more.  The continuance  of  the destructive war  in the 
Low Countries tended to the disturbance  of  the wool  industr-y, and the 
English  capital,  so displaced,  had to find  fresh outlets.  Much  of  the 
prosperity  of  the years  from  1575 to 1586 depended  on  the fact that 
l  Spillola to Lord  Burghley,  Jan.  10,  1575.  Cahdar, State  Paj~ers,  Fo~eign, 
1675-7,  p. 3. 
~'~wes,  Journals. D. 248.  ,  . 
Anderson,  Historical  and  CJhronological  Deduction  of  the  fhiyin of  Commerce, 
Dublin. 1790. 11.  D.  188. 
,  . 
4  ~ide  infra, 11.  p.  391. 
Calendar, State Papers, Foreign, 1.575-7,  p. 411. 
6  Ibid., pp.  122, 137, 176, 207, 208, 226, 250, 261, 262. 
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Englishmen  had the initiative and the courage to discover  profitable 
openings  for the resources,  so  released. 
The crisis of  1569-74  was  remarkable  in  so far as the companies, 
then existing, emerged from it in an altered form-the  Russia company 
as a new undertaking, the Mines Royal and Mineral and Battery Works 
as parent bodies, leasing certain parts of  their property to associated or 
subordinate organizations.  It has  been  shown1 that the roots of  this 
change lay in the previous development  of  the joint-stock  company, so 
that, under the change, there is in  reality continuity.  Another side of 
the enterprize of  the period is to be found in the renlarkably successful 
privateering expeditions,  and these, also, are to be connected  with  the 
crisis and the years that went  before it.  On the one hand, there had 
been  the expeditions of  Hawkins to the West Indies,  followed by the 
seizure of  the Spanish treasure-events  which showed the vulnerability  ' 
of  the fleets sailing from  America-and  on the other hand,  there was 
a  certain  amount  of  displacement  in  capital,  previously  employed in 
trade with  the nearer  European  countries. 
While  the  desire  to  make  a  fresh  start  manifested  itself  most 
strikingly in the expeditions against the Spaniards, the same imp~~lse 
is to be traced in the undertakings already in existence.  In the case of 
the Mineral  and Battery  Works the system  of  leasing  or "farming" 
the  wire-works  came  into  existence,  as  already  mentioned=, in  1571. 
The  subordinate  company  had  endeavoured  at the  end  of  1574 to 
obtain a reduction of  the rent from  g150 to 824  a year.  As against 
this  offer,  another  group  of  shareholders  tendered  500 marks,  where- 
upon those in possession increased their bid to  8200 a year, at  the same 
time binding themselves to erect additional plant.  At  the end of  1575 
the rent  increased,  probably  through similar competition,  to $5290 a 
year-that  is,  it had  almost  doubled  in  five  years3.  By  1580 the 
partners were protesting bitterly against this rent,  as excessive, while 
counter charges were made of concealed profits and of  "indirect  getting 
of  voices"  at the court meetings,  and, as a result, in 1582 a  lease  was 
made  to a  new  partnership  at 1,000  marks  or 6666. 13s. 4d.  a  year, 
which again is more than double the former rent4.  A few years after- 
wards as much  as 21,100  a  year  was  offered for  the Monmouthshire 
works.  Providing  the  higher  rents  were  paid,  these  alone  would 
represent  a  respectable  return  on  the original capital, altogether irre- 
spective  of  the  large  profits  of  the  brass-works.  Owing  to  some 
uncertainty,  as  to how  various  statements relating  to the capital  of 
this company are to be interpreteds, it is impossible to say exactly how 
1 Vide supra, p. 66.  Vide mpra, p.  58. 
Vide inf~a,  11.  p.  419.  4  Ibid., 11.  p. 420. 
Ibid., 11.  pp. 417, 418. 
CHAP. IV.]  Flf&anciaZ  State of the Mines Royal 1675-86 
much the return actually was,  but,  supposing the wire and iron-works 
could  be  leased at 61,000,  this would  yield  apparently about 14 per 
cent. or 15  per cent.  on the whole share capital,  and, in addition, there 
were the profits of  the brass-work.: 
W. 
The importance of correcting one source of information with another 
is shown, when this system  of  farming is investigated.  As practised by 
the Mineral and Battery Works,  it resulted in endless charges of  fraud 
and betrayals  of  one group of  shareholders  through  another.  In the 
case  of  the  Mines  Royal,  when  there  were  at least  two  subsidiary 
companies existing simultaneously,  no such  allegations were  made.  In 
another respect  too, the Mines Hoyal differed from  the related  under- 
taking.  Unfortunately for its shareholders, it was  far from a successful 
venture during the first years of  its history.  Up to 1575, no dividends 
had been paid.  At the end of 1576 the accounts showed that a profit of 
about 5 per cerlt. appeared to have  been  made on  the nominal  capital. 
This, for the time, was a very low return,  and it represented only 2 per 
cent. for those shareholders, who  had bought at a premium.  Moreover, 
the profit was  apparent, rather than real, since it had  been  earned  by 
suspending  the  work  of  development'.  The funds,  obtained  in  this 
way,  were  used  in  reducing  the debt due to Elizabeth, and it was  not 
long before difficulties were again encountered.  By 1579 the members 
were  faced  by  the  alternatives  of  either  paying  a  call  of  240 per 
share or leasing the Keswick mines.  At tirst,  the best offers they could 
obtain  xverc.  either to be  freed from  liability, or else  to reserve  them- 
selves  a  share  in the profits  that  the persons,  actually  working  the 
mines,  expected  to make.  Eventually  from  1580 to 1583, a  share- 
holder  obtained  separate  leases  for  the  Keswick  and  Cornish  mines, 
engaging to pay the royalty to the Queen and a rent in money to the 
society  besides  a  portion  of  the  copper  or  silver  won.  Under  this 
arrangement in 1586, the society was receiving, in rents and estimated 
royalty,  8900 a  year,  yielding  about  44  per  cent.  on  the nominal 
capital.  In the  following year,  however,  a  very  important  discovery 
of  silver was  made at Combe Martin.  This mine was  situated within 
the area, reserved to the society, and therefore it is probable that either 
a rent or royalty was received.  Should this have been so and should the 
company have been able to exact the terms it claimed in  other cases, it 
is possible  that all the capital hitherto expended was  returned to the 
members.  It is recorded  that the partners made  a profit  in two yean 
of  260,000.  This would  be  clear  of  royalty to the society, which,  on 
the basis  of  one-third  of  the whole profit,  would  have been  .&?30,000. 
At the same time, it may have been that this mine was granted directly 
l  Vide infra, 11.  pp. 303, 394. 
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from  the  Crown,  in  which  case no  profit  would  have  accrued  to the 
society, and there is a certain amount of  indirect evidence in support of 
this interpretation  of  the facts,  since the rent, received for the Keswick 
mines.  was  set  aside  to  extinguish  the  balance  of  the  -.  debt.  The 
results obtained by Smith and his  partners are detailed elsewhere ;  -.  and,  --  - 
speaking  generally,  it seems  that up  to about 1589 he  was  making 
a  profit  at Keswick,  but  that he  had  incurred  considerable  loss  in 
Cornwall l. 
The  society  of  the  Mines  Royal  deserved  to  meet  with  more 
success than it actually obtained.  Burghley was governor ;  and, durillg 
the sixteenth  century,  its management  was  enlightened.  The share- 
holders,  too,  were  alert  and  enterprizing,  many  of  them  frequently 
visited  the  mines  and  suggested  improvements.  A  large  amount  of 
prospecting  work  was  accomplished,  niiners being  sent  to Ireland  as 
early as  1571 to look  for  copper  and lead mines  there.  The skilled 
men  at  Keswick  were  treated,  on  the  whole,  with  consideration. 
Although  it was  natural  that shareholders,  who  had  invested  large 
sums  and  who  had  to wait  almost  indefinitely  for  a  return,  should 
complain, the society was always prepared,  once  it was  receiving rents, 
to spend  a  part of  its revenue  in making  fresh  discoveries;  and, on 
many occasions, it remitted  a  portion of  the rent, due by farmers who 
had fallen into difficulties. 
A comparison of  the Mines Royal with the Russia company at this 
time shows the error of  judging  on a  priori  principles,  unsupported by 
evidence.  Stating the matter abstractedly,  it would  seem  that the 
management of  an undertaking, composed partly of  noblemen, partly of 
gentlemen,  partly  of  merchants,  would  be  less successful than that of 
another (such as  the Russia  company), where the mercantile class was 
in  a  great majority.  Yet as a  matter  of  fact this  was  not  so.  The 
organization  of  the  mining  venture  has,  as  far  as  recorded,  escaped 
blame ;  while there are very numerous complaints of the almost complete 
failure  of  the governor  and assistants  of  the other  body  to exercise 
an efficient control  over  its factors  in  Russia.  This  had  been  the 
chief  cause  of  the small  arnount  of  success,  which  had  attended  the 
first Russia company ;  and, after the formation of  the new  joint-stock, 
about 1573, the same evil continuedz.  Still as far as can be gathered, 
this venture was much more fortunate than its predecessor.  There were 
two main reasons for the improvement.  In the first place, there can be 
no  doubt that the management was  most  enterprizirlg in making new 
discoveries;  and,  during  the closing  years  of  the previous  company, 
expeditions  had  been  made  by  the  Volga  and  the Caspian  Sea  into 
1  Vide infka, 11.  pp. 385-9.  2  Ibid., 11.  pp. 42,  46,  47. 
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Persia.  Circrlmstances precluded the former adventurers from profiting 
by the discovery, which  was  the most  valuable asset transferred  to the 
new  company.  At first sight,  it may  seem  that the idea of  bringing 
Eastern  com~nodities  by  the  White  Sea  and  the Baltic  involved  an 
unnecessary  amount  of  transportation.  But,  at this  period,  English 
ships had not established a regular trade into the Mediterranean.  The 
risk  from  the  Barbary  pirates,  the  hostility  of  the Turks  and  the 
uncertainty  of  the  attitude  of  Spain  made  such  a  voyage  one  of 
remarkable  hazard.  Therefore,  up  to the foundation  of  the  Levant 
company in  15811, it is   roba able  that the Russian  route was  the less 
dangerous  of  the two.  Now  this  trade gave  England a  very  strong 
position  in  the  European  market  for  spices  and drugs-in  fact  the 
Russia  company,  having  failed  to establish  a  European  monopoly  in 
wax  and  cordage,  was  successf~il for  a  few  years  in  making  one  fn 
Oriental commodities.  Therefore, there is every reason to believe that, 
from 1573  to 1581, this part of the trade was  exceedingly remunerative, 
as is  shorvn  fro111 the suggestion made  by Mendoza,  the Spanish  Am- 
bassador in England, that a special envoy should be sent to intrigue with 
the Tartars to induce them to interrupt the trade2. 
In the second place, the growth of  luxury, after the privateers began 
to capture Spanish treasure, increased the demand for the goods brought 
from  Persia;  while  the  activity  in  English  shipping  added  to the 
steady demand for ropes  and sail-cloth.  To some extent,  the decline 
of  the export of  cloth,  by withdrawing shipping from  the North  Sea 
trade, would diminish  the consumption of  these commodities, but this 
loss to the Russia  company  was  more than made good  by the require- 
ments of  ships, sailing to the West and South.  Moreover, the losses of 
spars and rigging, either by storm or battle, were  inuch greater in the 
new  voyages  than  in  the old; and,  altogether,  the  imports  of  naval 
stores were increased materially during the existence of the second Russia 
company.  Therefore,  up to 1581,  both  branches  of  the undertaking 
were nourishing exceedingly.  There is no means of  obtaining a quanti- 
tative  estimate  of  the profits  made  beyond  the  statement  that  the 
last  Persian  expedition,  which  was  counted  unfortunate,  owing  to 
the  loss  of  two-thirds  of  the  goods,  returned  the  shareholders  106 
per  cent. 
After  1581 the  Eastern  trade  was  abandoned,  owing  to  the in- 
creasing dangers  of  the route,  and  the company had  to depend  upon 
its  original  Russian  trade.  This  may  have  afforded  a  respectable 
Vide infru, 11.  p. 84. 
Wabndar  of' Letters and State Papers, relating to English A  fairs, preserved  prin- 
cipally in the Archivea of Simancas,  1580-6,  pp. 366-8. 
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return1, although  the  dividends  would  have  been  inconsiderable,  as 
compared with  the 300 per cent.  or  400 per cent. that may have been 
paid during the best yean of the Persian expeditions ;  but the company 
determined  to share  in  the prosperity  of  the privateering enterprizes, 
and it  is said to have subscribed 24,000 to the voyage sent out towards 
the  East  by  the adventurers  in  Frobisher's  Voyages?  As  far  as  is 
known,  this venture  was  not successful, and by 1583 the company was 
in difficulties.  In 1586 it was  decided  to transfer the remaining assets 
to a new company which came into being at that date3. 
Two questions of  some interest arise, in connection with the history 
of  the Russia company from  1573 to 1586.  In several respects, had it 
been able to recommence the Persian trade, it would have found a rival 
in the Levant  company  after 1581.  In fact,  the great caravan  route 
from India through Persia would have been common ground to both, and 
therefore, although each  had a  monopoly as against any other English- 
men using  its route, both  would be,  in a sense, competitors.  Were it 
true,  as generally  assumed, that the Levant company was a regulated 
one, it would  be  of  interest to endeavour  to ascertain what  were the 
grounds for re-introducing this type of  organization, and that, too, at a 
time when  the most  important joint-stock  company and the only one, 
as yet, for foreign trade was doing remarkably well.  But, although the 
Levant company was undoubtedly a regulated one at a later stage of  its 
history, it may not have been founded as such.  There is, at least, some 
evidence that would point to some such conclusion.  At its foundation, 
Elizabeth lent the governor and three assistants a sum of  over £40,000, 
obviously a  part of  the great capture brought home  by Drake in the 
previous  year4.  Now,  it is  unlikely  the  loan  was  made  to  these 
merchants,  as individuals,  and previous  experience had  shown that it 
was  difficult to collect large sums from a regulated company.  Besides, 
in  1583 Mendoza  wrote  that efforts were being made to raise  a large 
capital, to sustain the "  Levant negotiation."  Not only had the richest 
merchants and companies contributed, but Elizabeth and  members of 
the  Privy  Council  had  subscribed,  so  that  altogether  280,000  was 
raisedj.  It  is  difficult to understand  how  the  Queen  and noblemen 
could  have joined  in  the venture, had  it been  a  regulated  company, 
since  this  would  have  involved  the supervision  of  his  investment  by 
1  The last season's  account of this group of adventurers, made up to December 
1585,  gave  a total  divisioll  of g108.  17s.  8d. per  cent.  So  many  of the  debts, 
reckoned  as  good, proved  bad, that the shareholders  were assessed  to make good 
the loss.-Infra,  11.  p.  47. 
2  Ibid., 11.  pp.  81, 82.  Ibid., 11.  p.  48. 
4  Xotes of Queen Elizabeth's Reign by Burghley in Murdin, State Papers, 1571-96, 
p.  747. 
6  Cblendar oj'statr Pullers ...  in the Archives of Simancas,  1680-6,  p. 432. 
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each  member, in  purchasing  goods and sending an agent to sell  them 
in  Turkey,  besides  marketing  the  commodities  brought  back  in  his 
ship  l. 
In another  connection  the position  of  the Russia  company is  im- 
portant at this time.  Under the act of  1566 it had the sole right of 
trade  with  countries  '' not  commonly  frequented " by  Englishmen, 
discovered  by  its agents, either to the north, north-east  or north-west 
of  London2.  The company  prosecuted  its discoveries vigorously.  By 
1556 the north-eastern passage had been traced as far as the river Obi3. 
Then in  the next ten years,  the route to Persia  had  been  found  and 
trading posts  established.  In this way  the  energies of  the company 
were diverted from the finding of  a north-western passage, and, when in 
1569 Frobisher  believed  he  could  accomplish  this  discovery,  he  was 
prevented by the privileges of  the company4.  It required a letter from 
the  Privy  Council  to force  the company  to license  Frobisher's  first 
expedition.  The necessity  for  such  an  order  seems  to point  to an 
abuse  of  the monopoly  by  the adventurers  to Russia,  but  they  had 
certain  arguments  in  favour  of  their  action.  Frobisher  and  his 
associates were  unable  to  convince  the  company  that  the proposed 
expedition  was  really  designed to search  for a north-west passage,  and 
the vagueness of  the scheme  raised  suspicions that "  some other matter 
was  meant  by  the  parties5."  The attitude of  the  company,  towards 
other  expeditions  to America,  shows  that  it was  not  adverse  to en- 
couraging such ventures, provided it was shown that no attempt would be 
made to enter the market, reserved to the undertaking in Russia.  For 
instance,  after  some  negotiation,  the  company  licensed  a  proposed 
expedition  of  Hunlphrey  Gilbert  in  1567, stating that it "very  well 
liked"  the suggestion  that he  should  be  governor of  any territory he 
planted  in  America6.  Again in  1583,  when  Christopher  Carlile  was 
arranging  for  a  voyage  to the  "hithermost  parts of  America,"  the 
articles  were  drawn  up  by  a  joint-committee,  composed  partly  of 
Carlile's  associates and partly  of  members  of  the Russia  company7. 
By either itself  opening new trade routes,  or enmuraging others  to 
do  so,  the  Russia  company  constituted  the pivot  of  maritime  enter- 
prize  to the north.  This might  be  described  as  the  legitimate  ex- 
pansion of  English foreign trade up to 1580.  At the same time, there 
was  another  side  to  the same  movement,  which  was  of  a  different 
character.  This was  the series of  expeditions for the plundering of  the 
l  Vide infra, 11.  pp.  84, 85. 
2  Ibid., 11.  p.  41. 
3  Ibid., 11.  p. 76.  Ibid., 11.  p.  77.  The  Three  Voyuges  qf  Martin  Frobieher,  edited  by  Rear-Admiral  Richard 
Collinson  (Hakluyt Soc.  1867), D.  89. 
..  A 
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Spanish plate-fleets  and settlements in  America.  The origin of  such 
ventures is to be found in the crisis of  1569-74,  partly arising from the 
diversion  of  shipping  from  the Baltic  trade,  partly in the successful 
seizure of  the Spanish treasure  in  1568.  Before this date,  there had 
been  a  large  amount  of  English  ~iratical  privateering,  that is,  the 
depredations on Spanish commerce within the Channel and other home 
waters.  Legally, perhaps, the unauthorized expeditions towards Spanish 
America were of  a similar kind, but, morally, some excuse map be made 
for them, although they cannot be altogether extenuated.  International 
law at this period was  in its infancy, if  indeed  it could be said to exist 
at all.  To the English  sailor the sea was  open to all,  and the man, 
who  had a grievance  against any nation,  might  exact  reprisals  on his 
own  account.  Unquestionably  the Spaniard  was  within  his  rights in 
closing the ports of  the countries in his  occupation in  America.  The 
adventurers,  who  like  Hawkins,  tried  to trade,  in  spite  of  this well- 
known prohibition, must have expected to run the risk  of  loss  of  ships 
and cargoes, but what roused intense  indignation  in  England  was  the 
policy of  consigning such men, as were captured, to the tortures of  the 
Inquisition.  Most of the raiders of  Spanish commerce had lost relatives 
or friends in this way, and it was not contrary to the spirit of  the time 
for those, who had been aggrieved, to take the law into their own hands, 
by  exacting  retribution  how  and  when  they  could.  It  was  for  this 
reason that these adventurers  aimed as much at the doing of  wanton 
damage as securing plunder.  Spontaneous action of  this kind, while it 
enornlously complicated the perplexities  of  the political situation, had 
the effect of teaching the world the high value set by Englishmen on the 
lives and liberties of  their fellow-countrymen. 
The epoch  of  the raids  on  Spanish commerce  is one  of  great inl- 
portance in the progress of  England.  For upwards of  twenty years, the 
power and wealth  of  Spain had been menacing Elizabeth.  Her states- 
men had tried to weaken or  embarrass Philip by assisting  his  revolted 
subjects in the Low Countries, but what Flanders was to Spain, Ireland 
was,  to some  extent,  to  England'.  From  1574  Philip  was  able to 
adopt an exactly similar policy in  supporting the insurrection  against 
Elizabeth's government, so that the diplomatic strife had resulted  in  a 
drawn battle, the only effect of  which  had been a very serious drain  on 
the finances of  Philip and a considerable one, now beginning, on those of 
Thus Burghley  speaks of  Flanders as the "counterscarp"  of  the defences of 
England.  Similarly Hatton describes Scotland and Ireland as a "posterll-gate"  by 
which  "the  entries and ways to our destruction  may  most  aptly be  found."-The 
Lord  Tremurer H~~rleigh's  Advice  to  queer^ Elizabeth in Matters of Religion  and State, 
in Somers' Tracts (1762), xnr. p. 106 ;  Memoirs of the Life and Times of'Sir Gfhristopher 
Hatton, by Sir Harris Nicolas, 1747, p.  158. 
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Elizabeth.  It remained  for  the  seamen  of  England  to discover  the 
most vulnerable  part of  the power  of  Spain ;  and they did this,  quite 
unconsciously,  with  a  view  to avenge  ~ersonal  wrongs  and for  their 
~rivate  profit.  At this ~eriod  few,  if  any,  understood the importance 
of  power  on  the sea.  Spain  was  drawing  much  of  its wealth  from 
America; arid the galleons were ill-adapted for preserving the necessary 
communications,  free  from  interruption.  Spanish  naval  construction, 
for a number of  years,  had failed  to advance; while  that of  England 
was daily adapting itself  to the new  circun~stances,  that confronted the 
maritime population.  English ships were being built so as to give both 
speed  and capacity for manaeuvring.  Probably there was no aggressive 
intention  in  this  development.  For  it  was  forced  on  those,  who 
navigated  the northern seas,  so as  to be  able to avoid ice-floes,  or to 
sail in safety along an unknown coast.  Thus English ship-building was 
evolving  a  medium-sized, agile  ship ; while  the  Spaniards  continued 
to build  their  slow  and  massive  galleons.  Therefore,  when  the  pri- 
vateers began to engage the plate ships, they soon  found  that superior 
speed  more  than  compensated  them  for  their  smaller  tonnage,  and 
Spanish naval  power  was  tersely described as "a Colossus stuffed  with 
clouts." 
The privateering expeditions against the Spaniards in America con- 
stituted the training school for  the battle  against the Armada.  The 
bravery of  those, engaged in them, has been a source of  gratification to 
Englishmen for many generations.  Naturally,  the courage shown  and 
the victories won  have excited attention and even pride in the historians 
of  the ~eriod. Yet there  was  another  side to these  voyages,  namely 
their effect on the social progress  of  the country,  the means  by which 
the objects gained were effected and the result of  the whole movement 
on the commerce of the country. 
The raids against Spanish America from 1568 up to the time of  the 
Armada  divide  themselves  naturally  into two  groups; the earlier  of 
which  ends with the return of  Drake's  expedition  round  the world  in 
1580.  In both series there is the common element that all of  them, of 
which  there  is  any  record,  were  conducted  by  joint-stock  companies. 
This plan had many advantages.  Financially it enabled the investor to 
distribute, and so minimize the risk of a hazardous enterprize.  Suppose, 
for instance, a capitalist was prepared to adventure 82,000 in privateer- 
ing, he could only fit out one ship of about 200 tons or two smaller ones. 
His expedition might be too weak to make any captures of importance, or 
it might be  sunk  by the Spaniards.  If,  on  the other hand, he joined 
in several larger  expeditions, even  if  one  of  these were a total failure, 
he had every prospect of  obtaining handsome profits from his shares in 
the  others.  Moreover,  the sole-owner was  subject  to a  further  risk. 74  Privateering on a Joint-Stock Basis 1570-80  [CHAP. IV. 
Even  if  he  succeeded  in  taking prizes,  the  Spanish  ambassador  had 
agents at  all the chief ports, and demands would be made for the return 
of  the captured ships and goods.  Whether these were complied with or 
not depended partly on the political outlook at the time,  partly on the 
amount  of  influence that could  be  brought  to bear  in favour  of  the 
privateersman.  Obviously  a  company  or  syndicate,  which  included 
amongst its members prominent personages at Court,  was  much  more 
likely  to be  allowed  to retain  its prize  than  the single  unsupported 
adventurer.  Besides, there was  not only financial, but personal risk to 
the individual  owner  of  a  privateer.  There  was  always the danger 
that,  under pressure from  Spain, the English  government  might hold 
him  criminally  liable  for  any loss  of  life,  occasioned  by  his  ships  in 
an engagement  at sea.  This risk  was  eliminated  by the formation of 
a  syndicate or company, which  conducted  its operations in secret, and 
the members  of  which,  although  they might  be  suspected, remained 
undetected.  There was a further advantage in the management of such 
enterprizes  on  a joint-stock basis, which applied to the later raids and 
which  was  wholly  political.  Elizabeth  herself  was  able,  by  taking 
shares  in  an  expedition,  to  control  its  management;  and  thus  she 
was  in  the  strong  diplomatic  position  of  obtaining all  the gain  of 
carrying  on  a  localized war  against  Spain  and  escaping  most  of  the 
disadvantages.  Should  any  particular  expedition  result  in  extreme 
complications, it could be disavowed ;  and there would be no proof that 
the government had been  in any way committed to it.  There was also 
the further  immense  saving  to the Crown  that certain  ships  of  the 
navy were kept in commission and the crews trained, without involving 
any charge on the finances. 
To understand  fully  how  these  objects  were  accomplished,  it is 
necessary  to investigate  the internal  organization  of  the privateering 
syndicate.  In the special circumstances, it is only to be  expected  that 
information is difficult to obtain.  The whole operations were conducted 
with the greatest secrecy, since success depended on the raid being made 
at a  place  where  the  Spaniards  were  unprepared.  The spies of  the 
Spanish ambassador were always on  the watch to glean any news  that 
might  be  useful,  and  even  the  smallest  hint  might  have  occasioned 
disaster.  It was for this reason that, it is related, Elizabeth swore she 
would have any man's  head, who informed the King of  Spain about the 
fitting  out  of  Drake's  expedition  in  1577l.  There was  yet  another 
cause  that accounts  for  the lack  of  detail  of  the internal  affairs of 
these undertakings.  The capital required was  found only for a specific 
expedition.  When the ships returned and the captures had been sold, 
1 The Great Lord  Burghley, by Martin A. S. Hume, London, 1898, p. 346. 
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the proceeds were divided and the whole business was  wound up.  It is 
fortunate  that exceptionally full accounts have  been  preserved  of  the 
allied ventures  of  Frobisher; and, in so far as this information  can be 
applied  to the privateering  voyages,  almost  every  detail  can  be  sub- 
stantiated by a parallel incident in the management of  some one of  the 
raiding syndicates. 
First  of  all, it will  be  convenient  to distinguish  such  parts  of  the 
Frobisher  expeditions  as  were  peculiar  to them.  The whole  series, 
extending from 1576 to 1579 with a supplemental  voyage in  1583, was 
unfortunate.  Frobisher  believed  he  had  found  ore,  containing  gold, 
and it turned out that a serious mistake had been made.  Therefore, the 
capital subscribed for the first voyage was  carried down  to the second; 
so that, in  this case, each expedition had not a  separate capital which 
was  wound up at the end of  the voyage.  Since,  too, there was  less of 
a furtive character  about this company, it was able to obtain a charter, 
with  full  incorporation  and precise  rules  for the conduct of  business. 
The evolutioii of the term "stock,"  in the sense of  a negotiable security, 
is shown very clearly in the following extract from one of  these rules- 
namely that del00 was to be accounted "  one single parte or share in stok 
of  the companyl."  It therefore follows that  at  this period "stock"  meant 
simply  a  share  of  2100,  which  was  regarded  as  divisible  into half 
shares,  but  not  into  smaller  subdivisions.  This  use  of  the  term 
brings into more prominence the ambiguity mentioned  in  the previous 
chapter2, since  the  whole outlay  (or  stock  in  one sense)  on  the first 
three voyages was  220,160, whereas the "parts,"  or "shares  in stock," 
amounted  to 212,102. 10s.3 
Comparing  what  was  common  to the companies, that found  the 
capital  for  the expeditions of  Frobisher, Drake,  and others,  with  the 
methods of  the Adventurers  to Africa4, the former show an advance in 
the manner of  dealing with the capital employed.  In both cases, goods 
were  adventured ;  but, in the earlier instance, these were dealt with on 
the basis  of  a  share in the profits, whereas subsequently ships or com- 
modities were valued and became a part of  the capital.  For instance, 
when  in 1561 Elizabeth lent ships to join  in the voyage to Africa, she 
was  compensated  for  her  risk  by  receiving  a  share  of  the  profit: 
whereas  in  1577, on  again  subscribing  a  vessel  to Frobisher's  second 
voyage, a very careful and minute valuatiod was  made,  and "shares  in 
the stock" given her accordingly"  This change of  procedure had two 
Vide infra, 11. p.  79.  Vide supra, p. 62. 
Vide infra, 11. p. 82.  4  Vide supra, p. 30; i~gra,  XI. pp. 5-7,  77-81. 
6  The  Inventarie  of  the  Ship  dyde,  printed  in  The  Three  Voyages  of  Martin 
Frobisher,  pp.  218-23,  cf.  Murdin,  State  Papers,  ut supra,  p.  303; Sir  Francis 
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im~orta~lt  consequences.  The nominal outlay  on a voyage after  1575 
tends  to appear greater, when  compared with  that on  an earlier  one, 
owing to the inclusion of the estimated value of the ship or ships at the 
later date.  In the second  lace, when an attempt is made to estimate 
the success of  a privateering expedition, the profit, for similar reasons, 
was generally larger  than  it would appear at first  sight.  Suppose, for 
instance, the whole capital of  an expedition were  25,000 and that the 
captures, after  all  expenses were  paid,  realized say 210,000,  it would 
seem that the division would  be  200 per cent.,  or a profit  of  100 per 
cent.  I11  reality, however, it would have been about 250 per cent., or a 
profit of  150 per cent.  For, if  all the ships returned safely, when they 
were repaired, each shareholder, who "subscribed"  a ship, would receive 
it back again.  On an average, the cost of  the ship, as distinct from its 
stores, was about half the whole sum at which it was capitalized.  There- 
fore, when a division came to be  made on  the 25,000 nominal  capital, 
there would  be  a  total amount of  212,500  to be  distributed, namely 
&10,000  of  plunder  and the refitted  ships,  valued  say at 22,500 and 
returned to the original  owners. 
In organizing  a  privateering  expedition,  when  the ships had  been 
subscribed, it remained  to fit  them  out for  service.  This outlay was 
met  by  those  who  had  subscribed  money,  and  if  the  money  were 
proportionately  greater than the commodity-subscriptions,  ships might 
be purchased1 and sold  at the end  of  the voyage.  Ammunition  and 
provisions were bought, and other stores were  provided  for a period  of 
service, varying  from  three months to two years.  Generally  speaking, 
the privateers depended upon  supplying themselves, when they reached 
their chosen cruising ground;  so that, as a rule, their cost of  provisions 
was  lower than in other cases.  No funds were reserved for the payment 
of  wages, since the claims of  the men were  met out of  the proceeds  of 
the voyage.  If it were  highly successful, they obtained  a bonus : if  it 
were a total failure, it was necessary to assess the shareholders to provide 
the funds required. 
The whole capital  outlay of  Frobisher's Voyages and of  one or two 
of  the privateering  expeditions,  made  up  in  the manner  explained, is 
known2.  From a careful study of  the details of  these ventures, certai~i 
ratios  emerge,  which  are  either  constant  or  vary  within  assignable 
limits.  Taking the number  of  men, carried  on  armed  ships, the pro- 
portion  was  almost invariably about one  man  to every two tons.  In 
ships  of  small  burden,  the ratio  was  slightly  higher-for  instance  in 
1 E.g. Frobisher's first Voyage, cf. infra,  11. p. 77. 
2  Ibid., 11. p.  82 ;  The  Three  Voyr~ges  of  Martin Frobz'sher, pas8im ;  State Papers, 
Domestic, Elizabeth, CCXXII.  89, 01, 97, 98,  ccxxxrII. 56; Hakluyt,  Voyages, paseim; 
Liye of  Sir E?a?~cis  Drake, by John Barrow,  1843, passim. 
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Frobisher's  first  voyage,  there  were  34  persons  and  the  aggregate 
tonnage was 55l.  The general ratio  of  one to two is  confirmed by the 
figures of  the ships serving against the Armada, which were  of  31,985 
tons, manned  by 15,272 men2.  The importance of  this ratio is that, if 
either the capital outlay per ton or per nian can be established, the cost 
of an expedition can be ascertained within narrow limits. 
The chief element of variation in the charge for an armed expedition 
was  the amount  of  provisions  carried.  Frobisher's  first  voyage  was 
provisioned for a year, and therefore the expense was  greater than the 
average.  Neglecting  some wages  or bounty to seamen, the whole cost, 
before the ships sailed,  was  2992, of  which  8387 (or  39  per  cent.) 
represented  provisions.  Therefore,  in an expedition  of  this  size,  pro- 
visioned  for  a  year,  the outlay per  ton  was  215.9, but  on  the same 
basis, allowing only three months' provisions, the charge per ton would 
be  reduced to 812.75.  The figures for the second  voyage  are slightly 
higher,  and some difficulty arises  in  interpreting those  for  the third, 
since the outlay was  £6,922.  lOs.,  and fifteen ships sailed.  It  is almost 
certain that, of  these, eleven were  hired to carry the ore and were fitted 
out  by  their  owners,  irrespective  of  the joint-stock.  This  left  four 
vessels of 650 tons, carrying 250 men, giving an outlay of  210.7 per ton, 
227.7 per man or 21,730 per ship. 
The following statement shows in detail the results  of  a  number of 
calculations on this basis : 
Statemnt of  Capital cost  of  certain expeditions, 







'fiis  is the highest figure given for the tonnage,  others are recorded which are 
lower. 
Murdin, State Papers, p. 618 ;  State Papers relating to  the  Ddeat of  the Spanish 
Armada, edited  by  Prof. J. K. Laughton (Publications Nag Records  Soc. 1895,rr. 
p. 331). 
On the basis of there being four ships on the joint-stock. 
Adding to the tonnage  of  the 20  ships,  as given in Nacal  Tracts  of  Sir  W'. 
Mowon, ed. by M. Oppenheim (hhlications ,?Tavy  Records Soc. XXII.  p. 124), that of 
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Applying these results to the expedition  of  Drake in 1577 to 1580, 
it is  possible  to  reconstruct,  with  some  approximation  to accuracy, 
the valuation  of  his little fleet, together with other financial aspects of 
the venture, which  were  sedulously concealed.  There were  four  small 
ships  with  an aggregate tonnage  of  375.  The number  of  the crews 
varies  in  different accounts from  150 to 164l.  Therefore, in  size, this 
voyage was midway between the second and third Frobisher expeditions. 
Taking  the  average  of  these  and  also  that  of  the  maximum  and 
minimum  of  the number  of  the crews, according  to the tonnage rate2, 
the whole outlay would amount to B5,212, and, on the rate per man, to 
about B4,67g3.  Probably the actual expenditure lay between  the two 
sums, and it is not unlikely that the capital required was  slightly under 
25,000.  The  consequences  of  this  modest  outlay  were  sufficiently 
startling.  The expedition  had  the distinction  of  being  the first  to 
circumnavigate the globe, it brought about an acute political crisis with 
Spain, besides capturing an amount of  silver, gold, pearls  and  precious 
stones,  described  as "  enormous,"  "immense,"  or even "  incalculable." 
From the financial point  of  view, there is  no  little fascination  in  the 
effort to bring to light facts, which  were concealed with  extraordinary 
care; besides, there is the interest of  ascertaining how the shareholders 
in the syndicate fared, and what were the dividends they received. 
The whole situation was  unique.  Drake had  rounded  Cape  Horn 
and  secured  vast  treasure  before  the  Spaniards  had  made  any  pre- 
parations to resist him.  When armed  ships had been  collected, Drake 
evaded the avengers by sailing west, instead of  returning by the way he 
came.  Then he disappeared for nionths ;  and, meanwhile, news reached 
Spain  of  the  variety  and  extent  of  his  depredations.  In time this 
information  filtered  to  England,  and  in  September  1579  Mendoza 
records  that the adventurers were  beside themselves with joy, and that 
people  were  talking  of  nothing  else  but  the  fitting  out  of  similar 
expeditions4.  Steps were at once  taken by  the adventurers to convey 
secret  instructions  to all  justices  of  the peace  that, wherever  Drake 
might land, every assistance should be  given him  in at once concealing 
the treasure5.  Even at this early date, it is quite plain that Mendoza 
had  almost  despaired  of  obtaining  restitution.  These  preparations 
ante-dated the actual  arrival  of  the plunder  by  more than a  year. 
When Drake returned everything was  in readiness.  It was  reported 
150 men and  14 boys.--Sir  Francis Drake,  by  Julian Corbett, London,  1890, 
p. 60. 
2  I.e.  17.1 +  10.7  375.  I.e. 
31a9+27.7  150+164 
2  2  2. 
4  Calendar of  State Papers ...  in the Archives of  Simuncas, 1568-79,  p. 694. 
Ibid., p. 701. 
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that the treasure amounted to a million and a half  sterling1.  Mendoza 
records that it had been "  confessed" that silver, gold and pearls were 
brought back to the value of  over a  million  and three quarters, while, 
according to advices from  Seville, Drake had captured even more than 
this2. 
It  is  highly  probable  that,  before  news  reached  London  of  the 
arrival of  the expedition, a large amount of  the bullion and jewels had 
been  secreted.  In the Privy Council, opinion  was  divided  as to what 
should be done with the treasure.  Burghley was in favour  of  repaying 
the adventurers their principal  and returning the rest;  Leicester  and 
others, who probably had shares in the syndicate, were strongly opposed 
to this course.  The documents, relating to the transaction, have every 
appearance of being prepared for some ulterior purpose.  They comprise 
a letter from Edmund Tremayne (who supervised the detention  of  the 
bullion  on  behalf  of  the  government)  to Walsingham  with  certain 
enclosures,  giving  the answers to various  questions,  he  was to ask  the 
members  of  the  expedition.  The  replies  were  signed  by  forty-six 
persons, but since they had not as yet been  paid  their wages,  it is im- 
possible  to give  too  little credence  to  their depositions.  Asked  first 
whether it was true that the value of  the plunder  was  a  million and a 
half, the seamen replied that some silver and some gold had been taken, 
but they did not know the value of  it, "  which was a very small sum in 
respect  of  what  there is reported."  It was  altogether untrue that any 
ships were sunk with their crews on board.  No Spaniards were slain  or 
maimed ;  and,  in  only one case, was  a  man wounded.  He was  hurt in 
the face, and Drake lodged  him  in his own  ship, fed  him  at his  own 
table and would not suffer him to depart before he was  recovered3.  To 
complete the comedy, a  most exact and careful  inventory was taken of 
the bullion, which was packed  in 46 bales, containing in all 10,812 lbs., 
worth about 846,000.  This was  conveyed to the Tower, publicly with 
due  escort4.  It  is  highly  significant,  however,  that as  late  as  1585, 
there  was  then  remaining  of  the bullion  "brought  by  Sir  Francis 
Drake,"  despite the fact that many  payments  had  been  made  in the 
interval  out of  this  treasure,  no  less  than  9,056 lbs.  l7  ozs.  besides 
101 lbs. 1  oz.  of  gold5.  It is quite plain  that what had happened  was 
that  Drake  had  removed a certain  amount  of  the treasure; this was 
State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, CXLIV.  17. 
Calendar  oj' State  Papers ...  in the  Archives  of  Simancas,  1580-6,  p.  63.  The 
amount stated is, in weight of bullion,  400,000 lbs.  of silver,  five boxes of gold a 
foot and  a half  long and  some valuable pearls.  The silver bullion was  valued  at 
g4. 4s. 23d. per lb.  Murdin, State Papers, p. 781. 
State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, CXLIV.  17 (ii). 
* Ibid., cx~rv.  17 (i).  6  Murdin, State Papere,  p. 540. Destination  of  the  Prize-.Bzclliow 1580  [CHAP.  IV. 
primarily  for the adventurers, but some of  it was  sent  secretly to the 
Tower.  These  facts  appear  clearly  in  the  despatch  of  Tremayne, 
covering the documents already mentioned.  He was  careful to explain 
that he enjoined  Drake to impart no  more than  was  needed, "for  so 
I hear him  commanded,  in  Her Majesty's  behalf, that he  should  not 
reveal the certainty to any man  living."  Drake agreed  with  Elizabeth 
that  he  was  to receive  &10,000  secretly,  this  sum  was  partly  as  a 
personal  reward  for  his  services, partly to afford  him  ready  money to 
secure the support  of  some  doubtful  members  of  the Privy  Council. 
Time was given Drake, not only to remove the &10,000 unobserved, but 
also to conceal elsewhere "  the portion  that had been  landed secretly." 
Accordingly, when  only enough  remained  to make a  respectable  show, 
Tremayne and Christopher  Harris (who  was  to convey the bullion  to 
the Tower) went with Drake to the place,  where the ingots were  stoied, 
and thereupon the inventory, already mentioned, was  made1. 
Soon after the arrival of  the treasure, the only question  remaining 
undecided was  whether a small part of  the plunder was to be  restored, 
or all of  it was  to be  retained.  Already the greater part was  placed 
out of  reach  of  the government.  The attitude of  Elizabeth,  at the 
time of  the arrival of  the expedition,  is  difficult  to determine.  She 
appeared  to have  an  open  mind  on  the  subject,  but  there  is  some 
evidence that she held  shares  in  the syndicate.  At a time when  the 
crews  were  dissatisfied during the voyage,  Drake  produced  "a by11  of 
hir Maiesties adventure of  a  1,000 crowns,"  also one in favour  of  Sir 
Christopher  Hatton2.  If  this  account  is  correct,  Elizabeth  was  in- 
terested  as an adventurer; and, besides, tempting  offers  were  made  to 
her by Drake of  a much larger  part of  the coin and bullion.  At first 
there were  two parties  in  the Council, the one  in  favour  of, and the 
other against restitution.  Eventually a  compromise was  agreed  upon. 
Attention was drawn to the subsidizing of  rebellion in Ireland by Philip, 
and the assistance given to the insurgents by  Spanish  soldiers.  If, on 
the one hand, Philip gave satisfactory assurances that he would  cease to 
interfere in Ireland, it was  proposed that the adventurers should  either 
receive back their capital or their capital with a profit of  100 per cent., 
and that the rest of  the plunder  should be  restored.  If, on the other 
hand,  no  such  undertaking  were  given,  the whole  amountS would  be 
employed in carrying on the war in Ireland"  This compromise was  an 
obvious  subterfuge,  since  at this  time  and  for  some  years  before, 
1 State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, CXLIV.  17. 
2  The World E~zcompassed,  by Sir  Francis Drake (Hakluyt Society, 18.54)) p. 216. 
3  That is the whole ostensible amount-as  already shown  much of the treasure 
had already been concealed. 
4  Calendar of  State Papers. ..in the Archizes of'Siwmncas, 15804, pp. 59, 63. 
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Elizabeth had been subsidizing and assisting the leaders of  the revolt in 
the Low Countries.  However, the whole  question  was  whether  Philip 
was  able, or was  willing  to go to war  on  the ground  of  the captures, 
made  by  Drake; and,  although  for  some time the situation was  very 
threatening,  war  was  avoided. 
Since then the treasure  was  not restored to Spain, it was  available 
for  division  in  England.  First  of  all,  there  were  the claims  of  the 
adventurers.  These had been  secured from  the beginning by the con- 
cealment  of  a  very  large  portioil  of  the  proceeds  of  the  voyage. 
Fortunately  the amount  of  the division  made  to them  has  survived. 
Lewis Roberts  records the result in the following terms : "the voyage.. . 
made  profit  to himselfe  [i.e.  to Drake]  and merchants  of  London  his 
partners and fellow-adventurers, according to an account made up at his 
return, all  charges paid  and discharged, which I have  seen  subscribed 
under  his owne hand, 47 li for one  ~ound;  so that he who  adventur'd 
with him in this voyage 100 li had  4700 li  for the same1."  Therefore, 
on the estimate of  the capital outlay, upon the basis already indicated2, 
as  being  something  under  &5,000,  the  amount  divided  to  the ad- 
venturers would  come to about 2250,000.  This agrees with the figures 
recorded  of  the  bullion  captured,  namely  1,189,200  ducats ; which, 
taking the ducat at 5s. 6d.5 would  give 2307,030, as the gross captures 
of  silver  and gold4.  Moreover,  in  the numerous  histories  of  the  ex- 
pedition, all the details  of  the larger captures agree; so that it would 
appear that the ~lunder  was  wholly  accounted  for,  in  paying  charges 
and  bonuses on  the return  of  the ship and in divisions to the share- 
holders.  But so much agreement in the authorities is in itself suspicious; 
and, as a matter of  fact, there still remained a large sum, diverted from 
the adventurers,  which  found  its way  to Elizabeth.  The manner  in 
which this operation was effected was  ingenious.  It was the practice in 
Spanish  America  to smuggle  bullion  on  hoard  the  homeward-bound 
ships, without passing the Customs, so as to avoid  the exactions of  the 
officials.  The valuation  of  1,189,200 ducats is  expressly stated to be 
that of  the ''  customed "  bullion only, and the compiler of  it states that 
there  was  "besides  the  treasure  which  was  uncustomed  (the  value 
whereof  I cannot learne), consisting of  pearles, precious stones, reals of 
plate and other things of  great worth."  It frequently happened that 
The Jferchants' Mappe of  Commerce, 1638, p. 61. 
Vide supra, p.  78. 
Hakluyt,  Voyages, X.  p.  114.  Although  the silver  ill  the  ducat  was subse- 
quently reduced  (wide  Newton's Tables in I'ostlethwaite,  Dictionary  qf.  C'ommerce- 
"  Coil1 ") the value was not 9s. 6d. as stated  by Froude (History of England, reign of 
Elizabeth, v. p.  383)-9s.  Gd. was the value of the gold  ducat. 
Drake,  World Encompnssed, ut supra, p.  291. 
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the value of  uncustomed,  was  as great as  that of  the customed  plate 
and precious  stones;  so that, it is  clear, there was  a  large concealed 
surplus, after the "customed"  bullion  had been  sold  for the benefit of 
the shareholders.  In April 1581 it is recorded that the whole treasure 
"  was better than 2600,0001."  If  this estimate is correct, there would 
have been from 2250,000 to 2300,000 which was received by Elizabeth. 
She certainly obtained  as much  as &'263,790;  since, in a memorandum 
made  by  Burghley and conjecturally dated 1581, there is  mention  of 
that amount being then in the Tower in Spanish coin"  Judging from 
the state of Elizabeth's finances in 1580, she would not have had money 
on  hand, and if  she had,  it would  not have  been  in  Spanish coin, so 
that it is almost certain  that this sum came from  Drake's  capture.  In 
addition the Queen received  most of  the jewels, and she may have had 
the uncoined  silver as well.  Whatever may  have been the exact  sum 
she  obtained,  it was  certainly  large,  and the disbursement  of  a con- 
siderable  portion  of  it can  be  traced.  A  sum  of  828,757 had  been 
borrowed and it was re-lent to the Protestants in the Low Countries, at 
about  14 per  cent.  interest.  Elizabeth  appears  to have  satisfied her 
creditors  in  1580-1  for this  obligation3.  Then the first  of  the pay- 
ments, made to Alenyon, amounting to 242,000, was  said to have been 
coined out of  the captured bullion4.  Further there was  over 242,000 
invested in the Levant trade and delivered in uncoined  silver out of  the 
Tower5.  These sums aillount to over &110,000; and, if  the statement 
of the Chancellor of  the Exchequer  can  be  relied on, in January 1581 
additional payments, in excess of  this figure, must have been made from 
the same source.  It was then said that the subsidy of  1575-6  had only 
sufficed to provide  half  the cost  of  the war  in  Ireland,  the remainder 
being paid  by Elizabeth, who  was  not at that time in debt6.  That a 
deficit had been incurred, but had  been  met out of  the balance  of  the 
treasure, is consistent with the report of  Mendoza, in September of  the 
same year, that Elizabeth was  then about 2100,000 in debt,  since  in 
the interval large sums had been remitted to Alenyon. 
The winter  of  1580-1  represents the culmination  of  the financial 
administration  of  Elizabeth.  With  only  moderate  assistance  from 
Parliament,  she had  been  able to extinguish the Crown  debt and to 
improve the status of  the country abroad.  In the midst  of  the per- 
Queen  Elizabeth  and  her  Times, A  series  of  original letters, edited  by Thornas 
%'right,  London, 1838, 11. pp.  133-6. 
C'alendar Salisbury MSS., 11.  p.  384. 
3  Murdin, Stute Papers, p.  780. 
4  Calendar oj'State Papers. ..in the Archives of Simuncm, 1680-6,  p. 166. 
Murdin, State Papers, p. 781, cf. infra, 11.  p. 84. 
6  D'Ewes,  Joumtak, p.  287. 
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plexities  in  the understanding  of  the accounts of  the finances during 
this period,  it becomes clear that the improvement was due, less to the 
increase in the Ordinary Revenue, even when supplemented by aids from 
Parliament,  than  in  quite exceptional  receipts,  such  as that resulting 
from Drake's expedition.  The total amount of  these cannot be recorded 
precisely, since they did not come within the purview of  the tellers of 
the Exchequer.  From the latter type of  account it may  be  gathered 
that  the  Ordinary  Revenue  had  not  increased  materially  since  the  , 
beginning of  the reign, for the gain in Customs and impositions, due to 
industrial progress, was partially neutralized by the alienation of  Crown 
property.  Moreover,  either  through  necessity  or  a  development  of 
foreign policy, an increased outlay abroad was  begun, which  continued 
for a number of  years.  This led to an increasing strain on the finances. 
Thus it is  recorded  that from  May  to December  1581 no  less  than 
2278,000 had been remitted to Alenyonl, and in 1581 a further subsidy 
of  two-fifteenths and two-tenths was granted by Parliamentz. 
The  effects  of  the  diffusion  of  the  great  quantity  of  captured 
valuables in England was sufficiently marked.  Not only was  Elizabeth 
able  to re-habilitate  her  finances  for  a  few  months,  but she  was  en- 
couraged to pursue a  more vigorous  foreign  policy.  The part  of  the 
treasure, however, which  yielded  the best  results in her hands was  that 
used  in aiding the foundation of  the Levant trade.  The sums divided 
amongst the seamen  and adventurers produced  many consequences, the 
most desirable  of  which  was  the increase of  English  shipping.  When 
even  the rumour  of  Drake's  success  had  started  everyone  talking  of 
fitting out similar expeditions, it can  readily  be understood that, after 
his  arrival,. new  ships  were  being  arranged  for ; and  even  already 
England had secured the monopoly of  the carrying trade to and from 
Spain3.  Drake was offering all, who would adventure with him in a new 
expedition, a profit of  six or seven times their original subscriptions4. 
Persons, who had obtained large gains from the expedition of  1577- 
80,  spent  money  freely  and  there  were  complaints  of  the growth  of 
luxury and extravagance5.  The standard of  living of  the upper classes 
was  higher than it had been  during the years  of  economy, early in the 
reign  of  Elizabeth.  This prosperity  was  shared  by  the  rest  of  the 
' State Papers, Foreign, France, X. 158, 159. 
Statutes,  IV. 684; wide  infra, rri. p.  526. 
Cndendar ofstate Papers ...  in the Archiems ofSimancas, 1580-6,  pp. 8, 9. 
Ibid., pp.  55, 75. 
Anatomy  of  Abuses  in England,  by  Philip  Stubbes  (1583), New  Shakespeare 
Societ,y  (1879-82);  An  Ezhortation,  to  stir  U],  the  Mindes  of  all  her  Majesty's 
faithful  Subjects  to  defend  their  G'ountrey in this  dangerous  Time frona  the  Invasion 
of  Enemies, 1588, in Harleian Miscellany (1744),  I. p.  165 ;  A  Treatise on  Money, by 
J. Shield  Nicholson, London, 1901, p. 229. 
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population, and Thomas Churchyard contrasted the distress in Flanders 
with the good fortune of  those living in England : 
"  Hier thyngs are cheape and easly  had 
no  soile the like can showe 
No  State nor Kingdome at this daie 
doth in such pleiltie  flowel." 
Sir  John  Hawkins,  who,  as  Treasurer  of  the Navy,  may  have  had 
opportunities  of  forming  an  opinion,  estimated  that, since  1558,  the 
wealth  of  England had trebledz.  Part of  this increase must be off-set 
against the economic loss involved in the suppression of the monasteries: 
but, even after this allowance is made, there was a substantial gain. 
It was  natural that the superficial observer attributed the activity 
of trade to the captures of bullion, made by Drake and other privateers- 
men;  but the real  cause  is  to be  found  in  the  years  of  peace  and 
national  economy.  Although  the  cloth-trade was  suffering  from  the 
troubles on the Continent, profitable exchanges were  being effected  in 
Russia;  and, when  the Persian route was  closed, the Levant company 
had been  founded, bringing the same commodities3.  The home  trade 
was flourishing, as is shown, amongst other indications, by the influx of 
persons  from  the country  to the towns.  As  early as  1579 Burghley 
described England  as "  surely abounding in riches',"  and the liberation 
of  the captured treasure accentuated the general prosperity. 
Considering privateering  solely from the economic standpoint, there 
can  be  little doubt that, in the long run, it was  prejudicial to the best 
interests  of  the commerce  of  England.  Much  of  the capital,  either 
withdrawn from the cloth-trade or rendered available by the opening up 
of  new  enterprizes,  had  been  invested  in  shipping; and,  once  it was 
known that Philip would not declare war against England on the ground 
of  Drake's  plunderings,  it remained  for  him  to  make  English  trade 
with Spain uncertain.  Even though the loss  in a  single year, as com- 
pared  with the magnitude of  the captures, would be small (as long as 
this  policy  could  be  maintained)  it would  be  recurrent,  and,  over a 
number  of  years,  would  exceed  the value  of  the bullion  seized. 
But,  in  addition to the purely  economic  aspect,  there is  also the 
political one.  If  it were  possible for England to avoid war with Spain, 
l  The Misery of  Flunders  ...  and the Blessed State of  England, 1579. 
2 July 20,  1.584-Lansd.  MS. (Brit. Mus.) 43 (ll), printed by Wright, Elizabeth, 
11.  p.  231. 
3  Vide inira,  11. 85. 
4 An  Order how to proceed to the discussion of  the Questions corlcerni~lg  the 
Queeue's  marriadge  with  Mo~~sieur  d'Anjou-Murdin,  State Papers,  p.  327.  It is 
interesting to notice  in  the same document that Burghley proposed the foundation 
of a State-bank. 
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privateering  was  a  blunder,  since  it added  to the existing tension  in 
the relations  of  the two  countries.  If, on  the other hand, a  war  was 
inevitable ;  then expeditions,  such as those of  Drake,  were invaluable. 
The finances of Philip were in an embarrassed condition, and the seizure 
of  bullion  increased  the strain.  If  the  estimate  of  the proceeds  of 
Drake's  expedition  is  correct,  it represented  from  one-third  to one- 
quarter of  the whole  average  annual  produce  of  the American  mines, 
remitted  to  Spain1.  Still  more  important  was  the  moral  effect. 
English  sailors learnt their superiority over the Spaniard; and, if  the 
contest with the Armada was unavoidable, this lesson was of the greatest 
importance. 
From  the return  of  Drake's  expedition  of  1577-80,  English  pri- 
vateering increased, both in the numbers  of  voyages and in the size of 
each venture.  Much  of  the money, taken by  Drake,  found  its way to 
persons connected with  maritime  enterprize, and it was  inevitable that 
very  many  armed  ships should  have  been  prepared.  The joint-stock 
system was so flexible and had answered so well  in previous expeditions 
that capital could  be  easily procured  from  noblemen,  gentlemen  and 
merchants.  Munitions  of  war  were  plentiful, and it did not take long 
to convert a merchantman into a privateer.  Activity at the ports was 
so  great, that the spies of  the Spanish Ambassador  were  compelled to 
report that, so many armed ships were  constantly going' and coming, it 
was impossible to ascertain what expeditions were contemplated. 
It is obvious there was a danger in this boom  in  privateering.  The 
success  of  any  venture  depended  on  its arrival,  where  it was  least 
expected.  Once  it was  known  that  England  had  a  great  fleet  of 
privateers, the Spaniards in America lived in a state of  preparation, and 
bullion was  kept in the interior, instead of  at the ports;  while it was 
only  transported  to Europe  in  heavily  armed  fleets.  To meet  this 
new  development it was  necessary to augment the size  of  the English 
expeditions, which consisted of  more ships of  larger size.  For instance, 
the four vessels  in the expedition of  1582, intended for the Indies, but 
which did not penetrate further than Brazil, had an aggregate tonnage 
of  790.  This voyage was  the concludiag one of  the Frobisher  series, 
and like its predecessors resulted  in  loss2.  It was probably the faiIure 
of this enterprize which prevented the formation of  a Co~tzpany  to trade 
beyond the Equinoctial, which had been proposed  in 1580 and of  which 
Drake was to be first governor3. 
The Rise of  the Dutch Izepuhlic,  by J. L.  Motley, London,  1856, 11.  p.  518. 
Vide infra,  11.  p.  82.  The capital was  £11,600,  of  which about  £3,000  con- 
sisted of trade goods (C'alendar of  State Papers ...  in the  Archives of  .Si:i,j~uncm,  1580-6, 
P.  199).  Thefore, deducting  this amount,  so as to preserve  the same  basis  of 
comparison,  there remains  £8,600  for  ships and provisions,  or Y10.  9s.  per  ton. 
These ships were  provisioned for two  years. 
State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth,  ~XLIV. 44 ;  Calendar, 1547-80,  p.  689. Early  colonizing  Companies  1582-3 
At the same time, some efforts were made towards colonization  by 
Gilbert  in  1583 and by Raleigh  in 1584.  As yet, however, the minds 
of  the promoters  were  divided  between  the legitinlate  objects of  the 
voyages and the obtaining of  gold, eithe? by discovery or capture, and 
the planting did  not  succeed1.  Most  of  these  enterprizes were  small 
companies, and the capital outlay was larger than in privateering.  Even 
if  success were  eventually  obtained, the results  involved more  waiting. 
In colonizing,  it was  necessary,  not  only  to make  a  voyage  to the 
proposed  settlement,  but to establish the settlers  there and  provision 
them, until they became  self-supporting.  For this reason, an estimate, 
made in 1583, places the capital outlay for each colonist  at 240, a rate 
higher than those of the contemporary trading or privateering ventures2. 
It follows that the efforts at colonization were merely anticipations 
of  later developments, and the chief  energies of  the more venturesome 
seamen  continued,  for  some  years,  to  be  devoted  to  privateering. 
Though Drake  had  wished  to follow up the success of  his  voyage of 
1577-80,  it was  not until 1585 that he surceeded  in  obtaining the 
sanction  of  Elizabeth for another expedition.  This was organized on a 
much larger scale than its predecessors, consisting of  twenty-one ships. 
A valuation was made of  the vessels, subscribed by the adventurers, and 
cash  might also be ventured.  Thus Elizabeth provided  220,000, one 
half in cash and the other half in ships of  850 tons.  The whole capital 
was  260,400, subsequently  reduced  on  adjustmerlt  to 2.57,000.  The 
prize goods were valued at 264,900, of  which 217,000 was set aside for 
the  seamen.  The  balance  remaining,  after some  expenses  had  been 
deducted, was  245,908.  189. 6d.;  so that, even including the estimate 
of  the ships returned  to the owners, there  was  a  loss  of  20 per cent. 
To some  extent,  this may  have  been  a  deficit  on  paper;  since,  on 
examining the Queen's  account, it appears that her ships were valued at 
210,000 as capital, but only  at 28,000 as part of  her division.  She 
received the remainder in cannon and pearls3. 
The expedition  of  1587,  also  under  the command  of  Drake,  was 
more  successful  from  the point  of  view  of  the adventurers.  It was 
organized on a different model from  previous ventures.  Besides Eliza- 
beth, Drake and his friends,  there  were  twenty  merchants interested4. 
Vide infra, 11.  pp.  242,  244.  The  Genesis  of  the  United  States.  A  Series  o_f' 
Historical  Manuscripts  now  JErst  Printed,  by  Alexander  Brown,  London,  1890, 
I. pp.  9-14. 
Hakluyt,  Voyages (1904), VIII.  p. 148 ;  vide supra, p. 77. 
3  Harrow, Life  of Drake, ut supra, p. 191 ;  Hakluyt,  Voyages, X. pp. 97-9,  133; 
Calendar  of  State  Papers ...  in the  Archives  of  Simancas,  1580-6,  p.  651 ;  Atkinson, 
Gold  Mynes  in Scotland,  ut supra,  p.  69; Papers  Relating  to  the  Navy  during  the 
Spanish  War, ed.  J. S.  Corbett (Publications Navy Records  Soc.),  XI. pp.  86-96 ; 
XXII.  pp. 124-30. 
The names are printed in an appendix to the Camden Society's edition of  The 
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By an agreement, made between the latter and Drake on  March 188, 
1587, it was  arranged that all captures  should  be  divided  equally, as 
between  the Queen's  ships and those of  the other adventurers1.  This 
understanding  appears to have been  based  on the supposition that the 
tonnage and number of  the crews of  the vessels from the Navy and of 
those provided  by  private persons, would  be approximately  the  same. 
When  the expedition  had  returned,  having  taken  a  prize  valued  at 
2108,049. 13s. lld.2,  and a division came to be made, it was found that 
the quota .in tonnage  and men,  furnished  by  the private  adventurers, 
was  larger  than  that  of  Elizabeth.  Therefore,  a  modification  was 
proposed, whereby the spoil should  be divided into the same number of 
parts as the aggregate both  of  the tonnage and the men.  This basis 
required the calculation to proceed on the principle of there being 7,623 
parts, of  which  3,120 were  reckoned as belonging to Elizabeth and the 
remainder  (namely  4,503)  to  the  other  adventurers.  Allowing  for 
certain  minor expenses after the arrival of  the fleet, this left a division 
for the Queen of either 242,699. 3s. 3d. or 245,063. 15s. 9d., according 
as her tonnage was reduced or not by an item of  400 tons, which was in 
dispute, and proportionately for the remaining ship-owners3.  Since this 
expedition  was  not organized  on  an estimated  capital,  there  is  some 
difficulty in determining the amount per cent. of  this division.  On the 
rates  per  ton  and  per  man  of  the  previous  venture,  the estimated 
capital would  be 278,500, giving a  gross profit of  138 per cent.  This 
was  not considered great,  since Raleigh wrote that 100 per cent. (also 
gross) was but "  a  small return,"  and that he "  might have gotten more 
to have sent his ships fishing4."  Several deductions have  to be  made 
before the nett profit can be arrived at.  Wages had to be paid and the 
ships refitted.  Elizabeth allowed 28,643 for the former charge5, and 
$20 per cent. of  the estimated value of  the ships for the latter.  On her 
tonnage,  the original capitalization  of  her venture would be 233,000, 
giving a  nett profit  of  &R8,500  or 87  per  cent." 
True Diswiption  of  the  last  Voiage  of  Sir  Frauncis  Drake, by  Robert  Lenge (Mis- 
cellany, v. 1864, p. 27). 
I  Ibid., p. 26.  2  Publications Navy Records Soc.,  XI.  pp. 200-6. 
3  Camden Soc. Miscellany, v. pp. 53, 54. 
4  Publications Navy Records Soc.,  XXII.  p. 268 ;  cf. infra, 11.  pp. 298, 361. 
6  Publications Navy Records Soc., XI. p. 191. 
6  Estimated  valuation  of  the  ships,  "subscribed"  by 
Elizabeth at  8s. per ton ...  ...  ...  ...  %33,180 
Average of the gross profit, payable to Elizabeth  ...  £43,881 
Deduct 20 "1, of estimated capital value ...  ...  ...  ;E6,636 
Wages and rewards ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  8,643  15,279 
Nett Profit  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... -  £28,602 
It was  said  that  it was  the  capture  of  the  San  Filipe  which  first impressed 
Englishmen with the riches of the Indies (Hakluyt,  Voyages, VI.  p. 438), but, as already 88  Spanish Reprisals cause Depression 1586-7  [CHAP.  IT. 
Whether privateering was  a political necessity or not, as time went 
on, the economic loss it involved began to be felt.  By 1586 the reprisals 
of  the Spaniards, in hindering English trade when possible, had begun 
to induce commercial depression, which was aggravated  by the disloca- 
tion of trade with the chief European countries.  The following report, 
drawn  up by a  Spanish spy  in London,  sums up the situation in the 
least favourable terms : "The whole country is without trade and knows 
not how to recover it ;  the shipping and commerce here having mainly 
depended  upon  the  communication  with  Spain and  Portugal.  They 
feel the deprivation all the more now, with the loss of  the cloth trade 
with Germany, which they formerly carried on through Holland and up 
the Rhine, but have now  been deprived  of  by the capture of  Nutz on 
that river.  If  Berck  be taken  also, which please  God it will  be,  now 
that the neighbouring places have fallen, they will  not be able to send 
any cloths at all, and this is causing much  dissatisfaction  all over the 
country.  The rest  of  their  trade  with  the  other  German  ports and 
Muscovy  is a mere trifle; as all, they brought from those  places, was 
sent by them to Spain, and, their Spanish trade being  now  gone, the 
other is of  no use  to them, as they do not know what to do with the 
merchandize they bring hitherL.  All that is left to them is the Levant 
trade,  which  is  with  Turkey  and  Italy,  and  that with  Barbary.  If 
these two are taken from them, which  can  easily be  done, they will be 
driven into a corner, without any commerce or navigation at all.  Their 
French  trade  is  very  insignificant  and  is  carried  on  by  a  few  small 
vessels  only2."  Information from such a source may  well  be  suspected 
of  some exaggeration, but it is remarkable that Burghley describes the 
situation  in somewhat similar terms.  "This  great matter of  the lack 
of  vent," he writes,  not only of  clothes, which presently is the greatest, 
but of  all other commodities which are restrained from Spain, Portugal, 
Barbary,  France,  Flanders,  Hamburgh  and the States,  cannot  but in 
process of  time work  a great change and dangerous issue to the people 
of  the Realm, who, heretofore, in time of  outward peace, lived thereby, 
and without  it must either perish  for want or fall into violence to feed 
and fill their lewd appetites with open spoil of  others3." 
mentioned. an ex~edition  had been projected and actually started for that region in 
1582-wide  supra, p.  82, infra,  11. p.  82. 
In spite of  the embargo a considerable trade was  carried on with Spain  by the 
use of  Scottish ships, or English ones registered as Scottish-Calendar  of  State Papers 
...  in the Archises oj'Simancas, 1587-1603,  p.  186. 
Ibid.,  1580-6,  pp. 651, 652.  The writer continues by  recommellding  that the 
Levant and Barbary trades should be closed, by statior~ing  Spanisli war-ships at the 
Straits of  Gihraltar. 
3  Burghley to Hatton, May 12, 1687, printed  in Memoirs  of  the  Life  and Times 
of  C'hristopher Hatton, by Sir Harris Nicolas, 1847, p.  470. 
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A  further cause  of  the industrial depression,  which  now  began  to 
manifest  itself,  was  the uncertainty of  the political  situation.  There 
were Catholic plots in England, culminating in the Babington conspiracy 
(1586) and the execution  of  Mary  Queen  of  Scots (1587).  The year 
1587 was marked by the financial aid of  the Pope to Philip and by the 
collection  of  the ships that formed  the Armada.  At the same  time, 
poor  trade  and  a  threatening  political  outlook  were  aggravated  by 
exceptionally bad harvests in England. and in London, especially, wheat 
reached the highest recorded price of  the whole century1. 
The depression  of  the years  1586-7  affected  the existing  under- 
takings,  in  a  manner  similar  to  the crisis of  1569-74.  The second 
joint-stock  of  the Russia company was  wound up, and a new one begun 
in  1586'.  About  the  same  time,  the  subsidiary  companies  of  the 
Mines  Royal  in  Cornwall  and Cumberland,  formed  bv  Smith.  came 
,  ----  to  an  end,  and  a  new  undertaking  for  the  northern  district  was 
constituted3. 
This crisis had an important bearing  on the contest with  Spain in 
1588.  While the diversion of  capital towards the shipping trade was 
an  important  element,  making  for  the  success  of  England  in  the 
struggle, the want of money prevented the fleet from being as efficiently 
manned and provisioned  as it should have  been.  The Crown  finances 
were  in  a  more  embarrassed  condition  in  1588 than  they  had  been, 
since the beginning of the reign of  Elizabeth.  The transition from the 
soundness of  1575 to the difficulties of  ten  years  later is  remarkable. 
The policy of  subsidizing  the enemies  of  Spain had grown during the 
interval; and, although  much  of  the money was  spent  unwisely,  such 
payments  may  be regarded  as  an insurance, made by England  against 
the risk of  invasion.  The peculiar hardship of  the situation in 1587-8 
was  that these  expenses had  been  incurred, merely to delay the evil. 
Though the strain  on the finances became marked  in 1588, events had 
been leading up to it, since the beginning of  1581.  Prior to that date, 
the assistance, provided  by  Elizabeth  to Protestants  abroad,  had  not 
involved any burden on her finances, beyond what could be borne by the 
surplus Ordinary Revenue.  Up to 1579, the Queen had lent to foreign 
States  665,0004, while  she  had  become  security  for  a  loan,  raised 
abroad by the Netherlands ;  and, should the Estates default in the pay- 
ment  of  interest, the liability would  fall  upon  hers.  It was  no small 
Chronicon  Preciosum,  London,  1707,  p.  123.  Fleetwood  records  61s.  per 
quarter.  iMaitland says the price "in  divers places" (other than London) was 1048. 
History of  London,  p. 271. 
Pride infra,  11.  p.  48.  Ibid., 11.  pp.  396,  397. 
State Papers,  Domestic, Elizabeth,  cxxxr. 49;  C'alendnr, 1547-80,  p.  628. 
Calendar, State Papers,  Foreign, 1577-8,  p. 365. State  of the  Crown Finances  1570-88  [CHAP. TV. 
financial achievement, during the ten years  1570 to 1580, to have  ex- 
tinguished  the remainder  of  the  Crown  debt,  borne  the cost  of  the 
rebellions  in  Ireland,  which  together  may  be  estimated  to have  cost 
8585,000  while  the grants from  Parliament  only  realized  8417,000, 
besides  contributing  to  extraordinary  expenditure  on  the  Navy  and 
Ordnance,  mainly  out of  the surplus  Ordinary  Revenue1. 
No doubt, the freedom from debt in 1580-1  was attributable to the 
treasure,  received  by  the  Crown  from  Drake's  expedition ; but,  after 
the outstanding loans  had  been repaid, there remained  a considerable 
surplus, which would in normal circumstances have provided an adminis- 
tration, as economical as that of  Elizabeth, with ample  funds  for the 
development  of  its foreign  policy.  Just at this time,  however,  there 
came  the  Alenqon  entanglement;  and,  between  1581 and  1583,  the 
great  sum  of  2632,071  was  disbursed  in  this  way2.  Moreover,  the 
policy of  fighting Philip in Flanders was one which, once it was begun, 
must  be  continued ;  and,  on  the fall  of  Antwerp in  1585, it became 
necessary for Elizabeth to incur further outlays in the Low Countries. 
A  considerable  sum  was  required,  beyond  the ordinary  charge,  for 
Ireland ;  a subsidy was paid to James VI. of Scotland, the outlay on the 
Navy and Ordnance was  large and much had to be spent on secret and 
special  services.  But  the  total  grants  from  Parliament,  receivable 
between  1581 and 1588, came to less  than 8400,0004, so that it was 
only  possible  to  meet  expenses  by  the  savings  from  the  Ordinary 
Revenue,  which  may  be  estimated  at this  time  to  have  been  about 
870,000 a  year5. 
It follows that the financing of  the defence of  England against the 
Armada  presented  some  difficulty.  Already,  through  the  assistance 
given  to the  Low  Countries, there  was  considerable  pressure  on  the 
Crown  finances.  Moreover,  the peculiar  stak of  the money-market, 
both at home  and abroad, just  at this time created  unexpected  diffi- 
culties.  The  credit  of  Elizabeth  was  good,  and,  under  ordiriary 
circumstances, it would  have been  easy  for her to have borrowed such 
funds as she required, either abroad or at home.  It so happened, that 
in 1587 and 1588 England could not procure a loan abroade.  Early in 
1 For the details vide infra, 111.  pp.  515, 526, 527. 
State Papers,  Foreign, France, X. 158, 159.  This sum was practically identical 
with that  paid  by the  King  of France  at  the same  time.  He  added  a  further 
£279,000,  making in all 21,012,500.  Alenqon altogether received  22,583,282,  the 
remainder  being  raised  by the  Estates  (%160,970) or  by loails  (2777,732).  He 
expended  32,683,905. 
3  Vide infra, 111. pp. 503, 504.  Ibid., III.  p.  526. 
5  Ibid., 111. p. 503. 
6  Cf.  I  find no probability how to  get money here in specie, which is our lack, 
but by exchange, to have it out of  parts  beyond  sea, which will riot  be done but in 
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the reign Elizabeth could borrow with comparative freedom at  Antwerp, 
but now  that city had  been  sacked and its wealth  dispersed.  So far 
from  the Low  Countries  being  a  lender,  its government  was  now  a 
debtor, and in Germany capital was  not available to lend to England. 
Already considerable sums had been borrowed from capitalists at Lyons, 
and it would  appear that, at  this juncture,  these men were not disposed 
to add to their commitments1.  The Italian bankers  were  pledged  to 
Philip of  Spain, both on religious  and financial grounds, and the only 
foreign capital available was that which  found its way into the country 
through  Spinola,  Pallavicino  and  Justinian.  Therefore,  during  the 
great national trial of  1588,  England had to depend almost wholly on 
its own  resources.  There were  two  ways  in  which  money  could  have 
been obtained at  home, as it had been previously, to meet an emergency 
until  funds were  granted  by  Parliament, and these were  paid  into the 
Exchequer,  namely either by  loans on Privy Seals or borrowings  upon 
interest.  Since  wealth  had  been  increasing  during  the past  twenty 
years, little difficulty would have been experienced in finding a sufficiency 
of  money, had it not been that, at  the critical moment, the country was 
in the throes of  a commercial crisis.  No doubt it is to the difficulty in 
raising funds by  borrowing  that much of  the vacillation  in  England's 
foreign policy during 1587 is to be assigned.  Possibly, too, Elizabeth's 
ministers  relied  on  their  success  in  previous  diplomatic  encounters, 
which had hitherto resulted in the preservation  of  the species of  peace 
that England desired.  No doubt, also, Drake's expedition of  1587 had 
much  to do  with  delaying  the sailing  of  the Armada,  and  another 
influence in the same direction is said to have been certain  operations 
on the foreign exchanges, whereby Spanish bills were collected and then 
presented in large quantities at the same time, with the result that they 
were  "protested,"  and money could not be  procured  in time to enable 
the fleet to sail that yeara. 
The year  1588 was  not  far advanced,  before  it was  realized  that 
the arrival  of  the Armada  was  to be  expected,  and Elizabeth  was  ill- 
prepared  to provide  the funds that were  necessary for  the defence  of 
England.  It is true that at  this time there was a surplus from the nett 
Ordinary  Revenue  of  over  270,0005,  while  the  subsidies  granted in 
1586-7,  which  were  payable  in  1587 and  1588 in  October,  realized 
a long time "-Burghley  to  Walsingham, July 19, 1588 ;  State Papers relating  to the 
Dgeat of  the Spanish Armada, ed. J.  K.  Laughton (Publications Navy Records Soc.), 
I. p. 285. 
1 Entry Books of  Issues-Eliz.  27-28,  28-29. 
Of  a  Free  Trade,  by  Henry  Parker,  London,  1648;  Memoirs  of  the  Most 
Important  Transactions in England for the  last  Hundred  Years, by James  Welwood, 
London, 1718, p. 9 ;  Anderson, Annals of  Commerce, rr. p.  222. 
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for  many  purposes,  it does  not  describe  adequately  the whole  facts. 
Although the country  was  much  more  prosperous  from  1572 to 1586 
than it had been at the beginning of  the reign of  Elizabeth, the produce 
of  the tenth and fifteenth  was  steadily  declining,  as  is  shown by  the 
following table of  the subsidies of  the laity : 
Yield of  and  of the subsidy 1562-3  ...  ...  $103,861 
,  3  ,,  ,,  isas-7  ...  .  ..  81,565 
9 J  1,  ,,  1592-3  ...  ...  74,348 
9,  37  )Y  1597  ...  ...  68,975 
9,  7 J  J 9  1601  ...  ...  65,285l 
This progressive diminution in the proceeds of  the tenth and fifteenth 
is a remarkable  and apparently anomalous fact ;  since it might be sup- 
posed  that the yield of  this tax would  afford a basis for comparing the 
condition of  the country at different times, as is customary at a much 
later  date  from  the produce  of  id. of  the Inconie  Tax.  Indeed  it 
would  seem  that, for  statistical purposes,  the advantage lies with  the 
Elizabethan  impost, since from 1563, if  the grant of  1566 be excepted, 
no change was made in the nature of  the tax itself.  It was  the method 
of  assessment  which  resulted  inevitably  in a  decrease  per  tenth  and 
fifteenth.  Naturally  there were  many  claims made  for a  reduction  in 
the  assessments.  When farmers  received  a  high  price  for their  corn, 
they endeavoured to show that their profits  were not increased, owing 
to the quantity for  sale being proportionately  less.  The clothiers and 
allied trades insisted on the decay in this industry, through the "  ill-vent 
of  cloth,"  while the sheep farmers protested  that, for the same reason, 
their wool  could not be  sold at "any  reasonable price2."  A  writer of 
an  exhaustive  treatise  on  the subject  shows how  it came about that, 
while full weight was given to pleas for abatements, few if  any increased 
assessments were obtained.  The fault lay with the Commissioners of the 
subsidy and the assessors,  some of  whom  "knew  too  much,  some too 
little, some  were  for  show,  some  for protection  of  their friends,  some 
remiss and slack and others distaste  the service."  The greatest blame 
is accorded to those,  described as the "  populares,"  "who  see and will 
not  see-and  what  they  see  is  with  the  eyes  of  partiality."  These 
assessors  sought  popularity  by  "  smooth  words,  pleasing  talk.. .and 
pitying  the poor."  The returns,  received  from  them,  were  found to 
be largely  composed of  the names of  thox who were  exempt  from  the 
payment  of  the  tax.  There  was  a  ~revalent  opinion  amongst  the 
officials that "men  must  not rise  in the subsidy-book,  although  they 
rise in wealth."  For these reasons,  there were  few  increases  in assess- 
ments  and  very  many  reductions  or  total  remissions.  For  instance, 
1  Vide infra,  111. p.  526. 
8  Lansd. MS. (Brit. Mus.),  59 (57). 
CHAP. v.]  The Burden of  Taxation 1588-1603  95 
amongst the Commissioners themselves, the highest valuation was g100 
a year rental in a  single  case,  one other at 280, another at 850 and 
only some few at 245  to  240.  Many knights and justices of  the peace 
paid  on  2.20  a  year,  others  under  that amount,  and  some  knights 
escaped assessment alt,ogetherl.  This statement is  confirmed by  that 
of  Sir Robert Cecil in Parliament on March Rnd, 1593, who  said that 
the maximum  annual  valuation  of  lands for  any individual  was  only 
280 a  year,  and the  highest  rating  of  the  capital value  of  personal 
property  in  London  was  2200 and  that in  only  four  or five  cases2. 
The same under-valuation obtained with those of  more moderate means. 
Men, who  had been assessed at 83  or g5  personal  property, were now 
able to pay on twice these sums, respectively, but the old rates had been 
continued3. 
It follows that, under this system, the produce of  tie  tenth and t.he 
fifteenth  would  continue to fall, and that therefore,  while the number 
of  these levied is some indication  of  the burden  of  taxation, it fails to 
provide  a  completely  accurate  standard.  A  better  index  is  obtained 
from  the total  sums, realized  by  the grants made by the Parliaments 
from  1588 to 1601, which  produced  over 81,950,0004.  Owing to the 
data, required for balancing the various items of  Extraordinary Revenue 
and Expenditure,  being so compiled that they can be  best co-ordinated 
from  October  to November 1590, there is some difficulty in fixing the 
amount from the end of  1588 to that date to be added to the sum that 
can  be assigned to the period  from  1590 to 1603, so  as  to provide  a 
complete view  of  the war-expenditure after the Armada  had been  de- 
feated until the end of  the reign  of  Elizabeth.  During the two years 
from October 1588 to October 1590, the largest item of  Extraordinary 
Expenditure  was  the cost  of  the troops in  the Low  Countries.  This 
may be taken to have been (as stated by Burghley) 8130,000 per annum 
or 2260,000 in all5.  The "Portugal  voyage" in 1589 cost 261,0196, 
and the outlay on other naval expeditions may be estimated at  235,0007, 
making altogether 2356,019.  The expense of the operations in Flanders, 
France and Ireland from  the end of  1590 was  &3,057,226, to which  is 
to be added the estimated cost of the Navy during the same period (over 
l  "A Small Treatise or Discourse touching the Diminution of  the Subsidie and 
how it may be justly raised,"  by William [?Tucker]-Harl.  MS.  (Brit. Mus.) 188. 
D'Ewes, Journals, p.  483. 
"A Small Treatise  ...  of the Subsidie," ut supra. 
4  Includirlg the subsidies of the Clergy-Vide  infra,  111.  p. 526. 
Cobbett, Parliamentary History of  England,  London,  1806, 1.  p.  870,  cf.  State 
Papers, Donlestic, Elizabeth, ccxt. 69,  72; Calendar, 1591-4,  pp.  326,  327. 
B  Vide infra,  111.  D.  527.  .  . 
rile voyage of Frobisher (1389) cost £11,320,  that of  Hawkins and Frobisher 
(1590) £17,275,  vide infra,  111. p.  602. 96  The War-Expenditure to be  pa;d  1588-1603  [CHAP. V. 
and above the ordinary charge) of  2475,000 and dC100,OOO  debt paid 
off,  making  a  war-expenditure  of  23,988,245.  The  Extraordinary 
Revenue from 1588 to 1590 included  subsidies of  the clergy and laity 
of  &182,545l,  proceeds  of  sales  of  land  &126,3052  and  prize-money, 
which  may  be  estimated  at 27,5003.  It follows then  that, over the 
whole  period  from  1588 to 1603, the parliamentary  grants only  met 
one-half of  the Extraordinary Expenditure.  The deficiency was  partly 
made  good  by the sales of  land, by prize-money, repayments  of  former 
loans from the Low Countries and France, with forfeitures from persons 
convicted of treason.  In this way, 2924,988 was  provided, leaving still 
a  deficiency  of  &1,103,007  which  was  met  by  the  surplus  Ordinary 
Revenue : 
Sumnza~y  Extraordinary  Expenditure  1588 (Oct.)  to  1603. 
Cost of  Military and  Naval expeditions  ......  23,988,245 
Subsidies, clergy and laity ......  21,960,250 
Sale of  Lands ............  645,493 
Prizes ...............  207,500 
Repayments, Fines, &c.  ......  71,995 
-  2,885,238 
...  Deficiency met by  surplus Ordinary Revenue  21,103,007 
These figures show the importance of  the surplus from the Ordinary 
Revenue,  without  which  the burden  from  taxation  would  have  been 
greater.  So  far  the effect  of  that  surplus  was  negative  rather  than 
positive;  but,  in  being  reached  simultaneously  with  increased  alloca- 
tions to Ordinary Expenditure, it required an advance in the Ordinary 
Revenue.  In 1571-2 the nett proceeds had been  2209,912, in 1588-9 
2258,419 and, on the average of the five years 1598 to 1603, &326,066'. 
The remarkable  increase at the later date is noteworthy, since it was 
accomplished in spite of  depressed trade (which would tend to diminish 
the  income  from  Customs  and  impositions)  and  the sale  of  Crown 
lands.  Indeed, the growth of  the Ordinary Revenue, and especially the 
augmented income from Customs5, constitutes an apparently convincing 
statistical argument against the complaints made of  the decay of  trade 
at this time.  The explanation,  however, is not far to seek.  Prior to 
of  the subsidy of  the clergy of  1586-7  and, roughly, the first half of that of 
the laity fell within this period. 
State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, ccxxxvr~r.  30 ;  (7alendar, 1591-4,  p.  8. 
Vide infra, 111.  pp.  501, 516.  4  Ibid.,  III. pp.  514, 516. 
6  Revenue from Customs and Impositions : 
1571-2  ............  $362,439 
1575-6  ............  69,240 
1588-0  ............  101,698 
1598-1603  (average)  ......  121,400 
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the years  of  financial  stress,  while  the  revenues  were  prudently  ad- 
ministered, no strenuous efforts were made to obtain the highest possible 
return  from the farmers  and  collectors.  Therefore,  during the eleven 
good years, the Customs do not reflect the full amount of  the improve- 
ment.  When money was  required, schemes for increasing the Revenue 
were  sought for and carefully considered.  About  1588 a  change  was 
made  in  the farm  of  the "Customs  inwards  of  London  and the four 
ports"  (which  provided  about  one-quarter  of  the whole  income  under 
this head) with the result  that the return  to the Crown  was  at once 
improved  by  210,0001.  The same  process  was  applied  in the other 
branches, notably in cases of  tin, coal and leada; and, as a consequence, 
the  Ordinary  Revenue  increased,  though  trade  was  dull.  Moreover, 
such  increases  in  time  necessarily  involved  additional  payments  by 
merchants.  Just  as  in  the case  of  the collection  of  subsidies,  so  in 
that  of  Customs  allowances  had  been  permitted,  but  as the  farmers 
had to pay  into  the  Exchequer  more  and more,  they,  in  their turn, 
exacted full rates  from  the traders  who  exported  or imported.  Thus 
the cost of the war had a further consequence, in addition to the burden 
of  the subsidies, in  tending to depress trade, by what  was  virtually an 
increase in the Customs actually paid. 
A further burden, while  more direct, is less easily calculable.  This 
was  that for musters  of  levies in the inland  counties and on  the ports 
for ships.  The tax, so demanded, is stated to have been "higher  than 
the subsidy itself3," and it follows that the pressure of  the two, on the 
people rated, was considerable. 
The interruption of, and added danger to trade by the war  produced 
serious losses, and as early as 1588, the clothiers were making "a grievous 
conlplaint of  the ill  vent  of  cloth"  and the distress in Gloucester and 
Wilts from this cause was  so extreme that the people were  ready  "to 
mutiny4," while,  in  1591, it was  reported  that many  merchants  had 
become  bankrupt  "  through  loss  of  traffic5."  English  traders  were 
State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, ccxxxrx. 67 ;  Calendar, 1591-4,  p.  64. 
Ibid.,  ~CLI.  100, 120; wide infra, 111.  p.  517. 
"Subsidies  be  in the valuation  of every  man's  lands and  goods  by records 
called the  Queen's Books ;  and, according  to men's valuation of subsidies, are they 
at all other charges as to the wars and  in time of muster with horse and  armour; 
and  this charge maketh men so  unwilling to be raised  in  the subsidy; hut, if  these 
subsidies brought in no other charge with them, they would  be yielded  willingly. 
But the tail and  appendage of it being so  great, and  higher than the subsidy itself 
is the reason that men are so  unwilling to yield  it "-D'Ewes,  Journals, p.  494. 
A  Treatise  of  Commerce,  wherein  are shewed  the  Commodities  arising  by  a  we1 
ordered and ruled Trade such as that of the Societie of Merchants Admnturers is pored 
to bee, written principallie for the better Information of  those who doubt the Nece-e-carie- 
ness of the said Socirtie, by John Wheeler, Middleburg, 1601, pp.  61, 62. 
State Papers,  Domestic, Elizabeth, ccx~.  143 ;  Calendar, 1591-4,  p.  162. 
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ilow  excluded  from  Spain,  Portugal, bar bar^,  the  Levant  and,  to a 
considerable extent, from  Poland, Denmark and Germal~yl. Moreover, 
foreign  trade  was  conducted  at very  great  risk,  since  captures  of 
merchant  vessels  by  the  enemy  were  not  infrequent;  and,  after  the 
taking  of  a  fleet  of  ships from  Bordeaux,  it was  said by  Raleigh  in 
1593 that the merchants of  Newcastle "  lay still from  fear,"  while "  our 
trades decay every day, and our poverty increaseth every day more and 
morez."  As time went on, it became clear that the loss  from stoppage 
of  trade and the taking of  ships by the enemy was far from being made 
good by the prizes, obtained by the privateering syndicates.  From 1588 
to 1591 there is  no  record of  any  captures  of  considerable  value.  In 
1592 an  expedition, sent  out by  Raleigh,  secured  a  prize,  valued  at 
&150,000.  A rival syndicate, formed  by the Earl of  Cumberland, had 
a claim for salvage, and Elizabeth (who had a small share in one of the 
syndicates) took  possession  of  the ship, under the plea  of  settling the 
dispute.  The capital,  ranking  for  division  in  both  the privateering 
fleets, was a little over 250,0003; so that, if  the prize had been divided 
proportionately  between  them,  the division  would  have  been  300  per 
cent. gross.  The award  of  Elizabeth  provided  a profit  (gross)  of  100 
per  cent.  for  Cumberland  and the London  merchants;  while  Raleigh 
received only &24,000, which, according to his own  account, left him at 
a loss, though this was  the most  valuable single ship taken during the 
war4.  This  action  by  the  Queen  was  unfortunate;  and,  when  the 
London  ship-owners  experienced  delay  in  obtaining  the  share  they 
claimed  as  due to them  from  the Cadiz voyage of  1596, there was  a 
distinct tendency for the privateersman  to avoid the larger expeditions. 
These,  as investments,  suffered from  different commanders having  dif- 
ferent  ideas.  The man,  appointed by  a group of  private adventurers, 
desired to obtain as much plunder as possible, while  the naval captains, 
though they had orders not to neglect  this side of  the enterprize, had 
also to obey  instructions  from  which  profit,  in a pecuniary  sense, was 
unlikely to result.  The consequence  of  this friction  was  that the in- 
dependent  adventurers  were  forced  to  act  alone,  and  also,  to some 
extent, privateering was discouraged5.  This had a considerable effect on 
l  State Papers, Domestic, Elizzzbeth, cc~xv~.  3 ;  Calendar, 1598-1601,  p.  2. 
"Ewes,  Journals, p.  492. 
3  Raleigh and adventurers under him  ...  ...  26,200 
Lorldo~l  Merchants ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  6,000 
Cumberland ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  19,000 
251,200 
4  Publications ATavy Records Soc.,  XXII.  p.  205.  The valuation  of  this  ship is 
independent  of  a large quantity of  precious  stones or1  board,  most  of  which  were 
embezzled.  Their value  is said to have been  Y100,OOO. 
6  Thus in November 1596 the Lord  Mayor  wrote  to the Privy Council  in order 
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the whole political  situation.  Out of  a war-expenditure of  34 millions 
from 1590 to 1603, about three millions were spent on  the land forces 
and about  half  a  million  on  the extraordinary  expenses of  the navy1. 
But, if the true import of  the situation had been  recognized, it was  an 
efficient naval  service, that would  have been  able to terminate the war 
in favour of England.  Spain had come to depend entirely on the arrival 
of  the treasure-fleets  for  the carrying out  of  commercial and political 
obligations.  In the words of  Mr Oppenheim, "the  arrival  of  the fleets 
was awaited with strained anxiety.  The effects of  their non-arrival were 
felt equally in the hut of  the Spanish peasant, payment  for whose wool 
was  to  be  made  from  their lading, in  the offices  of  the German  and 
Italian financiers, in the warehouses of the Swedish or Dantzig merchants 
who supplied naval stores, in the camps of  Flanders and in the cities of 
France where civil war was bought with  the silver of  Potosi2."  At this 
time,  out of  a total revenue  of  14i million  ducats, over two  millions 
were derived from  the West Indies and more than a million and a half 
from the East Indies3.  It follows that the true source of  the strength 
of Philip lay in the mines of  America, and, after 1588, his weakness was 
the long sea-route, that had to be traversed before these resources could 
be  made available.  Had less been  spent  on  land operations and  the 
funds so released been used  to equip the Navy to cruise across this line 
of communication, while at the same time privateers were encouraged to 
make raids,  by  receiving  fair  treatment,  when  they  were  successful, in 
being permitted to enjoy the fruits of  the voyages unmolested ; then, it 
seems possible that sufficient plate-ships would  have been  captured or 
destroyed to have rendered it in~possible  for Philip to keep his troops in 
to express "the  dissatisfaction  of  the citizens"  at the poor  results,  financially,  of 
the last  two  voyages  to which  they had  contributed,  when  directed to do  so  by 
Elizabeth-Renzembraneia,  11.  58,  surnmarized in Analytical Indexes to  vols.  11.  and 
VIII.  of...the  Remembmncia, 1870, p.  38. 
l  Mr Oppenheim  (Publications Nay Records  Soc.,  XXII.  p.  10) estimates  the 
expense  of  naval  expeditions  from  1585 at a million and that of  land operations 
at four and a half millioris.  According to the figures and estimates in the text, the 
former from 1585 to 1603 would be as follows- 
The Armada  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  3137,829 
Navy (extraordinary) 1585-90  .  ..  ...  101,019 
JJ  JJ  1590-1603  ...  ...  475,000 
Navy (ordinary)  1585-1603  ...  ...  275,000 
-. 
Total  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  3988,818 
To this is to be added any payments for the sea forces, made through the treasurers 
of the armies in the Low Cou~ltries,  France or Ireland. 
Publications ATa y Kecords Soc.,  ~XIII. pp.  309, 310. 
A Discourse  of  the State of  Spayne,  written ir~  1607, by  Sir  Charles Corn- 
waleys in Somers' Tracts (1751), xrv. p.  440.  After the war  it was  estimated that 
the Spanish debt was 160 million ducats. The  Crisis of  1597 
the field.  As it was,  England  surrendered  the advantage, secured by 
the  defeat  of  the Armada,  by concentrating  its chief  resources on  a 
land-war,  where  it was  at a  disadvantage;  and therefore  the struggle 
was  protracted  and proved  financially exceedingly burdensome  to the 
country. 
The continuance of  the war, involving loss of  trade and shipping as 
well  as high  taxation,  was  followed  by  further  events  prejudicial  to 
commerce.  From  1594 until 1597 there was  a great  dearth, and the 
price of  wheat  and other provisions was very high.  In 1594 and 1595 
the quotation of  corn was from 56s. to 53s. 4d. a quarter, rising sharply 
in  1596  to 80s.  and  finally  to 120s.  which  was  repeated  in  1597l. 
Tillage was  described  as  being  very  greatly  decayed, and bread-riots 
were  frequents.  The distress in rural districts was  accentuated by the 
rise  in rents that had taken place during the time of  prosperity  from 
1575 to  158@.  The wool-trade  at the  same  time  suffered,  since in 
1597 the Merchant Adventurers were expelled from Germany ;  and, for 
several years, it was difficult to obtain a market for woold.  The situation 
was so serious that it was reported that this company was  on the eve of 
dissolving, and the whole trade of  the city was described as being much 
impaired and its traffic greatly diminished5.  The cumulative effect of 
these misfortunes was a period of  considerable distress in 1597 and part 
of  1598, which  approximated  a crisis.  That  the Dutch succeeded in 
carrying on a trade with  Spain,  in spite of  the efforts of  Fhilip, pro- 
duced great dissatisfaction  amongst the mercantile  classes in England. 
It was  represented  that "we,  for theire sake and defence entring into 
the  warre,  and  being  barred  from  all  commerce  and  entercourse  of 
merchandize, they in the meantime thrust us  out of  all trafficke to our 
utter  undoing  (if  in  time  it be  not  looked  into)6.."  The  difficulty, 
experienced by Elizabeth in endeavouring to obtain a loan of  6150,000, 
is another symptom of  the acute depression of  the time.  The mention 
of  it made the citizens "  shrinke and pull in theire hornes'" ;  and, after 
1 State  Papers,  Domestic,  Elizabeth,  CCLXVI.  90; Calendar,  1698-1601,  p.  36 ; 
Maitland,  Hstory  of  London,  I. p.  280;  Chronicon  Preciosum,  pp.  123,  124; 
Analytical  Indezes  to  vols.  11.  and  VIII.  of...the Remembraneia,  1870,  pp.  61-3. 
a  State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, CCLVII.  80, ccr,x~r.  151, C~LXIII.  55 ;  Calendar, 
1695-7,  pp. 2i7,401,120. 
A  I&+  for  an upstart C'ourtier: Or a quaint  Dispute  between  Velvet-breeches and 
Cloth-breeches.  Wherein is plainely  set  down  the  Disorder  in all Estates  and  Trades, 
by R. Greene, 1592, in Harleian Miscellany (1745),  v. pp.  376, 388, 396. 
4  State  Papers,  Domestic,  Elizabeth,  CCLXIX.  6 ; Calendar,  1598-1601,  p.  130 0; 
Camden, Eliz., ut supra,  111. p.  748.  C'alendar Salisbury  MSS.,  vr~.  pp.  307,  308 ; 
Early C1hartered Companies, by G.  Cawston and A. H. Keane, London, 1896, p.  27. 
6  Letters written by John Chamberlain (Camden Soc. 1861), p.  31. 
6  Ibid., p. 12.  7  Ibid., p. 35. 
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efforts  extending  over  six  months,  it was  found  impossible to obtain 
two-thirds  of  the  sum  required1, so  that  the  Queen  was  forced  "to 
descend  to mean  men"  and "pick  up  money  here  and  there"  as  it 
could be obtained2.  Some return of confidence arose from the rumoured 
peace  negotiations;  but  the outlook  again  became  overcast, through 
anticipations  of  a  Spanish  invasion and  by  the serious nature  of  the 
revolt in Ireland.  The concluding years of the war made great demands 
on the Crown finances, more than a million  and a half being  spent in 
Ireland alone from August lath, 15983.  Against this and other charges, 
there was  part of  the subsidy of  1597 still to be received ;  and in 1601 
Parliament granted eight-tenths and eight-fifteenths, which, on the basis 
of  collection early in the reign, should have realized three-quarters of  a 
million, but actually produced  only a little over half  a million4.  The 
remainder of the funds required was obtained, with considerable difficulty, 
by  sales of  land, savings from the Ordinary  Revenue and from miscel- 
laneous extraordinary  receipts,  such as  prize-money.  Privateering was 
prosecuted  vigorously;  and Sir John Gilbert was  said to have taken a 
ship, which, if proved a prize, was  likely to be  worth 6100,0005.  This 
capture was  made  with  the assistance of  four other privateers6, owned 
by a syndicate formed  by  Alderman John Wattes, who  had been  very 
successful in previous expeditions7.  The prizes of the latter were valued 
at Y18t6258, while  in  February  l603 it  was  reported  that  Captain 
Newport  had taken  five  treasure-ships9.  Apart from  individual  prizes 
of  great value, there is sufficient evidence to show that the adventurers 
at this time  met  with  very  considerable success10.  This, however, was 
only one side of the national account in relation to this phase of the war. 
The captures of  English shipping were very great.  In l598 the Russia 
company was exceptionally unfortunate, losing two or three ships in this 
way on the voyage to  Archangel and one of  those returning1'; while, three 
years later, the Levant company had one of  its vessels taken, which was 
valued at 640,00012.  In l600 the Danes and Norwegians began to make 
reprisals on English shipping1"  The Dunkirk privateers were very busy 
Chamberlain, Letters, ut supra, p. 37.  Ibid., p.  43. 
Journals of the  House  of  Commons,  I. p. 395; Parliamentary Debates in 1610, 
edited from the Notes of a Member  of the House  of Commons, by S. K. Gardiner 
(Camden Soc. 1862), p. 4. 
Vide infra, 111. p. 526. 
Chamberlain, Letters, ut supra, p. 127. 
State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth,  ccLxxxnr. 59 ;  Calendar, 1601-3,  p. 163. 
Publications Xavy Records Soc.,  XXII. p.  268. 
*  State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, cc~xxxv~.  32; Calendar, 1601-3,  p.  275. 
g  Chamberlain, Letters, ut supra, p. 180. 
l0 Publications Nacy Records Soc., xxrrr. p. 246. 
"  Chamberlain, Letters, ut supra, p.  18.  l2 Ibid., p. 109. 
l3 Camdeu, E'Iiz., ut wpra, 111. p. 824. The Plague  of  1602-3 
along the coasts, even taking vessels in the harbours:  and in 1600 and 
1601 some districts were  so terrorized that no ship dared to leave the 
ports  2. 
It follows that the loss of  trade through the plague in 159P  and bad 
seasons.  the interru~tion  of  the woollen  industry and  the exclusion of 
English  merchants  from the Spanish dominions-all  influences tending 
towards  depression-became  intensified towards the end  of  the war by 
numerous  captures of  ships and goods.  The final misfortune was  the 
serious outbreak of  the plague which  began  in 1602, and which  reached 
its height  in  September  1603.  During  the year  December  1602 to 
December 1603, it was  reported  that 38,138  persons had  died  of  the 
pestilence in I.ondon4,  this being close on  one-quarter of  the estimated 
population  at  that  times.  Merchants,  like  many  of  the  other  in- 
habitants,  had  fled  to  escape  the  risk  of  infection,  and  trade  was 
described  as  "having  utterly  ceased"  for  a  period  of  almost  six 
months6. 
For these reasons it is only to be expected that, during this period, 
the existing joint-stock  companies, as  well  as  the system as a whole, 
would remain in a condition of  arrested development.  Trading outside 
England was  subject to new and serious risks, while the series of  minor 
crises, as well  as the discussions about monopolies',  tended  to restrict 
invention  at home.  Joint-stock privateering,  which  had been  so pro- 
niinent prior to 1590, had declined for several years  and only revived 
again towards the close  of  the war.  The Spaniards in America  were 
adopting  precautions,  which  made  captures a  matter more  of  chance 
than  of  daring.  I11  the larger  expeditions,  the loss  of  Granville and 
the Revenge  in  1591 and the deaths of  Hawkins and Drake in  1594 
were  far  from  being  off-set  by  the  capture  of  the Madre  de  Dios 
in  1592. 
Chamberlain, Letters,  ut supra, p.  101 ;  Analytical  Indexes to vols.  11.  and  VIII. 
oj:  ..the  Remembrancia, p.  39. 
Calendar Salisbury MSS.,  IX. 343, 350. 
l'he  deaths from plague  in 1592 in London were 11,603-London's  Lord Have 
Mercy upon us, A True Relation ofthe Seven Modern Plagues or Visitations in  London, 
1665, Somers' Tracts (1750))  VII. p. 53; An Historical Account of the Several Phgues ... 
since ...  1346, by Dale Ingram, 1755, p.  2;  Natural and  Political  Observations  men- 
tioned in  a following  Index made upon the Bills of Mortality,  by Captain John Graunt, 
1665, p.  65. , 
"he  First Letter  Book  of  the Emt India Company,  edited  by Sir George Bird- 
wood,  p.  39; London's  Lord  Have  Mercy  upon  us ; Dale  Ingram,  An Historical 
Account  of Several  Plagues,  p.  2. 
The population  of London  was  estimated  to have  been  about  160,000  by 
Giovanni  Botero-Anderson,  Annals of Commerce,  11.  p. 235. 
First Letter Book  of  the East lndia Company, p. 30. 
7  Vide ilgra, Chapter VI. 
CHAP. V.]  Position of  Companies  158'7-1603 
The war told especially on the Levant trade which began to fall on 
evil times  towards  the end of  the century.  At first the company was 
accustomed to a  return  of  about 300 per  cent.',  but  during the war 
many  ships  were  captured  and  the  currant  n~onopoly  was  heavily 
burdened  with  taxation, with  the result  that there was  dissatisfaction, 
and the privileges of  the company were suspended.  Eventually it was 
re-organized, but as a  regulated  company2.  During the last years  of 
the existence of  this  body  under joint-stock  organization,  a  group of 
its  members  was  instrumental  in  forming  the  East  India  company, 
which  was  incorporated  in  1600.  The  closeness  of  the  connection 
between  the two  undertakings  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the same 
volume  was  used  as a  letter-book  by  the Levant  adventurers and for 
the  earliest  minutes  of  the East  India  merchants5.  If  the origin  of 
the capital, used  for the foundation of  the India trade, be traced back, 
it will  be  found  to have  a curious history.  Much of  that, employed 
in  establishing the Levant  company,  came from  the gains  of  Drake's 
privateering in  the voyage  round  the world.  Then, out of  the profits 
of  the Levant trade, a  considerable  part of  the resources,  required  to 
start the East India venture, was provided.  As yet, however, the latter 
was  in  a  purely  experimental  condition, and its development  required 
better times.  The same remark  is true of  other promising  enterprizes, 
the Russia  company had discovered whaling grounds4, Raleigh was  con- 
tinuing, under great disadvantages, to act as the pioneer of  colonizing5 ; 
and, in the Parliaments of  1597 and 1601, proposals  had been made for 
the draining of  low-lying  lands at home6.  With the return of  more 
settled conditions, these various activities became prominent in the next 
period. 
Probably of  all the companies, that trading to Russia  should have 
been  least disturbed  by the war.  Its trade route lay outside  the area 
of  hostilities,  and the numerous  expeditions led  to an  increase in the 
demand  for  some of  the commodities  it imported.  Unfortunately it 
suffered from some special disadvantages.  The third  company started 
in  1586-7  with  a  small capital;  and,  in  the commercial world  after 
1587,  it was  difficult  to  obtain  more.  Even  though  interest  was 
relatively  low-it  appears to have been  about 8 per  cent.  on  loans  to 
Elizabeth-this  was  an evidence of  want  of  confidence, rather than of 
an abundant supply  of  capital.  Thus in three years  following 1586, 
dividends  of  profits  were  declared  of  11  per  cent.,  289 per  cent.  and 
Anderson, Annals of Commerce, 11, p.  209.  Vide infra, 11.  p. 88. 
The Dawn of British Trade to the East Indies, by Henry Stevens, London, 1886, 
pp. 226-83;  cf. infra, 11. pp. 01, 97. 
Vide infra, 11.  p. 47.  Ibid.,  11.  p. 244. 
6  Ibid.,  11.  pp. 352, 353. 104  Position of  Companies 1587-1607  [CHAP. V. 
30 per  cent., respectively.  It was  unfortunate that, in  making up the 
accounts, insufficient provision was  made for doubtful debts, and it was 
found  necessary in  each case  to make  an assessment on those who  had 
received these distributions.  By means  of  these levies, the second pay- 
ment  was  reduced to 9$ per cent. and the third to # per cent.'  Other 
difficulties arose from the attack, made on this company in the Parlia- 
ment  of  16042; and,  in  addition,  there  were  disputes  between  the 
governor  and  the commonalty  about  the private  trade carried on  by 
the former3.  The delay, involved in  the elucidation  of  claims arising 
out of  this matter, prolonged  the existence of  the existing joint-stock, 
which appears to have been wound up about 1607. 
The society  of  the  Mines  Royal  was  also  troubled  by  financial 
difficulties,  and  especially  the  subsidiary  company,  formed  by  the 
German  miners, which in  1600 was  forced to suspend operations,  until 
it could  obtain payment  for  copper  sold4.  There was  nearly  being  a 
serious dispute between this society and that of the Mineral and Battery 
Works.  The former had the right of mining the precious metals in the 
whole of Wales, while the latter had iron works (concerning which there 
had  been  the numerous  disputes mentioned  in a  previous chapter6) i11 
Monmouthshire.  One of  the farmers of  a portion  of  these works  used 
his  lease to cover, as it was  alleged, the smelting of  large quantities of 
silver ore, without paying a royalty to the Mines Royal6. 
The period of  depression shows itself in the change that now appears 
in the tenure of  the wire and iron works.  Up to 1587 each new  offer, 
for the farm of  these, produced an  increased rent.  Possibly, i11  view of 
the  favourable  impression  such  competition  would  produce  as  to the 
profits, the society ran  the works  on its own  account  for a  number  of 
years, but it was  not long before a reversion was  made to the farming 
system, though at a greatly reduced rent7. 
In one respect  the society of  the Mineral  and  Battery Works was 
very fortunate.  It was able to obtain an act, prohibiting foreign wool- 
cards in 1601, and it escaped condemnation  in  that Parliament, though 
it exercised two monopolies : since the bill,  discussed, only applied  to 
patents  granted  to individuals.  When the subject  was  dealt  with  in 
1604,  the  investigation  was  confined  to  bodies  engaged  in  foreign 
trade,  so  that  this  society was  outside the range  of  censure on  both 
occasionsS. 
Vide infra,  11.  pp.  48, 49.  In the summary in the text the  dividends  and 
assessme~~ts  are given in the nearest fraction per cent.  The exact sums are stated 
in the accoul~t  of this company. 
Vide infra, p.  127.  Ibid.,  11.  p.  52. 
Ibid., 11.  p. 399.  Vide supra,  p.  66. 
Vide infra, 11.  p.  422.  Ibid.,  11.  pp. 421-3. 
8  Ibid.,  11.  p.  464. 
CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  strain of  the war  with  Spain showed  itself,  not  only  in  high 
taxation  in  England, but also, to a  certain  extent, in  a  relaxation  of 
supervision  in  the  internal  management  of  the  State.  The  policy 
of  avoiding foreign  complications, as far as possible, during the earlier 
part  of  the  reign  of  Elizabeth  had  given  her  ministers  time  and 
opportunity to control  domestic  affairs.  After the Armada there were 
successive  naval  and  military  expeditions,  which  had  to be  prepared 
generally  at short  notice.  The political  situation  emerged  from  one 
crisis  only  to  enter  another,  and  the  best  energies  of  the greatest 
statesmen  were  concentrated upon  foreign  politics.  For these reasons, 
during the closing  years  of  the sixteenth  century,  there  is  frequent 
mention of  abuses; and the people were able to make their voices heard 
through  Parliament,  since  the need  for  supplies,  to carry on  the war, 
compelled Elizabeth to call the members together more frequently than 
had been thought necessary at the beginning of  her reign.  One  of  the 
abuses  to which  attention  was  drawn  was  the  existence  of  patents 
of  monopoly.  This subject received particular attention, together with 
a  number  of  others, in  1597, owing to the industrial depression of  that 
year1.  Parliament  endeavoured  to discover  the  causes  that had  con- 
tributed towards the existing distress, and the "  enormities growing by 
patents of  privilege  and monopolies"  were  mentioned2.  The House of 
Commons  did  not  pass  any  resolution,  but  the  Speaker brought  the 
matter under the notice of  Elizabeth.  She, in the speech at the close 
of  the Parliament,  declared  that "she  hoped  her  dutiful and loving 
subjects  would  not take  away  her  prerogative,  which  is  the  chiefest 
flower  in  her  garden  and  the principal  and  head  pearl  in her  crown 
and  diadem,  but  that they  will  rather leave  that to her  disposition. 
And  as  her  Majesty  hath proceeded to tryal of  them  already, so she 
Vide supra,  p. 100. 
D'Ewes,  Journals,  ut supra,  p.  554. 106  The  Crown and  Monopolies  1597-1600  [CHAP. vI. 
promises to continue, that they shall all be examined and abyde the trial 
and true touchstone of the law1." 
In this manner  the full discussion of  the subject was evaded, and, at 
the same time, the Crown tacitly admitted that a royal grant of trading 
privileges was  subject to a trial at law.  How  much  or how little this 
meant depended on the purity of the administration of justice, which at 
this period was far from being immaculate.  There is some evidence that 
an  effort was  made  to carry out the promise, made  to Parliament in 
159Y2.  About 1600, an opinion was obtained from Coke, the Attorney- 
General, on the extent of  the prerogative.  He stated that the Queen 
might  prescribe  orders  for  the  advancement  of  trade,  that being  a 
point  of  government.  This was  supported  by  the  precedent  of  the 
incorporation  of  the  Merchant  Adventurers.  She  was  also  entitled 
to grant patents  for  the exercise  of  new  inventions,  as convenient  to 
the commonwealth, that the  inventor  may  reap  some  reward  for  his 
service  and she might  also grant privileges for new  trading voyagess. 
These  principles  were  not  illiberal, considering  the times ; but  there 
were two loop-holes by which abuses might enter.  The Queen might be 
misinformed as to the novelty of  some privileged  trade, or again it was 
possible that, during a  period  of  some confusion, the beneficiary, under 
a  certain  grant,  might  use  it in  an  oppressive  manner,  by  exacting 
something which was not included in the patent.  There appears to be 
little doubt that there were abuses of the latter kind ;  and it was stated, 
later, that some of  these  had been remedied, and that more would have 
been tried had it not been  for the pressure on the courts, arising out of 
the trials occasioned by the rebellion of  Essex4.  At  the same time, it is 
important to notice  that, at least in one case, a suit against a patent in 
the Common Pleas was  stayed by  an order  from  Elizabeth,  "that her 
prerogative might not be  called in  question5."  Thus the investigation 
was  not  as  complete  as had  been  expected.  If  Elizabeth  had  been 
prepared to allow a trial of  the patents in existence in 1600 and 1601, 
it is probable that the majority of  them, as grants, would  have  been 
defensible.  At  the same time, the agents of the patentees in many cases 
had acted ultra vires and thereby occasioned great complaint ;  therefore, 
D'Ewes, Journals,  p.  547. 
In 1601 Bacon  stated that since the last Parliament fifteen or sixteen patents 
had to his knowledge been repealed, "some  by her Majesty's own express command- 
ment upon complaint made to her by  petition, and  some by  Quo  Wawanto in the 
Exchequer."  Ibid.,  p.  645.  At  the  same  time  another  member  stated  he had 
"never  heard  the  cry  against  monopolies greater  and  more  vehement."  Ibid., 
p. 646. 
3  State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, cc~xxvr.  81 ;  Calendar,  1598-1601, p. 521. 
D'Ewes, Journals,  p. 652. 
State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, ~LXXXII.  8 ;  Calendar, 1601-3,  p. 108. 
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on the ground of  these abuses, there would  have been  sufficient reasons 
for  the quashing of  some  of  the patents.  Such  a  course would  have 
been  the  most  satisfactory one  in  the circumstances.  The reasons  it 
was not adopted  completely were, first  of  all and in the main, the great 
pressure of  other ~ublic  business, secondly there may have been the fear 
that, although it could  have been  shown that in most cases the abuses 
arose from illegal  acts of  the patentees  or their agents, the voiding of 
the patents might have appeared to reflect on the prerogative.  Finally, 
there  was  a  small  group of  grants in favour  of  some of  the younger 
favourites  of  Elizabeth, and she was  unwilling to deprive  them  of  the 
~rivileges,  recently  conferred  upon  them. 
While these  causes afford  an adequate explanation  of  the delay  in 
obtaining a  redress  that would  have  been  easy  to grant without  any 
sacrifice  of  dignity  by  Elizabeth,  such  partial  satisfaction  only  en- 
couraged the Commons to press  the matter with  more insistence in the 
Parliament of  1601.  In fact England was smarting under the cessation 
of  the prosperity that had been enjoyed from 1575 to 1586, and, as has 
often happened since, the first impulse was to seek for real or imaginary 
abuses to be  remedied  by Parliament.  Amongst a number mentioned, 
the monopolies seemed to be in some respects the line of least resistance, 
and  therefore  attention  was  again  directed  to  this  subject.  On 
November  19, 1601, this  topic  was  re-introduced  in a  somewhat  un- 
expected  manner.  On  a  bill  being  handed  to the clerk  to be  read, 
a  number  of  members  clamoured  for  another bill,  intended to reform 
abuses  in  the Exchequer,  and "some  said '  yea'  and some  'no'  and 
a great noise there was'."  Eventually Laurence  Hide was  able to make 
himself heard, and he obtained leave to bring in a bill  "to explain the 
common  law  in  certain  cases  of  letters  patents."  In  the  important 
debate which  followed,  a  number  of  different  lines  of  argument  cross 
each other.  There was  the constitutional question, as to whether  the 
House  should  proceed  by  bill  or  by petition  to the Queen or by  the 
compromise of  a  petition  for leave to consider a bill.  Then there were 
numerous  points  of  law,  and  finally  the  economic  question  of  the 
advantages  and disadvantages  of  monopolies emerges.  The grievance 
of  patents was  prefaced by many speakers with extravagant expressions 
of  condemnation.  The monopolist was  described ''  as the whirlpool of 
the princes' profit,"  "the bloodsucker of  the commonwealth."  Francis 
Moore said  that no  act of  Elizabeth "hath  been  more  derogatory to 
her  own  majesty,  more  odious  to the subject,  more  dangerous  to the 
commonwealth  than  the  granting  of  these  monopolies."  Another 
memberg represented  himself  as  speaking  "for  a  town  that  grieves 
D'Ewes, Journals,  p. 644. 
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and  pines,  for  a  countrey  that groaneth  and  languisheth  under  the 
monstrous  and unconscionable burden."  In such language, there  was 
necessarily a  certain amount of  exaggeration, and the House was  well 
advised  in  committing the whole  subject to a Select Committee.  The 
most  complete  list  of  the  patents,  complained  of,  was  given  by 
Sir  Robert  Wroth,  who  mentions  twenty-four  patents,  which  he 
objectionable1.  These  include  all  ~rivileges,  relating  to 
commodities, whether  exercised  by  an  individual,  a  corporation  or a 
trading  company.  It  was  held  at this  time  that  a  true  monopoly 
(or certainly the most  objectionable one) was  that granted to a single 
individual, thus Bacon  said, "  if  the grant be to a number of  burgesses 
or to a  corporation, that  must  stand  and is forsooth no  monopoly2." 
For  this  reason  several  of  the  alleged  moiiopolized  commodities, 
mentioned  by  Wroth,  do  not  appear  in  the  list  returned  by  the 
Committee.  Those, controlled by companies, were currants (the Levant 
company3) and calamine stone (the Mineral and Battery Works4). 
Altogether the Committee had before it upwards  of  forty grants of 
different kinds.  The only  unity  amongst  these  consisted  in  the fact 
that, in all of  them,  there was  an  element  of  compulsion, originating 
from the Crown.  It cannot  even  be  said that the whole list contains 
only those grants, limiting the initiative of  the individual trader, since a 
considerable number were aimed at removing, rather than the imposing 
of  restrictions.  This group of  licenses comprises two sub-divisions, the 
one relating to domestic, and the other to foreign trade.  With regard 
to the former,  it was  considered  that the act  for  the right  tanning 
of  leather resulted  in certain inconveniences; and, as far back as 1575, 
a  patent  had been  granted  to Sir Edward  Dyer  to release  certain  of 
the forfeitures under  the statute,  in  some  specified cases.  Then,  the 
laws, prohibiting exportation of various commodities, sometimes resulted 
in a  glut of  these  in the home-market;  while  conversely  it was  held 
advisable, in other cases, to relax  the impediments  to imports.  It was 
customary  to effect  these  objects  by  means  of  a  royal  license,  which, 
as a  rule,  specified the quantity of  a given  commodity to be exported 
or  imported.  There  were  eight  of  these  grants,  mentioned  by  the 
Committee.  Several affected  trades  of  very  small  importance,  as  for 
instance  the  license  to  export  lists  and  shreds,  aniseed,  a  limited 
nuniber  of  calf-skins  and  two  others,  described  as  of  "no  great 
importance,"  for  small  quantities  of  iron  and  tin5.  There  still  re- 
mained  three  grants.  One  of  them  was  the permit  to export  steel. 
At this time,  it was  admitted  that steel  was  a new  trade, and efforts 
1  D'Ewes, Journals, p. 648.  "bid.,  p. 645. 
Vide infra, 11. pp. 86, 87.  Ibid., 11.  p. 424. 
D'Ewes, JournaL, p.  650. 
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were being made (as will be shown below1) to establish the manufacture 
in England by the limitation of  competitive imports.  Obviously, the 
encouragement  of  an  individual  to  export  English  steel  would  be 
productive  of  good,  if  only  as showing  how  far it could  compete  in 
foreign markets.  Then there was  the patent for the brewing of beer for 
export.  This  was  the continuation  of  an  old  grant,  surrendered  by 
William Carr in 1596.  On  November 23rd  a  new  patent was  issued, 
which conferred the privilege of  the sole brewing  of  all beer for  export 
by  liceme  in London, Westminster, Sussex, Essex, Kent, Middlesex and 
Surrey,  subject  to the following provisos,  that  the grant was  not  to 
apply to beer for the navy, the army or members  of  the Royal House- 
hold  and that, if  the price  should "  excessively increase,"  it was  to be 
moderated by the Lord Treasurer2.  Finally, there was  a license, which 
had  originally been  made  to Dr Hector  in  1567 and  which  expired 
in  1594,  to import wool  from Spain for  making  Spanish  felts.  This 
was  renewed  in  favour  of  Michael  Stanhope,  groom  of  the  privy- 
chamber,  for  twenty  years,  on  condition  that he  should  pay  45.  2d. 
per cwt. customs.  As yet the demand for Spanish wool in England was 
not great, and, in any case, during the war with  Spain, the possibilities 
of  such  importation  would  not  be  frequent.  At the  same  time,  in 
principle,  even  from  the point  of  view  of  the time,  this  license  was 
objectionable, since it tended to impede the development  of  one branch 
of  the cloth trade. 
At first sight,  it is  not easy  to discover why  these  transportation- 
grants  were  included  in  the  indictment  against  monopolies.  The 
difficulty  arises  from  the  popular  impression  that  the  House  of 
Commons, in  the time  of  Elizabeth  and James I., was  the champion 
of  freer  trade.  If  this  were  so,  it would  have  been  in  the  illogical 
position  of  condemning  a  tendency  in  this  direction.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  the ground  of  objection  tolthis group  of  licenses  was  that 
the Crown  had  intervened  to modify the consequences of  restrictions, 
imposed on trade by Parliament4.  Even granting there may have been 
some  abuses in the carrying out of  such licenses, it is plain  that at a 
period, when Parliaments were  infrequent, some machinery was required 
to relax regulations  made to meet a temporary emergency.  In addition 
to the feeling of  irritation against the interference  of  the Crown, there 
was  another  element  which  explains  the  attitude  of  the  Commons. 
As  already  shown:  trade had  been  bad,  and the mercantile  class had 
Vide infra, p. 117.  '  S"  pap;&,  Domestic, Elizabeth, ccu. [Docquet] ;  Calendar, 1595-7,  p. 307. 
Ibid., CCL.  [Docquel] ;  Calendar, 15914, p.  556. 
The EngZkh Patentr  of Monopoly, by W.  Hyde Price, Boston, 1906, pp. 9, 10. 
Vide supra, pp.  100-2. 110  Copyrights and Grants  for aemp, &c. 1601  [CHAP. VI. 
suffered.  It  resented  the  growing  importance  in  commerce  of  the 
capitalist,  who  was  not  a  merchant.  During  the  first  twenty  years 
of  the reign  of  Elizabeth, capital was  so exceedingly scarce in England 
that it was  welcomed  from  any  source, even  from  abroad1.  After a 
series of  good  years  there was  considerable  accumulation.  Had trade 
been  prosperous  in  the  last  years  of  the  sixteenth  century,  in  view 
of  the large war-expenditure, it is probable that merchants would have 
been glad to obtain capital from other classes.  But, with the depression 
of  trade, the series of  losses through the war, the high prices occasioned 
by  the recent  scarcity  and  the consequent  fall  in  profits,  merchants 
were  anxious  to limit  competition  to their  own  class  at least.  This 
spirit  expresses  itself  with  sufficient  emphasis  in  a  petition  of  the 
Merchants  of  the Staple,  as  early as 1560, against  licenses  to expo& 
wool,  which  had been  granted  to persons who  were  not merchants or 
members  of  the society.  This course, they urged, had led t,o the utter 
decay of  the company, through the competition of  the broggers  of  the 
licensees  who  "swarmed"  through  the country  and  bought  wool  at 
"  unreasonable " prices2. 
After  separating the export and import licenses, there still remain 
about  thirty grants,  complained  of  by  the Committee  in  1601.  Six 
of  these may be readily disposed of.  These were authorizations to print 
certain specified books, and are in reality instances of  copyright.  There 
was  no  question  of  an inlportant  trading monopoly  in  an edition  of 
Tacitus, or of the Psalms in Hebrew, or of  songs in three parts. 
Another  small  group  of  grants related  to the sowing  of  certain 
seeds, which  were  related to the textile industries,  such as hemp,  flax 
and woad. 
It is plain that the grievances, if  grievances there were, are to be 
sought in  the remaining  fifteen  grants.  These  may  be  divided  into 
four distinct classes, one related to munitions of  war, another to articles 
of  the greatest  luxury,  another  to manufactures,  alleged  to be  new, 
and a final group, which is made up of  miscellaneous privileges given by 
Elizabeth  for  personal  reasons.  This  last  class  to  a  certain  extent 
is  a  cross  division,  since  it  could  be  amplified  by  the inclusion  of 
patents, such as those to Darcie, Stallhope  and others, which have been 
assigned to one of  the other sub-divisions, but it will be convenient to 
distinguish cases where there was  an element of  royal favour, conjoined 
with a supposed economic benefit to the country, from others where the 
latter element  is either absent  or  not apparent.  The patents granted 
Cf.  the existence of  German  shareholders  in  the  hfines  Royal,  infra,  11. 
pp.  385-7. 
2  State Papers,  Domestic, Elizabeth, Addenda,  IX. 56; Calendar Addenda,  1547- 
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forapersonal reasons were  to a considerable  extent conditioned  by  the 
state of  the Crown finances.  It has been shown that, during the closing 
years of  the reign, there was  a great strain on  the Exchequer, and one 
direction  in  which  some  alleviation was  sought was  by  means  of  the 
grant  of  offices  or privileges1.  Thus,  in  some  cases,  grants, affecting 
trade,  were  made  to  servants  of  the  Crown,  as  a  remuneration  for 
services.  It was characteristic, both of  the times  and the temperament 
of  Elizabeth, that there was  a  tendency towards  payment'being  made 
in  kind  rather  than  in  money,  and  most  occasional  or  exceptional 
services  were  rewarded  in  this  way  as  well  as,  in  some  cases,  claims 
arising  out  of  fixed  salaries  that  had  fallen  into  arrear.  Thus  the 
paramount  necessity  of  increasing  the  surplus  fro111  the  Ordinary 
Revenue,  in  order  to provide  for  extraordinary  charges,  accounts  for 
the appearance  of  monopolies in  favour  of  those,  who  had  claims on 
the  Crown,  which  could  not  be  conveniently  liquidated  other~visea. 
One of  these personal  grants may be  readily disposed  of,  namely  that 
to Eliza Matthews, widow  of  a  Yeoman  of  the Poultry, to make train 
oil out of  blubbers and the livers of  fish, which was  granted in  1594, 
with a monopoly for twenty-one years3.  It was  scarcely in accordance 
with the dignity of  Parliament to draw attention to a paltry matter of 
this  kind,  since  the amount  of  oil  extracted  from  the  livers  of  fish 
in  England  must  have  been  inconsiderable.  Two  grants  to Raleigh 
were  on  an altogether  different basis.  One  of  these  was  the farming 
of  the impost on  sweet  wines4.  The objection to this must have been 
due  to the personality  of  Raleigh  (who  is  said  at this  time to have 
been  the  most  unpopular  man  in  England),  since  the  system  of 
"farming"  certain  imposts  was  a  recognized  method  of  fiscal  ad- 
ministration.  There were numerous other farms of Customs in existence, 
and it is  not altogether creditable to the agitators in Parliament  that 
one of these should be pilloried and the rest ignored. 
Part,  at  least,  of  the  objection  to  Raleigh's  connection  with 
Fragments Regalia,  or Observations on  the late Queen  Elizabeth, her  Times  and 
Favou~ites,  by  Sir R.  Naunton,  1642,  p.  7 ; vide  supra, p.  99 ; infra,  111.  pp.  498, 
508,  509. 
Vide supra, p. 96 ; infra,  111.  pp.  507,  508. 
State  Papers,  Domestic,  Elizabeth,  CCXLVIII.  [Docpuet];  CaZendar,  1591-4, 
P.  513. 
There was a prejudice against any interference with  the trade in sweet wines 
dating back to the time of Edward III., in whose reign John Peachie of London was 
punished  for exercising a monopoly  of  selling these wines in London.  Again,  by 
a patent  of  Mary, the burgesses  of  Southampton obtaiued the sole right to import 
malmsey into England.  This grant was  pronounced  contrary to the statutes  by 
a court composed  of  all the judges-Institutes  of  the  Laws of  England, by E. Coke, 
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tin-mining'  is to be attributed also to personal  motives.  In this case, 
the privileges he  exercised, while far from  unobjectionable, constituted 
an immense  improvement  on the system  in vogue a  few  years before. 
For an understanding  of  the position  it is necessary to bear  in mind 
two different circumstances.  The Crown was  entitled to certain rights, 
arising  out of  the Duchy  of  Cornwall,  amongst  which  was  the pre- 
emption  of  tin,  as well  as a  royalty on  the quantity raised.  As yet, 
tin-mining  was  insufficiently  provided  with  capital,  and therefore  the 
miners had to be  financed by some outside person.  In 1595, there was 
keen competition between Lord Buckhurst and the Earl of  Oxford for a 
transfer of  this right of  pre-emption.  The plan proposed was that the 
farmers  should  purchase  the whole  output of  the mines,  paying  £25 
per 1000 lbs. to the miners, and, by creating an artificial  scarcity,  they 
expected  to advance the price  to Y5O  per  1000 lbs.  It was  expected 
that, in  this  way,  a  gross  profit  of  Y40,000  a  year  could  be  made. 
It was  proposed  to pay Elizabeth $7000  annually after the first year, 
to lend her money at 8 per cent., and to reduce the high rate of  interest, 
then  paid  by  the  miners  to  the  London  merchants,  who  advanced 
capital, before the tin was  smelted2.  Buckhurst proposed  to Burghley 
that the latter might  put in &'10,000  stock, if  he used his influence as 
against  Oxford.  In  1599, Bevis  Bulmer,  who  had  previously  been 
interested in a number of  mining speculations3, tendered 210,000 a year 
for  the right  of  pre-emption  at Y26.  13s. 4d.  per  1000 lbs4  About 
1600, Elizabeth  decided  to abolish  the system of  pre-emption  of  the 
whole  output, substituting for it a  fixed levy  on  each  1000 lbs.  In 
a proclamation to the tinners, the Queen  stated that this method  was 
more  convenient  to  the  whole  realm,  though  less  profitable  to  the 
Crown.  To remedy  the lack  of  working  capital  amongst the miners, 
money was to be lent them up to 64000, half  yearly, free of  interest6. 
It appears to have been the farming of  the royalty, which was  granted 
to  Raleigh,  of  which  the  Commons  complained.  This  method,  in 
spite of the censure of the House, was more advantageous to the country 
and the miners than  that of  pre-emption.  There was  now  only  one 
price (about Y27 per  1000 Ibs.), and this was  received  by  the miners, 
subject to the deduction  of  the royalty, and, allowing for the payment 
of  it in money, not in kind as before, they obtained more than formerly. 
Moreover, the purchaser  of  tin was  able to buy it at the mine,  freely, 
1  G. R. Lewis, The Stannaries, p. 146. 
State Papers, Domestic,  Elizabeth,  CCLI.  71, 100,  120; CCLII.  49; ccLrrr. 68;  -  - 
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and thereby effected a saving of almost 100 per cent.  When the matter 
was debated in Parliament, Haleigh stated that, before his patent, wages 
amongst  the  tin  miners  had  been  as  low  as  2s.  a  week,  but  that, 
afterwards,  4s.  a week  was  paid  and that "there  is no  poor  that will 
work there, but may and have that wages."  At the same time, he said 
that, if all other patents were to be repealed, he "would give his consent 
as freely to the cancelling of  this as any other  member of  the House." 
It is recorded that there was "  a great silence " after his declaration1. 
Doubtless  had Kaleigh  not been  pel-sonally unpopular, the patents 
granted to him would  not have  been  mentioned.  In fact, the inclusion 
of  these  raised  the  whole  question  of  leasing  the  collection  of  the 
digerent  taxes;  and public opinion, as yet, was  not sufficiently formed 
to see the objections to this method of fiscal administration. 
A  distinct  group  of  the grants  impugned  relates  to munitions  of 
war,  such  as ordnance  and gunpowder.  It will  be  remembered  that, 
at the beginning  of  the reign  of  Elizabeth,  the greatest difficulty  was 
experienced in importing arms and powder from abroad2.  Had England 
not been able to ~roduce  some ~owder,  the country would have been at 
an enormous disadvantage in the contest with Spain.  During the years 
before the Armada, this industry had been  reduced to small dimensions 
in  England;  and,  when  the need  arose,  it was  found  impossible  to 
obtain  a  supply abroad.  Warned by the danger then  experienced, the 
administration  took  steps,  whereby  a  patentee,  bound  under  certain 
penalties,  undertook  to supply  powder  up  to a  certain  amount  each 
year, when required.  It was claimed in 1600 that English powder  had 
been  sold for the past eleven years at 8d. per lb.;  whereas, had it been 
imported, the price would have been  Is.  It was  said that the saving to 
the State in this period was 2100,000.  The same reason  accounts both 
for the necessity of  a monopolistic element in this industry and for the 
dissatisfaction with which it was regarded.  The foundation of  powder- 
making  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  consisted  in  the 
obtaining  of  earth  from  the  floors of  buildings  that  had  been  used 
for stables3.  This earth required  to be  put through  certain processes 
in  order  to extract the  saltpetre.  In a  period  of  national  crisis,  it 
was  necessary that someone should be  invested with powers  of  entering 
private property, of  removing the soil required, subject to making good 
any damage done.  Such  powers  could only be exercised either by the 
State or by persons to whom  the duty was  delegated, under  satisfactory 
guarantees.  In  this  case,  the  Crown  concerned  itself  chiefly  with 
obtaining  an  undertaking  that the powder  should  be  supplied  to  it 
at a  low  ~rice,  and  by  1600  no  more  than  Yd. per  lb.  was   aid. 
l  D'Ewes, Journals, p. 646. 
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From  this point  of  view,  the working  of  the patent  was  satisfactory, 
since  Burghley  is  said  "oftentimes  to  have  spoken  of  this  contract, 
as  the  greatest  service  that  could  be  done  for  the  security  of  the 
kingdom, the strength of  the wars  being altered  from bows and arrows 
to  ordnance."  The  demand  for  powder,  towards  the  end  of  the 
sixteenth  century,  made  it  necessary  to  empower  the  patentees  to 
dig  for  peterish  earth  in  the  grounds  "of  the  better  sort,  which 
had  not  been  entered  previously."  It  was  probably  for  this reason 
that objection  was  made  to this  class  of  grant1.  Sir  Robert  Cecil, 
in  informing  the  House  of  the decision  of  Elizabeth  on  the subject, 
described this patent in the following terms : "  There is another patent 
-that  for saltpetre-that  hath been  both accused and slandered.  It 
digs  in  every  man's  house,  it annoyavhe  inhabitant  and  generally 
troubleth  the  subject.  For  this I  beseech  you  be  contented. ..for I 
must  tell  you  the kingdom  is  not  so  well  furnished  with  powder  as 
it should  be.  But, if  it be  thought  fit  (upon  advice), that it should 
be  cancelled, her  Majesty  commanded  me  to  tell  you  that,  though 
she be willing to help  the grave gentleman that hath that patent, yet, 
out of  the abundant desire she hath to give you compleat satisfaction, it 
shall be repealed3." 
Another group of  patents, which fell under the censure of  the House 
of  Cqminons, affected  articles  that may  be  described  as  superfluities, 
such  as the making  of  gold  and  silver  thread,  the selling  of  playing 
cards and the keeping of  unlawful games,  otherwise  described  as  the 
"  dice patent4."  The object  in issuing these grants was, by  reserving a 
substantial money payment  from  the patentee, to increase the price of 
the commodities with  a  view  to diminishing the sale.  The State was 
entitled  to restrict  gambling,  and the  only  questions,  that remained 
open,  were  whether  the tax  should  be  imposed  by  the  Crown  or  by 
Parliament, or whether the imposition should  be collected by officials or 
farmed  to an individual.  None  of  these  problems were  considered by 
Parliament, attention being concentrated solely on  the inconveniencies 
occasioned  by  the patents.  Of  these  the playing-card  grant was  con- 
sidered  most  obnoxious.  It had  been  made  to Edmund  Darcie,  who 
had  obtained  powers  from  the Privy  Council  to search  shops for  any 
cards that did not bear his seal5.  It  was said that, in the execution of 
1 State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth,  cc~xx~.  76; Calendar, 1598-1601, pp. 470-2. 
In Townshend,  Historical  Collect~ons,  p.  251,  instead  of  "annoys,"  there  is 
~rinted  "  removes." 
3  D'Ewes, Journals,  p.  653. 
4  It  is recorded that at  the mention of this, during the debate, Raleigh "blushed." 
Since there is  no evidence  that he was interested in this grant, it seems likely that 
llis colifusion or indignation was manifested at the me~ltion  of the patent for tin. 
5  State Papers,  Domestic,  Elizabeth,  CCLXXIX.  93 ; Cblendur, 1601-3,  p.  46. 
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such search-warrants, Darcie's deputies summoned delinquents to appear 
at courts  fifty  miles  distant,  and  that,  in  many  cases,  the  persons 
accused compounded for a money payment to the searchers, rather than 
face  the loss  of  time involved in defending  themselves1.  This patent 
was  one  of  those  tried  under  the  promise,  made  by  Elizabeth  to 
Parliament  in  1597, and  a  message  was  sent  to the judges  that the 
Queen "would  not have her prerogative  called in question2."  At this 
date-the  message was  dated October 7th, 1601-it  is to be remembered 
that some fifteen  grants had already been  annulled,  so  that, although 
Elizabeth  appears  to have broken  the letter of  her  promise,  she  had 
shown a disposition to carry out the spirit of  it. 
There remains one group of patents which comes nearest to industrial 
monopolies.  There were  in all seven3 of  these; and it was  nrged that, 
through these grants, the price  of  common  commodities, such as glass, 
paper, starch, and steel, was  enhanced.  The starch patent should  not 
have been  included, as  it had  already been  revoked;  it is,  however, of 
interest  as  showing  the  peculiarities,  connected  with  the  execution 
of  some  of  these  grants,  and how,  in time,  numerous  persons  became 
interested.  Originally granted  in  1588, this patent had been  acquired 
by  Sir John Packington  in  1594, and was  reissued in  1598 in favour of 
a  new  method  of  making  starch;  and  thus  constituted  a  legitimate 
encouragement  of  invention.  Packington  assigned  his  franchise  to 
Sir Robert Cecil  who  sold it to George Rivers and John Ellys.  They 
transferred  it to four  persons,  reserving  an  annual  rent  of  J24,ROO. 
Finally,  this  rent  charge  was  purchased  by  Burghley  and  Sir  Robert 
Ceci14.  The partners, who  had  to make  this considerable rent  before 
obtaining  a  profit  for themselves, secured  authorization  to search for 
starch, made in  contravention of their patent; and, in 1600, a man was 
arrested in Taunton for resisting the agents of  the patentees5.  In 1601 
a  colnplaint  was  presented  by  38  persons  in  London,  who  alleged 
that they had been wronged by the "rigorous  dealing"  of  the servants 
Townshend,  CoMections,  pp.  240,  241.  It should be carefi~lly  noted that this 
and all statements,  relating to prices,  were not made in open debate.  They were 
contained in a paper, shown to Townshentl  hy the member who sat next him. 
State Papers,  Domestic,  Elizabeth,  caLxxxI1.  8; Calendar,  1601-3,  p.  108. 
Subsequent proceedings, Darcy v.  Allem,  embodied  the pleadings or, monopolies at 
this time ;  this case  is reported  in Nonopolies  by  Patent,  by  J. Mr.  Gordon, 1897, 
P. 2. 
This-is confirmed  by the statement of  Chamberlain in 1621, who wrote that at 
the accession  of James I. there were  "some  eight or nine morlopolies  the11 corn- 
 lairl led  of."  State I'apers,  Domestic,  James I.,  cxvl.  13 ; printed  in Gardiner, 
History  1603-42  (1893),  IV.  p.  1. 
Calendar Salisbury MSS.,  VIII.  p.  172. 
State Papers,  Domestic,  Elizabeth,  CCLXXVI.  84 ;  Calendar,  1598-1601,  p.  521. 
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of  this partnershipl.  This was  one of  the worst instances of  the abuse 
of  search-warrants,  issued'  by  the  Privy  Council,  although,  strictly 
speaking, the matter should not have been  mentioned, since, as already 
stated,  the  patent  had  been  recalled.  Another  case,  that  presents 
some points  of  similarity, was  the grant for substitutes for Aqua  Vit~ 
and  vinegar, which  had been  made also on behalf  of  a new invention. 
In this instance, persons, acting for the patentee,  forced those  selling 
the original  cornnlodities  in  a  certain  district either  to purchase  the 
substitute, or else to colnpound  with  the patentee so that they might 
dispose of  the stock they owned at the time.  This action was shown to 
be quite unauthorized by the patent2.  It is interesting  to notice that 
when  Ben  Jonson wrote his play,  "The Devil is an Ass,"  about 1616, 
this patent was  still remembered- 
''  Via pecunia!  when she's  run and  gone, 
And  fled  and  dead ;  then will  I  fetch her agail~ 
With  aqua vit~,  out of an old  hogshead ! 
While there are  lees of wine and  dregs of beer 
I'll never  want  her"" 
The paper  patent was  objected to on different grounds.  It was also 
a new invention, in  the sense that there was  no paper-mill in existence 
in  Eng]alrd, when  John Spilman  received  this grant about 1588..  He 
also obtained certain privileges for the collecting of  the rags he required. 
This concession  was  enjoyed,  without  interruption,  until  1600, when 
Edward Marshal1 established another ~aper-mill. Marshal1 approached 
the Common Council of  London, ofl'ering  a   early rent for the sole right 
of  collecting  rags  in  the  city.  The  Council,  thereupon,  interdicted 
Spilman, who  appealed  to the Privy Council5.  It is quite evident that 
in this case the origin of  the complaint  against Spilman arose from the 
desire of  the Council to obtain a revenue from the refuse-rags ;  altho~~gh 
the plea, actually put forward, was that the authorities had no sufficient 
control over the rag-pickers<  As  showing that t,he ordinary  law  was 
sufficient to deal with  any complaints that arose, it is worth noting the 
settlement,  made  between  Spilman  and  Marshal1 a  few  days  before 
Parliament met and which was  drawn  up  by  Francis  Bacon.  Spilman 
State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, cc~xxxlr.  29 ;  Calendar, 1601-3,  p. 115. 
D'Ewes, Journals, p.  641 ;  Analytical indexes to vols. 11. and  VIII. of...the  Remem- 
brancia, 1870, pp.  32, 3.1. 
Act 11.  scene I. 
A Spark of  Friendsh  ip... With a Description and Commendation qf  a Paper-Mill, 
now of lute set  up  (near the Town of  Dartford) by a'digh-German,  called Mr Spilmon, 
Jeweller  to  the  Queen, by T. Churchyard, 1588,  in Harbiun  Miscelluny  (1745), rrr. 
p.  255. 
6  State I>apers,  Domestic, Elizabeth,  ~CI,XXIX.  87 ;  Calendar, 1601-3,  p. 43. 
G  Ihid., 88 ; C'alendar, 1601-3,  pp  43, 44. 
CHAP. v1.1  Steel,  Glass and  Bottle Patents  1601 
undertook  to exact  no penalty from  Marshal1 for  any invasion  of  his 
. .  -..- 
rights in  the past, and he bound  himself  to supply a  mill, established 
by  Marshall, with rags.  On the other hand, the lease, recently granted 
by the Council, was  to be  surrendered, and Spilman  remained  the sole 
- -  ---  collector of rags for paper-making'. 
The patents  for  drinking glasses,  a  special  kind  of  stone-bottle., 
and for  steel were  ob,jected to on  the ground of  the great rise  in  the 
price  of  the  commodities.  In  dealing  with  the  increase,  two  facts 
should be  noticed-first  that these statements were  not made  in open 
debate, but were contained in a paper, which was  shown  to Townshend 
(who records the fact) by  another member.  Therefore it is impossible 
to  determine  what  reliance,  if  any,  is  to  be  placed  on  the  figures. 
In the second place, supposing that the agents of the patentees obtained 
an  advance  on  the  prices,  reached  thirty  years  before,  it  is  to  be 
remembered that there was  a general rise in the interval.  Townshend's 
anoilymous  informant  stated that the price  of  steel  had doubled  and 
that of  the other conlmodities was  trebled, or (in  the case  of  drinking 
glasses) quadrupled3.  What is significallt in these industries is that the 
earlier quotation was  that of  an  imported  comrnodity, while  the later 
relates to the same things, produced  in England after importation had 
been  practically  prohibited.  Therefore,  the  question  really  resolves 
itself  into a discussion  of  the protection  of  "infant industries."  Sup- 
posing Townshend's  friend  was  correct,  there  was  an absolute rise  in 
price ;  but, when  the change  in the general  level is taken into account, 
such  rise would  be  less than it appeared.  Then, the further problem 
would  arise,  whether  this relative  dearness should  have  been  faced  to 
establish  the industries in question  in  England.  There  can  be  little 
doubt  that,  if  the matter  had  been  stated in  this  form,  apart from 
prejudice, members of  the Parliament of  1601 would  have accepted the 
sacrifice, or otherwise they would have departed from the practice of the 
whole of  contemporary legislation4. 
Had  the discussion  of  monopolies been  a  temporary phenomenon, 
the foregoing  detailed  examination  of  the state  of  the case  in  1601 
would  have  been  unnecessary;  but,  since  that  discussion  is  no more 
'  State Papers, Domestic,  Elizabeth, ccrxxx~r.  6 ;  Calendar, 1601-3,  p.  108. 
Monopoie,  Kurtelie  und  Truats,  in ihren  Beziehungen  nur  Orguni.~ation der 
kapitalistischen  Industrie,  dargestellt  an  der  Entwieklung  in  Groasbritannien,  von 
H.  Levy,  Jena, 1909,  p.  29. 
"emo~ials,  pp.  2M,  241 ; The  Political  Hulmy of  England,  1547-1603,  by 
A. F. Pollard,  1910, p. 474. 
This view of the situation is confirmed by the fact that there were two patents 
for  steel, representing  different  processes  of manufacture, besides another  for  the 
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than a preface to later debates on the subject, it is important to obtain 
as clear a statement as ~ossible  of  the different points  of  view from the 
beginning.  Moreover, in view of  the presentation of  the same dispute 
in  1604,  it is  advisable  to estimate  the  clear-sightedness  and  dis- 
interestedness  of  the House of  Commons. 
Summing up all the grants,  it is  evidellt  that many  of  the qom- 
plaints  were  utterly  irrelevant.  Most  of  the patents,  that  were  in 
reality of  the nature of  trading monopolies, could be defended as pants, 
either to encourage  bona fide  new  inventions,  for fiscal  purposes or for 
national defence.  The complaints of  Parliament were to a large degree 
illogical,  since,  in  several cases,  the  Crown  was  merely  carrying  out 
the same policy that had received  legislative  sanction from the House. 
For instance, the importation of  a considerable number of  commodities, 
made  of  steel,  was  forbidden  by  an act, and  110  real  objection  could 
be  made  to  the  Crown  granting  patents  to those,  who  would  start 
this  industry  in  England.  Moreover,  in  so  far  as  the  leaders  of 
the agitation  were  actuated  by  motives  of  personal  dislike  to a  few 
of  the patentees, or by the inconvenience some of  them  had sustained 
from  the  production  of  saltpetre,  their  attitude  deserves  little 
sympathy.  The  whole  debate  was  marked  by  animus  and  by  a 
profusion  of  reckless  statements.  On  the  other  hand,  there  were 
reasonable  grounds  for  objection to the action  of  the agents of  some 
of  the  pztentees.  By  means  of  letters  from  the  Privy  Council, 
exactions,  which  were  quite  unauthorized  by  the  grants,  were  made. 
The most  objectionable  feature  of  these  was  that they  were  collected 
from those tradespeople, who were too poor  or too ignorant  to defend 
themselves.  As Cecil expressed it "To whom do they repair with these 
letters?  To some  out-house,  to some desolate widow, to some simple 
cottage or  poor ignorant  people who,  rather than that they would be 
troubled  and undo  themselves by  coming  hither,  will  give  any  thing 
in  reason  for  these  caterpillars'  satisfaction1."  Such  abuses,  in  the 
execution  of  the patents, were  incidental to the irregularities that had 
grown up in the working  of  the administration  all over.  Probably the 
frauds in the Treasury had occasioned much greater loss to the country, 
and, in either case, there was nothing that could not have been  remedied 
by the ordinary process of  the existing law.  Prior to the meeting  of 
Parliament,  Elizabeth  had  shown,  by  making  void  a  large  number 
of  patents,  that any  malpractices, in the execution  of  a  grant,  would 
lead to the revocation  of  it.  It was  unfortunate that, at least in one 
case,  a  suit,  initiated  under  the  promise  of  1597, had  been  quashed 
by  the  direct  interposition  of  the  prerogative.  In  that  instance, 
however,  something  might  be  urged  in  defence  of  the action  of  the 
1 D'Ewes,  Journals, p.  662. 
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Crown,  in so  far as there was  involved  the question  of  the control  of 
an  instrument  for  gaming,  such  as  playing  cards.  It  is  signifiwnt 
that none of  the grants impugned could be used to affect the market in 
commodities of  comnlon  consuniption, in which  there were  established 
producers in England.  The only possible exception  is the case of  salt, 
which  was  adduced  by  one  speaker,  but  not  included  in  the  list, 
furnished  by  the  Committee.  It would  appear  that  the patent  for 
salt  was  one,  granted  in  1599, not  for  the common  commodity,  but 
for what was  then a new  industry, namely the production  of  white salt. 
Strictly speaking, this was  only a quasi-monopoly, as the grant confined 
the privileges, it conferred, to an area  on  the East coast  of  England, 
between Lyme Regis arid Kingston-upon-Hull1. 
The  immediate  effect  of  the  whole  agitation  was  the issue  of  a 
proclamation, dated November  Rsth, 1601, under which several patents, 
the execution of  which had been extremely abused," were declared void, 
and the remainder were sub,jected to trial by common-lawa.  Should any 
be  found  bad  in  themselves, or  to have  been  attended  by  abuses  in 
execution,  it  was  ~romised,  unconditionally,  that  all  such  would  be 
recalled.  If, on  the  other  hand, some  patents  stood  this  test,  these 
should continue in force, during the respective periods  for  which  they 
had  been  granted.  Before the series  of  suits was  finished, Elizabeth's 
reign  had  come  to an  end,  and  James I.,  on  his  accession,  issued  a 
proclamation,  recalling  all  patents  to individuals,  which  were  then  in 
force3.  Whatever  may  have  been  the motives  which  occasioned  this 
proclamation, it eventually  turned  out  that James I.  had  simply dis- 
posed  of  the grants of  Elizabeth,  to prepare the way  for  a  series  of 
really objectionable  ones of  his own  creation.  In the meantime, how- 
ever,  when  Parliament  met  in  1604,  it seemed  as  if  all  monopolies, 
except those vested  in  corporate  bodies,  had  been  abolished,  and  the 
House of  Commons now  turned its attention to these.  Merchants, who 
considered themselves  aggrieved,  were  invited  to furnish particulars of 
their  complaints,  and  n committee  was  formed  to initiate  legislation. 
This body spent five whole afternoons  in considering the arguments for 
and against the trading corporations, and, on  May Rlst, 1604, two  bills 
were  introduced,  the one "  for  all  merchants  to have  free  liberty  of 
trade, into all countries, as is used  in all  other nations,"  and the other 
(6 for the enlargement of trade.. .into foreign countries."  These measures 
'  State Papers,  Domestic,  Elizabeth,  cc~xxrr.  [Docquet] ;  Calendar,  1598-1601, 
p.  310. 
Printed in  The English Patents of Mmopoly, by  W'.  Hyde Price, 1906, Appendix J, 
PP.  156-9. 
Proclamation dated May 7,  1603, printed  in Price, English Patents ofNonopoly, 
Appendix L, p.  163. "  lns&~uctio?zs  for  Free  Trade " 1604  [CHAP.  VI. 
were supported by  Sir Edwin Sandys in a  document, entitled "  Instruc- 
tions touching the bill for Free Trade1."  This paper  merits  the most 
careful  examination,  not  only  on  account of  some  curiously  modern 
expressions it contains, but still more in view of  certain hidden motives, 
that occasioned several of  its conclusions.  It consists of  three distinct 
parts-first  the reasons for  abrogating  all  privileges  in foreign  trade, 
secondly  the measures  by  which  this  ob-ject was  to  be  attained,  and 
finally a series of  answers to the claims of  the existing companies. 
The arguments for a foreign trade, open to all Englishmen, may be 
best given in Sandys' own words : "  All free subjects are born inheritable 
as to their land, as also to the free exercise of  their  industry, in  those 
trades whereto  they  apply  themselves  and  whereby  they  are  to live. 
Merchandize, being the chiefest and richest  of  all other and  of  greater 
extent  and importance  than all the rest, it is against the natural right 
and  liberty  of  the subjects  of  England  to restrain  it into  the hands 
of  some  few ;  for, although  there may be  some 5,000 or 6,000 persons, 
counting  children  and  prenticcs,  free  of  the several  companies of  the 
merchants, in the whole ;  yet, apparent it is, that the governors of  these 
companies, by their monopolizing orders, have so handled the matter, as 
that the mass of  the whole trade of  the realm  is  in the hands of  some 
200  persons at the most, the rest serving for a shew and reaping sir~all 
benefit."  The next argumel~t  quotes  the example of  all other nations, 
generally, in  the world,  who  avoid  in  themselves and hate in us,  this 
monopolizing way of  traffick."  It was  further urged that the measures 
now brought forward woulld conduce to a more  equal division of  wealth 
throughout the country and  amongst  individuals.  In this connection, 
attention  is  drawn  to the  customs  returns,  which  were  &110,000  at 
London and &17,000  in  all the rest  of  England2. 
The bills  aimed  at the  empowering  of  anyone,  with  or  without 
apprenticeship, to engage  in foreign  trade to the countries which were 
at that  time  within  the  limits  reserved  to the  chartered  companies. 
It  was  recognized,  however,  that,  since  the  State  did  not  support 
ambassadors, there would  be  some  expense involved  in  organizing the 
trade and carrying it on.  Therefore it was  proposed that the companies 
might continue to exist, and that levies should  be  made, from  time to 
time,  on  all  those who  availed  themselxres  of  the  facilities  obtained. 
This provision would have had the effect of  placing all foreign trade to a 
l Printed  in  Journab of  the  House  of  Commons,  I.  pp.  218-21.  Roger  Coke 
(A  Detection  of  the  Court  and  State  of  England,  1719,  I.  pp.  57-9)  amplifies  these 
"Instructions,"  according to his own standpoint. 
I11  a MS., entitled A Discourse of  Free Trade against Incorporated Societies 
(Lib. Trin. Coll., Dublin, 862, G 4, 13 No. 5), the teudency  of  compauies to draw 
trade to London is noted as a fact "which  is most lamentable to consider." 
CHAP. VI.]  Ijzaccuracies  of the  "hstructions" 1604  121 
given country in the hands of a regulated company, to which there would 
be no restrictions on admission, beyond the payment  of  a  moderate fee. 
This result  was  foreseen, and  the "Instructions"  favour  the regulated 
type of  organization, apparently on  the unsubstantial  ground that, in a 
sense, a joint-stock  was in itself a species of monopoly, as restricting the 
enterprize of  the individual member.  At the same time, it was  added 
that individuals might unite in partnership, should they desire to do SO. 
There is a great temptation to accept this document  as an unique 
example  of  a  noble  ideal  which  appeared  almost  too  early.  Hut, 
unfortunately,  all through the seventeenth  century, the most  powerful 
arguments  against  existing  privileges  were  those  of  the  would-be 
monopolists.  It seems to have been  recognized that a *man was  play-  ing the game "  in  condemning in unmeasured  language the practice of 
exclusive trading grants ;  and then, immediately he had fought his way 
within the charmed circle, to point out the evils of  "disorderly trading," 
coupled with a  petition  for a  more  stringent  monopoly.  It was  so  in 
this  case  with  Sandys.  In spite of  his  maintenance  of  "the  natural 
right of  Englishmen"  to trade where  and when  they pleased, one finds 
him a few years afterwards in the position  of  treasurer  of  the Virginia 
company,  which  was  certainly  not  the least  exclusive  of  the  trading 
corporations in  the beginning  of  the seventeenth  century.  It  may be 
urged  that since, as will  appear below, these bills did not become  law, 
a man of  energy was  forced to adapt himself  to the prevailing  system. 
This argument might account for his occupying the position of treasurer, 
but, if  he  really  held  the views  expressed  in  the "Instructions,"  it is 
impossible  to justify  his  action  in  relation  to the Virginian  tobacco 
monopoly, where  he  acted  exactly  in  the manner  he  condemns in  the 
governors of  the companies  in existence  in  1604.l. 
Moreover  the  argumentative  portion  of  the  document  contains 
numerous  inaccuracies  and many  distortions of  facts.  It is not  true 
that England  was  exceptional in  sanctioning  privileged  trading  com- 
panies.  At Genoa  there was  a  slave-trading undertaking, dating  back 
to 1580.  France had its African, its coral, and  its Canada companies, 
established  respectively  about  1561,  1600 and  1602.  All  these  had 
monopolies, and those  of  the French  organizations were  more exacting 
than  any  ever  granted  in  England.  Then Holland had  built  up  an 
East India trade, founded  by independent joint-stock companies, which 
had been amalgamated  into the celebrated  Dutch East India company2. 
Vide infra, 11. pp. 274-6. 
Les  Grandes  C'ompagnies  de  Commerce,  par  Pierre  Bonnassieux,  Paris,  1892, 
pp. 43-7,  181,  182,  254,  346,  453 ; Geschichtlicher  Ueberblick der administratiwen, 
rechtlichen  und jinanzielLen  Entwicklung  der Nt'ederLundisch-Ostindischen Compagnie, 
von G. C.  Klerk de Reus, The Hague,  1894, p.  2. The out-Ports and foreign  Trade 1604 
Moreover, this consolidation had been caused by the disputes of  previous 
associations, whose agents treated each other "almost  as enemies1"-facts 
of  which Sandys can scarcely have been ignorant-so  that the compara- 
tive argument is against him, rather than in his favour2. 
The attempt to show that the existing system favoured  London, at 
the expense of  the other ports, is even more misleading.  The gravita- 
tion of  capital  to the chief  city, as well the geographical  situation  of 
London in view of the trend of trade at  the time, suficiently account for 
its predominance.  Besides, it was untrue to suggest that the merchants, 
who gained by their membership of  companies, were  all inhabitants  of 
London.  The Merchant  Adventurers  was  a  national  organization, to 
which  the com$anies  at Newcastle, Hull and York were  affiliated.  It 
had also ramifications, extending to Lyon, Norwich, Ipswich, Exeter and 
Southampton3.  An Exeter  company,  incorporated  by  Elizabeth,  had 
certain  exclusive  privileges in  the French  trade  and the Senegal ad- 
venturers, who  received a  charter  in 1588, were  mainly resident  in the 
out-ports4.  It is  difficult to determine how  far  the joint-stock  com- 
panies, such as  the Russia and East lndia undertakings, were  actually 
open to persons non-resident in London.  An examination of  the meagre 
information, relating  to sales  of  shares  during  the  sixteenth  century, 
tends  to show that  there  was  a  freer  market  than  might  have  been 
anticipated.  The great variations in the numbers  of  members  of  the 
Russia  company is  sufficient to establish  this conclusion, and,  at the 
foundation  of  the East India  company,  subscriptions  of  capital  were 
invited,  and  even  canvassed  for  amongst  the merchants  of  the  West 
Country5, while the stock was  sold openly to the highest bidder at the 
same time that commudities were being auctioned"  Therefore, whether 
capitalists  outside  London  availed  themselves  of  their opportunities or 
not, it was possible for them to enter the joint-stock companies.  If any 
considerable number did so, it is apparent that, although these organiza- 
tions mid custom in London, the profits might be, and in some instances  "----- 
no doubt were, distributed through the country. 
1  Hktoire de l'Eapansion Coloniale des Peuph Europ6ens-Nierlande  et Danemark, 
par  C. de Lannoy et H. V. Liuden, Bruxelles, 1011, pp. 39, 41,44, 75. 
This  point was  brought out in a petition,  presented  against the bill  for the 
enlargement  of  trade,  on  account  of  the  East India  Company-State  Papem, 
Domestic, James I., ccx~v.  Addenda. 
The &odh qf  ZngZih Industry and Commerce in  Modern Timee, by W.  Cunningham, 
Cambridge, 1903, p. 245.  Wheeler, the secretary at this time, expressly states that 
the  fellowship  brought  much  wealth  to  these  out-ports-The  Early  Chartered 
Companies, by G. Gawston and A. H. Keene, Lolldon, 1896, p.  28. 
~ide-infra,  IT.  p  10. 
6  The &W%  of  British Trade to the East Indies m recorded in the Court bfi~~Ut.8  of 
the Emt India  Company, 1599-1603,  edited by Henry Stevens, 1886, pp.  53,  54. 
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Then, with  regard  to the claim  of  natural  liberty  of  the trade of 
merchandize, the question is not so much what was  most  convenient to 
the mercantile  class,  but  what  kind  of  organization  was  most  advan- 
tageous  to  the couwtry as  a  whole.  Even  in  civilized  countries  the 
sovereign exercised some powers in admitting aliens to trade there ;  in a 
semi-civilized  State the permission  to traffic  depended  wholly  on  the 
caprice  of  the  ruler.  Supposing  all  Englishmen  were  empowered  to 
enter a country  on  condition of  paying their proportionate share of  the 
expenses involved (such as the charge for an ambassador, for bribes and 
presents),  it would  be  necessary  that  there  should  be  some  form  of 
organization  whereby a  trader, who  refused to bear his part, might be 
excluded.  Or again, in order to comply with the practices of the foreign 
country, it would  be essential that the heads of  the trades should  have 
powers to disfranchise any individual whose conduct was  likely to injure 
the reputation  of  the whole  body;  since, in places like Russia or India, 
the offence of  a single Englishman was  likely to occasion the suspension 
of  the privileges  granted  by  the sovereign there'.  If  these  ideas  be 
carried to their logical outcome, one obtains the conception of a regulated 
company, only slightly less restricted than those condemned in the bills. 
It is  obvious, too, that the conditions  on  which  Englishmen  could 
enter on foreign  trade to most advantage depended to some extent on 
the nature of  the route to those countries, as well as the state of  their 
civilization.  The Mediterranean was  infested with pirates,  and, within 
a few years, the Dutch had fortified trading stations in  lndia.  It war, 
therefore,  necessary  that English  ships  should  be  heavily  armed,  and 
that several should sail  together.  That this should  be so required some 
form  of  centralized  organization,  and it was  no great extension  of  its 
powers to place some limit  either on the number  of  traders, or on the 
goods handled, or both, as had been  the practice  of  the regulated  com- 
panies2.  Moreover, when  the position  of  the English  merchants  in  a 
foreign  country  was  so  precarious,  it was  essential  that  they  should 
present a  united  front, and this  object was  best  obtained, in  the semi- 
civilized countries, by the joint-stock system.  -.  'rhe promoters of  the bills in 1604'ea~ressed themselves in favour of 
the regulated  company, on the ground that it gave  more scope, under 
the  modifications proposed,  to individual initiative.  For this  reason, 
the joint-stocks  of  the Levant and Russia  companies were  condemned. 
The fact appears  to have been  that, in view of  the recent  peace, there 
was  a  considerable amount of  energy and capital ready to be  directed 
towards foreign trade.  This idea is expressed by Sandys in the follow in^ 
D 
l  This actually happened in India in 1647, vide infra, e.  pp. 118, 119. 
S. van Brakel, Die Entwickiung  und  Drgonisation  der  Merchant-Adventurers in 
vierte@ahrschrifi  for SociaL und  Wirtschaflsgeschichte, v.  p.  408. 
6  Vide infra, XI.  p.  103. New  Trades resembled  Inventions  1604 
ter~ns-'~ What else  shall  become  of  gentlemen's  younger  sons,  who 
cannot live by arms, when there is no wars, and learning preferements are 
comnlon to all and nlean ?  So that nothing remains for them, save only 
merchandize (and such is the use  of  other politick  nations), unless  they 
turn serving  men  which  is  a  poor  inheritancel."  Although  the bills 
were  introduced  in  the  Commons,  as  measures  tending  to  make  the 
foreign  trade, hitherto restricted, open  to all; when  they  came before 
the House  of  Lords on  June 30th, it was  clearly recognized  that they 
were  by a group of merchants, and eight of  these were ordered 
to appear as against the sarne number on behalf of the compru~ies~. 
While it appears there is reason to aapect that the promoters of  the 
proposed  legislation  aimed at forcing  open the door  of  certain foreign 
trades, with the possibility of  closing it again in the faces of  those who 
sought admission after  them, it is not to be inferred  that the position 
taken up by the companies was  altogether maintainable.  To form  any 
estimate of  the merits of  the case it is necessary to remember the rela- 
tively  small  amount  of  the  commerce  where  the  trade was  reserved. 
With the exception  of  the Merchant Adventurers, the other companies 
had,  at this  time,  comparatively  small  capitals.  If  a  comparison  be 
made with a home industry, such as the Mines Royal (which controlled 
only a moderate amount of  English  mining), it rill be  found that the 
maximum  recorded  stock  of  the Russia,  the Levant  and  East  India 
companies was  not more, in each case, than two  or three times  that of 
the Mines  Royal3.  On  the whole,  contemporary  opinion  appears  to 
have  been  justified  in  regarding  a  new  branch  of  foreign  trade  as 
resembling  an  invention, and,  as  such, entitled  to a  monopoly for  a 
number of  years.  This claim was  admitted in the "Instructions,"  and 
a  tern,  was  suggested,  namely  that such  privileges  should  not  extend 
beyond the lives of  the discoveren4.  The reasons for a generous measure 
l  Jourt~als  of the House of Commons, I. p. 219. 
Journals  of  the  House  of   lord.^, 1. p.  334.  The bills had been passed  in the 
Commons, only forty members  voting against them.  In the House of  Lords, after 
petitions had  been  deposited,  counsel  were  heard  for and agaiast, and afterwards 
Coke addressed the House.  Although he thought the purpose of  the bill was 
he condemned  it, on account  of  its form and the many incoilveoie~~ces  that would 
result from it.  A conference was arranged for July 5th but,  owing to the dissolution 
of Parliament,  no further steps were taken.  Ibid., I. pp.  336, 341. 
In 1600 the whole outlay by the Mines Royal was  returned at 227,000.  The 
capital of  the Russia company does not appear to have exceeded some 850,000,  that 
of tile Levant compa~y  iq  said  to have been f  80,000 in 1581, while the stock of  the 
East India company from 1600-3  was 268,373. 
4  Journals of  the Hhus of  Gfommons,  I. p. 211.  It is worth noticing however that, 
although the East India company had only heen in existe~rce  three years, it also was 
included  amoiigst those which it was  recomme~~ded  should be carried on without a 
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of  encouragement  are obvious.  New  foreign  trades were  opened often 
at great personal risk, and there was almost invariably an expenditure of 
capital, without any immediate return.  It therefore was reasonable that 
the  first adventurers  should  be  given  a  number  of  years  of  exclusive 
trade, in which  they should  have a  chance of  obtaining the reward  for 
their  risk.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the encouragement  of  capital, 
the  period  of  such  concessions  would  therefore  be  fixed  at about  a 
generation ;  since,  if  the original adventurers  had  not  recouped them- 
selves  in  that time,  there  would  be  every reason  to doubt either  the 
value  of  their 'idiscovery,"  or else  their capacity to manage it.  From 
the point of  view of  the nation as a whole, there might be other con- 
siderations which would justify the prolongation of  the monopoly.  The 
State was not sufficiently  well organized to protect English merchants in 
foreign countries, and therefore, in the more disturbed places, or in those 
to which the route was  dangerous, the traders were compelled to protect 
themselves.  Thus until the home-government was  powerful enough  to 
guard the interests of  its commerce abroad, some kind of  company with 
large powers was requirsd.  Therefore, in spite of  the short-sighiedness 
of  some of  the companies, it seems probable  that English foreign trade 
was,  on  the whole, less  unstable in a  disturbed foreign  country  under 
a company with a monopoly than when  open.  There were  two striking 
instances of  this just at this time.  The Levant company had originally 
been  conducted  on  a joint-stock  basis1.  It had, amongst  other privi- 
leges, the monopoly  of  in~portiing  currants, subject  to the payment  of 
a very heavy tax to the Crown.  The joint-effect  of  the monopoly and 
the tax was  to make currants dear; and, towards the end of the sixteenth 
century, the trade was made open.  Within a few years  the position  of 
the merchants became so precarious that it was  necessary to re-establish 
the company as a regulated  one with a  moderate fee  for  admission.  It 
not  long  before  the management,  by  confining  membership  to 
"  legitimate " merchants (i.e. those who  had served  an apprenticeship in 
the Turkey trade), made entrance more difficult than it had been  before. 
Then there was the case of  the Spanish trade, which had been under an 
embargo during the war.  A company was  founded with a monopoly for 
this  trade, apparently with  the object  of  affording  the merchants  pro- 
tection.  Naturally such  a  monopoly  was  subject  to many  objections, 
for there  could  be  no  claim  that commerce with  Spain was  a new  dis- 
covery.  What should have been done was  the securing of  the rights of 
English merchants under  the treaty of  peace, and then for the govern- 
ment  in  England  to have  seen  that these were  obsened.  Instead  of 
adopting  this  course, a company with  a  monopoly  was  created.  which 
In Sandys' "Instructions"  it is stated that the joint-stock was u~isuccessful,  but 
there are grounds for holding a contrary opinion,  wide infra, 11.  p. 85. Gaia to the Crown  from hfonopolies 1604 
[CHAP.  VI. 
was  dissolved  by  act  of  Parliament  in  1606.  Within  s  few  years, 
English  traders with Spain were involved in endless difficulties, through 
seizures of  their persons and goods at the instance of  the Inquisition1. 
A  case  of  this  kind, so near  home,  shows  the need  of  protecting  the 
merchant,  and, when  the  State was  unable  to perform  this function, 
delegation  of  some of  its powers  to a  trading corporation  appears  to 
have  been  inevitable. 
The  great  abuse  in  the  monopolies  for  foreign  trade  consisted, 
not  so  much  in  the existence  of  the  monopoly  as  such,  but  in  the 
supervision of  it being  exercised  in  a  wrong  direction  by  the  State. 
The effect of  the delegatioo of  certain  powers  to a body of  capitalists 
with  reference to a given area, involved a large privilege, in return for 
which  the State was  entitled to exact benefits from those who  obtained 
that privilege.  This limitation of  the monopoly took  the form of  the 
exaction  from the conlpany of  the rnaximu~ll  gain to the Crown, either 
in furnishing loans, or guaranteeing the credit of  the sovereign, or again 
in  making  high  customs  payments.  Therefore  the  tendency  was  to 
increase  the  price  of  the  commodities  imported,  irrespective  of  the 
influence of  the monopoly.  Thus much  of  the dissatisfaction  against 
the high prices, charged  by  some  of  the conlpanies, was  occasioned by 
the tan  imposed  on  them  by  the government.  For instance,  Sandys 
complained  that  the  Russia  company,  by  arranging  not  to  import 
cordage  for  three  years,  had  advanced  the  price  by  50  per  cent.2 
What appears  to have happened  was  that the whole  working  capital 
of  the company was  locked  up in a debt, due to it by the Navy, which 
remained unpaid for a number of  years, and therefore the company was 
without  funds to trade to any considerable extent3.  Instead  of  taking 
the last penny possible  from the companies by the methods mentioned, 
the administration  would  have been  better advised to have  controlled 
the monopoly, bymaking it a condition that a limit should be imposed 
1 
on  the  prices,  at which  the  imported  comnlodities  should  be  sold. 
So  nlany  measures  received  the  sanction  of  Parliament  for  checking 
the possibilities  of  privileged  bodies  charging nlonopoly-prices in the 
home trade, that it is remarkable  that the same plan  was  not applied 
to foreign  commerce.  Probably  the reason  of  the omission  was  that 
the position of monopolies was always debated in the House of  Comnlons 
under great pressure, and that the attacks were  made by the mercantile 
class, whose object was rather to keep up than to reduce ~rices'. 
1 Rehtiow of  the  hum  to  Trade under  Jarnes  I,  by P.  Hermia  Durham  in 
'  T~ansactions  of the Royal Hi*torimi Society, New Series, XIII.  pp. 205, 206. 
2  Journals qf  the House of Commons, I. p, 220. 
3  Vide infra, 11.  p. 50. 
4  It is interesting to notice traces of this tendency in Sandys' "  Instructions"-- 
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It  is  true that,  in  most  of  the Elizabethan charters,  there was  a 
revocation  clause;  but, in the circumstances indicated, this gave little 
protection  to the consumer.  As  long as  a  company  was  "profitable 
to the  Crown"  it was  not likely  that its charter  would  be  revoked. 
In  fact  the  outcome  of  the  situation  involved  the  taxing  of  the 
consumer, mainly for the benefit  of  the Crown, while  the company bore 
the odium of the resulting high prices. 
- 
In  respect  to  the  nature  of  its  privileges,  the Russia  company 
occupied a somewhat  unique  position,  since its charter was  without  a 
revocation  clause,  and  it  had  an  act  of  Parliament  confirming  its 
monopoly1.  For  some  reason,  Sandys'  report  is  specially hostile  to 
this  undertaking,  which  is  described  as  a  "strong  and  shameful 
monopoly."  In its petition  against  the bill,  the company laid  special 
stress  on  the  fact  that  it  had  secured  parliamentary  sanction,  and 
that it had  in  effect discovered  three  new  trades-first  the trade  to 
Russia  proper,  then  to Persia  and  lastly  the whaling  industry  which 
as yet  was  not  developed2.  To this the Committee  of  the Commons 
replied  that  the company  should  have  reaped  sufficient  profit,  or  if 
it had  not,  the  management  was  to be  blamed.  No  notice  is  taken 
of  the fact  that whaling  was  new,  or  that the present  company  had 
purchased  the  rights  of  its  predecessors3.  Thus  the  members  could 
show that, in the half  century since the foundation, three new  branches 
of  commerce  had  been  opened;  and  that,  so  far,  the company  had 
justified  the  privileges  it enjoyed.  These  matters  introduce  several 
points of  difficulty in deciding what would have been the most equitable 
solution in  1604, in view of  the hostility towards the immunities vested 
in  this body.  First of  all,  the claim  of  the company, that it was  in 
dilficulties and had  not been  able to recover the capital outlay on  its 
discoveries, may be dismissed.  Although the fate of the first joint-stock 
is uncertain, there is every reason to believe that the second made very  - 
large profits.  Hence, on  the ground advanced, there was  110  reason  to 
prolong the monopoly of the original trade to Russia.  The discovery of 
whaling grounds, at this time, stood on a different footing, since, as yet, 
small,  if  any,  benefits had  been  reaped  fronl  it.  Therefore,  in  1604, 
the company was  entitled  to a  guarded  monopoly for a term  of  years 
for whaling.  Whether the monopoly of  the Russian trade should  have 
been  continued  or  not  depends  upon  several  considerations.  It  was 
necessary  to  send  heavily  armed  ships,  which  enterprize  required  a 
<C "ere  is 110  greater [?error] than that, if trade be made free, our commodities will 
abate their price abroad." 
Tide iifra, 11.  pp. 37-42. 
'  State Papers, Domestic, James I.,  VIII.  59; Calendar, 1603-10,  p. 117. 
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powerful  organization.  Russia  was  scarcely  sufficiently  civilized  to 
enable  English  merchants  to trade  there  without  stronger protection 
than  could  be  given  either  by  the  government  or  by  a  regulated 
company.  For these reasons, it might be concluded that, in spite of the 
unprogressive way  in which  the monopoly had been exercised from 1595 
to 1605, there  was  no  greater  disadvantage  in  continuing  it than  in 
opening the trade.  On  the other hand, it was  asserted  by Sandys that 
Englishmen, who were not members of  the company, traded with Russia 
through Holland, but here  again it would appear that there is a certain 
suggestio falsi  since such trade or  that at Narva, carried  on  by  inter- 
lopers, was  on a  very small scale;  thus it is  related that at the latter 
place sales of  cloth of  this kind were only made by inen who "  peddled " 
it through  the streets1.  If, however,  Sandys'  statements be  accepted, 
it would follow that an English monopolistic organization was no longer 
necessary.  Had this  conclusion been  adopted, and the company  were 
continued  with  a  monopoly  for  a  certain  time  for  whaling, while  the 
Russian  trade was  made open, something remains  to be  said in favour 
of  the shareholders  in  1604.  Unlike  other  charters,  that which  they 
had bought from the previous company had no revocation clause, and it 
was  confirmed by an act of  Parliament.  In view of  the discoveries made 
and the assistance given the government in various ways, there were no 
special reasons why the incorporation should be revoked.  Therefore, on 
the supposition  that merchants could  trade safely to Russia,  it would 
appear equitable that the existing shareholders should have received some 
moderate compensation for surrendering their monopoly of  the Russian 
trade. 
1 A Treatise of Commerce, wherein is  showed the Commdditi arising by a well-ordered 
und  ruled  Trade, by John Wheeler, Middleburg,  1601,  p.  74.  Even if  Wheeler 
exaggerated, the  foundation of  the  Dutch Russia Company  a few years later made any 
English trade through Holland to Russia very precarious-Van  Brakel, Hollandsche 
Handelscompagnie&n, pp.  22, 23. 
CHAPTER  VII. 
BRITISH  COMMERCE  AND  FINANCE  FROM  THE  PEACE  OF  1604 
TO  THE  CRISIS  OF  1620. 
THE  first years  of  the seventeenth  century found England suffering 
from  loss  of  trade and high  taxation.  It is  impossible to determine 
whether the cost of  the struggle with Spain, on the whole, had checked 
the increase of  the national wealth.  It is estimated that the aggregate 
property  of  the country  in  1600 cannot  have  exceeded  100 millions1. 
This sum, though apparently small, certainly represents  a great increase 
on the total fifty years before. 
The period of depression, which  had lasted since the crisis of  1586, 
began to pass away after the outbreak  of  plague  in  1603 was  over, and 
signs  of  revival  first  show  themselves  in  1604.  It  is  true  that  the 
foundation of  the East India conlpany  in  1600 is to be regarded rather 
as an  outlet  for  capital diverted  from  the  Levant trade  than  as  an 
actual gain in  the opening  up of  an additional  branch  of  commerce2, 
while  the  expedition,  organized  by  Kaleigh  and  Southampton  to 
America  in  1602,  although  successful  to a  liniited  extent,  was  only 
experimental3.  The succession  of  James I.  was  accepted  as  an  omen 
of  better  relations  between  England and  Scotland,  and the conclusion 
of  peace with Spain prepared the way  for a  period  of  recuperation and 
development.  The last traces of  the depression, which  had  continued 
for about seventeen years, are to be  found  in the final payments of  the 
subsidy  of  1602-5  and  the  efforts  of  Parliament  in  1604 to  make 
sweeping changes in the organization of  foreign trade.  If the reasoning 
in the previous chapter  be  sound,  this  was  an  early  instance  of  those 
popular  remedies  for  trade depression, which  are often  erroneous  and 
almost  always too drasticd. 
The year 1604 is  a  turning point; on  the one  side of  which  there 
were  seventeen years  on the whole  bad, and on the other there was  a 
The Growth oJ'Capita1, by Robert Giffen,  London, 1889, pp.  83,  110. 
Vide infra, 11.  pp.  87, 88, 91, 92.  Ibid.,  XI.  p.  246. 
Vide supra, pp.  120, 121. 
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period of about the same length, which was  good on the whole-  During  the  body  known  later as  the  Irish  society;  and, about  the  same 
the latter  interval British commerce made rapid progress.  The Opening  time,  efforts were being made to recover lands by drainagel.  ~h~~  the 
of  markets,  dosed  by  the  war,  was  in  itself  an  important  Of  the  water-supply  of  London,  by  the  introduction  of 
towards the restoration  prosperity.  It was  soon  noticed  that  spring-water, as distinguished  from that hitherto provided  by pumping 
was  being  accumulated, and it was  declared  that ‘‘the  nation  was  far  engines  from  the  Thames,  was  begun  and  brought  to  a  successful 
richer than  in all the long reign of  Queen Elizabeth1."  There was both  conciusiOne.  It also seems to be within this period that large quantities 
an  increase in  the standard  of  living  and in  the population;  thus  a  of  silver  were  discovered  in  Wales  by  a  subsidiary  company  of  the 
contemporary  writer  points  to "  the superfluity and increase  Of  these  Mines  Royal  society3. 
our times, of  this our kingdom that hath more people than  P~~~~~~~''. It is perhaps  a little surprising that in  the home trade  there were 
The  same  tale  of  industrial  progress  is  told,  with  Inore precision,  few inventions, in the narrower sense of the word-that  is 
the  income,  returned  by  the  Exchequer  as  derived  frorn  discoveries of  new  processes, as distinguished  from the introduction of 
Comparing the five  years ending with the plague of  1603 with  the same  a method ~reviously  adopted abroad or from the misleading descriptions 
period up to 1615-16,  the average  annoal receipts  show an 
Of  provided  petitioners for monopolies.  The chief  direction, in  which 
s5 per  sS&  expansion  of  trade is  attributable in part  to  the  invention showed  itself, was  the effort to devise furnaces  for  the sub- 
recovery  of  European  markets, but allowance must  also  be  made  for  stitntiorl  Of  coal  for  wood  in  several industries4.  The reasoll  for the 
the prosecution  of  new  enterprizes,  which  had  not  been  adventured  absence  of  invention  in  this  period,  as  with  the 
during the war.  part of  the reign of  Elizabeth, appears to have been  that 
~h~  ~~~t  India  trade  was  beginning  to yield  large  profits;  and  there were numerous advantageous  openings for capital in foreign trade, 
although,  after  the  of  the  independent  Dutch  under-  a'1d  partly  that men  of  an  ingenious turn  of  utilize their 
takings  into  one  powerful  company  in  1602,  there  Was  a  more  profitably in  devising projects  for  obtaining grants  for 
menace  to the  progress of  the British  organization,  it required  time  Other  than  industrial  objects,  such  as,  for  instance,  $6 the  Danvers75," 
for this danpr  to manifest itself4.  The Russia  Company  was  sucmsful  "the Green-Wax6" and  G Jurorsv  patents7. 
in its  whaling  voyages  up to 16156,  and in 1618 the trade to Africa  During the  of  Elizabeth  the  development  of  ellterprizes 
was  re-openedl.  ~~t only  were  former  markets  recovered,  but  requiring capital had been  largely  conditioned  by  the state of  foreign 
progress was  with the colonization  of  America.  There  were  the  politics.  In the succeeding seventeen years the effects  Of  peace abroad 
two  virginia  companies incorporated  in  1606, the  settlement  Of  the  were  to some extent by the personal character of  James 1. 
~~~~~d~~ in  1611, the attempts  to Occupy  Guiana,  first  Haleigh  by  the  financial  situation.  It is  difficult  to  touch  on  this  subject 
and again  in  1619 by a company7.  Then came the formation  Of  the  without  trendling  on  the sphere  of  the historian  of  the British  con- 
N~~ England company in 1620 and the beginning of  the New scotland  Stitution,  Since the views,  held  by  James  1.  on  his  prerogative,  were 
or sova  scotia  venture  in the  following  year'.  9%  same  'pirit  Of  manifested  as much  in the industrial world  as in any other.  perhaps 
enterprize manifested  itself, not only  abroad, b~t  also at home.  The  the most  concise manner  of  summing up  a  character  which, while not 
settlement  of  a large  tract of  land in Ireland was undertaken  in  'Go9  more  than  that  of  most  men,  appears  unstable  and 
to a remarkable  degree, would  be to describe it as  one that 
1 A  ofthe Court and State of  England, by Roger  1719, I' p'  94'  possessed  the  intellectual qualities developed in certain  directions to a 
A Discourse of  ~~~~i~~~ and  Wiving, 1615, in Harleian M*cezzany 
'I'  high  degree,  the practical  activities were  lamentably  deficient. 
p.  152. 
vide infro,  p. 521 ;  Gardiner, History  1603-16 (18@,  a.  p.  415'  In many  James  1.  W*  more  clear-sighted  than  his  ministers, 
periods are  as the anew impositions '' are not included in the second 
five years,  imreaSe would be  larger  if  1610-11  had  been  substituted  for  Yide  infra, 11.  pp. 338, 339,353. 
Ibid., 11.  p. 401.  Ibid., 111.  pp. 18-20. 
1615-16,  as, owing to the disturbance of  the cloth trade in that yparr the Customs  Ihd.,  11.  pp. 463, 464. 
were greatly reduced.  Three-quarters  Of  the benefit of fines and forfeitures above ~2,300  a 
4  vide infra,  11.  pp. 93-101.  sir  Aston for  fines and forfeitures,  known under the name 
6  Did., 11.  p. 11.  Of  "green-wax,  in the Duchy of ~~~~~~t~~.,p 
5  Ibid., 11.  p. 53. 
7  &did.,  11.  pp. 245-7,  252, 259-66,  299, 300, 323-5.  Oranfed to sir Herlr~  Bronker for  the eolIection of  <.the fines 
jurors  llot 
8  Ibid., 11.  pp. 301-6,  318, 319.  in England "-Journals  of  the House  c~~~~~,  I.  p. 316. 
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and it sometimes happened that  his views were exceptionally enlightened. 
His policy of  peace was one which both England  and Scotland needed, 
and his  advocacy  of  the Union  was  characterized  by  a  statesman-like 
outlook.  Speaking of  the latter  in  1607 he  described  it,  from  the 
noint  of  view  of  the advantage of  England,  as  follows-"  Who is  so 
1- - --- 
ignorant that doth not know The  gain;  will bee great?  Doe you  not 
~aine  bv  the  union  of  Wales?  And  is  not  Scotland  greater  than 
" 
Wales?  Shall  not your  dominions  be  encreased, of  landes,  seas  and 
persons added to your greatnesse?  And are not your  landes  and  seas 
adjoinying ?  For who  shall set downe the limits of  your borders  but 
as a mathematical1 line or idea?  Then will  that backe  doore be shut 
and those portes  of  Janus bee  for  ever  closed.  You shall have them, 
that were your enemies to molest you, a sure backe to defend you; their 
bodies  shall  be  your  aides  and  they  must  be  partners  in  all  your 
quarrels1."  In the same  speech, a  reply was  made to the objection- 
that a  commercial union would  involve a loss of  trade to some towns 
or individuals-which  was  more  broad-minded  than the standpoint of 
the House of  Commons.  "It may be,"  said James, "that  a merchant 
or two of  Bristow or Yarmouth may have a hundred pounds lesse in his 
packe, but if the Empire gaine and become the greater, it is no matter2." 
On  the  blessings  of  peace,  James  dilated  almost  with  eloquence- 
"  Denmark and Suevia ; Suevia and Poland ;  Cleves and Brandenburg ; 
have not these and many more come to this oracle of  peace and received 
their  dooms from  it?  If  the members of  a natural body  by  concord 
assist  one  another;  if  the politic  members  of  a  kingdom  help  one 
another and by it support itself; why  shall not the monarchical bodies 
of  many  kingdoms be  one mutual Christendom ;  if  still they sing this 
blessed  lesson  taught  them-Beati  Pac%@i3."  With special  reference 
to trade,  James  had  sometimes ideas  of  considerable  brilliancy.  He 
occasionally  had  the  foresight  to  select  the more  promising  of  the 
schemes of  his  day  and to be  desirous of  taking  a  share  in the risk. 
Thus he was  not only willing but anxious  to become an adventurer in 
the East India company4, and his connection with  the inception  of  the 
New  River  company  affected the capital account  of  that undertaking 
for nearly three hundred years6.  Even granting that it was  Salisburya, 
1  Journals of the Howe of Commons, r. p.  363 ;  His Majesties Speech...the hat Day 
of March 1607, in Somers'  Tracts (1750), v. p.  170. 
His Majesties  Speech ...  the  last  day of  March  1607, in Somers'  Tracts (1760)~  V. 
p.  166; Journals of the House of Commons, I. p. 361. 
The Peacemaker,  quoted by Gardiner, History 1603-42  (1893), 111. p.  183. 
4  Tide infra, XI. p.  108.  6  Ibid.,  111.  pp 20, 21. 
6  The son of Lord  Burghley, who, as  Sir  Robert  Cecil, was a  member of the 
later Parliaments of  Elizabeth, vide supra, pp.  114, 118. 
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who first introduced this scheme to the notice of  James I.',  the interest 
which he showed in the progress of  the work  is sufficie~lt  evidence that 
he was  able to recognize  the possibilities of  considerable profits  being 
made.  Then  in his  eff'orts  to start the silk  and  dyeing  industries  in 
England,  as well  as  in  the idea  of  encouraging fishing  in  Scotland: 
he showed at least  a  real  interest  in the development of  the countries 
under  his  rule. 
While  James I.  had  such  moments  of  insight,  he  was  altogether 
deficient in  the more  prosaic  practical  qualities.  He was  remarkably 
tactless  and  devoid  of  the  facuIty  of  recognizing  the  most  efficient 
ministers to carry on  the government.  According  to his  theory  of  his 
own position in the State, he should have been exceptionally industrious 
in  supervising  the  details  of  the administration, yet  adequate  super- 
vision  was  wanting  during  his  reign.  Similarly,  with  regard  to the 
Crown  finances  he  expressed  the  most  unimpeachable  sentiments-as 
for instance when  he told  the members  of  both Houses of  Parliament 
in 1604 "if  the meanes of the Crowne bee wasted, I am behoved then to 
have  recourse to you, my  subjects, and bee  burdensome to you, which 
I would  be loathest  to be  of  any King alive3"-pet  in actual practice 
he  permitted  great  waste  of  the  Crown  Revenues.  Probably,  in 
succeeding  to the  English  throne,  he  may  have  believed  that  the 
income was  inexhaustible, but it is  certain  that the revenue failed  to 
pay the outgoings.  Thus James I. was  periodically pressed  for money, 
and  this was  one  of  the reasons  of  his  difficulties  with  Parliament. 
Besides,  the  various  attempts,  that  were  made  to keep  the rapidly 
increasing  Crown  debt within some reasonable  dimensions,  resulted  in 
numerous  interferences  with  commerce  which  occasioned  great  dis- 
satisfaction  in  England.  Therefore, the  situation  resolved  itself  into 
the paradox  that, while  James  I. saw  clearly  the advantage  of  a  less 
restricted  traffic  between  England  and  Scotland,  few  sovereigns have 
restricted  and disorganized  trade  more  than  he  did, by  the numerous 
and ill-considered  burdens  he  laid  upon  it. 
The state of  the finances being such  an important  element  in  the 
history of  the time, it is necessary to form some estimate of  the normal 
revenue  and  expenditure,  when  the  country  was  at  peace.  At the 
beginning of  the reign of  James I., once the Iiabilities  incurred during 
the war  had  been  discharged, it should  have  been  possible for him  to 
l An  Apology for  the  late  Lord  Treasurer  by Sir  Walter Cope in  Collectanea 
Curiosa,  r.  p.  125 ;  Aulicus  Coquinariae  in The Secret  History  of  James  the  First, 
I.  p.  153. 
Vide infra, 11. pp. 55, 104, 361. 
The  Kings  Majesties  Speech  as  it  was delivered. ..the  19  day  of  March,  1603, 
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have  paid  his way  out of  the Ordinary  Revenue, which  had yielded 
a considerable  surplus over  the Ordinary  Expenditure  in the time of 
Elizabeth.  Mr Gardiner formed the following estimates of  the resources 
available for James I., on the basis of  the Ordinary Revenue and EX- 
penditure  during the first  five  years  of  his  reign: 
............  Ordinary Revenue  ;E247,000  .........  ,,  Expenditure1  290,700  ..............  Deficit  $343,700 
This calculation,  it seems  to me, tends to over-estimate  the necessary 
Ordinary Expenditure while conversely it under-estimates the Revenue 
available  to meet  it.  If,  at the end  of  the reign  of  Elizabeth, there 
was a surplus of about 690,000 on the ordinary account, an explanation 
is needed  to show how  it became unavoidably  converted into a deficit 
of  over 240,000 within the next five years.  The discrepancy is partly 
explained by  the nature  of  the documents,  on  which  Mr Gardiner's 
estimate  of  the  Ordinary  Revenue  is  based.  These  were  the actual 
receipts recorded at the Exchequer ;  and, even after adding the income 
of  the Duchy of  Lancaster  and the Court of  Wards, some other small 
branches  have  still to be included.  Another account gives  the whole 
annual nett Ordinary Revenue during the last five years of  the reign of 
Elizabeth at 2326,0661.  But it has  been  explained  elsewhere3 that, 
owing to the strain on the finances at this time, great efforts had been 
made  to  augment  the  Ordinary  Revenue.  Moreover  large  sales  of 
Crown  lands had been  effected, with  the result that for some years a 
decrease in rents might  be  expected4.  On the other hand, after a few 
years of  peace,  an advance in  Customs might be  anticipated5.  Since, 
however,  the latter would  not be immediately  available, such increase 
may be neglected for the present, and it may be estimated that, at the 
beginning of  the reign, the nett Ordinary Revenue would  be 625,000 
a year less than it had been from 1598 to 1603, that is in other words, 
on  an  average,  James  I.  and  his  financial  advisers  could  count  on 
2300,000 a  year,  apart from any further  income from  extraordinary 
sources.  This  would  have  balanced  the  estimate  of  the  ordinary 
Expenditure  made  by  Mr  Gardiner.  But,  if  the calculation  of  the 
l  ParZkmentary Debates  in 1610,  edited,  from the Notes of a  Member  of  the 
House of Commons, by S. R. Gardiner (Camden Soc. 1862), p. X. 
z  Vide infra,  111. p. 517. 
3  Ibid., 111. pp. 507, 508. 
4  From  1590  to  1593,  the  amount  returned by  the  Receivers  General  had 
averaged  $268,000  a  year.  From  1599 to  1603 it was  810,000 less.  ln 1603-4 
it was  only 850,000,  rising in 1605  to  1607 to  858,000-d8  infra,  111.  pp.  520, 
521 ;  Gardiner, History 1603-16  (1863), 11.  pp. 414, 415. 
6  At the end of  the Treasurership of  Salisbury the income had increased from 
E86,OOO  to 6125,000,  cf. Coke, Apology for  the  Lute Lord Tremurer, p. 124. 
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similar outlay from  1598 to 1603, which  places  it at 6225,000 on  an 
average, is correct, it is clear that the increase of  265,000 is too great. 
Much has  been  written  of  the desire of  Elizabeth for personal  adorn- 
ment  and  the  extent and variety  of  her  costumes, but it is  a  little 
astonishing to find the accession of  a  male sovereign urged as a plea for 
an increased allocation  to "the  Wardrobe1."  Necessarily it cannot  be 
forgotten that James I. had  a  family, and that therefore  the expenses 
of  the sovereign would  be  somewhat increased.  Still, after allowance 
is  made  for  this and for the maintaining of  the Court in a somewhat 
more lavish style, if  the Ordinary Expenditure from  1598 to 1603 were 
increased  by  225,000  or 235,000  (bringing  it  up  to  2250,000  or 
2260,000  a  year), a  sufficient  sum  would  be  provided  for all suitable 
expenditure on the ordinary account.  This is from 230,000 to &40,000 
a  year  less  than  the estimate of  Mr Gardiner; but, while  basing  the 
expenses of  the home government  on  those  during the last  five  years 
of  the reign  of  Elizabeth, he allows James I. 220,000 more than had 
been  paid  froin  1598  to  1603.  Even  taking  account  of  expenses, 
continuing in  Ireland  after  the rebellion  there  had  come  to an  end, 
the allowance for this charge  and for  the Navy might  be  reduced  by 
215,000, making  for  the two  275,000, which  was  still almost  double 
what  had  been  granted on  the ordinary  account  towards  the  end  of 
the reign of  Elizabeth.  Further, the estimate for the expenses of  the 
Court and for ambassadors exceeds that from  1598 to 1603 by f  5,000 
a year.  These deductions from Mr Gardiner's estimate together come to 
640,000 a year, making it, as revised, 6250,000.  Thus it may be calcu- 
lated that the Ordinary Revenue would produce at least 6300,000, while 
the Ordinary Expenditure  should  not  have exceeded 2260,000,  leaving 
a  surplus  of  about 240,000, and  in  all  probability  this surplus  could 
have been  considerably augmented, with  care in the supervising of  the 
Revenue and economy  in the Expenditure : 
Estimate  of the  Ordinary Rezfenue and Expenditure. 
1598-1603  ............  .2325,000 
Deduct (owing to sale of  land  &C.)  25,000  3300,000 
Expenditure 1598-1603  ......  225,000 
Add  for further expenses of the Court  33,000  260,000 
Surplus  .................. 
L  340,000 
- 
It  remains to enquire what was the extent of  the liabilities,  classed 
as extraordinaries,  that were  left  by  Elizabeth.  After crediting her 
with  the portion  of  the subsidies voted,  but not paid,  at the date of 
her death  (and  which  had  been  ear-marked  to pay  for  certain  war- 
expenditure) the gross debt  of  6400,000 at the accession  of  James I. 
Gardiner, Debates in 1610, ut supra, p. xi. 136  Assets and Liabilities of the Crown 1603-8  [CHAP. vn. 
would  be  reduced to 2100,0001.  In  addition  to this,  there  was  the 
expense of  restoring the Irish coinage, which  was  an operation similar 
to the payment of  a further debt.  This cost 296,076'.  The funeral of 
Elizabeth,  the coronation  expenses of  James I.  and  special embassies 
may have  required 2100,000, making, in round  numbers, &300,000 to 
be found.  The whole of  this sum was provided by a part of  the Parlia- 
mentary  grant  of  six-tenths  and  six-fifteenths  in  1606:  leaving  the 
estimated  surplus  of  the  Ordinary  Revenue,  available,  with  the re- 
mainder  of  the  subsidy,  to answer  any  exceptiollal  and  unforeseen 
outlay, such as the addition to the ordinary charge which was  discovered 
to be  needed for Ireland.  Further,  at the accession  of  James I., the 
Crown had other important  assets.  There were  considerable sums, due 
to Elizabeth in England,  and, necessarily, the Extraordinary Revenue 
would be  increased by  as  much  of  these  as  could be collected.  Then 
again,  according  to the treaty  with  Holland in  1598, the States had 
bound themselves to repay the nroney, spent on the English expeditions, 
at the rate of £100,000  a year as long as the war with Spain continued. 
After  the  declaration  of  peace,  the whole  debt  of  22,000,000  was 
to be  discharged,  or interest  was  to be    aid  thereon  at the rate of 
10 per  cent.4  Probably  it would  have  been  impossible  for  anyone 
to estimate in 1603, how  much  this debt or  that of  Henry  of  France 
would  realize, but  it is  clear  that, even  allowing  for  the expense of 
garrisons  in the cautionary towns, this was  an asset  of  great potential 
value. 
Summing  up  the  whole  financial  position  at the  accession  of 
James I., it is clear that he  succeeded to an Ordinary Revenue, which 
would have been  sufficient for the needs  of  a  prudent  sovereign, and 
the extraordinary expenses were  provided for.  But, in these estimates, 
it is  assumed  that  the  disbursements  would  have  been  made  with 
economy.  Had this been  so,  and granting a continuance of  peace, the 
resources of  the Crown would have sufficed.  As it was, there was laxity 
of  supervision  in  the  administration  and  prodigality  in  the  Royal 
Household.  Besides there was the temptation, which proved irresistible 
to James I., to reward  his  favourites lavishly.  Therefore, during the 
first years of  his  reign which were  eminently critical from the financial 
Vide infra, 111. p.  509. 
Gardiner, History 1603-18  (1863), 11. pp.  417, 418. 
3  The  subsidy of  the laity only ~ielded  the following sums : 
First  payment  2/10 and 2/15  ...  ...  2123,894 
Second  ..  39  9,  9,  .  .  .  2112,279.  -.-  <,  .  . 
State Papers,  Domestic, James I., XXXVII.  38. 
4  A  Detection  of  the  Court and  State  of  England, by Roger Coke, London, 1719, 
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point  of  view,  the deficiency  became greater  and greater,  so  that  by 
1606  the  Crown  debt  was  &735,2801-made  up  of  the  2400,000 
"  Queen's  debt" already analyzed and 2335,000 contracted by James I. 
The greater part of  this had  been  borrowed  on Privy Seals, and there 
was in addition a loan of 260,000, raised in London2.  It was  not only 
a matter for regret that James I. had contrived to incur, in three years of 
peace, a debt greater than had been contracted by Elizabeth in war, but 
he had rewarded his courtiers in various ways, without actually granting 
them  money,  which  proved  very  burdensome  to  the  country.  In 
addition, some taxes had been  imposed, without  the consent of  Parlia- 
ment.  It was the object of  the House of  Commons to induce the King 
to remove  some  of  the more  objectionable  grants; and,  at the same 
time, Parliament was prepared  to vote  a sufficient  supply to reduce the 
Crown  debt.  Altogether  about twenty  recent patents were  discussed. 
Two of  these were industrial monopolies.  Of  this class,  there were the 
patent for a  new dye,  made  by mixing log-wood with other substances 
(from which the Crown was to receive 2500 a year),  and a new  method 
of  starch-makings.  Then  the  saltpetre  question  was  again  brought 
under the notice of  the House, and a license to export iron ordnance, as 
well  as  the Hoyal  pre-emption  of  tin,  were  included  in  the  list  of 
grievances.  There was also a patent to sell certain wines, at an advance 
on the prices fixed by law.  Probably,  if  these grants had stood  alone, 
they would not have excited  the criticism  of  Parliament.  The tax on 
currants  had  been  imposed  to make  good  the  loss  to  the  revenue, 
occasioned  by  the withdrawal  of  the  payment,  made  by  the Levant 
company,  on  account  of  the monopoly it had resigned  under pressure 
some  years before.  The saltpetre and ordnance grants came under the 
category of  the provision of  munitions of  war.  There remain  only the 
log-wood4  and the starch monopolies.  Since in the same Session, Parlia- 
ment  confirmed  the  monopolies,  previously  granted  by  charter  to 
the Merchant Adventurers  of  Exeter (for the monopoly of  trade with 
France to the exclusion of  "ignorant  artificers who,  in  that city, took 
upon them  to use the science, art and mystery of  merchandize ") and to 
the  gild  merchant  of  Southampton,  it is  to be  concluded  that the 
objection  was  not  to these  monopolies,  as  such,  but  to  their origin, 
State Papers, Domestic, James I., x~x.  45 ;  Calendar, 1603-10,  p.  300. 
Ibid., VIII.  108, 118 ;  X.  45 ;  XVII.  86 ;  Calendar, 1603-10,  pp.  133, 136, 276 ; 
Maitland, History of London,  pp.  284, 290. 
A  Record  of  some  worthie Proceedings :  in the  Honourable,  Wise and  Faithfull 
House  of  Commons in ...  1611,  in  Somers'  Tracts  (1752), XIII.  pp.  284,  285 ;  Coll. 
Proclamations, Soc. Antiq., James I., Aug. 23, 1607, Jan. 10, 1609/10. 
The Earl  of Dunbar  received  22,000  011 the surrender of this  patent-State 
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the recipients  of  them  and the manner  in which  they  were  exercised1. 
The remainder  of  the patents introduced the objectionable principle of 
delegating  some  of  the  administrative functions of  the home govern- 
ment to individuals, in order that the patentees might be  provided for. 
The grant to Lord Danvers of  the proceeds of  fines, forfeitures &c.  was 
based  on  the principle  that  those,  receiving  it,  should  pay  82,800 
a year-  that being the average  amount previously realized-while  they 
retained any increase.  The obvious tendency of  patents of  such a kind 
would  be  towards  miscarriages  of  justice,  through the desire  of  the 
grantees  to obtain  as  large  a  surplus  as possible,  above  the specified 
amount which was to be  paid to the Crown.  When this concession was 
recalled,  with  others  of  a  similar  nature,  James  I.  compensated  the 
patentees  by  promising  them  annuities of  &1,100  a  year2.  Another 
grant of  a somewhat similar character was that to the Duke of  Lennox 
for sealing  New  Draperies.  This had  been  intended  to improve  the 
quality of  certain fabrics, by sealing those  that attained to a specified 
standard.  But,  while  the  agents  of  Lennox  acted  according  to the 
terms of  the patent, the income would  be confined  to the modest fees 
derived from the service  they rendered.  It was not long before further 
sums were  exacted,  and,  what was  still more  reprehensible,  seals were 
openly sold, so that the presence of  the official  mark was  no longer any 
guarantee of excellence of manufacture3. 
James I. was  induced to recall  or modify the patents, complained of 
by Parliament, through  a  considerable supply having been granted  to 
him.  This  subsidy  consisted  of  six-fifteenths  and six-tenths,  payable 
from 1607 to 16104.  When  Salisbury became Treasurer ill  May 1608, 
he had to deal with an accumulated Crown debt which, for the times, was 
enormous.  It  amounted  to about  a  million5.  The expenditure  was 
close  on  8600,000,  that  is  more  than  the  average  Elizabeth  had 
required, when the country was at war ;  and, even allowing for necessary 
additions  to  the  expenses  of  the  Crown  owing  to  the princes  and 
princesses  having  grown  up,  this  was  double  what  was  necessary. 
Moreover,  the  expenditure  continued  to grow  at an  alarming  rate; 
the year  1607-8  showing  an  increase  of  about  40  per  cent.  on  the 
average from 1603  to 160g6.  Under these circumstances, the growth of 
l  Anderson, Annals of Commerce, 11. p.  305. 
Journals of the House of Commons, I. pp.  205, 297, 298, 303, 316, 317, 318. 
3  The English Patents of Monopoly, by W.  Hyde Price, pp.  27, 28. 
Statutes, IV.  p.  1108. 
6 State  Papers,  Domestic, James  I., LII.  6 ; Parliamentary Debates  in 1610,  ut 
mpra, p.  xv; Gardiner, History  (1889), 11. p.  13 ; Montague,  History of  England, 
1603-60,  p.  37. 
6  State Papers, Domestic, James I., xxxv. 29, summarized by Gardiner, History, 
1603-16  (1863), p. 408. 
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the revenue, remarkable  as it was,  still left an annual deficit.  During 
the first five years  of  the  reign  of  James I.  the  total receipts,  both 
ordinary and extraordinary, were 22,183,244.8s.  Oid., as compared with 
22,612,137. 6s.  34d. from 1698 to 1603, when  the supplies  granted by 
Parliament were larger owing to the war1. 
Finding that it was hopeless to  attempt any considerable diminution 
in the expenditure, Salisbury devoted himself to a reduction of  the debt 
and to increasing  the revenue.  By  Michaelmas  1608, the debt had 
grown to 21,400,000.  During the next two years  the deficits of  that 
time were met, and this debt was reduced to 2300,000 by  means of  the 
following payments : 
The subsidy of  1607-10  realized  ...  ...  $450,000 
Sales of  lands and mills ...  ...  ...  ...  400,000 
Copy-holders, freed-woods and assarts  ...  100,000 
Old debts to  the Crown ...  ...  ...  ...  200,000 
Total repaid  ...  ...  ...  ...  $1,150,0002 
The increase  in  the revenue  was  accomplished  by  a  more  careful 
administration  of  the  Crown  property and also  by  the creation  of  a 
system of  additional taxation on  commodities.  These new duties were 
estimated  to ~roduce  270,000,  and  they  represented  an  increase  of 
between thirty and forty per cent. on the existing Customs3.  So great 
an addition to indirect taxation meant a heavy burden on trade and on 
the tax-payer.  The subsidy was as great as those levied from  1592 to 
1598; and,  on  this,  the increased duties were  superimposed.  Besides 
the collection of  the other sums,  on  account  of  old  debts,  fines &C., 
meant a further drain on the floating capital of  the country.  That so 
great an unproductive expenditure was  borne with comparative ease is 
a  remarkable  testimony  to the advance in  prosperity,  that had  been 
made  since  the  restoration  of  peace.  The fact  that interest  at this 
time  was  10 per  cent.  shows  partly  the activity  of  trade and partly 
the effect of  the diversion  of  capital from  industry towards supplying 
the royal necessities4. 
When  Parliament  met  in  1610, the new  impositions  at once were 
brought under its notice,  in addition to other interferences with trade, 
which had been adopted, either with a view to increase the revenue,  or 
to reward favoured persons.  The duties on  coals from Newcastle6 were 
l  State Papers, Domestic, James I., xxxv. 29. 
"arliamentary  Debates in 1610, ut supra, p.  6.  Ibid., pp.  xviii, xix. 
Court Book of  the East  India company, II.,  Feb. 16, 1608, May 23, 1609. 
The basis  of this tax was the charters to the town of Newcastle.  In addition 
to this certain charges were levied  in London which James  I. promised  should  be 
removed-England's  Grievance  discovered  in relation  to  the  Coal  Trude, by Ralph 
Gardner,  North  Shields,  1849,  pp.  31-69 ; The  Parliamentary  or  C'onstitutional 
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complained of  as a  a bad  grievance," and attention was  again drawn to 
the taxes on currants, wines and hides'.  Another tax, which had taken 
a new  form, was that on pepper.  The East India company in 1609 had 
obtained  the  monopoly  of  importing  pepper.  The duty was  to be 
6d.  per  lb.,  while  the company was  bound  not  to  charge  more  than 
2s. 6d.  per  lb.Z  It was  felt  that it was  necessary to concentrate  the 
attention  of  the  House,  to  prevent  grievances  "being  preferred  like 
pasquils3,"  and criticism was directed to the imposition  of  duties by the 
King, irrespective of  the consent of Parliament.  The speeches, delivered 
on both sides, bring to light the opposition  between the Court and the 
popular  party, and mark  at the same time the beginning of  the con- 
stitutional struggle.  This difficulty was only one of  several, arising out 
of  diferent iiiterpretatiolls  of  the prerogative,  and occasioned by  the 
extravagance of  the expenditured.  Parliament was  dissatisfied, and it 
adjourned, having granted the minimum subsidy of  only one-tenth and 
one-fifteenth5. 
After  the dissolution,  the financial situation  presented  many diffi- 
culties.  Although the debt had been  reduced in  1610, the supply was 
far from sufficient  to meet  the deficit; and there was,  in addition, the 
expense  in  Ireland due to the rebellion  of  OIDogharty in  1608.  By 
1612 the Crown debt had grown to £500,0006, and all kinds of projects 
were  introduced "  to improve " the  revenue.  A  notable  instance  of 
these  ingenious,  if  not  very  reputable,  devices  was  the  creation  of 
Baronets.  This scheme realized,  up to March  25th,  1614, ~!290,885~. 
Many other proposals were  considered,  most of  which  promised either 
half  the  profit  or  a  substantial  money  payment,  annually,  to  the 
Crown.  It is this class of  project  that is satirized by Richard Brome 
in The Court Beggar : 
2 P.  Next for the performance of  our undertakings. 
3 P.  And then the certainty of  the propounded  profits, 
Both to the king and us. 
It frequently happened that the authorization of  these projects gave 
James I. an opportunity of  rewarding  persons about the Court, either 
l Journals of the House of Commons, I. pp.  416, 436. 
2  Court  Book,  II.,  Oct.  27,  1609;  State  Papers,  Proclamations,  James  I., 
CLXXXVII.  No. 13 ;  Journals of the House of Commons, I.  p.  419. 
Journals of the House of Commons, I. p.  415. 
* The  whole  question  is  fully  discussed  by Gardiner,  History  (1880),  11. 
pp.  75-83. 
Statutes, IV.  p.  1187. 
6  Parliamentary Debates in 1610, pp.  163-79. 
7  Gardiner, History  (1889), 11. p.  112 ; An Abstract  or  Brief  Declaration  of  the 
present  State  of  his Majesties Rewnew, with the Assignations  and  DeJhbations upon the 
Same, 1651, p. 11. 
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by  re-granting  the  sum  reserved  to the Crown  or  else  through  the 
propounder  having  agreed to pay some favoured  intermediary a large 
sum  on  obtaining his grant.  The result  was  that, when  Parliament 
met  in  1614, it was  reported that, "as  a garden,  clean weeded,  weeds 
next year,"  so since 1611 a fresh crop of objectionable grants had sprung 
up1.  The patent for glass was characterized as a "pregnant monopolyn 
and there was a likelihood of  another for iron, while there were fears that 
the same system would  be  extended to glass and all other trades,  which 
would be "  like taking away the mill-stone from the poor2." 
The growth  of  projects,  for  the  improving  of  the revenue,  was 
accompanied by many ideas for new  processes of production-the  latter 
being  occasioned  by  the  great  activity  of  trade,  which  reached  its 
culminating point from  1613 to the beginning of  1615.  Everywhere, 
except  in  the  royal  exchequer,  money  was  plentiful3.  The rate of 
interest for loans on the best security, which had been 10  per cent. since 
the beginning of  the seventeenth  century, fell  to 9 per cent. in 1614 ; 
and,  for a  short time in the following year,  the East India company 
was  able to borrow at 8 per  cent.4  Most  of  the companies, which  had 
been founded on the declaration  of  peace,  had begun to realize some of 
the  expectations  of  the promoters.  The planting  undertakings  were 
opening  new  markets  and  thereby  increasing  the  outlet  for  British 
commodities.  Foreign trade on the whole was flourishing.  The capital 
employed  by  the East India  company  in the separate  stocks during 
the period from 1609 to January 1613 had yielded a n~aximum  profit of 
234 per cent. and a  minimum  profit  of  121g per cent., not per annum, 
but  during  the period  the  funds  were  employed,  which  was  longerb. 
The Russia company had been remarkably fortunate and it was able to 
pay 90 per cent., annually, in 1611 and again in 161R6.  At home, the 
reclamation  of  land by drainage was  making progress, the Irish society 
had been formed for the settlement of a considerable part of  Ulster and 
the New  River had been begun'. 
There were two hidden menaces to this prosperity, namely the com- 
petition  of  the Dutch  in the  whaling,  the East India and  the cloth 
tradess; and  added  to this was  the possibility  that James I.,  under 
Journals of the Hm~e  of Commons, I.  p.  491.  Ibid., I.  p.  460. 
A Detection of the Court and State of England, by Roger Coke, 1719, I. p.  94. 
Calendar State Papers, Colonial, East Indies, 1513-1616,  pp.  272, 276, 293, 302, 
395, 418, 421. 
Vide infra, 11. pp.  124, 125.  Ibid., 11. p.  53. 
Ibid., 11. pp.  338-40,  353, 111.  p.  20. 
For the foundation of  the Dutch East India company, vide supra, pp.  121, 122, 
130.  A Dutch whaling company was established in  1614, and a Dutch Russia company 
rather earlier-S.  van Brakel,  De  Hollandsche Handelscompagnie2nJ pp. 22, 27, 28 ; 
Gemhiedenis der Noordsche Compagnie, Utrecht, 1874, p.  68. 142  The Crown Revenue and Trade 1613-16  [CHAP. m. 
financial pressure, might seriously endanger the commerce of the country 
by  snatching at some  temporary alleviation  of  his  difficulties,  at the 
expense  of  the  general  welfare  in  the  future.  By  May  1614  the 
liabilities of  the Crown  had  increased to A?680,0001; and they would 
have been higher, had it not been  that considerable payments had been 
made, beginning in 1611-12, by Holland under the arrangement of 160ga. 
James I. had found by experience that the patents he had granted, 
hitherto, had not been effective in increasing  the revenue to a material 
extent.  If they  were  for  bona Jide  new  inventions,  time  must elapse 
before the royalty,  reserved to the Crown, was  received.  Often, before 
that stage was reached, James I. had ~arted  with his rights.  If, on the 
other  hand,  the grant  were  one,  like  that made  to the East India 
company,  the  Crown  only  gained  by  increase  of  Customs,  and  the 
benefit, from this source, was lost sight of  in a gross total.  Sometimes, 
it was  found possible to exact a direct payment  from the company, as 
for instance in 1614, when, on  the representation  of  "the very many 
occasions  of  the King to use  money,"  it was  decided  to make  him  a 
benevolence, the amount of which was to be kept secret3.  As yet, beyond 
the patent  for  a  new  dye,  nothing had  been  obtained from the cloth 
trade up to 1613, beyond the usual  Customs.  This industry exported 
goods  to the value of  about nine-tenths of  a total of  two and a half 
millionsd.  Of  this the Merchant Adventurers at this time, even though 
through  foreign  competition  their  trade was  reduced5, shipped about 
6600,000  a  year-this  being  more  than  double  the  export  of  spices 
by  the  East India  company6.  It was  the practice  of  the Merchant 
1 Gardiner, Zistory (1889), 11.  p.  228. 
Ibid.,  1603-1616  (1863),  11.  p.  418. 
1611-12.  French  King's  debt  .........  £45,000 
Low  Country  ,,  .........  40,000 
1612-13.  French  King's  ,,  .........  15,000 
Low  Country  ,,  .........  58,000 
1613-14.  Low  Country  ,,  .........  31,213 
$189,213 
3  Court Book, III.,  June 20, 1614. 
The Circle of Commerce, by E. M[isselden],  Merchant,  1623, p.  121. 
5  In 1611 it is recorded  that, though the clothiers "laboured  in their calling as 
much at this time as ever before they did, doe  of late find  so little fruit of their 
labour, as that many of them are decayed  and  many of them also have given over 
that  trade  to the great  hindrance  of the realmm--A  &cord  g  some  worthie 
Proceedings :  in the Honourable,  Wise and  Faithful1 House of  Commma in.  ..1611,  in 
Somers'  Tracts (1752),  XIII. p.  271. 
6 The Dgence  of  Trade, by Sir  Dudley Digges,  1616, p.  43.  The export of the 
Merchant Adventurers before 1614 was 65,063 cloths (Proceedings and Debates of  the 
House  of  Commarrs  1620  and  1621, Oxford, 1767, I. p.  204).  These sold  at about 
S10 per  piece-Wheeler,  quoted Early Chartered Companies, ut supra, p.  28. 
CHAP. VII.]  The  Clbth-Jinishing Scheme  1613-14 
Adventurers and other exporters to deliver the cloth abroad, either partly 
finished, or else undyed.  Thus all the finer cloth was  dressed and dyed 
abroad.  It  was thought that it  would be possible to perform this work in 
England, and that the higher  price  realized would  make good  the loss 
in the quantity exported.  The scheme, so  far, was perfectly legitimate, 
and it would  have  deserved encouragement,  as  a new invention, by the 
grant of  a monopoly of the dyeing of fine cloth for a term of  years and 
by exemption from Customs for a  short period.  If  it were  possible to 
perform  the work  satisfactorily in  England at that time,  this method 
would have enabled the government to watch the progress of  the experi- 
ment-if  it failed, there  would  be  little loss,  except  to the capitalists 
who would have voluntarily undergone the risk : if success were obtained, 
a valuable  industry would  have been  established1.  Unfortunately, the 
adoption of  such a method would  only have  benefited the Crown after 
some years,  and the  necessities  of  James I.  were  so  urgent  that he 
required  an immediate increase of  income.  At this stage, the inter- 
vention  of  William  Cockayne determined  the form, which the scheme 
eventually assumed.  It was  proposed  that all exportation  of  undyed 
and undressed cloth should be prohibited,  and Cockayne and the other 
promoters undertook  to provide  sufficient  workmen  to finish all  cloth 
offered to them.  They estimated  that from  2600,000  to .&5"70,000  a 
year would be added to the value of  the cloth exported, and the Crown 
was to obtain &300,000 of  this2.  The orer was  tempting to James I., 
and  Cockayne had  secured  the support of  many  influential courtiers, 
by  means  of  lavish  bribery3, so  that  the privileges  of  the Merchant 
Adventurers  were  suspended  and a  new  company  incorporated  as  the 
New Company of  Merchant Advemtz~rers. A cominission was  signed at 
the end  of  1613, ~rohibiting  the export of  undyed  cloth4; and,  in  a 
draft proclamation of  May R5th, 1614, it was  declared  that no  "stand 
of  cloth" need be feared,  for those engaged in this industry  cc may goe 
on  in  the course of  their  former trading,  leaving  it to our care  and 
providence to introduce this great and happy alteration for the better, 
without  any  alteration  of  trade  or  pulling  down  of  the  price  in 
the  meantime5."  By  July  22nd  it  was  proclaimed  that,  after 
l  An arrangement such as that indicated in the text would have invaded some of 
the privileges of the Merchant Adventurers.  The refusal of  this body to  enter into 
the new trade enabled the government to  make other plans. 
Add.  MS.  (Brit. Mus.)  14,027,  f. 271 ;  Anderson,  Annals  of  Commerce,  11. 
pp.  308, 309; The Relations  of  the  Crown to  Trade  under James  I.,  by F.  Hermia 
Durham, in Transactions of the Royal Historicalsociety, New Series, XIII. pp.  212, 213. 
The  Five  Years  of  King  Janies,  by Sir  Foulk  Grenvill,  1643,  in Harleian 
Miscellany (1746), VII. p.  398. 
State Papers,  Domestic, James I., Grant Book, p.  176. 
"011.  Proclamations Soc. Antiq.,  James L.,  No. 35. Crisis in the  Cloth Trade 1616  [CHAP. VII. 
November 2nd, the exportation of undyed and undressed cloth should be 
prohibited'. 
It will  at once be  obvious that the experiment was highly  specu- 
lative.  Supposing  the  most  glowing  expectations  of  the promoters 
were  realized,  for  a  number  of  years,  the  increased  value would  not 
exceed 2700,000 a year; while, as it turned out later, the loss annually 
would  be  &1,000,000.  The  whole  unpleasant  transaction  was  a 
gambling  venture,  in  which  the great bulk  of  the export trade was 
lightly  staked.  It is  true  that the Privy  Council  had  conducted  an 
enquiry,  the  result  of  which  had  tended  to  show  that the 
establishment  of  the  proposed  industry  would  be  advantageous,  and 
the undertakers  had  given  security  to ~urchase  the whole  output of 
the looms.  If, however, the dyers did not succeed, the outcome would 
be that an immense amount of  the best  cloth would be spoiled, and no 
statesman  could  have  failed  to foresee that  the Dutch would  resent 
being  deprived  of  the raw  material  for  their  dyeing  industry.  Both 
effects followed, the cloth dyed in England is said to have been a failure 
and the Dutch prohibited it2.  Within a  short time, the new company 
received  permission  to export undyed  cloth,  undertaking to produce 
6,000 dyed cloths by 1616, 12,000 the next year and 18,000 in 16183. 
Members  of  the former  company  were  forced  to compound  with  the 
existing  organization  before  they  could  deal in  cloth4.  By  1616 the 
cloth  trade was  experiencing  a  severe  crisis,  there were  many  failures 
and the legality  of  the positioil  of  the new  company  was  questioned. 
The assistants frankly admitted that they would be  unable to maintain 
their ground, if the clauses in the charter of  1615, which were said to 
be illegal, were reformed.  They clearly recognized that the whole work 
rested solely on  the King's  prerogative5.  The favour of  James I. was 
cultivated assiduously.  He was entertained at a banquet in June 1616, 
and  the  company  presented  him  with  an  ewer  of  gold,  containing 
21,000.  A  masque was  performed  by dyers and other workmen, who 
spoke "  such language as Ben Jonson putt in theyre mouthes~" Efforts 
, 
were  made  to find  250,000  to present  to James I.'  As  time went 
on, opinion  even  at Court, turned  against  the company.  As late as 
September 1616, James had been reported to  have expressed an intention 
1 Coll. Proclamations Soc. Antiq., James I., No. 39. 
The  Five  Years of  King  James,  by  Sir  Foulk  Grenvill,  1643,  in Harleian 
Miscellany,  VII.  p.  412. 
3  State Papers, Domestic, James I., ~xxx.  112; Calendar, 1611-18,  p.  288. 
4  Ibid., ~xxx.  127 ; Calendar, 1611-18,  p.  291. 
6  Ibid., ~xxxvr.  40 ; Calendar,  1611-18,  p.  347. 
Ibid., Lxxxvrr.  57 ; Cabndar, 1611-18,  p.  373. 
7  Ibid., xc. 147 ;  Calendar, 1611-18,  p.  454. 
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of ve11turing240,000, but the puzzle was where he could raise the money1. 
His  hopes  of  an  increased revenue had  not  only  been  disappointed, 
but there  was  a  substantial decline.  It was  reported  in  November 
that,  owing to the  decay  of  the  cloth  trade,  the King  intended  to 
force  the members  of  the old  company  to enter  the new  one2.  Few 
proposals could have been less tactful, since there were bitter animosities 
between the two bodies.  Besides, the weavers were  so incensed against 
Cockayne's  undertaking  that  a  reconstituted  body  would  be  safer 
without  any  of  those,  against  whom  there  was  so  much  ill-feeling. 
The members of  the old company, therefore, stood out for the complete 
restoration  of  their  former  privileges.  After ~rotracted  negotiations, 
which involved the paying of  between 260,000 and 270,000 to persons 
about the Court, the King  declared  that he  would  no  longer  depend 
on  specious and fair shewes, which produce  not the fruit our actions 
doe  ever  aim  at "; and  on  August  12th, 1617, the old  company was 
restored  to its former  status, and the new  one  was  dissolved3.  This 
payment,  on  the re-establishment  of  the Adcenturers,  constituted  a 
serious  burden  on  a  trade,  that  had  already  suffered  severely.  Un- 
fortunately,  too,  the dislocation  of  the  industry did  not  cease  with 
the return  of  permission to export cloth,  either unfinished  or finished, 
dyed or undyed.  The Dutch had taken steps to protect themselves, by 
starting the preliminary stages of  the manufacture,  for which they had 
hitherto depended on England.  As a consequence of  this and the loss 
of  reputation of  English cloth, the export by the Merchant Adventurers 
in l620 was little more than half  what it had been before 1613.  This 
meant  an enormous loss  over a  series of  years, and it was  one  of  the 
chief  causes of  the crisis,  which  began  in  1620.  In fact,  it is not  a 
little remarkable that a serious panic had been avoided in 1616 or 1617. 
The complete dislocation of  the cloth trade and the failure of  numerous 
merchai~ts,  engaged  in  it,  indicated  that credit  was  severely strained. 
Probably the incipient  crisis was  avoided,  partly by the general  belief 
that on  the dissolutioll  of  the New  Merchant  Adventurers, the trade 
would  return  to its  former  level,  partly,  too,  by  the success  of  the 
Russia and East India companies.  The former had been  very fortunate 
in its whaling expeditions from  1608 to 1615.  It  had divided from its 
profits for this period aggregate  dividends  of  as much as 339 per cent., 
or  an  average  of  4Ri  per  cent.  per  annum.  Since  the  capital  was 
264,687, the profit for the eight years was &R19,2884.  The credit of  the 
l  State Papers,  r)omestic, James I., LXXXVIII.  89; Calendar, 1611-18,  p.  395. 
Ibid., r~xxxrx.  17; C'alendar, 1611-18,  p.  404. 
Ibid.,  Sign  Manual,  vol. VIII.  Nos.  77, 80-84 ; Proceedings  of  the  Howe  oJ 
Commons, 1621, I. pp.  87, 153; Coll. Proclamations Soc.  Antiq., James I., No. 82. 
Vide  infra,  11.  pp.  53, 54.  In  the statement  above  an attempt is  made  to 
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company was so good that it  was able to borrow in 1618 at 8 per cent., as 
compared with 10  per cent. paid both by the Crown and the East India 
company  for  loans'.  The India  trade,  up  to  this  time,  had  been 
highly prosperous.  Until the termination of  the "  First Joint-Stock " 
in  1617,  the  profits,  in  addition  to  the  return  of  the  capital, 
amounted  to B1,028,281.  It is  by  no  means  easy  to compare  these 
figures  with  those  of  the  Dutch  company,  owing  to  the  different 
financial  methods  of  the two bodies.  The English  organization from 
1600 to 1617 consisted of  thirteen  distinct ventures, each of  which had 
a separate capital ;  and, on the termination of one voyage (or a series of 
voyages), the whole assets were  divided to the adventurers.  Therefore, 
any  sum  of  the  divisiolls  would  be  misleading,  since  these  repre- 
sented  the return  of  the capital  subscribed,  and that capital  varied 
in  amount  for  different  expeditions.  Moreover,  these  stocks  over- 
lapped-a  fresh  voyage  being  subscribed,  before  the  capital  of  a 
previous one was  repaids.  One source of  confusion  may be eliminated, 
by reducing the divisions  made  to the profit  distributed, after allow- 
ing  for the  return  of  the various  capitals  adventured.  It remains, 
therefore,  to  estimate  the  amount  of  capital,  required  to  earn  the 
specified profit  of  over  a million in the seventeen years.  Allowing for 
the overlapping of  stocks  until the original  sum  was  returned to the 
shareholders,  it seems  probable  that the average amount  of  capital, 
earning  dividend  during  the  seventeen  years,  was  not  more  than 
&R00,000, and it may  have  been less.  Therefore, the profit,  during 
the whole period, was at least five times the stock  subscribed and out- 
standing.  Since the English  company  started de  novo in  1600, while 
the Dutch undertaking was  an amalgamation  of  a  number of  existing 
undertakings,  whose  assets  were  taken  over  by  the new  company, no 
injustice will  be  done to the latter by comparing its profits from 1602 
with those of  its rival to 1617.  The dividends of  the Dutch enterprize 
fall into two series-the  first of  which was paid frorn 1605 to 1614 and 
represents the proceeds of  the expeditions sent to India in 1601.  These 
payments amounted to 265 per cent.-but,  as in the case of  the Russia 
represent the financial situation as it was in 1617, when the account H (i.e. that for 
1615) was  made  up.  Through  subsequent  changes  in the outlook,  many  of  the 
assets proved bad ;  and, not only was the original  capital lost, but the Adventurers 
in this company were  assessed to the extent  of  335. 9s.  lld. per cent.  Thus it 
follows that the total nett divisions for this ~eriod  were 303i per cent., or a profit 
for the eight years of 2038 per cent., being at the average annual rate of 25 per cent. 
instead of  42 per cent. 
1 The Petition of  hlrs Mary  Brocas,  27th  May,  1624, House of  Lords  MSS.; 
Excheauer of  Receipt  (State Papers) (Miscellanea) 43,  (3);  Calendar State Papers, 
Colonial, East Indies, 1617-21,  p.  85. 
2  Vide infra,  11. pp.  98-101,  103. 
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company1,  there had  been  a  miscalculation,  and  it became  necessary 
to recall 4 per  cent., reducing the total distribution  to 261 per cent.l 
The second series was  derived from the operations of  the company  on 
its own account.  These dividends were paid between 1610  and 1611, and 
came to 1624 per cent.3  It will thus be  seen that the English company 
had  some advantage in  the rate per  cent.  of  profit;  but  it is  to be 
remembered  that  the capital  of  the  Dutch  undertaking  was  larger, 
being  6,449,588  florins  4 ~t.~,  and  therefore  its total  profit  was  the 
greater  of  the  two.  In addition  to  the profits  divided,  the Dutch 
were spending considerable sums on fortifications in the East; so that 
the situation resolved  itself into one in  which the Dutch company was 
forming  a  reserve  fund,  invested  in  forts  and munitions ; while  the 
English undertaking, owing to its system of terminable stocks, had as yet 
taken  no effective steps towards securing  the permanence  of  its trade. 
Neglecting this disposal  of  undivided  profits,  the average annual rate 
for the English  company was  over 31  per cent.,  about 25 per cent. for 
the Dutch organization and over 42 per  cent.  for the Russia  company, 
the calculation in the latter case covering the period from 1608  to 161Ei6. 
The success of  the Russia  and East India  companies had tempted 
some  of  the  members  of  the  Court  party, and  in  1617 an ingenious 
device  was  discovered,  whereby it was  thought  possible for  several of 
the favourites of  James I. to share in the gains, without undergoing any 
considerable risk.  This scheme was  the incorporation, under  the great 
seal of  Scotland, of a body, which might trade within the limits of  these 
two companies.  Possibly  this  grant  was  defensible on  legal  grounds, 
and it might be urged that there were equitable arguments in its favour. 
It seemed  unfair  that a lucrative trade, which was  incorporated  before 
the Union  of  the Crowns, should  be  confined to Englishmen.  Such  a 
limitation was  more apparent  than  real.  Several Scotsmen resident  at 
Court  were  admitted  as members6, in some cases  it would  have  been 
Vide infra,  rr.  pp. 47,  48,  58. 
Klerk de Reus, NiederZCndisch-Ostindischen Compagnie, p.  178. 
Ibid.,  Appendix  VI.  The  payments  were  partly  in commodities,  partly  in 
money.  Some shareholders did not take payment  in this form, and they received 
1628 per cent. in money in 1612, 1613 and 1616. 
* Ibid.,  p.  176;  AndrC  E.  Sayous,  Le  Fractionnemed  du  Capital Soaal de  la 
Compagnie  Nierlaandaise des Indes  Orientules aux  XVII~ et  XVIII~ SiPcles  in Nouvelle 
&UW  Hislorique de Droit Franqaise et Etrunger,  1901, p.  622. 
For details of the divisions of  the Russia company at this period, vi&  infra,  11. 
PP.  52-4. 
L11 1614, 011  the admission  of  a courtier gratis, it is recorded  the company was 
desirous "to  have some such their friends about the King that should be tied unto 
them  by some kindness,  especially agaiust this time of  Parliament "-Court  Book, 
"I.,  March  19,  1614.  At the previous  meeting  the  appointment  of  a  Scottish 
chaplain  was  considered. 
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possible for others, not already admitted, to buy shares ;  and, on at least 
one  occasion,  subscriptions  of  capital  were  invited  from  the  general 
public1.  As  shown  elsewhere,  the proposed  Scottish  company  was  a 
breach of the promise made by James I. in the charter he had granted to 
the London undertaking in 1609, and the whole scheme presented many 
practical  difficulties2.  Had it been  carried out, the India trade would 
have  suffered, like  the cloth industry;  and, to prevent this disaster, it 
was  decided  to form  a  new  whaling  company-the  capital  of  which 
should  be  provided  in  equal  parts  by  the  Russia  and  East  India 
organizations.  It  was  arranged that this body should  purchase all the 
materials, which  had been  procured  in  preparation  for a voyage by the 
Scottish  adventurers3. 
Although the Russia and East India companies were  soon  to experi- 
ence a change  of  fortune, no signs of  this were  apparent in 1617.  In 
that year, a new subscription was  made by the latter (which was intended 
to continue for eight years), and 954 persons  undertook  to adventure 
amongst  them  21,629,0404.  The amount of  capital  promised  shows 
that the public was  prepared  to invest  freely, and further evidence in 
the  same  direction  is  to be  found  in  the  formation  of  an  African 
company in the following year (1618)5.  It seems likely that the abund- 
ance  of  capital  was  not  so  great as  it seemed  to be.  The injury to 
the cloth trade continued, and the activity of  enterprize is to be ascribed 
to the resources, set at liberty by the contraction of  the cloth-industry, 
seeking  new  fields  for  investment.  If,  as  actually  happened,  these 
proved unproductive,  the crisis, that might  have come  in 1617, would 
be  intensified  in  destructive power. 
In England there were  indications  that trade was  less  prosperous 
than it had been.  Although the revenue had recovered from the check, 
sustained by the interference with the cloth trade, the rate of  expansion 
was slower6.  While in 1619 there was an estimated balance of  245,000, 
after  defraying the ordinary  charges,  the extraordinary  expenses  con- 
tinued to be a  serious burden, transforming  the ordinary surpluses into 
chronic  deficits.  In September  1617 the debt was 2726,000.  At first 
sight,  it is  surprising  that,  in  view  of  the fact  that the subsidy  of 
1610-11  was only one-tenth and one-fifteenth, and that the Parliament 
of  1614 granted  no  supply, the borrowing  had  not  been  larger.  No 
doubt some reform in  the royal expenditure had been erected, but the 
small increase of  debt was  due mainly  to two  different  causes.  Large 
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sums had  been  paid  by Holland, in  reduction  of  its debt (as  much as 
2205,077  was  received  in  1615-16),  and James I.  was  rewarding  his 
favourites, without making such large money payments, as had been his 
custonl in former years.  During the long gap between the Parliaments 
of 1614 and 1621, opportunities had arisen for a fresh series of  monopo- 
lies.  Though  the annual  payments  actually made  to the Crown  only 
amounted, at the most, to the inconsiderable sum  of  &?9001, there were 
intermediate persons  between  some of  the patentees and the Icing, who 
intercepted considerable  amounts.  For  instance,  in  addition  to large 
sums  exacted  from  both  the "New"  and  the "  Old"  Merchant  Ad- 
venturers, Lady Bedford had received 2500 from one of  several persons, 
interested  in  obtaining  a  patent  for  gold  and  silver  thread2, while 
Lord Kelly was  said to have secured 240,000 from his right to nominate 
400  merchants  or others under  a new  patent  of  the Staplers"  Thus 
these patents were  burdened  by heavy preliminary expenses, and those, 
who  had obtained privileges through them, were  likely to use  oppressive 
measures to recoup themselves.  It followed that, under orders from the 
Privy Council, the patentees began to tax the allied trades for their own 
benefit, with  the result  that there were  actions against, and imprison- 
ments  of  those,  who  refused  to  compound,  to  an  extent  hitherto 
unknown.  Such  harsh  measures  naturally  aroused  much  indignation, 
and some of  the patentees were  severely handled, when  Parliament met 
in  1621. 
l  Gardiner,  History  (1893), IV.  p.  21 ; Mr  Price  (English Patents  of  Monopoly, 
pp 31-2)  calculates  that there was  "hardly 250 annually derived  from the true  . 
monopoly  rents." 
Proceedings of the House of C'o:ol.nmons,  1621, I.  p.  127. 
Ibid., I. p.  87.  With  reference to the origin of  the Staplers,  vide supra, p.  8. 
1  Court Book, II., April  22, 1608. 
2  Vide infra, 11. p.  104.  3  Ibid., 11. p.  55. 
4  Ibid., 11.  p.  104.  Ibid., 11. p.  11. 
8  Cf.  Estimates  of  Ordinary  Revenue  1610,  1614,  1819,  Gardiner,  Hktory 
1603-16  (1883),  11.  pp. 412-15 ;  Ihid. 1628-37,  11. p. 344; (1904), X.  p. 222. CHAP. VIII.]  Incorporation  of  Companies 1600-20  151 
CHAPTER  VIII. 
THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  JOINT-STOCK  COMPANY  FROM 
1600  TO  1620. 
EVEN  though  much  had been  accon~plished  by the joint-stock com- 
panies  founded  in  the sixteenth  century, it was  not  until the reign of 
James I. that this type of  organization became  sufficiently common  to 
have  a  distinctive  life-history  of  its  own.  No  doubt  much  valuable 
information  could  be  gleaned  from  the earlier  undertakings, were  the 
documents relating to them complete.  As it is, the absence of  minutes 
and  other  important  papers  limits  the  investigation  to  a  series of 
glimpses rather than a full view  of  the methods of  management adopted. 
It  is  typical  of  the  development  of  this  class  of  venture  that, 
beginning with  the foundation  of  the East  India  company  in  1600, 
a  more exact  type of  incorporation  was  adopted.  Prior  to this date 
there was a wide latitude in the description of  a trading body, sometimes 
it was  entitled  a  fellowship  or  a  society  or  a  company.  There are 
instances,  too,  where  there  were  either no  special privileges, or where 
the concession was  for a short period, in which  the body established had 
no special name given it in the charter or grant.  From  the foundation 
of the East India company, a more exact system of  nomenclature begins, 
which  continued  until  the  end  of  the  reign  of  Charles I.  Almost 
invariably the official title consisted of  the following parts.  First there 
was  the  "Governor  and  Company"  or  the "  Governor  and Society," 
consisting  of  a  specified class of  persons, formed  to carry on  a  certain 
enterprize, and to this a local designation was  added, either  as applying 
to the persons or to the object they had in view.  Thus the full title of 
the East India company was "  the Governor and Company of  Merchants 
of  London  trading  into  the  East  Indies1."  Similarly the  Bermuda 
company was  "the Governor  and Company of  the City of  London for 
the  Plantation  of  the  Somers  Islands"  (1611)2.  In  1613 the Irish 
Society was incorporated as ''  the Society of the Governor and Assistants 
l  Vide infra, 11.  p.  92.  Ibid., 11.  p.  262. 
of London of the New Plantation in Ulster within the realm of Irelandl," 
in  1618  the  Guinea  company  as  "the  Governor  and  Company  of 
Adventurers of  London, trading to Gynney and Bynney2," and in 1619 
the New  River undertaking as "the Governor and Company of  the New 
River,  brought  from  Chadwell  and  Amwell  to London3."  The same 
tendency is  shown  in the charters granted  to the Mines Royal and to 
the Mineral and Battery Works in 1604-the  former being described as 
"the  Governors, Assistants and Society of  the City of  London  of  and 
for the Mines Royal,"  and the latter as "the Governors, Assistants and 
Society  of  the  City  of  London  of  and  for  the Mineral  and Battery 
Works  4." 
In  these  incorporated  titles  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  the name 
G society,"  which was  common in the sixteenth century, is giving way to 
that of  "company."  The only  cases  in  which  it survives are the re- 
incorporated  bodies  for  the Mines  Royal  and for  the Battery Works 
and  in  the new  undertaking  of  the  Irish  Society.  It  is  probably  a 
coincidence that, only in the latter and in the title of  the Mineral  and 
Battery  Works  are the assistants  included  in  the  official  description. 
There are a  few  minor  exceptions  to these  principles.  The  Virginia 
company was  unique  in having  no  official  known  as a governor.  The 
head of  this body was called a treasurer, and therefore its title was  "the 
Treasurer  and Company  of  Adventurers  and  Planters of  the  City  of 
London  for  the First  Calony  in  Virginia5." 
The  management,  as  a  rule,  was  entrusted  to  a  governor  and 
assistants-the  number of  the latter being either twelve or a  multiple 
of  twelve.  In the Somers Islands company,  for  instance,  there  were 
24 assistants, in the Irish  Society 12.  The smaller membership of  the 
Mines  Royal  rendered  it impossible to have  more  than  six assistants, 
while the Mineral and Battery Works had eight.  The latter is the only 
case  in  this period where  this number  is  not  either 12 or a  multiple 
or  sub-multiple  of  12.  There are two  interesting  divergencies from 
the normal type.  The one in the case of  the East India company, where 
the  management  consisted  of  a  governor,  a  deputy-governor, and  24 
G< committees" ;  while in  the African  company,  incorporated  in  1618, 
there were a governor, a deputy-governor, and 12  directors.  This is the 
first use  of  the term  director  in a charter; but, as early  as  1604, the 
word  occurs in Sandys' "Instructions"  and, curiously enough, in reference 
to the Russia  company, the affairs of  which, it is stated, are "  managed 
by  fifteen directors6."  Apparently at this date the existellce of  consuls, 
Vidc infra, 11.  p.  339.  Ibid., 11.  p.  12. 
Ibid., rrr.  p.  22.  Ibid., 11.  p.  424. 
Ibid., rr.  pp. 249,  250  (note). 
Journals of  the House of  Commons,  I.  p. 220.  It was Sandys who introduced Regulated  aad  Joint-Stock Companies  [CHAP. VIII. 
in addition to the usual governor and assistants, was  felt to be  archaic. 
Still earlier, the term had been employed in the case of  the Mines ~o~al 
for certain subordinate officials, who occupied a positio~r  resembling that 
of  managers or foremen1.  The introduction of  the word by Sandys and 
again  in the charter of  the African  company was  premature; since, at 
this  period,  the governor  had  larger  powers  than the chairman  of  a 
board  of  directors ;  and,  therefore,  the description  of  those  elected  to 
serve with the governor as "  assistants,"  represented most adequately the 
actual relation  of  the officials.  These men were, both in name and in 
fact, the assistants  of  the governor. 
Since the form of  incorporation and the mode of  government in the 
regulated and the joint-stock  companies were essentially the same, it is 
only to be expected that there should be many points of  contact, indeed 
in some eases  there are features in  the first joint-stock  ventures  that 
carry one back  to the social  gild.  Such  characteristics  are of  excep- 
tional interest as showing the continuity of  the developn~ent  of  associated 
effort.  The continuance of the exclusive spirit, which was necessary only 
as a bond of  union amongst the members, is repeated in the company, 
not only in the desire for a monopoly, but also in the oath of  member- 
ship'.  The terminology of  the gild was  continued in the naming of  the 
shareholders "  brothen"  in the East India company, and in fining those 
who were absent, when summoned to meetings.  There are some traces 
of  the social side of  gild-life in  the feasts  that were  held  on  suitable 
occasions by  the Russia  and East India undertakings3. 
In some respects the East India company had more points of  contact 
with the regulated bodies than other joint-stock  undertakings that had 
been  founded  earlier.  In  this  case,  a  distinction  was  made  between 
a  purchase  of  shares  by  one, who  was  already a  member,  as distin- 
guished  from  another, who  was  not.  In the latter circumstances, the 
new  shareholder,  in  addition to the agreed-upon  price,  had  to pay-a 
certain  sum  for  his  "freedom,"  this  being  analogous  to the fine  on 
admission  to the regulated  company.  In 1615  a  graduated scale d 
payments  on  entrance  was  drawn  up-merchants  were  charged  g50 
each, shopkeepers 100 marks  (i.e. 866. 13s. ad.), one son  of  a freeman, 
not exceeding 21 years of  age at the date of  his father's  admission, &l 
to the poor box; and the other children, not exceeding l4  years of  age, 
the term director in this connection (G& Records of  the Virginia Company of  London, 
edited bv S. M. Kingsburp, Washingtos, 1906,  11.  pp. 144, 154),  but it mm  William 
Paterson who brought it into cornmoll use. 
Vide infra, 11.  p. 399 (note). 
2. For the ter~lls  of  the oath of  a member of the East India company, oi&  Bruce, 
Annals,  I. pp. 8, 9. 
Vide supra, pp. 4, 6. 
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10s. each,  when  they  came  of  age.  Gentlemen  were  admitted by  the 
governor on such  terms as he thought  fit1.  The Virginia company was 
in  the habit  of  admitting persons, who  were  not  shareholders, to the 
freedom at first for some special service, and subsequently "  by favour of 
the court "-a  system  which, during the dissensions  in  this  body from 
1619 to 1624, led to several abuses2. 
While there are these and similar resemblances between the regulated 
and joint-stock companies at the beginning of  the seventeenth century, 
the most interesting and important aspect of  the latter is that which is 
~eculiar  to itself-namely  the management of  the common capital of the 
undertaking.  There  can  be  little doubt  that  the primitive  type of 
company was  that formed for a single expedition, on  the terminatioil of 
which  the finances were  investigated  and the venture  was  wound  up, 
although the same persous might at once equip a fresh voyage.  Thus 
the partnership, or small  unincorporated company, was  oi~ly  terminable 
at the end  of  the voyage, but it was  customary ,  i  n  the case  of  a  dis- 
agreement and when the discontented partner refused to sell his interest 
or to buy that of  the others, that the majority might carry on the next 
voyage, as  if  the person  who  dissented  remained  a voluntary  partner. 
Under  such  circumstances, the capital  of  the new  expedition would  be 
continuous with that of its predecessor3.  The Russia company, possibly 
owing  to its  capital  being  locked  up4, was  in  advance  of  its  con- 
temporaries  in  having  only  a  few  different  stocks  in  the sixty-seven 
years up to 16205.  The company for Frobisher's  voyages carried on the 
losses of its early expeditions?  There is no information as to the details 
of  the capitalization of  the Levant company, while it traded on a ,joint- 
stock;  but  the adventurers  to Africa,  during the reign  of  Elizabeth, 
treated each voyage as a  distinct venture, with  a capital of  its own  on 
which  dividends  were  t~aid'. 
L  --- 
This system involved the payment of monies to the adventurers, both 
011  account of the capital subscribed, as well as from profits.  Therefore, 
such  distributions  may  be  best  described  by  their  original  title  of 
"divisions,"  to  distinguish  them  from  the  modern  dividend.  These 
facts have an important bearing on the finances of  the first  plantation 
Companies.  Such  organizations  were  expeditions  for  surveying  and 
O~cupying  districts, suitable for colonization.  There were  two clearly- 
lnarked stages in their histories.  When the area chosen had  been made 
Court Book, III.,  October 31, 1615. 
'  Records of the  Virginia CompanyJ  I.  pp. 264, 592, also infra,  11.  pp. 280, 281. 
Co~wtudo,  we1  Ler Mercatoria, by Gerard Malynes, 1622, p. 169. 
vide supra, pp. 30, 34. 
Vide infra, 11.  pp. 40, 44-6,  48, 49, 52-4. 
Ibid., 11.  p. 79. 
7  Ibid., 11.  p. 6. 154  Tendencies towards a permanent  Stock 
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sufficiently safe  for  settlers,  it was  divided  rateably  amongst  the ad- 
venturers.  Therefore, there was  at an early period  a  division  of  land, 
which constituted the chief return made to the shareholders.  In some 
cases  the company  continued to exist and to exercise  certain  trading 
rights, vested in it by  its charter.  This was the case with  the Bermuda 
company1.  A peculiar  modification of  the same method  occurs  in  the 
continuance  of  the  Irish  Society.  This  was  in  effect  a  joint-stock 
company, the shares in which were taken up by the Livery conlpanies in 
1609, while by 1613 the greater part of  the land had been divided ;  and, 
a  time went  on,  the  income  of  the remainder  was  disbursed  by  the 
society, in its corporate capacity, for religious, educational and charitable 
objects2. 
One  effect of  the  foundation  of  plantation  companies  was  the 
lengthening of  the period before the first divisio~l  was made, and another 
influence, in  the same direction,  was  the  example  of  the Dutch  East 
India company.  In a foreign-trading body the disadvantages of  termin- 
able  stocks  are  very  apparent.  These  are  noted  elsewhere3.  The 
contest between capital, subscribed for a short or a long period, is clearly 
marked  in  the early  history  of  the East  India  company.  The sums, 
paid in by  the shareholders  for  the first voyage  in  1601, were  consoli- 
dated with those adventured in the secolrd in 1603.  The capital of  the 
third expedition (1606) was merged in that of the fifth.  The remaining 
voyages from the sixth to the twelfth (1609-13),  as well as the fourth 
(160$), were  financially distinct, having separate capitals which  (except 
in the case of  the fourth voyage, where  a loss was  made) were  returned 
to those who  had subscribed4.  In 1613 a new  method was  adopted of 
making a subscription, which was to extend over and provide  funds  for 
four years, and in 1617 a further prolongation of  the term of  the stock, 
issued in that year, was determined on.  This-the  Second Joint-Stock, 
as it was named-was  to last for at least eight years6.  It is impossible 
to determine whether the plan of only asking for capital for brief periods 
was  due to the desire of  the members  for this form  of  investment, or 
whether  it was  forced  on  the  governor  and  committees,  at first,  by 
political uncertainties  abroad, and continued later, through the fear of 
interference  with  the company  by  James I.  There is no  doubt that, 
1  Vide infra, 11.  pp.  263, 289-97. 
2  Ibid.,  11.  pp.  341, 342.  To  some extent, the Irish Society resembled the Dutch 
East India company in  the manner in which the capital was ~rovided. 
3  Ibid.,  11.  pp.  101, 109, 111. 
4  It is to be noted  however that it was  usual when one stock was being wound 
up at the time another was being formed, for the latter to purchase  "the remai~ls" 
of  the former-wide  infra, 11.  p.  103. 
6  Ibid.,  11.  p.  104. 
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during  the subsequent  struggle  between  the  English  and the  Dutch 
bodies,  the former  suffered through  its having  been  unable to make 
strongly defended  factories, owing to the necessity of  keeping its assets 
liquid,  in  order  to distribute  them  when  each  stock  was  wound  up1. 
The few companies dealing with  industries in  England  had permanent 
capitals-as  for instance  the Mines  Royal:  the  Mineral  and  Battery 
Works3  and the New River company4.  In these cases no other method 
would  have been  possible. 
During the seventy years up to 1620, there was a gradnal evolution 
from the primitive type of share towards a capital stock.  Attention has 
already  been  drawn  to  the tendency  at first  to treat  the joint-stock 
company  as  an  extended  partnership5, with  the result  that the whole 
undertaking was divided  into a  comparatively small  number  of  shares ; 
and, as  a  consequence, if  the business  was  one  of  any magnitude, the 
amount  paid  up on  each  share was  large.  The Mines Royal, Mineral 
and  Battery  Works  and  African  Adventurers  are  instances  of  this 
tendency!  Had this system  been  continued  in  its original rigidity it 
would  have  confined  membership  to the  very  wealthy;  and, therefore, 
two  methods were  adopted  of  attracting the smaller investor-the  one 
by  dividing  shares  into  fractions  and  the other  by  the admission  of 
"under-adventurers."  After  1600 these  devices were  continued, in  the 
case  of  the New  River company-the  adventurers'  moiety was  divided 
into thirty-six shares, the original par value of which was &257. 59.  9#d., 
and which were  soon  sold  in  fractional  parts7.  On  the other hand, in 
the Irish Society the original capital was  divided into only 12 "portions" 
of  &3,333.  6s.  8d.  each,  and the smaller  livery  companies subscribed 
66 under" one of  the greater bodies, to which the shares were assigned in 
the first instance8.  Yet  another  method  was  adopted  in  the case  of 
the  syndicate  which  owned  the Globe  Theatre  during the  time  that 
Shakespeare was  connected with  it.  At first there were  10 shares, and 
new  ones were added until the total was increased to sixteeng. 
With the foundation  of  the East India company a modification was 
introduced.  Instead of the number of  shares being determinate and the 
amount  paid  thereon  indetermillate,  at the  formation  of  the under- 
taking  the nominal value  of  the share  was  fixed,  but  there was  con- 
siderable  latitude in  the quantity  of  shares.  As  a  general  rule,  the 
committees were prepared to receive more capital for the earlier voyages 
than  was  actually  adventured,  and so  the subscription  lists  remained 
Vide infra, 11.  pp.  97, 108.  Ibid.,  11.  pp.  385-405. 
Ibid.,  11.  pp.  405, 416.  Ibid.,  111.  pp.  21-31.  Vide supw, p.  45.  Vide imf~a,  11.  pp.  7, 387, 416. 
7  Ibid.,  111.  pp.  21, 24.  Ibid.,  11. p.  340. 
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open for a long period.  In the first voyages the shares  appear to have 
been  £250  each ;  while in the fourth expedition the amount was  raised 
to 2550, and under-adventurers  found  a  part  of  the calls on  some of 
the shares1. 
At  the same time, a movement was in progress towards the reducing 
of  the  denomination  of  the share.  As far back  as  1583 Carlile  had 
proposed  the formation  of  a  plantatiolr  company with  shares  of  £25, 
&?l%.  10s.  and &6. 5s. each2.  Similar undertakings at  the beginning of 
the seventeenth  century (with the exception  of  the Irish Society) con- 
sisted of  shares of  a fixed but small amount, and capital was  created as 
required by the issue of  more shares.  Thus the first Virginia company 
had "great  shares''  of  612. 10s. and half-shares of  £6.  59.'  The NW 
England  undertaking  (1620)  had  two  distinct  capitals-the  one  for 
exploration,  the shares in  which  were  £110  each;  and  the  other  for 
fishing, in which £50  on every part was    aid  up at  the same date4.  In 
the company  of  noblemen  and  gentlemen  for  planting  Guiana,  first 
fornied in 1619, but not incorporated until 1629, there were three kinds 
of  shares, with  £150,  £100  and g50 to be called up5.  In this case, as 
well as Carlile's proposed venture and the Virginia company, the distinc- 
tion between different  classes  of  shares was  confined  to the amount of 
each-there  was  no  priority. 
A fresh stage in the evolution was  reached, on the formation of  the 
First Joint-Stock of the East India company in 1613.  The adventurers, 
who  joined  in this series of  voyages, undertook  to subscribe a  certain 
amount  of  capital,  payable  in  equal parts  over  four years.  For  con- 
venience, the subscription was dealt with as consisting  of  units of  £100 
each to be paid, annually, up to 16176.  Although from a modern point 
of view this method of  capitalization would be considered as one divided 
into shares  of  £400,  the tendency of  the seventeenth  century for  ear- 
marking  different sums as  far as possible led  to attention being  cbn- 
centrated  on  the  annual  payments.  Therefore,  although  the  same 
persons  were  proprietors  of  the thirteenth,  fourteenth, Gfteent,h and 
sixteenth  voyages,  each  had a  distinct capital on which  divisions were 
made.  Since, moreover, the unit in all of  them was  £100,  an approxi- 
mation towards the replacement  of  the share  by stock  is  reached.  As 
yet, however, the evolution of  "  stock," as a marketable denomination of 
the  total capital, consisting  of  multiples  of  a  certain  specified  sum, is 
incomplete.  In fact the best description of  the First Joint-Stock of  the 
East India company, from this ~oint  of  view, would be as consisting of 
shares of  £100  each-these  constituting the connecting link between the 
Court Book, II.,  July 22, 1607.  Vide infra, 11. p. 243. 
Ibid., 11. p.  250.  Ibid., 11. p. 302. 
Ibid., 11. p.  325.  Court Book, III., May 19, 1614. 
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share, as such, and  stock  in  its later mealling as a  transferable portion 
of  the whole  capital. 
Correlative  to the  treatment  of  the resources  subscribed  was  the 
distribution  of  the  profits  thereon.  The  East  India  company  was 
peculiar  in  its  partiality  for  terminable  stocks,  while  the  Russia 
adventurers  continued  to  trade on  the capital,  which  had  been  sub- 
scribed, as long as it continued to give good returns1.  It was only when 
results became disappointing that it was  wound  up  and a new  subscrip- 
tion  taken.  In both cases, no distinction was  made between the capital 
that earned the profit and the profit itself, and many of  the troubles of 
the Russia  company in  1620 were  due  to the lack  of  this precaution2. 
The East India company had a fixed method of  procedure in arriving at 
the amount  of  its divisions.  There was  often  some doubt  as  to what 
goods were to be credited to the capitals of  two distinct, but CO-existing 
"voyages,"  and  first  of  all  the auditors reported  to the governor  and 
committees,  recommending  a  certain  dividend  on  a  particular  stock. 
The committees then ~assed  the proposed  payment, and referred  it to 
a general court of  the adventurers concerned, who finally sanctioned the 
distribution 
There were  severd forrnul~  by which  the divisions were  announced. 
For  instance, in  the case  of  the East India company, at a  meeting  of 
committees  on  June  8th,  1614,  it  is  recorded  that  there  was  a 
"remainder"  in  cash  of  between  &10,000  and  611,000,  belonging  to 
the third and fifth voyages, from which  it was  proposed  that "  sixteen 
upon a hundred  should  be  divided4."  As a rule, single payments under 
50 per  cent.  were  spoken  of  in  this way-namely  as  so  much  upon  a 
hundred.  Divisions of  50 per cent. or multiples  of  that amount were 
calculated  in  terms  of  "capitals."  Thus on  September  20th, 1614, a 
division  of  50 per cent. is declared as "  fifty on the hundred5," while  on 
December  6th the same distribution  is  referred  to as  one  of  a  S'  half- 
capital6."  About  a  fortnight later,  a  "capital  in  money"  was  to be 
divided amongst  the proprietors  of  the eleventh voyage7.  After 1614 
payments, expressed  in terms of  one  or  more  "capitals,"  are frequent, 
such  as the recommendation  of  the auditors  of  three  capitals  on  the 
seventh voyage, and  one  capital and a  half  on  the ninth  voyage8, or, 
again, the sale of  stock  upon which  three half-capitals had been  taken 
out9. 
Vide infra, 11. pp. 45, 48, 52.  Ibid., 11. pp. 64, 65. 
Court Book, In., Sept. 8, 1615. 
"bid.,  nr., Jnrle 8, 1614.  As the subscribed  capital was 267,200, a divisjoll of 
16  per  cent. required 210,752. 
Ibid., rrr.,-Sept. 20, 1614. 
Ibid., III.,  Dec. 20, 1614. 
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The use of the word "  capital " in this connection is of  great interest, 
as one of  the earliest  applications of  it, in  relation to joint-stock  com- 
panies,  in  English  records.  It  is  true  that  the Italian equivalent is 
employed  in  a  communication  from  the Venetian  a~nbassador  at Con- 
stantinople,  in  relation  to the proceediugs  of  the English merchants 
there.  On  October  17th, 1598, he  writes:  "Che  inglesi  hanno  intro- 
dotta una navigatione  nei  mari  et nelle Isole di Sua SerenitB, tenendo 
pratica  et intelligenza  con  sudditi del Zante, CeRalonia ed altri luochi 
molti de quali vnnilo a Constantinopoli con  capitali de medesimi  inglesi 
et alloggiano  nelle  case  lorol." 
The introduction  of  the term by the East India company into their 
minutes  was  a  recognition  of  a  practical  difficulty, arising  out of  the 
different  significations in  which  the more  usual  word  stock  was  used. 
At the beginning  of  a  voyage, the "stockx  was  the amount actually 
paid up by the adventurers-it  was both the stock-h-trade in the widest 
sense and the sum total of  the sums subscribed.  At this period a com- 
plication  was  introduced  by  the  Dutch  and  the  English  East India 
companies,  as  well  as  the Russia  adventurers,  borrowing  large  sums2. 
It  followed  that  the  stock, employed  in  the business, became  greater 
than the payments made by the members on their shares.  The tendency 
towards confusion became  accentuated, when, on the foundation  of  the 
First  Joint-Stock, "  stock " acquired  yet  a  third  meaning,  namely  as 
standing for a  share of  6100.  The existence of  this difficulty may be 
traced in the minutes of the company, as for instance when it is recorded 
that the Dutch  company had  "a  stock"  of  &'900,000,  while  it owed 
6400,0003, where the term denotes the whole outlay.  Coupled with the 
necessity  to avoid  misunderstanding,  there was  a  second  cause,  which 
accouiits for the introduction of  capital  as a business-expression at  this 
time.  The East  India company  endeavoured  to keep its  accounts  in 
a more scientific manner  than had been  usual amongst its predecessors. 
The need  for  improvemellt  was  sufficiently  apparent.  Not  only  are 
there no balance sheets of  the Crown revenue and expenditure, but errors 
in addition might almost be described as the rule rather than the excep- 
tion.  The Italians were  the pioneers  of  accurate bookkeeping,  and it 
l State Archives, Venice-Rubricario  del  Dispaccio  dell'  Ambasciatore Verleto 
Ca~~ello-No.  601-304,  Sez. 111. ;  Calendar State Papers, venelian, 1591-1603,  p.  347. 
A 
Vide injka, 11. pp. 44, 104, 107. 
3  Court  Book,  III.,  May  5,  1615.  Similar  difficulties showed  themselves  in 
reference to the capital of the Dutch company as divided amongst the shareholders. 
At first the holding corisisted of  CC  parts"  (cf.  supru, p.  45) of the subscribed  capital 
which  lvere  eventually  cnrisolidated  or  divitled  into  shares  of  3,000  florins- 
A. E. Sayow, Le Fructionnement  du Gfapitul Social de  (a L'ompagnie  Ne'erlandaise den 
Indes Orientales  aua xv11~  et  XVIII~  SiScles  in lLTouvelle Revue  Historique  de  Droit 
Framcaise  et  Etranger,  1901,  pp.  624,  625. 
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has  already been  shown that, as early  as  156g1, an  attempt had  been 
made to introduce their methods of accountancy into England, including 
the  employment  of  the term  capital.  It appears,  however,  that this 
effort did  not succeed, and it was  only when  merchants who, later, had 
business  relations  with  the  Mediterranean  became  convinced  of  the 
advantages  of  the Italian  method,  that it came  to be  studied.  Now 
amongst  this group there were  many members  of  the East India com- 
pany.  Although  there were  differences  of  opinion  between  this body 
and  the Levant  merchants,  the latter had  been  instrumental in  the 
foundation  of  the East India undertaking?  But the Levant company 
itself was  an amalgamation  of  two other bodies, one  of  which was  the 
Venetian  merchants3.  In this way there was a connection between some 
of  the  East India adventurers and  Italy, so  that  it is  probable that 
several of  the officials of  the company had learnt their  bookkeeping in 
the Mediterranean  and  urould  introduce  improved  methods.  In  this 
manner the transplantation of  the term capital can be explained. 
At the  same  time,  it should  be  noticed,  as  an  example  of  the 
perplexities  attending the investigation of  seventeenth-century finance, 
that the description of divisions, as consisting of a half-capital or a whole 
capital,  is liable  to mislead  the modern reader.  Owing to the incom- 
plete state of  the minutes of  the East India company, our knowledge of 
the  divisions made  during  the beginning  of  its history  depends  on  a 
report  drawn  up  by  the accountant  at a  later  date, which  gives  the 
amount of each separate subscription and the total of the divisions thereon. 
It would  be  expected  that the dividend  of  a  capital  would  be  equal 
to sums paid in by the adventurers.  This is so in the case of  the eighth 
voyage,  where, according to the  minutes,  three  capitals  were  divided, 
with a final payment of 11 per cent., making 311 per cent., which agrees 
exactly  with  the figures  given  by  Sambrooke.  The difficulty  begins 
with the First Joint-Stock.  Unfortunately, since there is a gap of nearly 
two years in the minutes, it is  not possible to make a complete list  of 
all the divisions declared, so as to compare them with the result  stated 
by  Sambrooke.  However, starting with  the amount subscribed which 
he  dves,  and  which  is  confirmed  by  the  minutes,  and  taking  "the 
capital " as equal to this sum, the extraordinary result is arrived at that, 
0"  this  basis,  the incomplete  dividends  come  to more  than  the  total 
should  be.  At first  one  is  tempted  to suppose  that  the  "capitaln 
divided must have been less than 100 per cent., or else that Sambrooke's 
figures are wrong.  Neither  of  these suppositions is admissible.  There 
would  have  been  no  gain  in  the adoption of  c6capital"  as  a  terrn  of 
accoontancy, unless it were used in its natural meaning;  and Sambroolie 
vide supra, p.  60 (note).  Vide infra, n. p.  01. 
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is accurate, where his work can be checked.  The solution of  the problem 
is to be sought in a difTerent direction, namely in the practice of  keeping 
separate accounts for each of  the four voyages, financed by this stock1. 
Since a  quarter of  the stock was  called  up  each year,  a  division  of  a 
whole  capital  on  the first  of  these would  mean  100 per  cent., not  on 
2418,691, but on about a quarter of that amount.  It might be thought 
that when, in  the second year, one-half  of  the stock was  called up, the 
division  of  a  capital would  be  equal  to this sun];  but as  a matter of 
fact, for  the same reason, if  funds accrued  from  that voyage they were 
assigned to it,  and similarly  with  those  of  the succeeding two years. 
Thus  a  dividend  of  a  capital on  the First Joint-Stock  was  in reality 
not  100 per  cent.  on  the whole  subscription, but  on  the  voyage  af 
a  particular year.  The diffrrenee between the usage in the seventeenth 
century  and  that  now  adopted  was  one  in  the point  of  view.  The 
East India  adventurers  divided  the whole  into distinct parts, each  of 
which was  kept separate ; and therefore, according to their practice, they 
were logical in naming each of  these parts ''  a capital."  If  the divisions 
on  this stock  be  treated  by assigning  each  of  them  to the voyage on 
which it was  declared, in relation to the subscription  allocated to that 
voyage,  taking the capital as  100 per  cent. on the funds of  its proper 
voyage, it sill be  found  that the divisions in  the minutes,  instead  of 
being  in excess  of  Sambrooke's  return,  come  to a  snlaller  sum,  as  is 
necessary from  the incon~pleteness  of  the records.  A  ~recisely  similar 
result  is  arrived  at in  the  case  of  the  subsidiary  joint-stock  of  the 
Virginia  company,  which  was  known  as  "the  great,"  or  "the  old 
magazine2."  Being  distinct from  the parent  undertaking,  its minutes 
were kept separately3,  but there are sufficient references to its finances to 
enable a reconstruction  of  their main  outlines to be  made.  The sub- 
scribed capital was  27,000, payable  in  three annual  instalments.  By 
December 19th, 1621, "a whole  capital"  (in the  form  of  two "  half- 
capitals") had been divided4.  Yet in February 1623 it is recorded that 
the shareholders had then oldy received, as their total divisions, &4,0006; 
and, as  in the case  of  the East  India company, it is  plain  that "the 
capital" was computed on the stock of a distinct vopge, as is clear from 
the form of declaring a distribution as "  half  a capital of th  $rst  firstear's 
aduent ure  R." 
1 This was also the practice of the Russia company-infra,  11. pp. 39, 45, 52-4. 
For some account of this venture, ibid., 11. pp. 256, 257, 270, 273, 276. 
3  With the exception of  the report of  one meeting, which was  copied into the 
Court Book of the Virginia company (Records of  the Virginia Company,  I. pp. 524-6), 
none of these minutes are known to exist. 
4  Ibid.,  I. pp. 227, 238, 585, 547, 572. 
5  Ibid., 11. p. 279. 
6  Ibid., I. p. 328.  The division of $4,000  on &'7,000  appears to have been three 
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Owing  to the increased  importance  of  the joint-stock  company  at 
this period, sales of  shares became comparatively common.  The names 
of proprietors given in the various charters of the society of Mineral and 
Battery Works show numerous changes, but it was after the foundation 
of the East India company that thess transactions becaale frequent.  By 
the formation of successive subordinate ventures, there were opportunities 
for those, who  had capital to subscribe, to acquire an intekst in these 
stocks.  Application was  first  made  to persons,  who  were  already free 
of  the company,  and subsequently  outsiders  were  invited  to become 
adventurers1.  It  is  surprising  that  in  spite  of  these  opportunities- 
there were twelve distinct subscriptions  up  to the beginning of  1613- 
many shares were sold.  In most cases these were dealt with by private 
negotiation  between the parties, and the company recorded the "  trans- 
port" without noting the price  obtained.  It sometimes happened  that 
members, for various reasons, were either unable or unwilling to dispose 
of  their interests  in this way.  In such cases, the "  court of  sales"  pro- 
vided  a  ready  means  for  the  realization.  After  the auction  of  East 
India commodities by ''  inch of candle," any shares which the proprietors 
wished to part with, by the same method, were otKered.  This procedure 
is  of  interest  as  showing  that  there  was  an  open  market  for  these 
securities, since the court of  sales was  attended by any persons who were 
prepared to purchase the goods.  In many cases the purchasers of  shares 
by  auction, as  well  as those  who  had bought  by  private  negotiation, 
were  not  members  of  the company, and they paid, in addition  to the 
price  agreed  upon,  the  usual  fine  for admission.  The governor  and 
committees were  anxious  to encourage  public  sales  of  shares, and,  in 
1615, it was ordered that 2800 paid up in the First Joint-Stock should 
be  auctioned,  whereby  they  may  better  know  the  worth  of  their 
adventures, which will give a good reputation to the voyage, if  it shall 
be  well  solda." 
The prices realized at these sales are recorded elsewhere"  They are 
of interest chiefly as very early quotations for stocks.  Had this company 
not adopted the practice of making divisions on terminable stocks, these 
figures would have  been  of  great importance, as  showing the yield  on 
an investment of this kind.  Unfortunately, the irregularity of  the pay- 
ments  and the incomplete  state of  the minutes  make  it impossible to 
determine, in a  sufficient  number  of  instances, how  much  of  the total 
division on a certain stock had been distributed at the time many of the 
sales were  made.  A  long period  elapsed before  inost  of  these  stocks 
were  wound  up, and  it might  be  expected  that  intending  purchmers 
would have been  able to forecast with considerable precision how much 
Court Book, II., May 15, 1607. 
2  Ibid., III.,  October 13,  1615. 
Vide infra, 11. pp.  123-5. 
half-capitals with a balance of an odd amount. Prices  of  Shares  1600-21 
remained  to be  divided.  Therefore  the    rice  would  be,  in  fact,  the 
discounting  for a  period  of  one  or two  years  a  certain payment then 
probably due.  One  series of  prices  is  of  interest as showing a serous 
miscalculation.  In 1618 the thirteenth voyage1 had a number of  assets 
as yet  undistributed.  Since, after 150 per cent. had been divided, the 
stock was  sold from  214 to 2183, it was  expected that the "remains" 
would  realize  a  large  sum, but the conflict with  the Dutch  company 
precluded  the making good  of  this anticipation.  There was  only  one 
case  in which it was  recorded  that an adventure was  sold  below  par. 
This was  in  1601, when  a  share  in  the first voyage changed hands  at  - 
only  90 per  cent. of  the sum  paid  in.  To some  extent  the sale  was 
a  forced  one,  since  the original  adventurer was  not  disposed  to  -.  pay 
a  further  call, then  due=.  Other companies  were  not so  successtul  as 
investments.  There  is  a  quotation  of  the  21%.  10s.  shares  of  the 
Virginia company, though belonging rather to the time of crisis in 1621, 
which was  between 40s. and 50s.  This was  from 16 per cent. to 520  per 
cent. of  the amount paid up3. 
During the years of  good trade at  the beginning of  the seventeenth 
century, the internal afl'airs  of  the joint-stock  companies were  on  the 
whole  harmonious.  This was  especially so in the East India company. 
There are indications, however, that there were  elements in the manage- 
ment, which, though  tolerated in good times, would  lead to dissatisfac- 
tion in a period of  adversity.  Attention has already been drawn to the 
payment of  moneys to the Crown, of which no account was kepti  The 
same tendency is shown in the concealment of a loan contracted in 1615, 
which was  to be  a  secret,  "in  regard  the generality  cannot  suddenly 
apprehend the true grounds and reasons thereof%" Both the East India 
and Russia companies had many difficulties in preventing  private  trade 
by individuals6; and, on laxity being shown by the administration, this 
evil, from the point of view of the joint-stock system, invariably aros  3  Those  companies, which  were  less  prosperous  than the East In ia 
undertaking, provide  instances  of  severe  criticism  of  the management. 
In the Virginia  company the dissensions and disorders at the meetings 
were  notorious7, whilst  amongst  the  Russia  adventurers,  after  1619, 
there were allegations of  the voting and other business being conducted 
improperly" 
As a  general  rule,  up to 1620 and for  some  years  afterwards,  no 
special arrangements had been made in the charters as to the relation of 
1 That is the first year's adventure in the First Joint-Stock-cf.  infra, rr. p. 126. 
2  Court Book, I.,  July 24, 1601.  3  Vide infra, 11. p.  276. 
4  Vide supra, p. 142.  6  Court Book, III.,  June 20, 1616. 
6  Vide infra, 11. pp. 42, 46, 52.  7  Ibid., 11. p.  283. 
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the votes to the shares.  In most cases the usual  clause, which gave the 
companies powers  to make by-laws, was  held  to provide  for the deter- 
mining of the amount of the qualification.  The charter granted in 1604 
to the society of  Mines Royal was  an exception to this rule, since, in it, 
it is stated "  the voice  of  everyone, having a quarter part, is to be held 
of  as great account  as the voices of  two others, having but half-quarter 
parts a piece, and so the voice  of  any other, havihg a greater part than 
a  quarter, to be  esteemed of  as  great force  as  so  many  several other 
persons, having but a half-quarter a piece1."  It was  the practice of  the 
East India colnpa~~y  to decide questions, where  there was  a difference of 
opinion, by a show of  hands amongst those present at the meeting2, and 
the same  method was  adopted by  the Virginia  company  up  to 161g3. 
To some extent the natural objection to this practice was  minimized in 
the former case by  fixing a  minimum  holding for voting purposes ;  but, 
in  the latter, where  the share was  only &12.  10s.  and where  moreover 
members  of  the council and freemen  could attend the courts and vote, 
there was the risk that a minority of capital might have a large majority 
of  voting  power4. 
Occasionally some light is obtained on the number fixed upon as the 
quorum  at a  general  meeting.  In the Mineral  and Battery Works it 
was twelve persons, and in the New  River company five5. 
It was  the practice for  the members of  the East India conlpany to 
vote a honorarium to the governor and committees.  The first  mention 
of  such  a  payment  being  made was  in 1609, when  the meeting passed 
a motion to grant Sir Thomas Smythe &650 in recognition of his aid in 
obtaining the charters and of  his service for five years as governor.  On 
his  re-election, Smythe absolutely  refused  to serve  unless  the vote was 
reduced  by  22506.  This modesty  is  so widely different  from  modern 
practices that it deserves special mention.  In 1615 &1,000 was granted 
to  the  twenty-four  committees,  on  account  of  the growth  of  the 
business,  which  required  their  attendance every day7. 
Turning from  the internal  management  of  the individual company 
to the relation  of  these bodies to each  other, there are several unex- 
pected  points  of  contact  and  antagonism.  The  so-called  monopoly, 
granted by the charters, was no more than the prohibition of subjects of 
the Crown, other  than  the discoverers,  to use  a  certain  trade  route. 
Therefore unless,  as  in  the case  of  the  Levant  company, the further 
Fodince  RegaZes:  Or the  Historg, Laws and Places of  the chief Mines and Mineral 
Works in England,  WaZes  and  the  English  Pale  in  Ireland,  by Sir  John  Pettus, 
London,  1670,  p.  56. 
Vide infra, 11. p.  92.  3  Ibid., rr. pp.  268, 269.  * Ibid., 11. pp.  278-9.  Ibid., 11. p.  415, III.  p.  23. 
Court Book, XI.,  July 4, 1609.  Ibid., III.,  September 1, 1615. 
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privilege  of  sole importation  of  a certain  commodity was granted1, the 
company  had  to face the competition  of  foreigners, although  this was 
limited by the higher customs  exacted from  aliens.  Besides  it some- 
times happened that although each  organization was  safeguarded  in its 
own route, a number might be  competing dirdctly or indirectly.  This 
was the case with the Russia, Levant and East India companies.  To all 
of  them  the spice-trade  from  Persia  was  open-the  Russia  company 
brought  the  commodities,  it purchased,  over  the  Caspian  Sea  and 
through  Russia  via  Archangel  or  the  Baltic2, the  Levant  company 
through the Mediterranean3, and the East India undertaking round the 
Cape of Good Hope4.  The Cossacks had interrupted this branch of  the 
activity of  the Russia company after 15816,  although it still continued to 
import such Oriental commodities as it was  able to purchase  in Russia. 
At times  the competition between  the two  remaining  companies was 
very keen, and this fact accounts  for the antagonism between them  for 
nearly  a  century. 
At the same time, besides opposition of this nature, there were many 
arrangements for establishing a "  community of interest."  In the Mines 
Royal  and Mineral and Battery Works this came  about gradually by 
a number  of  persons owning  shares in both6.  The Levant  and  East 
India companies had joined  with  the Russia  undertaking  on  different 
occasions in providing funds for the discovery of  a North-west passage7. 
A closer  union was  the joint-adventure  of  the Russia  and East India 
companies, beginning in  1618 for a  series  of  whaling  voyages8.  Still 
more remarkable was the proposition, which had the support of James I., 
for an amalgamation of  the English and Dutch East India companies9. 
This scheme had been developed with considerable detail in 1615, and it 
is  not impossible that if  the King had used  more tact in his dealings 
with  the company,  composed  of  his  own  subjects,  some  arrangement 
might  have  been  arrived  at,  which  would  have  rendered  the losqs, 
incurred  by  both  bodies  a  few  years  later,  quite  unnecessary.  Yet 
another  side  of  this  tendency  towards  the  harmonizing  of  different 
interests, through the joint-stock principle, is shown in the settlement of 
disputes between the privileged undertakings  and adventurers, who  had 
opened  up  a  trade within  the limits assigned by the charters.  If the 
persons  who  had  entered  these  trades  had  been  able  to establish  an 
organized  business,  it  was  usual  for  the  privileged  company,  when 
enforcing its monopoly, to purchase the ships and stock-in-trade of their 
rivals  at a valuation,  and, in some cases,  shares in the company  were 
issued  to carry out the agreement.  The ~recedent  for transactions of 
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this kind was  the Act of  Parliament in favour of the Russia company in 
1566l,  and  subsequently  the  absorption  of  competing  ventures  was 
effected  on  a  similar  basis  by  the East India company  in  1614:  and 
by  the  whaling  undertaking,  financed  by  this  body  and  the  Russia 
adventurers,  which  agreed  to purchase  all  the  ships  and  stores  of 
Cunningham's Scottish company4  In the latter case there was delay in 
the  payment  being  made,  but  the  principle  was  important,  since  it 
enabled  enterprizing  men  to enter the privileged  bodies, and provided 
(in  addition to the ordinary means  through transfers of  shares) for the 
introduction  of  those who  may have  had  fresh  ideas  or who  had  ests- 
blished new methods for trading with the natives of distant countria. 
l  Vide infra, 11. p. 42. 
Vide infra, 11.  pp.  55, 104  Court Book, III.,  December 2, 1614. 
1 Vide infra, 11. p.  86.  a  Ibid., 11. p. 43.  3  Ibid., 11. pp. 83, 84. 
4  Ibid., 11. p.  89.  6  Ibid., 11.  pp.  43, 44.  Ibid., 11.  p. 403. 
7  Ibid., 11.  pp. 49, 95.  8  Ibid., 11. pp. 65, 104.  9  Ibid., 11.  p.  103. CHAP. IX.]  Characterizations of  the  Crisis  1621  167 
CHAPTER  IX. 
THE  progress of  the joint-stock  company, during the peaceful years 
of good trade up to 1619, has been dealt with separately, as showing the 
organization under favourable conditions.  To this there is the necessary 
complement, which  represents  the same undertakings during a time of 
stress.  To  say that bad years follow good years, at  more or less uncertain 
intervals,  is  a  truism;  and,  concealed  under  the fair show  of  British 
commerce during the reign of  Jarnes I., there were  elements making for 
a  crisis  in  the  future.  The time  at which  the  depression,  that was 
inevitable, would  begin to show  itself  was  uncertain  and depended  on 
several causes.  Capital  had been  driven out of  some of  the customary 
channels for investment, and, about 1614, there had been great activity 
in the formation of  new schemes.  The incipient boom had been checked 
by  the partial  crisis  in  1616-7  in  the  cloth  trade,  and  capital was 
directed towards  the extension  of  foreign trade.  The strength of  this 
movement is shown by  the subscription of  a stock, four  times  greater 
than any previously taken up, for the East India trade, by the formation 
of  a  new  whaling  company  and  the  establishing  of  another  African 
undertaking,  all  in  the  years  1617-8.  Had  these  ventures  been 
successful, the approaching crisis might have been delayed for some time, 
but the aggressive competition  of  the  Dutch  meant  the  cessation  oq 
immediate profits'.  Therefore in 1620 these trades had begun to suffer 
severely.  Neither the Russia nor the East India companies were able to 
pay  their obligations when  due, and the African  body  had lost all its 
capital2.  The great English  industry-the  cloth trade-had  for  some 
years been  depressed, and early in 1620 the country began to experience 
a  serious crisis. 
Regarded externally, as it  was viewed by most of those who considered 
the  matter  at the time,  this ~eriod  of  depression was  described as a 
monetary  crisis.  It  seemed  impossible  for  any  of  those,  who  wrote 
1 Free Trade or the Means to make Trade EElorish;  wherein are discovered the Causes 
of  the Decay of Trade of this Kingdom, by E. i\.lisselden,  1622, p.  13. 
Vide infra, 11. pp.  12, 55-8,  107. 
reports to the government or who  spoke in the Parliament of  1621, to 
allude to the prevailing bad trade, without attributing the evil to  scarcity 
of  coin, or (as has happened  in many subsequent crises) to the want of 
money1.  To this cause was attributed the inability of  the farmer to pay 
his  rent,  or  the  merchant  to meet  his  engagements.  The  range  of 
metaphor  was  taxed to describe the magnitude  of  the evil:  trade was 
said to be "  at a stand," "  to be sick," to be "  in a consumption," "  to be 
decayed " or "  to lie a-bleeding2." 
I 
The phenomena, that marked the appearance and continuance of  the 
crisis, were all the more striking after the years of  prosperity.  Markets 
and fairs  were  sparsely attended, prices  for  cattle and wool  were  low, 
weavers  and  agricultural  labourers  were  out  of  work3.  There  was 
necessarily a great increase in pauperism;  and, as the crisis developed, 
there were "  n~utinies  " of  the unemployed4.  At  Bath, for instance, the 
clothiers  were  "much  decayed,"  and  many  of  the weavers  were  being 
supported by the city.  In Gloucester, by 1622, the trade was  described 
as "growing  worse  and worse."  The local  authorities were  unable  to 
relieve  "the infinite  number"  of  those  out of  work.  Many  of  these 
"were  in case  to starve  as  their  faces  did  manifest,  and  they  so  far 
oppressed those  parts, wherein  they lived, that the abler sort of  people 
there were not able longer to mainteyne the same5."  Cloth-makers, who 
kept  their  looms running,  only  paid  the weavers  Is. a  week  in  1622; 
and, even under these conditions, the work was  carried on at a loss, since 
in  some  districts  cloth  was  "almost  valueless6."  Bankruptcies  were 
multiplying, while  the rate of  interest was  higher than it had been for 
a  number  of  years. 
The prevalent  impression, that the crisis was  due to a  "scarcity  of 
coin,"  was  one of  those facile explanations, dependent on the taking of 
the symbol for the thing itself.  The credit system of  the country was 
not sufficiently developed to produce a panic through any abuse of credit- 
instruments.  There  was  no  debasement  of  the  currency;  and,  even 
State  Papers,  Domestic,  James  I.,  cx~x.  139;  Calendar,  1619-23,  p.  211; 
Journals  of  the  House  of  Commons,  I.  p.  527. 
Proceedings of  the House of  Commons in 1621, Oxford, 1766, 11. p.  139; Causes 
of Decay of  Trade amongst English Merchants,  Add.  MS. 34,324  ff.,  191-5. 
3  Several1  Grievances concerning Trade presented  to King James I., by Sir R. 
Heath,  May  28,  1624: Harl.  MS.  2,244,  f.  1. 
*  Tom Tell-Troath:  Or a free  Discourse touching the Manners of the Time [?1622], in 
Harleian  Miscellany  (1746), 11. p.  407; State  Papers, Domestic, James I., cxxrr. 41; 
cxxv~rr.  50; C'alendar, 1619-23,  pp.  278, 358. 
6  State  Papers,  Domestic,  James I., cxxx. 61; cxxx~.  4:  printed  in A  Dismal 
Depression  in 1622,  by It.  H. Clutterbuck  [1883], pp.  9, 11. 
6  State  Papers,  Domestic,  James  I., cxxvrrr. 49 (1)  ;  cxxx. 81 ;  Calendar, 1619- 
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though a temporary scarcity of  the precious metals may have occasioned 
some inconvenience,  Europe had enough  to support  the usual  level  of 
prices.  No  doubt  in  1620 England  was  short  of  bullion;  but  this 
phenomenon was  a symptom  of  the malady rather than the true cause 
of  the distress.  Not  only had the activity of  trade been checked, but, 
through special circumstances, the balance of  indebtedness  had turned 
against  England  in foreign  trade.  The enterprize of  the Dutch  and 
their  determination  to secure  an  entrance  into  various  branches  of 
commerce  by  armed  interference,  where  force  could  be  used  without 
straining international relations-as  for instance at the whaling grounds 
or in the East Indies-meant  a  necessary  arrest  of  the expansion  of 
exports.  The resulting  tendency  towards  depression  applied  only to 
the newer  branches of  commerce, but a much graver decline in English 
prosperity arose partly from another side of  the same competition, partly 
from  the hazardous  manipulation  of  the cloth  trade by James I.  No 
industrial measure in the beginning of  the seventeenth century was more 
disastrous  in its immediate effects than that aimed  at the foundation 
of  the dyeing and finishing of cloth in England by the privileges granted 
to the New  Merchant  Adventurers.  This movement  had  a  plausible 
justification,  as  an  effort  to remedy  the decline in  the production  of 
cloth, which had already  begun  to show  itself  to a  moderate  amount. 
The English  cloth-making trade had gained  through  the wars on the 
Continent;  and, with the recovery of  the Low Countries after peace was 
made, some falling off  was  to be expected.  As suggested in a previous 
chapter1, it would  have been worth making the experiment of  granting 
a patent for the introduction of  dyeing, as a new trade, for a  term  of 
years.  Unfortunately,  the financial necessities of  James I. enabled  the 
promoters of  the New  Merchant  Adventurers company to obtain  such 
privileges  that the whole  trade was  dislocated. 
It might be expected  that, if  a  crisis were  to come,  it would  hav 
arisen when the industry was disorganized, not after the dyeing privileges 
had been  recalled.  As a matter of  fact, during  the brief  period  that 
this  grant  had  been  in  operation,  so  much  injury  was  done,  that it 
required  many  years  to recover  the ground  that had  been  lost.  The 
Dutch began  to make unfinished cloth, and in 1617 it was  discovered 
that they had  succeeded in establishing the industry  on  a  firm  basis.  , 
This meant more than might be anticipated, unless due weight be given 
to the importance of the export of cloth in the foreign trade of  England. 
In spite of  the progress made in the East India and American  ventures, 
the shipping of  cloth remained  at this period by far the largest part of 
the exports, and the falling off in 1620 was remarkable.  The Merchant 
1  Vide mpra, p. 143. 
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Adventurers were  selling about  one-half  of  the amount they had been 
able to dispose of  abroad in  1612-3,  and the Eastland  company little 
more than one-third.  The loss in value, annually, was  upwards of  half 
a  million  in  the  exports  of  these  two  organizations  alone,  or  nearly 
25 per  cent.  of  the total amount sent abroad  in a year  of  good trade 
such as  1613l.  If  there be  added the further losses  elsewhere to this 
decline in the exports to the Baltic, the whole decrease must have been 
very great, especially in its ratio to the total volume of  goods sent abroad. 
The depression extended  to other  textile  trades,  and,  at Manchester, 
there were 853 ~ieces  of  friezes, cottons and bays at  the Hall which could 
not be sold, while it was reported that "  there was a far greater quantity 
of  cloth of  these  sorts lying in the country ready to be  sent up, if  the 
market  were  not  so  bad2."  The  responsibility  for  this  loss  is  to be 
attributed mainly  to the disturbance of  the trade from  1613 to 1617, 
but also, in  part, to the manner in which the old company of  Merchant 
Adventurers was re-established.  The members had to pay some &70,000 
in bribes to secure a  new charter;  and those, who provided the money, 
recouped  themselves by  a  tax or  imposition  deducted  from  the  price 
offered  to the clothiers.  I11  an over-stocked  market,  this meant  that 
the nett sum, received  by  the manufacturer,  was  reduced, first by  the 
competition  at home and that further he had to bear this deduction in 
order  to make  a  sale. 
The period, that elapsed between the dislocation of the cloth industry 
and the crisis, is a striking testimony of  the soundness and prosperity of 
commerce in other directions.  There was, however, another cause which 
aided in delaying the crisis.  England was a creditor-country in relation 
to Holland, and the repayments of  the capital, advanced by Elizabeth 
(under the agreement of  1609), did much towards reducing the adverse 
trade balance  as between  the visible exports and imports.  When these 
repayments  came to an end, the full force of  the decline in the cloth 
trade was  experienced, with the result of  the foreign exchanges being at 
a discount and the export of  bullion3. 
While the main  cause  of  the crisis of  1620 is  to be  found  in  the 
decline of  the cloth trade, in so  far as that decline was itself  the effect 
of the financial exigencies of James I., of  his extravagance and his desire 
l  State  Papers,  Domestic,  James  I.,  cxv.  109;  Calendar,  1619-23,  p.  157; 
Proceedings  of  the  House  of  Commons  in  1621,  I.  p.  204;  Several1  Grievances 
concerning  Trade presented  to King  James  I.,  by Sir  R. Heath,  May  28,  1624: 
Harl.  MS.  2,244, f.  1.  .  . 
State Papers, Domestic, James I., cxxvr~~.  74;  printed  in A Dismal  Depression 
in 1622, by R. H. Clutterhuck [1883], pp. 9, 10. 
The Maintenance of F~ee  Trade according to the three essential2 Pa~ts  of TraJique, 
by Gerard  de Malynes,  1622, p.  9 et  sey. ; Center of  the  Circle of  Cbmmerce,  1623, 
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to make gifts to his  courtiers either in money or in kind, the same evil 
resulted in other burdens on trade which aggravated the depressioa.  In 
many directions new impositions had been levied, which meant an increase 
in  the cost of  both for the foreign and the home markets. 
The rise ia English  Customs was  a contributing cause to the diversion 
of  a great carrying trade to the Dutch.  In the latter part of  the reign 
of  Elizabeth, her subjects possessed  so much of  the gains from shipping 
between  European  countries,  that it had  excited  the  jealousy  of  the 
Spaniards1.  By 1621  there had been a great reduction in the number of 
English ships trading to the Baltic2; and, after allowing for the tonnage 
employed in the East India and  American  voyages, it seems probable 
that this industry was  certainly not expanding.  Moreover, in addition 
to the new taxes on trade, there were many indirect burdens, all traceable 
to the necessities of  the Crown  or to the efforts made  by  James I. to 
reward  his favourites.  When the debt had  become unmanageable and 
credit all but exhausted, James granted numerous patents, by which he 
delegated certain administrative functions  of the  government to  individuals, 
such for instance as the patent for the supervising of  ale-houses, which 
occupied much of  the attention of  Parliament in 1621.  Then again the 
obtaining of  a royal charter involved the bribing of  prominent courtiers, 
and in this way trade was subject to a high indirect taxation, since those 
who  obtained such grants were  forced to recoup themselves for the pre- 
liminary outlay.  In some cases too the facility with which warrants were 
obtainable for the imprisonment  of  persons,  who  were  alleged  to have 
infringed  some grant, or who  refused to pay the agents of  the patentee 
the sums demanded for real or imaginary infringements, constituted yet 
another  strain  upon  the industry  of  the country. 
Still the burdens  of  the home-trade were  contributory to the crisis, 
rather  as  impairing  the  elasticity,  it would  otherwise  have  had,  in 
recovering from the shock of  the interference with the cloth trade.  The%- 
fore, primarily, the crisis which began in 1620 was one, occasioned by that 
interference,  and which  manifested  itself  in  an adverse balance  of  in- 
debtedness abroad.  These facts account for the  contemporary descriptions 
of  the period  of  depression.  The farmer depended so much on the sale 
of his wool, that a great reduction in consumption would necessarily affect 
him.  Owing to a number of good seasons, the price of  grain up to 1621 
was  relatively low,  while  the  importation  of  cattle from  Ireland had 
reduced the price  of  stock.  For these reasons  it is natural that many 
farmers were unable to pay their rents, and they were obliged to surrender 
their leases.  The interaction  of  depression, bbth in agriculture and in 
1 Calendar  of  State  Papers ...  in the  Archives  of  Simancm,  1580-6,  pp.  651, 652 
quoted  supra, p.  88). 
2  State Papers, Domestic, James I., cx~x.  142; C'alendar, 1619-23,  p. 211. 
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the weaving industry, occasioned  much  distress  in the rural and semi- 
rural  districts.  So much  of  the export trade was  engaged  in dealing 
with  cloth  that merchants,  whose  business  was  mainly  with  European 
markets, also suffered.  Nor was  any immediate relief  experienced from 
the voyages to more distant countries.  In Russia, in the Levant, in the 
Indies and even in the northern seas, the Dutch were everywhere pressing 
the advantages  they had  begun  to obtain.  The losses in  these  trades 
and the postponement  of  the interest  on  their loans by the Russia and 
East India companies injured mercantile credit1, and the stringency was 
accentuated by  the state of  the Crown debt.  In September  1616 the 
debt  had  been  returned  at 2726,000,  while  in  1620 it was  stated to 
have been 2711,026. Is. Yid.,  exclusive of  sums due, not certified, which 
were owing by the ~ublic  offices, or close on 2800,000 in all2.  Reductions 
had been  made in the Ordinary Expenditure to the extent of  &100,000 
a year  in the Household, and of  225,000 in the Navy3, while there was 
an estimated surplus of  &47,500, without taking extraordinary expenses 
into account.  Such a statement, however, does not show more than the 
financial position  from  the accountant's  point  of  view.  The reduction 
of the extraordinary expenses had been effected by substituting the grant 
of  privileges for money payments, and the burden of  the latter was the 
greater, when  allowance is made for the arbitrary proceedings of  some 
of  the patentees.  Then, as afl'ecting  credit in the City, there were the 
anticipations of future revenue, which,about 1619,  amounted to2117,00O4. 
Moreover, the method of  dealing with the debt was most unsatisfactory. 
At Michaelmas  1620,  out  of  699,990,  borrowed  on  Privy  Seals  by 
Elizabeth, only 2385 had been paid.  The carrying on of this debt from 
year to year was discreditable, in view of the large sums of the Elizabethan 
loan to Holland which had recently been received by James I.  Payments 
of  interest,  at the best,  were  highly  irregular.  London  had  provided 
2117,098. 9s.  8d.  on  Privy Seals, to which was  added a further loan of 
296,466.13s. 4d. at interest in 1618.  In 1620 two-thirds of the interest 
was  still unpaid;  while  at the same  time  several individuals,  who  had 
made  advances  in  1616, had  received  neither  principal  nor  interest6. 
The credit of  the Crown  had become exceedingly bad.  In 1619 it was 
necessary to postpone the funeral of  the Qucen  through want of  ready 
money.  Payments by  the Royal Household had grown so irregular and 
Vide influ, 11. pp. 55, 58, 107. 
'  State  Papers,  Domestic,  James  I.,  CXI 142;  oxv.  115;  Calendar,  1619-23, 
PP.  110,  168. 
Proceedings of  the House of Commons in 1621,  I. p.  7. 
State Papers, Domestic, James I., CXI.  142. 
Collection of His  Majesty's  debts ...  at Mich.  1620: Exchequer  of Receipt 
(Miscellanea),  43 (3)  ;  Analgtiml fnderes  to  vols.  11. and v111 fl...  the Remembran&, 
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were  so long delayed that tradesmen were in the habit of  charging the 
King  double  the usual  prices  for goods  supplied  to him1. 
When Parliament met in  January 1621, two great questions  were 
agitating  the public  mind.  There was  a  widespread desire that help 
should be afforded to the Protestants in Germany, whose ~osition  was 
precarious  after  the battle  of  Prague,  which had been  fought  on  the 
29th of  October 1620.  If  British aid were  to be given, in addition to 
the volunteers who  had already been  enrolled and the money raised by 
voluntary  subscription,  it would  be  necessary  for  Parliament  to vote 
supplies,  and  advantage  was  taken  of  the  opportunity  to  attempt 
legislation, that would  remedy  the prevalent  depression. 
It is necessary to bear in mind, not only the fact that the Parliament 
of  1621 endeavoured to stem a  crisis by its enactments, but also that, 
since the cause was believed to be the "  scarcity of  coin,"  all efforts were 
directed  towards the attraction  of  bullion  and the retaining of  it in 
England.  The committee "concerning the decay of trade,"  the chairman 
of  which  was  Sir Edwin  Sandys, reported  that exports to Spain were 
paid for by importing tobacco  to the value of  £100,000  a year, and it 
was  recommended that, in future, no tobacco should be imported except 
from Virginia and the Bermudas, but that it should be a condition that 
it must not be  sold at a price exceeding 8s. per lb.'  The effect of  the 
proposed  measure would  be,  not to prevent  the drain  of  bullion  from 
England, but, so far, to divert it from a foreign country to the planta- 
tions.  At the same time, when it is recognized that Sandys had framed 
a scheme for a most comprehensive tobacco monopoly of  which he himself 
was  to be  the director3, it is difficult to accept  the proposals  of  the 
committee  as being entirely honest.  It might  indeed be thought that 
this scheme was  conceived with an Imperial instinct;  but, unfortunately, 
there are other suggestions that show a  complete disregard of  motives 
of  this kind.  About a quarter of a million a year was said to be paid in 
cash to Ireland for cattle, imported thence, and a bill was promotedfor 
the prohibition of  such importation under heavy penalties4.  Steps were 
also considered for reducing the imports from Scotland, with  the same 
object  of  keeping  bullion  in  England. 
The movement to exclude Irish cattle was  framed in the interest of 
agriculturalists;  while the proposal, to prevent the exportation of  wool, 
was designed to assist the cloth trade.  Then the spirit, that had already 
shown itself  in  a previous period  of  depression, was  manifested  in the 
State Papers,  Domestic,  James I., cvn.  54; A  Dismal  Deprssion in 1622, by 
R.  H.  Clutterbuck  [1883],  pp.  5,  6. 
2  Proceedings  of the House of Commons in 1621, I. p. 239. 
3  Vide infra, 11.  pp. 276-8. 
4  Proceedings  of the House of Commons in 1621, I. p. 97. 
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efforts of the mercantile class to secure special legislation1, as for instance 
that no shop-keeper in London might engage in foreign trade, and that 
alien merchants should not be allowed to trade in England2. 
Another side of  the investigation  brought  up  the question  of  the 
monopolies.  The attention of  the House of  Commons was  re-directed 
to this subject,  in  connection  with  the scarcity  of  coin.  One  of  the 
main causes of the dearth was  supposed to be the consumption of bullion 
by the patentees for making gold and silver thread, who were bound to 
import the precious metals they required, but who were believed to have 
failed  to do  so.  Immediately  numerous  abuses  came  to light;  and, 
during the whole of the Parliament, there was  a continuous investigation 
of  the grievances that had arisen. 
There were  two classes of  grants which were  subjected  to criticism. 
First  patents such  as  those  for  registration of  inns  and ale-houses, of 
pedlars  and  itinerant  musicians, for  the  recovery  of  concealed  tithes 
or Crown lands,  as well as many  others  of  a  like nature, involved the 
delegation  of  certain  functions  of  the administration  to individuals. 
The theory,  underlying these grants, appears to have been  that, when 
a "projector"  discovered some means by which either the Crown revenue 
might  be  augmented  or certain  abuses  reformed,  he  was  entitled to a 
remuneration  which  was  provided,  in the one  case, by  a  percentage on 
the amount he added to the revenue, or, in  the other, by a fee  for his 
services in registering and supervising certain classes of  the population 
that required, or were supposed to require, to be controlled.  Several of 
these patents were justifiable  in theory, as is shown by the endorsement 
of  the grant for the licensing of  inns by some members of  the House of 
Commons in 16213.  It was the mode of  execution, which has given the 
word  monopoly an evil reputation, that is scarcely yet forgotten.  The 
carrying out of the patents for the regulation of  inns and ale-houses had 
occasioned a great amount of  scandal.  There was  no limitation to the 
fees that the patentees could charge, and a system grew up by which the 
work  to be undertaken, together with the prospective profit, was  farmed 
out for  certain  areas.  Thus,  the powers,  delegated  to the  patentees, 
were  again  delegated  to others  in return  for  an immediate payment. 
Moreover,  these  sub-licenses were  only  obtainable,  in certain  cases,  by 
bribing an individual patentee to use  his  influence,  in  favour  of  those 
who  had  secured his  support in  this way4.  Therefore, it followed that 
the men,  who  were  the actllal collectors of  the fee,  were  compelled in 
their own  interests  to increase rather than to diminish  the number  of 
licenses, so that the disorders, which the patents were designed to reform, 
Vide supra,  p. 124. 
Proceedings  of  the House of Commons in 1621, I. p. 237 ;  11. p. 192. 
Ibid., I. p. 64.  Ibid., I. p. 84. Industrial  Monopolies  1621 
were  increased, not  lessened1.  Moreover, the agents of  the patentees 
received  large powers for dealing with those who  refused to pay the fee, 
and, in 1621, 1,000 persons had been outlawed upon this charge2. 
The industrial patents were  not numerous.  As a rule the grant, at 
its inception, was defensible, either in the modern sense of  a new invention 
or of  a trade which, as introduced from abroad, was  new in England or 
again (though this was  disputed) as an industry, which was  new in the 
sense that it had been previously started, but had died out before it had 
been re-established  by the patentees.  In several cases, abuses crept in, 
first, through the privileged  persons  being the "  inventors "  in the fore- 
going sense, not of  a distinct trade, but of  some process.  For instance, 
two of  the grants related to the making of glass and the smelting of iron, 
by coal, instead of  by wood as had been the practice previously.  111 the 
case of  the patented process for glass-making, the importation of  foreign 
glass  was prohibited, and in other ways  the tendency  was  for the whole 
industry to fall under the control of those who were originally intended to 
develope a  new  process3.  Two methods were  adopted  for diminishing 
the consumption of  wood in glass-houses.  In the one group of  cases, the 
proprietors  received a  pension, on  condition  that they  would  cease  to 
manufacture.  In this way Sir Jerome Bowes, who held a patent granted 
in  1606, was  to obtain dC1,000  a year, and three others, amongst them, 
2450%  The other plan was to interdict the owner of  an existing glass- 
house, and then license him  to re-commence work, on condition that he 
paid  a  royalty  to the patentees.  In one  instance,  an  agreement  was 
produced, where the royalty was 124 per cent.5  It is surprising, although 
the patentees had by these means acquired the control of the whole glass 
industry,  that prices  were  not higher.  They  had  the sole  right both 
to import and to export, while any glass works, owned by  independent 
manufacturers,  were  forced  to pay  them  a  royalty.  Apart from  the 
monopoly, some rise  in price  was  inevitable  if  the undertaking  was  to 
pay its way.  The original outlay was  25,000, but when  men  like th'e 
Earl of  Montgomery  and  Sir Robert Mansell  were  admitted into the 
partnership in 1615, they became entitled to a share of  the prospective 
profits.  It is doubtful if  they o aid  anything; their influence at Court 
being regarded as a contribution to the capital.  But, the first promoters 
would  expect  at  least  reasonable  interest  on  their  investment,  and  , 
therefore the assumption of  the new  partners would have the same effect 
towards a need for increasing profits as the "watering"  of  the stock of 
1 Proceedings  of the House of Commons in 1621, I. p. 79. 
2  Ibid., I. p. 150.  3  State Papers, Proclamations, James I., No. 42. 
State Papers, Domestic, James I., ~xxv.  9 ; Calendar, 1611-8, p. 207 ;  Proceed- 
ings of the House of Commolzs in 1621, 11.  p. 72. 
5  Proceedings of the House of Commons in 1621, 11.  pp. 71, 72. 
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a company.  Besides, although the pensions to glass-makers were payable 
in the first instance by  the Exchequer,  the burden  of  them  must  fall 
eventually on the industry.  In view of  these outgoings, the rise in the 
price of  glass was moderate; since glass, sold in cases, was dearer by not 
more than 30 per cent., while looking-glasses were sold at less than those 
that had formerly been imported, though there was a conflict of  evidence 
as to the quality of  the English mirrors.  It is interesting to notice the 
certificate  of  Inigo Jones in this connection, from which it appears that 
James  I. had to pay g150 a year more for the glass, used in the Royal 
Palaces, than had been usual before the patent1. 
It is plain  that the abuse  in  the patent  for glass  was  not in  the 
principle  of  the  protection  of  a  new  invention,  but  in  the  further 
privileges, that were  accorded to make the protection effective.  In this 
respect  the mistake,  already made in  the cloth  industry, was  repeated; 
and, in order to effect an improvement, the trade, already in existence, 
was  endangered.  It is to the credit of  the patentees that they enforced 
their monopoly by moral suasion, rather than by  physical compulsion. 
Only one case of the imprisonment of a person, who infringed the patent, 
is reported;  and, on the matter coming to the notice of  the partners, he 
was  at once released2. 
There were other instances where patentees showed less consideration. 
Attention was  directed towards the execution of  grants for the erection 
of  certain lighthouses.  These were  of  the nature of  a local monopoly, 
such as the toll for the use  of  a  bridge,  or for  entrance  of  a  market. 
Trinity House was  unable to erect a sufficient number of  beacons;  and 
persons, who took the risk, reimbursed themselves by  a charge of a small 
sum on the tonnage of  ships that passed  the place where the light was 
placed.  The charge, against the owners of  the lighthouse at  Dunge Ness, 
was that Trinity House had approved of  the building, on condition that 
it should be of  stone and that the charge was to be Id. per ton, whereas 
the patentee charged Rd. per ton for supplying an arrangement of lanterns, 
suspended  from  masts.  Somewhat  different  complaints  were  made 
against the owners of  the light at Winterton Ness.  It was  stated that 
the outlay of  the patentee had been  only 2600, and the cost of  upkeep 
was  2130 a year, whereas he received 21,500 a year from the owners of 
vessels,  sailing  from  Newcastle  to London.  In defence  of  the action 
of  the patentee, it was  urged  that the cost of  obtaining his grant and 
of  building the lighthouse was  &6,000 with  an annual charge of  2300 
a year.  This would give a return  of  20 per cent. or double the rate of 
interest  on good  security.  Considering the risk, this was no more than 
l  Proceedings  of the  House  of  Commons in 1621, 11.  p. 73.  A careful account of 
the glass patent is given in English Patents of Monopoly, by W.  Hyde Price, pp. 71-7. 
a  Proceedings  ofthe House of Commons in 1621, 11.  p. 40. Arbitrary  Acts  of  Patentees  1621  [CHAP.  IX. 
a  moderate yield  on the investment,  but  what  is  really  instructive,  is 
that, assuming the figures are even approximately correct, an altogether 
disproportionate amount was  paid for the obtaining of  the patent.  This 
was  where  the real  grievance lay;  since in this, as in other  cases,  the 
sums payable  to influential  persons at Court by  those who  sought for 
grants,  constituted  a  great drain  on  industry'.  In some respects  the 
patent granted to George Wood is of interest.  This grant was intended 
to encourage an invention for the printing of linen, and in it £10  a year 
was reserved to the Crown, while 2200 a year was payable to those, who 
had been  influential  in  procuring the privilege.  As in other cases, the 
price of  linen advanced, and so-called ''  infringers " were imprisoned.  It 
is recorded that Wood sold shares in  his  monopoly  "for  Rs.,  3s.,  5s., 
lOs., 40s.  or anything he  could get,"  while the purchasers again sold to 
others2.  This was  an anticipation of  the methods of  promoters during 
the boom from 169%  to 1695, when the procedure adopted was described 
in similar terms3. 
In the execution  of  the patent for bringing live fish to the London 
market  from  Ireland, there were  several kinds of  interference  with  the 
personal rights of  individuals.  The agents of  the patentees  were  said 
to have  intercepted  fishermen  at sea and to have seized  forcibly their 
catch.  Like the partners in the glass  monopoly, they  interfered  with 
the industry, already in  existence, by compelling the long-shoremen to 
sell them lobsters at  g4  a hundred, for which they obtained 26 a hundred. 
Charges were  made of  their breaking open houses to search for lobsters 
and  of  imprisoning  those  who  were  alleged  to  have  contravened  the 
patent4. 
These abuses, serious as they were  in interfering  with  the personal 
liberty of  the subject, were  quite negligible, as compared with the mal- 
practices  of  the patentees for  making gold  and silver thread.  It  was 
the existence of  this grant which, from its alleged tendency to increase 
the scarcity of  coin by consun~ing  bullion, first re-awakened the interest 
of  the House of  Commons in the monopolies.  As far back as the reign 
of  Elizabeth  there had been a patent for this industry, which was con- 
sidered deserving  of  encouragement  in  order  to  provide  employment. 
Accounts  differ  as to whether  the trade had died out early in the reign 
of  Jaines I., and, according to one statement, it was  necessary to import 
a  foreigner  to teach  the  art.  In  1611 a  patent  was  granted, which 
1  Proceedings  of the House of Commons in 1621, I. pp. 268, 269. 
The  Pavticulur  Grievances  of  those ...  which  dye  under  the  oppressions  of  George 
Wood's  Patent  for  the  sole  printing  of  linnen  cloth  [1624], Coll. Broadsides,  Soc. 
Antiq., No. 222. 
3  Vide infra, Chapter XVII. 
4  Proceedings  of the Howe of Commons in 1621, I. p.  295. 
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continued  in  existence  for  some  years  and  which  was  renewed  with 
extended powers in  1616.  As yet, the industry was  the ordinary case 
of  a  new  invention;  and,  since the art was  easily  learned,  there  were 
many  infringements,  with  the result  that the patentees had not been 
successful.  In 1618 Sir Giles Mompesson forxriulated a scheme, according 
to which  the manufacture was  to be transferred to the Crown as a royal 
monopoly, in  the expectation that James I. would  receive a  profit  of 
&'10,000  a  year,  while  the patentees  were  to be  compensated by  the 
grant  of  moderate  pensions. 
The gold-thread  industry, as a  royal monopoly, was conducted with 
a reckless disregard of the most rudimentary commercial morality.  The 
silver and the silk were "  sophisticated " shamelessly.  Lead  or quick- 
silver was  mixed with the silver;  and a workma~i  was  brought from Italy, 
who could dye silk "with an advantage of  weight,"  whereby an addition 
of  one-third  was  made1.  When  it  is  remembered  that  the  thread 
produced  was  sold  by  weight,  the dishonesty  of  this  course  will  be 
apparent.  The  ordinary  modus  operandi  was  simplicity  itself.  The 
artizans  were  bound  to produce  a  certain  amount  each  week,  neither 
more nor less, and they were forced to pay nearly 60 per cent. of  their 
earnings to the Commissioners, who were appointed to supervise them2. 
The effect of  these methods was  to increase the quantity of  thread, 
made by persons who infringed the monopoly, and the harshest measures 
were  adopted to force them either to cease work  or to bind themselves 
to the Commissioners.  It was  shown that Mompesson threatened wire- 
workers,  who  withstood  him,  that he  "would  fill  all  the  prisons  of 
London with them and that they would rot there3."  Sir Edward Villiers 
used  similar language4, and this was  surpassed by  the brutality  of  the 
agents, one of whom, in addition to arresting-a  workman, threatened "to 
pull the flesh from his jaws and to starve his wife and children5."  The 
depositions of  the wire-drawers before the House of  1,ords show  that 
these were  no  mere empty threats:  great violence was  used  in making 
arrests;  and those seized, often only on suspicion, were detained in prison 
for long periods6. 
The fact that the so-called gold and silver thread patent was  a royal 
monopoly, made it more difficult for Parliament to  prevent similar abuses 
in the future.  The blame was  of  course laid upon Mompesson and the 
other active commissioners, and a part of  it fell on the law officers,  who 
l  Proceedings of the Hwe  of Cornmm in 1621, I. p.  128. 
Bid., I. p.  125.  a  Ibid., I. p.  126.  4  Ibid., I. p.  166. 
Notes of Debates in the House  of Lords,  taken by Henry Elsing, 1621 (Camden 
Soc. 1870), p.  141. 
B These depositions are ~rillted  in Notes of Debates in the Home of  Lords, ut srcpra, 
Appendix 11. 
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Lad  approved  of  the  issue  of  the  warrants  for  imprisonment  of 
infringers. 
It was  felt that, though  under the pressure of  Parliament James I. 
might be  induced to recall  most  of  the patents, as he had done before, 
some step should be taken, which would  prevent the recurrence of  the 
most gross abuses.  Before the end of the session, out of  nineteen grants 
that had been condemned, thirteen had been "  decried "  by proclamation, 
leaving  the glass and lobster patents, those for the two lighthouses and 
a pair for the sole drawing of  bills of  pleading in different districts, still 
in being1.  The method adopted by the House of  Commons was to pro- 
ceed by a bill "  against monopolies,"  which measure began by stating in 
general terms that many grants, obtained by false pretenas of  advantages 
to the public,  had  occasioned  great grievances and inconvenience.  It 
was therefore proposed to be enacted that any privileges of a  monopolistic 
nature, either already granted or to be granted in the future, should be 
void  and subject to trial at common law.  There were however several 
important exceptions.  A proviso was inserted to  legalize the sole working 
of  "  any manner  of  new  manufacture within this realm,"  for a period of 
21 years or l4  years.  Moreover, the measure was  not to be construed 
as diminishing the privileges of  any city or borough, nor was it to apply 
"  to the corporations, companies or  societies of  merchants2."  This bill 
did not become law in 1621; but in  the next  parliament,  in  1624, it 
passed  both  Houses  after  a  number  of  additional  provisos  had  ben 
inserted by  the Lords.  The act,  as  revised, fixed  the period,  during 
which a new invention was to be protected, at 14  years;  and it excepted, 
in addition to the provisos of  the bill, any grants confirmed by act of 
Parliament, the powder, ordnance and printing industries,  alum  mines 
(which were to remain a royal monopoly), the privileges of  the Hostmen 
of  Newcastle, the glass patent, as well as another for the transportation 
of calf-skins, and the grant for the making of  smalt, also that to Dudley 
for smelting iron with coal3. 
There was  nothing in this act that had not been  long  recognized 
as what  should  be  the practice  in  England;  indeed,  in some respects, 
as for instance in  excluding from its provisions the trading companies, 
it was  more moderate than might have been expected.  In the interval 
between 1604 and 1624 there had been a considerable change in public  , 
opinion, which  at the later date had returned more to the attitude of 
l  Proceedings oJthe House  of  Commons in 1621,  11.  pp. 347, 348. 
9  Printed  in Notes of Debates in the House of Lords, 1621, pp.  151-5. 
3  Statutes,  rv.  pp.  1212-14;  The Institutes  of  the  Laws  of  Englbnd,  by Edward 
Coke, London, 1797, VI.  pp. 182-4-with  reference to Dudley's invention vide infra, 
11.  pp. 464, 465. 
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statesmen in the reign of  Elizabeth'.  Companies for foreign trade were 
generally admitted to require extensive immunities, since they performed 
functions which the State was not able to undertake.  At the same time, 
it is to be noted that the existing bodies were far from escaping criticism, 
but this was  directed, not (as in 1604) to their  being  endowed  with a 
monopoly, but in relation to  certain features in the individual organization 
of  each company.  In accordance with the dominant idea of  the Parlia- 
ment of 1621, the East India company was charged with being responsible 
for the decline in the stock of  bullion i11  the country, but it was able to 
provide a  fairly satisfactory  answer.  In fact  the only complaint, that 
could have been fairly made from this point of  view, was that the capital 
lately invested in the undertaking was in danger of being lost, and so an 
unprofitable foreign investment was  to be  added to the other causes of 
the crisis as  an element  in  the adverse balance  of  indebtedness2. 
The  African  company  was  mentioned  in  the House of  Commons, 
both in 1621 and 1624.  By the proviso in favour of  con~panies  in the 
bill  and  the act against  monopolies, it should  have been  exempt from 
the scope of  these measures.  In this case there was a distinct peculiarity, 
which  however was  not mentioned in the proceedings.  There had been 
two ~revious  African  companies and therefore  the rnonopoly could not 
be justified as the discovery of a new trade.  But, according to Elizabethan 
practice,  it was  recognized  that,  either  re-discovery,  or  the  effective 
prosecution  of  a  branch  of  foreign  trade was  a  sufficient ground  for 
exceptional privileges.  This was  covered by the clause in early grarits, 
which  stated that certain places  had "not been commoilly frequented" 
by  English  merchants.  Still,  there was  the great  irregularity in  the 
patent,  granted by  James I., that it gave  the monopoly  of  the whole 
explored  African  coast,  whereas  the previous grant of  Elizabeth  had 
limited the area of  the privileges  to the district  between  the Senegal 
and  the Gambia3. 
The affairs of  the Russia company came before the House of  Lords 
solely in relation to its methods of  finance.  These intricate proceedings 
are detailed in the full account of  the company4,  and they are of  interest. 
chiefly, as showing the risks to which owners of  capital were sometimes 
subjected, through  the joint-stock  form  of  organization.  When  this 
body  co-operated  with  the East  India  company,  in  forming  a  sub- 
ordinate  undertaking  for  whaling,  it had  raised  the  capital  required 
by  contracting  loans  on  the  security  of  its  property  and  privileges. 
I  Consuetudo, vel Lez  Mercatoria,  by Gerard  de Malynes,  1622,  pp.  210,  217; 
TT&  or  the  Means  to  make  Trade  FIwish  [by E.  Misseldenl,  1622,  pp. 
66-84. 
ride infru, 11.  pp. 105, 106. 
Ibid.,  11. pp. 12, 13.  4  Ibid.,  11.  pp. 57-65. 
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Thus,  the position  of  those  who  found the capital, was  allalogous to 
that of the modern debenture-holder.  About 1620 the company sustained 
many misfortunes.  The joint-adventure  in  whaling  was  a failure,  and 
the Russian trade had declined.  There were not sufficient funds to pay 
interest on the debt, but, considering the large divisions paid from 1608 
to  1615, even  after  an  assessment  had  been  made  on  the stock,  the 
proprietors still retained substantial gains.  Unfortunately the company 
endeavoured  to evade its obligations.  The old  stock  was  wouild  up, 
and a  new  one  formed,  which  contracted  to pay  a  large  sum  for the 
assets transferred.  Then two separate companies were established-the 
one for whaling and the other for the original  trade to Russia.  The 
result  was  that  those,  who  were  endeavouring  to recover  arrears  of 
interest, were refused by each of  the three bodies on whom the liability 
might rest.  Not only so but an order of  the Lords was evaded by what 
was characterized as "gross juggling"  in the accounts1. 
The depression was greatly accentuated by the appearance of  plague 
in 1625.  During four weeks in August, the deaths in London numbered 
16,455; and, during the year, the total assigned to  this cause was 35,417. 
Moreover, the  mortality,  attributed to other  diseases, was  more  than 
double  the  average,  so  that  it is  probable  that  the  ravages  of  the 
pestilence  were  even  greater than  those  shown  by  the returns2.  The 
distress  following  the  interruption  of  trade  was  accentuated  by  bad 
seasons.  The harvests in 1622 and 1623 were below the recent average. 
In a time of  good trade, the consequent  moderate  rise  in the price  of 
grain  would  not  have  been  greatly  felt;  but,  when  work  was  scarce 
and wages low, the effect was  to increase the prevailing  distress of  the 
working classes.  The cloth trade was  still in a stagnant state, and in 
1624 no less than 12,000 weavers were out of  work3.  The continuance 
of  the crisis had concentrated attention on  the industrial  condition  of 
the country;  and,  when  Parliament  met  in  1624, much  juster  views 
had  been  formed  than  in  1621 of  the causes  of  the depression.  The 
more clear-sighted  began  to recognize the true cause of  the crisis.  It 
was  seen that the great decline in  trade was  in  the woollen  industry, 
where the loss in the reduced price of  wool alone was estimated to amount 
to half-a-million  a year"  Moreover, the "new  inlpositions " continued 
to increase to such an extent that it was declared that, if they continued,  , 
they  would  "tend  to the utter destruction  of  the kingdom?."  It was 
Vide infra, 11.  p.  60. 
NaturaL and Political  Ohservatio  W...  upon the  Bills of  Mortality,  by Capt. John 
Graunt, London,  1665, p.  174 ;  Lo~zdon's  Lord have Mercy upon  Us, 1665, in Somers' 
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not only the very high Customs that were  oppressive;  but in addition, 
through the prevailing laxity of  the administration,  the farmers  were 
exacting sums over and above those recorded in the book of  rates.  It 
follows  that taxes  on  commodities,  in  certain  cases,  were  immensely 
high.  The merchant  had  to pay  the  original  and  statutory duties; 
these had  been  augmented by the new and additional impositions, and 
it might  be  that he would  be  forced to disburse a further sum at the 
will of  the officials of  the custom-house.  Both the causes of  depression- 
the decline in the cloth trade and the burden of  taxes-were  to be attri- 
buted  to the financial difficulties of  James I.; who,  when  he  could no 
longer borrow, had been forced to increase the Custonls, or to allow the 
farmers to add to the duties,  while  the original  interference  with  the 
cloth  trade  had  been  undertaken  at the  instance  of  courtiers,  who 
obtained funds from  the promoters  of  the charters, at a time when the 
condition of  the Crown finances ~recluded  the royal favour being shown 
by  large gifts of  money.  Thus, some of  these men  received payments 
from the foundation  of  the New  Merchant Adventurers and again from 
the re-incorporation of  the members  of  the  old  company.  The dis- 
advantageous  effects of  the disorganization  of  the  cloth  trade  were 
lasting in the reduction  of  the total exports;  and, in the consideration 
of  the situation by  Parliament in 1624, comment  was  directed  to the 
increase  in  the dues  charged by  the Merchant  Adventurers.  A  part 
of  these was  shown  to be  attributable to higher  taxation  abroad, and 
the rest is to be  assigned to the cost  of  gaining the charter  of  1617. 
The whole discussion is of  interest as an evidence of  the state of  feeling, 
regarding the need for a  monopoly in the conduct of  a certain foreign 
trade.  It  would  appear that, by the corruption  of  the Court in 1617, 
an important  opportunity  was  lost,  since  the experiment  might  have 
been  tried  of  making  the trade  in  cloth  to the  Baltic  open  to all 
Englishmenl.  The circumstances of  the case diEered from the position 
in India or  the Levant; for, in Germany  or the Low  Countries, there 
was  a  settled  government,  which  might  have  been  expected  to afford 
protection of  life and property to the English merchants.  It is therefore 
surprising that the Parliament  of  1624 did not condemn the monopoly 
of  the company,  instead  of  contenting itself  with  passing  resolutions 
in  favour of  rendering the export of  certain new textile fabrics (which 
had  been  introduced  into  England  after  the  Adventurers  had  been 
incorporated  by  Elizabeth)  open  to the enterprize  of  merchants  who 
were  not  members  of  the organization2.  This  proposal  would  have 
l  A Discourse of Free  Trade against  Incorporated  Societies (MS.  862 G.  4. 13, 
No. 5, Lib. Trin. Coll. Dublin). 
Journals of the House  of  Comm,  I.  p.  780. The Merch,ant  Adventurers  1624  [CHAP.  IX. 
left the earlier trade in white cloths under the complete control of  the 
company. 
The judgment  of  the House  of  Commons during a period  of  crisis 
cannot be accepted as a guide to the best opinion of  the time, for it was 
often  swayed  by  the  temporary  exigency of  some  particular  interest. 
The "  decay of trade" frequently evoked demonstrations in favour of the 
mercantile  class as such.  This tendency  is  shown  in the approbation 
by this Parliament  of  the policy of  restricting  membership  of  trading 
companies to "  mere  merchants,"  and in the efforts of  that of  1621 to 
exclude tobacco  imported from  Spain in favour  of  the produce  of  the 
plantations'.  For these reasons the bonaf;de8 of the House of Commons 
cannot be accepted without further enquiry. 
In this case, there seems to be  more to be said for the continuance 
of  the monopoly  in  undressed  cloth,  than might  have  been  expected 
from  a  superficial  examination  of  the evidence.  The  State,  at this 
period,  was  not able to take efficient  steps to secure an extension  of 
the foreign market for English goods.  Permission to trade in a  foreign 
country  on  favourable  terms  was  only  obtainable  at a  certain  price. 
The  governments  there  expected  that  the aliens,  they  admitted  to 
bring  in  certain  commodities,  should  contribute  to the needs  of  the 
sovereign, by  supplying  financial  assistance  from  time  to time.  TO 
collect  capital,  when  it  was  required,  involved  some  organization. 
This  organization,  in  order  to escape  as  much  as possible from  the 
jurisdiction  of  the foreign  courts, became  responsible for  the conduct 
of  the merchants of  the country to which it belonged;  and, in return 
for its loans, relaxation  in the Customs against foreigners was  granted 
to it.  The  privileges,  secured  by  the  Merchant  Adventurers,  were 
valued  at a  large sum  in  1624*, and the problem  arose  whether  the 
right of  free entry, personal  security and low Customs abroad could be 
obtained  without  the existence of  a  body  of  this  kind.  This  is  the 
ultimate antithesis,  for there was  no  possibility  of  the company  con- 
ti~luiag  to exist,  if  there were no advantage attached to membership. 
It is clear, too, that the Adventurers  would  not be  wise  in  becoming 
responsible for  English  merchants,  over whom  they  could exercise  no 
authority,  nor  was  it equitable that non-members  should  obtain  the 
whole  benefit  of  favourable  import  duties,  which  had  in  fact  been 
purchased  by services rendered by the company.  For these reasons, it 
is  probable that an  open  trade to the Baltic would  have  meant  the 
dissolution of  the company ;  and, in  this  connection, the proposals  of 
the Adventurers,  on  several  occasions,  to surrender  their  charter  are 
significant.  Supposing, then, that the company had ceased to exist, it 
1  Vide supra, p.  172. 
Journals of the House  of  Commons, I. p. 784. 
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would  follow  that, as things were  at the beginning of  the seventeenth 
century, the privileges  it had  obtained abroad would  lapse,  for  there 
would  be  no  object  in  the  foreign  governments  continuing  them. 
English  merchants  would  then  have  imported  their  cloth  into th'e 
Low Countries and Gernlany as non-privileged, not as privileged aliens ; 
and  they  would  have  been  at a  disadvantage  in  doing  business,  in 
having  no  strong  body  behind  them  to enforce  protection  of  their 
goods or  the recovery of  debts due to them.  Moreover, an  individual 
trader,  who  dealt  fairly, would  be  always in danger  of  the seizure of 
his property, and  even sometimes of  arrest, should a fellow countryman 
have given any serious cause of  complaint.  Taking these circumstances 
into account and considering the state of  international trading relations 
at the time, it appears probable that England  would  have  lost  triore 
than would have been gained by a completely open trade to the Baltic. 
The elenient  in  the whole  situation, that pressed  most  hardly  on  the 
capitalist, was  the fact that the companies were, to some extent, made 
the scape-goats  of  the extravagance  of  the  Court.  The large  sums, 
extracted from then1 in this way, constituted a burden on the producers 
and consumers-the  former  receiving  lower prices  than  would  other- 
wise  have  been  the case  and  the latter  having  to pay  more.  The 
incidence of  an increased duty may  have  been  recognized  to some ex- 
tent, but few, if any, could have noticed the effects of  the benevolences 
and  bribes  that had  to be  paid  by  the companies, which  bodies were 
in the unfortunate position at a parliatnentar~  enquiry of  being  unable 
convelliently to adduce  in  evidence the charges  of  this character,  to 
which  they  were  subjected. 
The crisis of  1620 left its mark  to some extent on  the plantation 
companies.  In  1624  certain  regulations  made  by  Fernando  Gorges 
(who had been  granted  the tract  of  country, that afterwards  became 
the province  of  Maine,  by the New  England company1) were criticized 
by  the House  of  Commons2.  On  the other  hand,  the dissolution  of 
the Virginia  comparly in  1624 is  to be  attributed  to political  forces 
and to the dissensions of  the members.  This event  may  be  taken  as 
marking  the end  of  a  period  in  the  history  of  British  colonization. 
Two of  the plantation ventures had come to an end-the  First Virginia 
company by dissolution  and  the Second by its failure to carry out the 
objects, for which it had been  incorporated.  Both the Somers Islands 
and  the  New  England  companies  had  reached  the  stage  at which 
divisions of  land  had been  made, and already subsidiary  undertakings, 
such as  the Adventurers  to New  Plymouth  and the Laconia  company 
Vide infra, 11.  pp.  300, 304. 
Jarnab  of the House of Commons, I. pp. 688,697 ;  S~T  Fernando Gorges and  his 
Province of  Maine,  by J. B. Baxter, Boston (Prince Society), 1890, I. p. 119. Plantation  Compan,ies 1624 
were established.  Finally, the Scottish scheme for effecting a settlement 
in Canada  was  in process  of  development,  and funds were  being  pro- 
vided by the creation of  the title of  Baronet of  Nova Scotia, which  was 
added to the inducement of the division of land'. 
The most remarkable feature of  this movement was  the exceedingly 
small capital required  to found the British Empire in America.  The 
companies were responsible for providing  ships  to convey  colonists  to 
their respective  areas, for defending them when there, and for carrying 
on  the  government  of  the plantation.  Once  the  country  had  been 
surveyed,  the  shareholders  received  their  dividend  in  land,  and  the 
outlay for the cultivation  of  it was provided by the owner.  The total 
outlay by the Virginia conipany under these various heads  was said, in 
1633, to have  been  .&'200,00O2.  Probably  this  was  an  overestimate, 
and,  in  any case,  it is  to be  remembered  that only 236,862.  2s.  9d. 
was  paid in on account of shares in the joint-stock, the remainder being 
provided  by  the adventurers individually in developing their divisions 
of  land,  by  lotteries  and  by  subscriptions  to the  subsidiary  under- 
takings3.  Then, with regard  to the Somers Islands, the disbursements 
were  returned  in  June  1622 as  100,000 marks  "and  upwards4."  In 
order  to make this estimate end at the same time as that relating to 
the  Virginia  company,  it may  be  calculated  that  the  whole  outlay, 
from the general  stock and by  individual  shareholders  up to 1623-4, 
was  in  round  numbers  about  275,000.  This was  by  far the larger 
part of the expenditure on colonization  proper  in the first  quarter of 
the  seventeenth  century.  The  settling  of  the  territory,  originally 
assigned  to the "Second  Virginia  company,"  had  as  yet  made  little 
progress.  That area, as shown elsewhere6, was  being used in connection 
with  the fishing trade.  In no case, as far as is known, was the outlay 
on  colonization,  north  of  the  land  granted  to  the  First  Virginia 
company,  of  any  considerable  amount.  Judging  from  the  size  of 
expeditions sent to the Sagadahoc settlement, the capital  provided  by 
the adventurers was  small.  That of  the New  England council cannot 
have exceeded 22,000;  while that of  the New  Plymouth Adventurers 
was returned at 27,000 in 16246.  Besides these, there were the Laconia 
company:  the beginnings  of  the Scottish project  in Nova Scotia8, and 
the remaining land-grants from  the council of  New  England, as far as  , 
these had been  occupied up to 1624.  In view  of  the small amount of 
1  Vide infra, rr.  pp. 263, 287, 288, 299, 300, 304-7,  315, 318, 319. 
2  Ibid., 11.  p. 287 ;  cf. Records of the Virginia Company, 11.  p. 411. 
3  Vide infra, 11.  pp. 288, 289. 
4  liecords of  the  Virginia Company, 11.  p.  48 ;  cf. infra, 11.  p.  287. 
6  Vide infra, 11.  pp. 300, 301.  0  Ibid., 11.  pp. 299, 311. 
7  Ibid., 11.  pp. 31.5,  316.  8  Ibid., 11.  pp. 318, 319. 
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colonization,  actually  eflected  north  of  the  territory  of  the  Virginia 
company, it may  perhaps be  calculated  that up to this date 225,000 
would  cover  the total outlay on this region.  Adding this sum  to the 
total already arrived  at for the Virginia and Somers Islands companies, 
the whole expenditure on colonization in  North  America  up  to 1624 
may be taken to have been &300,000. 
Capital outlay on plantations  in  North  Arnc;.rica  up to  1624. 
Name of  Company  Total outlay 
The First Virginia Company  ...  ...  ...  3200,000 
The Somers  Islands  Company ...  ...  ...  375,000 
The New England Council  ...  ... 
The New Plymouth Adventurers  ... 
The Laconia  company,  other partnerships  £25,000 
plantations by individuals ...  ... 
-- 
Total  ...  ...  ...  ...  £300,000 
From the point of  view of  the shareholder, the main return on  his 
investment  was  the land-dividend  he  obtained.  This was  relative  to 
the number of  acres divided per  share  and to the amount paid  up  on 
the share. 
The subscribers in  the Virginia company were entitled to 100 acres 
of  land for each  share  of  212. 10s. that they owned.  This division 
was  increased,  on  the actual occupation  of  the grant,  in  proportion 
to the number of  persons transported  to it.  Thus the cost of  land in 
Virginia to the shareholders varied from 2s. 6d. to perhaps 5s. per acre 
on  the basis  of  the value of  the shares at par'.  The rate per acre in 
New  England  was  even lower, but  that company  did  not  perform  as 
many services for the settlers in developing the territory to be  settled. 
Low as some of  these rates were, they might be further reduced, if  any 
value  could  be  placed  on  the  remaining  rights  of  the  members  in 
plantation  companies  after the  land  divisions  had  been  made.  The 
Bermuda company,  for instance, continued to exist long after the land 
had been  assigned.  It had the right, under  its charter, of  acting  as 
sole  agent  for  the trade  with  the plantation.  Out  of  the  revenue 
obtained from  this source as well  as from undivided land, the expenses 
had to be  paid,  and the balance  was  available for dividends from time 
to time2. 
1  Vide infra,  Ir.  pp.  250, 255, 256. 
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CHAPTER X. 
IN  spite of  the plague in 1625, trade in that year began to improve, 
and there  were  several indications  that the period  of  depression had 
come  to an end.  For instance, by July 25th, it was  recorded that the 
cloth-trade had c'quickened,"  and that there were then no  complaints 
of  the decay of  the industry'.  For this reason, as well as through the 
revival of  trade, pauperism  was  less than it had been since 1620; and, 
with  the growth  of  the wool  trade,  other  occupations  shared  in  the 
return of prosperity. 
At the same time,  there  were  many  factors  which  prevented  the 
years from  1626 to 1630 from  being  more  than  partially good.  Al- 
though  the  cloth-trade  had  shown  improvement,  it is  probable  that 
it had not recovered from the ill-advised  interference  of  James I. from 
1613 to 1617.  Some of  the foreign  trades (such as those to the East 
Indies  and Africa2) had  suffered  serious  losses  of  capital  during  the 
crisis.  and the situation  was  still too  uncertain  to justify  the risking 
of  further considerable  resources. 
The chief  element, that limited the reviving  activity of  trade, was 
the state of  foreign  politics.  After a  long  period  of  peace,  England 
had  at length become  involved  in hostilities  with  Spain.  While the 
successive unfortunate expeditions  of  Mansfeld to the Netherlands and 
the operations at Cadiz and the Isle of  Rhh  were  exceedingly galling 
to the pride of  the nation, they exerted no direct effect on the condition 
of  industry.  Nor  was  the cost a  serious burden, in view  of  the accu- 
mulation  of  wealth  during the period  of  peace.  At the  same  time, 
the fact  that the country was  at war, occasioned  some disturbance  of 
trade by  the closing of  certain  markets  and,  still more,  through  the 
' 
attacks  on  shipping  by  privateers  in  the Channel.  Much  more im- 
portant  than either  of  these,  both  in  immediate and  remote  effects, 
were the methods by which the struggle was  financed. 
1  Debates in the  House  of  Cofnmons in 1625, edited by S. R. Gardiner (Camdell 
Soc. 1873), p. 39. 
2  Vide infra, 11.  pp. 12, 13, 104. 
Towards  the  close  of  the  reign  of  James  I.  the amount  of  the 
annual  deficits  had  been  considerably  reduced.  it is  true that  the 
improvement  was  more  apparent  than  real.  Extraordinary  receipts 
had come to the rescue  of  the usual  revenue,  and gifts to favourites 
were  made  in  kind  rather  than  in  money.  For  these  reasons,  the 
debt, which had been about three-quarters of a million in 1617, was not 
very materially increased1, except by the addition of  arrears of  interest. 
By  1620 it was  recognized that the repayment  of  the sums lent was 
scarcely  to be  hoped  for,  while  the  interest  that  had  accrued  was 
recorded  rather  for  the  sake  of  completeness  than  with  any  serious 
intention  of finding funds  to pay  it.  Thus it is  noted, in an account 
of  this time, cc that interest was set down till March  1620, yet we  leave 
it to His  Majesty and the direction of  the Lords how  much  shall  be 
paid thereofa."  The same spirit of extravagance and neglect of  financial 
uprightness had  permeated  the various  public services.  The adminis- 
tration of  the Navy,  of  the Customs and the Exchequer, was  corrupt; 
and the fall of  Bacon  showed that the purity of  justice  was  certainly 
not above suspicion.  The proceedings against Middlesex, the Treasurer, 
in 1624 tended to concentrate attention on details of  the finances rather 
than to present a general  view  of  their condition.  For the two years, 
ending Michaelmas 1683, the Ordinary Revenue exceeded the Ordinary 
Expenditure by  232,000,  but,  in the next  half  year,  the issues  were 
greater  than the receipts.  Unfortunately, during the same period  the 
Extraordinary  Expenditure  came  to over  ~2660,000, without  taking 
account of money owing for interest and to pay for powder.  As against 
this great  outlay, there  were  extraordinary receipts,  such as a further 
impost on wines, and the remainder had been  met  by additional loans, 
with  anticipations  of  the rent  due  from  the  farmers  of  the  great 
Customs3.  The rest of the expenditure had been provided by borrowing 
to a limited extent.  If however  James I. went  to war,  he  would  be 
at once plunged  into difficulties, through  the want  of  further credit. 
It  was  the fashion  at this  period  to speak  of  the penuriousness  of 
Elizabeth, with a  view  to justifying  the lavishness of  James I.  The 
difference  in  the  finances of  the  two  sovereigns  was  nowhere  more 
marked  than  in  the  methods,  adopted  by  each,  in  dealing  with  the 
Crown debt.  When Elizabeth borrowed and contracted to pay interest, 
she  met  her  engagements,  while  the  Privy  Seal  loans  (on  which  no 
interest  was  payable)  were  all  discharged  during her  reign  with  the 
exception  of  one contracted  in 1.597, to meet  which  there were  funds 
l  Vide supra, pp.  142, 148. 
Exchequer of Receipt (Puliscellanea), 43 (3). 
Debates in the  House  of  Gbmmons in  1625, ut  supra, pp.  24, 25; State Papers, 
Domestic, James I.,  CLX.  63 ;  C'alendar, 1623-5,  p.  185. The  Crown Finances  1624 
coming  into the Exchequer  soon  after  her  death.  This  obligation 
remained  uadischarged  all through  the reign  of  James I., and  only a 
fraction  of  similar  loans,  made  in  1614,  had  been  repaid.  Other 
liabilities,  incurred  in  the previous  reign,  were  still  outstanding-as 
for instance a portion of the money borrowed from Pallavicino in 1583l. 
Even  more  significant  is  the  complaint  of  an  executor,  who,  after 
paying  the sums owing by  the deceased, found himself  out of  pocket, 
through  being  unable  to collect  a  number  of  bad  debts,  prominent 
amongst  which  was  one  of  2750 due  by  the  Kingz.  Moreover,  the 
leases  of  the  Customs  had  been  made  with  a  clause,  enabling  the 
farmers to obtain a  "defalcation"  or rebate in the event of  war being 
declareds.  In  these  circumstances,  it was  absolutely  necessary  that 
Parliament  should  be  summoned.  However, though  both  James I. 
and the Commons were agreed  on the desirability of  war  with  Spain, 
each party differed as to the motive.  James I. was  prompted  mainly 
by  the  desire  to  aid  in  the  restoration  of  his  son-in-law  in  the 
Palatinate.  Parliament represented  the ideal  of  the statesmen of  the 
time of  Elizabeth who believed  that it was  to the interest of  England 
to aid the Protestants on  the Continent.  While each of  these objects 
involved hostilities against  Spain, the scope of  the operations required 
would be  very  different.  James I. had in view  extensive  preparations 
which  would  involve great expense, and  it appears  that as  much  as 
three-quarters  of  a million  to a  million a year was contemplated.  011 
the other hand, many members of  the House of  Co~nmons  remembered 
the success that had  attended  the  raids  of  the  privateers,  and they 
were  inclined  to regard  a  renewal  of  this  method  as likely  to yield 
the best results.  The immediate outlay would  not be large.  It would 
have  been  necessary to spend  inoney  on  the Navy,  in repairing coast 
defences  and  in  garrisoning  Ireland.  The  adoption  of  expeditions 
against  Spanish America  might  be  made  to pay their  way,  and such 
ventures would, in any case, inflict losses  on the enemy, altogether out 
of  proportion to the cost incurred.  It was  possibly from this point  of 
view that Coke declared the country "never  throve so well, as when  it 
was  at war  with  Spain'."  If these  opinions were prevalent  in  Parlia- 
ment it was  only to be  expected that a  Committee, on being  informed 
by James I.  that he required  ten-tenths and ten-fifteenths  for the war  , 
and  two-tenths  and  two-fifteenths,  annually,  towards  paying  off  his 
1 State Papers, Domestic, James I., XXXVIII.  21 ;  Calendar, 1625-6, pp. 458,459. 
Ibid., c;.  80; Calendar, 1623-5,  p.  70. 
3  The  Parliamentary  or  Constitutional History  of  England,  London,  1761,  VI. 
p.  94; The Proceedings and  Debates of  the  House  of  Commons in the  Session8  of  Par- 
liament begun the  twentieth of  Janua~y,  1628,  collected  by Sir Thornas Crew, 1707, 
p.  118. 
4  State Papers,  Domestic, James I.,  CLX. 63 ;  Calendar, 1623-6,  p. 185. 
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debts,  heard  the proposal  "with  such  amazement  that there  was  not 
one  'God  save  the King'  heard  as  they  went  away."  Subsequently, 
Buckingham  endeavoured  to explain  that the whole  twelve-tenths and 
twelve-fifteenths  were  needed  for  the  war;  but  Parliament  was  not 
satisfied either with  the amount asked  nor that it would  be  spent  as 
proposed'.  EventuaIly,  one-quarter  of  the  sun2  required  (i.e.  three- 
tenths and three-fifteenths) was  voted, on the condition that it should 
be  disbursed  by  persons  appointed  by  Parliament2.  As  the  money 
came  in, it was  used  to prepare  the expedition  of  Mansfeld;  and, by 
December 1624, the sums collected up to that time had been exhausted. 
It was  only  through  a  loan  raised  by  Charles, on  the security of  his 
revenues as Prince of  Wales, that the ships were enabled to put to sea 
at the end  of  January 1625.  By  this time  the preparations  already 
made  would  have  consumed  much  more  than  the  amount  voted  by 
the Parliament  of  1624.  There were,  however,  many  additional en- 
gagements  contracted,  which,  had  they  been  carried  out, would  have 
required  the provision  of  over a million during the current gear3.  4 
July 20th, 1625, there was  absolutely no  money in the Exchequer, and 
the future income from the Custonls had been  anticipated4.  Therefore, 
there  were  urgent  reasons for  obtaining further supplies  from  Parlia- 
ment,  which  had  met  in  May.  There appears  to have  been  every 
disposition  to credit  Charles I. with  the best  intentions;  and, had he 
taken the members into his confidence, it might have been  possible for 
a  large  grant to have  been  obtained.  Unfortunately,  neither  he  nor 
his  advisers realized  that, while  the war  was  popular  in  the abstract, 
the  manner  in  which  it was  being  conducted  did  not  meet  with 
approval.  Moreover, James I. had  undertaken  to furnish a  statement 
of  how  the subsidy of  1624 had been expended.  No  such  particulars 
were given, neither was any definite sum asked for the future.  Charles I., 
in his speech at the beginning  of  the session, contented  himself  with 
"suggesting  such supply as the greatness of  the worke and variety  of 
provision  did  require5."  The  debate  on  the  amount  to be  granted 
"  wavered a good while."  There was  considerable  difference of  opinion 
on  the propriety  of  continuing  the taxation  of  personal  property  (or 
"the fifteenths ");  and, when  it was  agreed  to levy on  the usual  basis 
of  both tenths and fifteenths, the number to be granted was disputed, 
some proposing  only  one of  each, others four.  Finally two-tenths and 
State Papers, Domestic, Jarnes I.,  CLX.  89; Calendar, 1623-5,  p.  191. 
Statutes, IV. p. 1247. 
Debates in the Home h commons in 1625, p.  vi. 
State Papers, Domestic, Charles I., IV. 92; Calendar, 162.5-6, p. 67. 
Debates of the Hause of Commons in 1625, p.  1. 190  'c The Country pick of  a dry Exchequer" 1627  [CHAP.  X. 
two-fifteenths were  voted1.  These were to be paid in two instalments 
at an early  date.  In addition,  the clergy had  voted  three  subsidies 
each of  4s. in the 22,  which were payable in six equal parts, half-yearly,  -  - 
beginning  on  December  lst, 1627a. 
The supply of 1625 was estimated to  have produced about 22120,0005 
and this fell very far short of  the engagements that had already been 
incurred.  The subsidies of  1624 had  been  collected  by  the  persons 
appointed by Parliament, and the money had been disbursed.  Charles I. 
was  anxious  to  effect reforms  in  the  expenditure  of  the .  Ordinary  .. --  ..... 
Revenue, so that some aid to his finances lnay have been received from 
this source.  Still, as against the outlay to which  he  was  committed, 
the extraordinary  receipts,  arising from  the vote  of  Parliament,  were 
quite inconsiderable, and he was forced to find some expedient by which 
resources could  be  obtained.  When the Parliament of  1626 dissolved, 
without  an  additional  vote having  been  made,  Charles I. resolved to 
levy  a  sum,  equal to the produce  of  five  subsidies, by  a  compulsory 
loan.  About  22300,000  was  expected,  and  on  November  16th, 1627, 
22%3,573.  14s. 34d. had  been  collected,  of  which  f154,292. 1%. 34d. 
had been  paid  into the Exchequer-the  greater part of  the remainder 
having  been  disbursed  directly  by  the  counties,  from  which  it  was 
levied, on maintaining soldiers4.  At this time the country was described 
as being "  sick  of  a  dry Exchequer,"  and  there  were  great difficulties 
in  obtaining a  sufficient  supply  of  powder:  By  March  1628, future 
revenue had been anticipated to the extent of  aE220,422. 9s. Id.' 
At the end  of  the financid  year  1627-8,  the Extraordinary  Ex- 
penditure  directed  by  Letters of  Privy  Seal for the past  three years, 
exclusive of  loans repaid, amounted to over two and a quarter millions. 
As  against this,  there  were  extraordinary receipts  of  only  half  that 
amount.  This left  more  than a  million  unprovided  for,  outside  any 
saving there might be on  the ordinary  expenditure  and anticipations. 
Moreover, to eke out the receipts,  it had been  necessary to include the 
dowry  of  Henrietta  Maria,  which  amounted  to 8116,929.  The sub- 
sidies,  prizes  and  sundries  came  to 22 439,958,  and  the  balance  was 
procured  as to f  152,480, derived  from  the sale  of  lands  and  woods, 
added  to 2403,742,  which  had been  borrowed  in various  ways. 
The  following  statement,  which  is  condensed  from  the  financial  , 
tables  compiled  by  Mr  Gardiner,  will  make the position  clear7: 
1 Debates of  the  House of  Commons in 1625, pp, 30, 31. 
"taatutes,  v. p  3. 
3  State Papers, Domestic, James I., XXXVII. 38; Charles I., LXXXIV.  89. 
4  State Papers, Domestic,  Charles I., LXXI.  25,  r,xxxrv. 89; Calendar,  1627-8, 
pp. 258, 437. 
5  Ibid., ~xxxv.  72; Cakendar,  1627-8,  p. 452. 
6  ad.,  xcv. 26 ;  Calendar,  1628-9,  p. 5.  7  History, 162837 (1877), 11.  346-9. 
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Extraordinary Receipts 1625-6,  16.26-7,  1627-8. 
Sale of lands and woods  ...............  %152,480 
D":",." 
I ll(rC3  ......... 
Queen's portion  ...... 
Privy  Seal  loans,  loans  from 
loans,  loans on mortgage 
Subsidies  ,  ........ 
Sundries  ......... 
............ 
............ 




Extraordinary expenditure (less loans repaid)  ......  2,229,211 
Deficit  as  between  extraordinary receipts  and  extra- 
ordinary  issues  .........  %1,116,102 
When,  in 1628, Parliament  granted  five-tenths and five-fifteenths, 
payable  between July loth, 1628, and March  Ist, 16.29, some progress 
had been  made towards the temporary financing of  the deficit.  It  is 
true that these  subsidies  would  produce  only  about  2300,000;  but, 
with  the reduction  of  expenditure on  naval  and  military expeditions, 
beginning in the financial year 1628-9, there were prospects of surpluses 
on  both  the  ordinary  and  extraordinary  accounts.  These  prospects 
were  altogether  changed  by  the  insecurity  of  the  Ordinary  Revenue 
derived from  tonnage and poundage.  In 1625 there had been several 
muses  which  had  induced  the House  of  Commons,  instead  of  voting 
these duties for the life of  the sovereign, as had  been  usual  in former 
cases, to limit the grant for one year, and the measure did not become 
law1.  Charles  I.  claimed  the right  of  authorizing  the collection  of 
these taxes, and in 1628 it was resolved that such collection  was  illegal, 
unless sanctioned by Parliament.  The merchants, who had been smarting 
under the increased taxation,  that had  been  imposed  under  the name 
of  the new  impositions, without  the consent of  Parliament,  refused  to 
pay either class of  duties.  Resistance in London was frequent, and the 
goods  of  the merchants  were  detained  till the duties  were  paid.  L 
sonie cases, those  who  declined  to pay were  imprisoned;  and, as  time 
went  on,  the indignation  became  widespread.  It was  significant  that 
the companies engaged  in foreign  trade  were  prominent  in  the agi- 
tation.  For  some  years  the Levant  merchants  had  been  protesting 
against  the duty on  currants, and some  of  them  would  not  pay  itz. 
-  " 
In  January,  1628,  Cotton  pointed  out the  danger  of  "unknowne  and  un- 
trodden ways" towards procuring funds,  "which  although they tooke as it were a 
supply at first and received  uo general1 denial;  yet since it bath drawn  many to 
consult with themselves. ..I much feare, if now againe it bee offered eyether ill  the 
same  face  or  by  Privie  Seale,  it will  be  refused  wholly."-The  Danger  wherein 
the  Kingdome now  Standeth and the  Remedie,  by  Sir  R.  Cotton,  1627,  in  Somers' 
Tracts (1750), v. 297. 
A-~ete~im,  @the Cwvt and State of  England, by  Roger Coke, 1719, I. p. 277. Commercial Progress  1627-9  [CHAP. X. 
The  Merchant  Adventurers,  when  called  before  the  Privy  Council, 
persisted  in refraining from  exporting cloth, even  after  they had been 
threatened  with  the  dissolution  of  their  company,  previo~~s  to the 
transference  of  their  privileges to those who would be more subservient 
to the Crown1. 
The opposing  views  of  the  Crown  and  the Comlnons up011  this 
question  became  one  of  the  causes  leading  to  the  dissolutio~l of 
Parliament  in  1629, and it thus marked  another stage in the progress 
of  the constitutional struggle.  The refusal  of  Parliament, under  the 
circumstances,  to  sanction  this  method  of  taxation  raised  a  fresh 
financial difficulty, once  the bulk  of  the subsidy,  voted  in  1628, had 
been  paid  into  the  Exchequer.  This  effect  showed  itself  fully  in  a 
few  years, but  there  was  an immediate  consequence, that had  already 
resulted, towards the end  of  1628.  Up to that time  trade had  been 
moderately  active.  The City of  London  is  stated  to have  been  "in  ' 
great splendour',"  and there were complaints of  the increase of  luxury, 
especially of  "the  monstrous  prodigality  in  apparel3."  Land, which 
had  sold  at between  eighteen  and twelve  years'  purchase  during  the 
early part of  the crisis of  16204,  had risen in 1628 to 28 years' purchase 
in some  cases5.  The cloth trade was  better,  and several  of  the other 
branches of  foreign commerce had improved.  As the Russia company 
emerged from the legacy of dishonest finance, the two new  undertakings, 
managing  the  one  the  Greenland  and  the  other  the  original  trade, 
were meeting with  considerable success6.  Besides the plantation  corn- 
panies, founded before  1620, a new  one  had  been  started in 1629 for 
the cultivation  of  tobacco  and  spices  in  the Mosquito  Islands7.  The 
New  Scotland  and  Guiana  ventures  were  both  showing  considerable 
activity, mainly in the direction of  privateering8.  The two undertakings 
which had  suffered most  from  the J3~tch-i.~. the African  and East 
Gardiner, Hhtory,  1603-42 (1891), VII.  pp. 82, 83. 
"istorical  Collections, by John Rushworth,  London,  1680, 11.  p. 28. 
The Present  State of  England, by Walter Carey,  1627, in Harleian Miscellany 
(1745), 111.  pp. 198-201. 
Debates in the House of  Cmmons in 1625, ut supra, I. P.  16 ;  The Autobiography 
and  Correspondence ~ Sir Simonds D'Ewes,  edited  by  J. 0. Halliwell,  1845,  1. 
p.  180. 
State Papers,  Domestic,  Charles I.,  orx.  44;  Calendar,  1628-9,  p.  197.  At 
first sight there is some difficulty in reconciling these rates with  the interest on 
investments, where the security was considered  good, which remained  about 8 per 
cent.  The explanation of the apparently unduly high number of  years ~urchase  in 
the case of  land is that, in addition to the rent,  the ~urchaser  received  a  further 
income from the fines on renewal of leases.  Therefore the number of  years purchase 
is multiplied by a part,  but not the whole, of the income. 
6  Vjde infra,  11.  pp.  66, 71. 
7  Ibid.,  11.  pp. 328, 329.  a  Ibid., 11.  pp.  318, 319. 
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India  companies-had  experienced  somewhat  diff'ercnt  fortulles.  The 
former  had lost all its capital1;  while  the latter had  been  unable  to 
force the shareholders  to pay  up  the  sums,  they  had  undertake11  to 
adventure in 1617, in  the Second Joint-Stock.  By 1628 it was  feared 
that much  of  this capital had been lost, and the comniittees were only 
prevented  from  winding  up the stock  by  the necessity  of  paying  off 
the debt that had been  contractedz.  Still this company also felt  the 
return of  confidence and it was able in 1628-9  to form another separate 
undertaking, known as the First Persian  Voyage"  the capital  of  whidl 
was &125,000. 
Activity  was  also shown  in the home trade.  As a  consequence  of 
the discovery  of  silver  in  Wales,  Middleton  had  formed  a  company, 
which  worked  under  a  grant  from  the society  of  the  Alines  Royal; 
and shares  in  this undertaking seem  to have  been  readily  saleable in 
1631"  In 1628 and again  in  1630 the Mineral  and  Battery  Works 
obtained  not only  fresh  grants  of  the privileges  secured  in  the time 
of  Elizabeth but, in addition, the prohibition of  the selling  of  re-made 
wool cardsE. 
The improvement  in  trade,  that  had  begun  in  1626 and  which 
became  more  marked  in  1628,  was  checked  by  the  disputes  about 
tonnage  and  poundage  at the  ports.  The  seizure  of  goods  made 
delivery  uncertain  in  England,  while  the  exports  were  held  back. 
Moreover  there  were  many  losses  through  captures  by  the Dunkirk 
privateers.  The House of  Commons had  stated  in  1628 that "what 
the poverty,  weakness and misery  of  our kingdoin  is now  grown  unto 
by  decay  of  trade  and  destruction  and  loss  of  ships  and  mariners, 
within  the last  three years,  we  are almost afraid to declare6."  Trade 
in  the English  Channel  was  subject  to many  interruptions from  the 
privateers  which  cruised about Land's  End where they  were  a plague 
as bad  as the  "caterpillars"  in  Egypt.  Often  for  weeks  at a  time 
it was  unsafe for  vessels  to sail from  Dover  to Calais, and the depre- 
dations  were  extended  as  far  as  the  herring  fleets  off'  Irarmouth7. 
These  losses  were  aggravated  in  1630 by  the  failure  of  the harvest 
and an  outbreak  of  the  plagues.  In  1629  the  price  of  wheat  was 
considerably above  the average of  the previous three years, and 1630 
Vide infia,  11.  pp.  12-14.  2  Ibid., 11.  pp.  108, 109. 
Ibid., 11.  pp.  109, 126.  4  Ibid.,  11.  p.  401. 
"bid.,  11.  pp.  424, 426. 
Parliamentary History, ut sujwa, vnr. p.  229. 
State  Papers,  Domestic,  Charles  I.,  CXLVII.  52,  CXLIX.  26,  56,  CLXIX.  67; 
Calendar,  1629-31,  pp.  22,  52,  58,  296. 
This was ]lowever  only a minor epidemic,  the deaths from plague in London 
having beer1 1,317 as against 35,417  in 1625-iVatural  and Political Observatio W... 
upon the Bills ofMortalit,y,  by Capt. John Grauut, 1665, pp.  174, 176. 
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is described as a time of  famine1.  The wool trade suffered to a marked 
extent.  About the end of  1629 or the beginning  of  1630 the excep- 
tionally  low  price  of  wool  was  under  the consideration  of  a  special 
commission,  appointed to ascertain  the causes of  the decline;  and, at 
-the same  time,  the  state  of  the  cloth-trade  was  causing  anxiety2. 
Towards the end of  1630, the demand  for cloth had fallen off  to such 
an  extent  that  the  manufacturers  were  compelled  to  dismiss  their 
weavers,  many  of  whom  were  in  danger  of  perishing  from  want  of 
work.  There was a great scarcity of corn, and those who were receiving 
wages  were  unable to purchase enough to supply their families, owing 
to the enhanced  price:  while  there were  some, who,  through  lack  of 
employment, were  destitutes.  In Hampshire, the production  of  cloth 
had declined by about 80 per cent.4 ;  while, in Norwich, the magistrates 
had to raise  treble the usual  amount  for  relief  of  the poor  from  the 
better rank  of  citizens  and  double  from  the rest,  besides  borrowing 
g300 to spend  on  corn5. 
The  crisis  at  the  end  of  1630  was  severe  while  it lasted,  but 
fortunately its duration  was  short.  The return  to more  normal  con- 
ditions  may  be  dated  from  the  peace  with  Spain  (November  1630), 
and  early in the next  year  there was  a general revival in trade.  In- 
dustrial  conditions both  at home  and  abroad were  better  than  they 
had  been  since 1619;  but the return  of  prosperity  was  overshadowed 
by the methods, adopted by the Crown, to raise a revenue independently 
of  Parliament.  It is this fact that gives the crisis of 1630 an importance, 
which, in view  of  its brief  continuance, it would  not otherwise possess. 
Provoked  partly by  the irregularities  in the collection of  tonnage  and 
poundage,  partly by  the losses  arising  out of  the ill-advised  conduct 
of  the war,  reacting  on a time of  scarcity in agriculture, it marks the 
dividing line between the period when Charles I. was still receiving the 
proceeds  of  subsidies, granted by  Parliament, and the time  when  this 
source  of  supply  was  no  longer  available,  except  the  small  amount 
of  arrears that remained  still to be  collected. 
Apart from the influence of  the constitutional issue, involved in the 
levying  of  taxation,  the  most  important  question  affecting  financial 
methods up to 1630 was  the change  in  the relative  positions  of  the 
English and the Dutch  East India  companies.  The latter had  con- 
tinued  the stock  formed in 1602; while, in the case of  the former, the 
new undertaking (known as the Second Joint-Stock, subscribed in 1617) 
1 Rogers, Agriculture  and Prices, v. pp.  197, 270. 
State Papers, Domestic,  Charles I., CLV.  52,  63; Calendar, 1629-31, p.  147. 
3  Ibid., CLXXVI.  36; Calendar, 1629-31,  p. 403. 
4  Ibid., CLXXXII.  45, 45 (1);  Calendar, 1629-31,  p.  481. 
6  Ibid., c~xxxvr.  26; Calendar, 162931, p.  626. 
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had been  due to determine  in  1625, but was  continued for four years 
more.  It was  not  wound  up  until  1633.  The effect of  the critical 
position  in  the East had  been  to prevent  shareholders  from  paying 
their calls, and this stock  was  not fully paid up1.  Therefore, the First 
Persian Voyage (1628) may be regarded  as completing the subscription 
to the Second Joint-Stock.  Moreover, since the profits  of  both enter- 
prizes  were  almost all made by 1630, for purposes  of  comparison with 
the Dutch company  they may be  taken  as having terminated  at that 
date.  On  the other hand, the Second  Persian  Voyage (1629) had not 
produced sufficient results to be included within  this period.  Therefore 
any profits made  by the Second Joint-Stock and First Persian  Voyage, 
after 1630, would probably be balanced by those of  the Second Persian 
Voyage, gained before the same date. 
Up  to  1617  the  Dutch  company  had  divided  its  profits  at an 
average annual rate of  about 25 per  cent., while the dividends  of  the 
English  undertaking  on  the  estimated  capital  actually  employed, 
exclusive of  the principal  returned,  came to over 31  per  cent.  on  the 
Voyages  and  the  First  Joint-Stock.  Therefore,  roughly,  the profits 
actually divided by  the Dutch company  were  a little more  than  two- 
thirds of  those,   aid  by its English  rival, in terms of  the average rate 
per  cent.2  There is every reason  to believe that the lower return per 
cent. of the Dutch enterprize was due to the expenditure of considerable 
sums on laying the foundations of  future developments.  One effect of 
a  permanent  capital was  that this body  was  able to provide  fortified 
stations,  which  became  of  great value  to it in  the  struggle  with  its 
rival.  The  latter,  owing  to  its  system  of  terminable  stocks,  was 
unable  to adopt the same policy, and this was  one of  the reasons why 
it suffered  most  during the years  of  strife in  the Indies. 
The effects of  the contest were  shown in  the reduced rate of  profit 
earned  from 1618 to 1630.  During eight of  these thirteen years, the 
Dutch  company  did  not  pay  any  dividend;  and,  in  the  other  five, 
distributions  of  120 per cent. were made3.  Over the whole period, this 
gave an average annual dividend  of  9 per cent., or just about the same 
rate as  was  obtainable  from  a  loan  on  good  security.  The English 
company  was  even  more  unfortunate.  The  whole  divisions  on  the 
Second Joint-Stock  were  only  112i per  cent.  or a  profit  of  124 per 
cent. for at least thirteen years.  It would be a niistake to conclude that 
the average  annual  dividend from profits  was  under 1  per  cent.,  since 
only  one-eighth  of  the nominal  capital  was  called  up during  each  of 
the first five years  of  this stock.  Therefore, at the end of  1623, about 
Vide infra, 11. p. 107.  Vide  supra, p.  147. 
Klerk  de  Heus,  Niederlandisch-Ostindischen  Compagnie,  Appendix  1.1. ; 
Auderson,  Annals  oj' Commerce,  edited  by  David  MacPherson,  1805,  rv.  p.  488. 
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a  nlillion  sterling  was  actually  paid  in,  and the following  year  the 
began to make divisions, averaging one-eighth of  the total. 
annually.  Allowing on  the one hand  for the calls on the stock being 
in instalments, and on the other for the repayments  of  capital, it 
seems probable that no serious error would  be  involved in  treating the 
profit made as if  it had been earned on a capital of  P500,000, taken as 
paid  up in 1618 and returned in 1630.  To this there is to be added 
the stock, subscribed  for  the First Persian  Voyage:  and, distributing 
this  in  like  manner  over  the whole  ~eriod,  the capital,  actually em- 
ployed,  may  be taken as being  about equal in amount to that of  the 
Dutch company-neglecting  the loans of  each, since interest  on  these 
was provided for before dividends were paid. 
On the basis of this calculation, the sum total of  the profits of  both 
companies may be compared  directly  during  the years  1618 to 1630. 
Strictly  speaking the English  organization  had  not sufficient  realized 
assets to do more than return the principal of  the Second Joint-Stock. 
All its remaining property was  transferred  to the Third Joint-Stock, 
in  return  for  an  allotment  of  shares  in  the latter.  This  allotment 
amounted to 124 per cent.  Since, moreover, one of  the most important 
of  these assets was  the claim for damages against the Dutch company, 
no account need be taken of  the compensation that was paid eventually 
by the latter.  The effect of  the arrangement  therefore  was  that the 
proprietors  received  a  profit  of  124 per  cent.  in  stock  of  the  next 
undertaking.  Taking this at par1, it would be worth about 2200,000, 
to which  is  to be  added  the profit  of  the First  Persian  Voyage  of 
275,0002, making  a  total  profit  over  the  whole  thirteen  years  of 
2275,000.  Reducing  the  dividends  of  the Dutch  company,  during 
the same period,  to sterling, these  would  come  to over three-quarters 
of  a  million,  so  that the result  is  reached,  that in  the years  under 
investigation  the  latter made  almost  three  times  as  much  profit  as 
the English undertaking ; and the average annual rate of  profit  on the 
share-capital was  about 9 per  cent.  in the one case and 3 per cent. in 
the other. 
The financial results of  the East India trade from 1618 to 1630 are 
important, not so much as an instance of  the rate of  profits, but from 
their eff'ects on the whole question of  monopolies for foreign trade and 
also indirectly in relation to the development of  the joint-stock  system. 
Up to the time of  the Amboyna massacre, the grant of  large privileges 
for trading to distant and uncivilized countries was based on the prin- 
ciple  of  encouraging discoveries.  In principle,  therefore,  it resembled 
1  In 1634 this stock sold cum divisions at 80, while in 1640 it was from 91 to 964 
ex divisions of  50 per cent. 
Vide infra, 11.  pp. 111, 126. 
CHAP. X.]  FOrt@cation~  ancl  Morraopolies  16  18-24  197 
the exclusive right of  exercising a  new  invention for a  term  of  years. 
This was  the view  of  the more  moderate  members  in  the  House  of 
Commons.  To this there was  opposed  a body of  opinion which ainled 
at the breaking down  of  all privileges in the export trade, and which 
finds expression in  the "Instructions"  of  Sandys.  There is,  however, 
reason  to believe that this agitation was  no  more  disinterested1 than 
the defence  of  the  companies, which  was  undertaken  by  persons  who 
were  shareholders in these  ventures,  or who  received  some recompense 
for their support. 
The conflict between the  English and the Dutch East India companies 
introduced an altogether new  element.  Competition took  the form of 
armed intervention.  The trader, who  was  too weak  to defend himself, 
ran the risk  of  being deprived  of  his goods;  and, once the Dutch had 
established  themselves in  the Indies, it would have been impossible for 
English  merchants  to have  sent  cargoes there  without  the protection 
of  armed ships.  Moreover, fortified stations were required, where goods 
could  be  stored  until  they  were  conveyed  to  Europe.  For  these 
reasons,  during a  period  when  the  Channel  was  not  always  safe  for 
British ships, some kind  of  responsible organization with large powers 
was  necessary.  Even  the  existing  English  organization  had  not  as 
yet risen  to a full  sense of  its responsibilities.  The system  of  stocks, 
subscribed  for  short  terms,  precluded  the  best  development  of  the 
permanent  interests of  the trade.  The cause  of  this policy  is difficult 
to determine.  It may  have  been  that  the East  India  company  was 
following  the  precedent  of  the  Elizabethan  trading  voyage,  but  it 
seenis possible  that, since  the Russia  company had  a  series  of  stocks 
which  had  been  terminable  only  by  liquidation,  there  were  other 
reasons.  These are perhaps to be  found in the attitude of  the Stuarts 
to  the  company.  James  I.  had  granted  licenses  which  seriously 
threatened  its privileges, and  the  minutes  show  that the committees 
were  apprehensive  of  frequent  interferences  by  the Crown.  Such  un- 
certainty made it inadvisable to expend capital  in any directions, where 
the return would be a distant one.  Thus it happened that the company 
was  ill-prepared to face the aggression of the Dutch, and that it surered 
most in the contest.  It is not unlikely that it was  the effect  of  these 
events which  caused companies to be  excepted  from  the scope  of  the 
monopoly  act  of  1624.  This  legislation  again  had  an  important 
consequence,  which  came  to light  in  the reign  of  Charles I., namely 
that there  was  no  obstacle  in  statute-law  to the grant  of  the  most 
objectionable  kind  of  monopoly  to any  body  of  persons,  who  at the 
same time were  incorporated  by  a  royal  charter. 
l  Vide suprn,  pp. 121, 182. 198  Fines for  Freedom of Cos. reduced 1618-30  [CHAP.  S  . 
The low level of profits of the East India company from 1618 to 1630 
tended in an almost accidental manner to eliminate some characteristics 
of  the regulated body from its organization.  At first any non-member, 
who  purchased  shares, had to pay a fine on  admission.  From  1624 to 
1628 shareholders  were  anxious  to sell out, so as to escape the liability 
of  unpaid  calls.  Since,  for  the same  reasons,  there  was  no  urgent 
demand  even  at a  price  which,  allowing for  the  divisions  of  capital 
already made,  was  below  par1, the proprietors  objected to any restric- 
tions  which  tended to limit the market.  Therefore, although the fine 
for  admission  was  not finally abolished  until later,  it was  reduced  so 
much,  that,  on  any  considerable  purchase,  it  was  no  more  than  a 
moderate  fee  payable  to  the  company  for  the  registration  of  the 
transfer. 
l  Vide infru, 11.  p.  126. 
CHAPTER  XI. 
THE  revival  of  trade  at the end  of  1630 was  accompahied  and 
strengthened  by  great activity in the extension  of  existing companies 
and still more by the formation of  new undertakings.  At the beginning 
of  the year  1631 and for some time  afterwards, the prospects  for the 
investment  of  capital appeared  to be  exceptionally  ~romising.  The 
signature of  a treaty of  peace offered security for  merchants, who  were 
prepared to equip distant voyages, or to advenbrers who were desirous 
of  exploiting  schemes for  colonization.  The woollen  industry showed 
signs of  recovering from  the depression which had lasted since the ill- 
advised interference, resulting in the formation of  the company of  New 
Merchant  Adventurers in 1614.  It was  only to be  expected that this 
rash  proposal  had checked the rate of  increase, which  might otherwise 
have been established, but there are many signs that both the clothiers 
and the sheep-farmers had begun to adjust themselves to the new condi- 
tions ;  and it is significant that complaints of "  decay of the cloth-trade" 
had become  less;  while,  when  they  began  again,  they  related  only to 
certain localities affected by special conditions.  There are many indica- 
tions which  point  to  a  considerable  amount  of  capital having  been 
available  for  investment.  The rate of  interest  on  good  security  had 
fallen  to that current  before  the crisis  of  1690, namely about 8 per 
cent.',  while the shops of the goldsmiths in Cheapside were described as "a 
most glorious sight2."  The great sums expended on luxuries, and more 
especially on entertainments, also afford evidence that there were large 
stores of  wealth, awaiting profitable outlets3. 
The stimulus of renewed hope can be traced in most directions where 
a large capital was used.  The off-shoot from the Russia company, which 
l  State  Papers, Domestic,  Charles I., CCLIV.  [Docquet], Dec. 28, 1633 ;  Calendar, 
1633-4,  p. 337. 
Historical Collectiom, by John Rushworth, London, 1680, 11.  p.  28. 
3  The History  of  the  Rebellion and  Civil  Wars in England,  by Edward,  Earl  of 
Clarendon, Oxford,  1712, I. p. 67 ;  Calendar Stde Papers, Domestic, 1636-7,  p. xxviii. Foreigr~  Trading Companies  1630-4  [CHAP.  XI. 
was beginning to be known (from the name given to its whaling grounds) 
as the Greenland company, was  making  profits';  and, as far as can be 
gathered,  the same statement applies also to the parent  undertaking2. 
The East  India  company  was  subject  to the conditions of  commerce, 
both at home  and in the East.  While the latter remained unfavour- 
ables, the former partially neutralized the disadvantage.  Thus, besides 
the First and Second Persian Voyages, which had already been established, 
a third and similar venture was made in 1630, with a capital of 2100,000. 
This was followed in 1632  by a Third Joint-Stock, with which the Second 
Joint-Stock was incorporated by a transfer of the remaining assets of the 
latter at a valuation.  Then in 1634 the property belonging to each of 
the three Persian Voyages was  purchased  by the Third Joint-Stock, the 
amalgamation being effected by payment being made in cash or shares of 
the Third Joint-Stock4.  Thus, after 1634, there was  only one under- 
taking controlled by this company, with a capital of  8420,7005, which 
only  exceeded that of  the First Joint-Stock by a few hundred pounds. 
At the same time, while  the situation in 1613, 1617, and 1634 may be 
roughly described by saying that the nominal capital subscribed in 1617 
was  four times  that in existence in  1613 and  again  in  1634, certain 
digerences are to be noted.  As already shown6,  in the case of the First 
Joint-Stock, the earlier calls had been repaid before the final instalment 
was due.  Therefore, the whole nominal  capital was  not earning profits 
at any  one time.  Again, the subscriptions of  the Second Joint-Stock 
were never all paid up ;  so that, while there was a considerable reduction 
in the amount of  the Third Joint-Stock, as compared with the Second, 
that reduction  is  not so large as  it appears at first  sight.  To some 
extent, this Stock was  unfortunate  in the terms  upon  which  it expro- 
priated  the Adventurers  in the Persian  Voyages.  These Voyages had 
been profitable.  Up to September  1634 the First had made divisions 
of  140 per  cent.,  the Second of  l50 per  cent.  and the Third of  100 
per  cent.  These  results  fostered  the  expectation  that  the  purchase 
of  their assets by the Third Joint-Stock would prove satisfactory, and 
therefore the terms arranged were more favourable  to stock-holders in 
the Voyages than they would have been, had they been  arranged a few 
years later. 
Besides the Russia and East India trades, other branches of  foreign 
commerce were  developed, notably the trade to Africa.  In June 1630 
a  charter  was  signed,  establishing  a new  African  company  with  still 
1  ride infra,  11.  p.  71.  At this  time  "Greenland"  was  the name  given  to 
Spitzbergen by  English  writers. 
2  Ibid., 11.  p. 66.  Vide wpra, p. 197. 
4 For the details vide infra, 11.  p. 111. 
6  Ibid., 11.  pp.  111, 127.  a  Vide wyra, p.  146. 
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wider limits and extended privileges.  It is noteworthy that the leading 
adventurer in this enterprise was  Sir Nicholas Crisp,  who  had  broken 
down  the monopoly  of  the previous  company1. 
Numerous circumstances led to an extension of  colonizing.  On the 
one  side,  already religious  difficulties had  induced emigration, and the 
Adventurers  to New  Plymouth  were  followed  by  the  Massachusetts 
Bay  company,  which  received  its charter  in  1629.  This  grant  was 
unique in so far as it did not preclude  the holding of  meetings in the 
territory settled ;  and, therefore, by 1631, shareholders, resident in Eng- 
land, had disposed of their holdings to those who had emigrated.  Thus, 
on the divisions of land being made, this plantation passed from company- 
administration  to local government2.  Another group of  circumstances 
tended  to foster  further settlements  in  America.  The Virginia  and 
Bermuda  colonies  had advanced  from  the experimental stage and had 
pointed the way to imitators.  Already from 1627 settlements had been 
proposed in a  number of  West India Islands, such as the Caribbees, St 
Christopher and the Mosquito Islands.  With more favourable monetary 
conditions, these  enterprizes  were  developed and new  ones commenced, 
as for instance the plantation  of  Carolina,  Maryland,  Montserrat and 
Antigua.  Maryland was  a proprietary colony, owned  by  Lord  Balti- 
more3, the Mosquito Islands were  the property  of  a company, founded 
in  1629,  which  obtained  a  charter  in  1630'.  The  Caribbees  were 
granted to the Earl of  Carlisle in  1627, but the funds for the work  of 
settlement were  provided  by a  small group of  London merchants, who 
became under-adventurers5.  The company, that had obtained the  grant 
of  the Mosquito Islands, introduced a  new element in the organization 
of the colonizing undertaking.  It has already been shown6  that planta- 
tion companies, such as the Virginia and Bermuda associations, proceeded 
at an early stage to make divisions of  land  to their shareholders.  In 
this case, however, although that course had  been  contemplated, it was 
decided  eventually  that  the  territory  occupied  should  be  worked  on 
behalf  of  the joint-stock,  with  the result  that the capital  which  was 
only &2,000 in 1629 had grown  by  1633 to 224,0007.  In addition to 
this  large  outlay,  there was  a subordinate  company  for planting  the 
Island of Tortuga, on which  g570 had  been  expended in 16348.  It  is 
not difficult to suggest  the reason  for  this change  in  practice.  The 
climate was bad, and the land was not suitable for the occupation of the 
l  Vide infra, 11.  p. 14.  Ibid. ., 11. pp. 314,  316. 
Ibid., XI. pp. 318, 326.  Ibid., 11.  p. 328. 
History  Civil and  Commercial of  the  British  Colonies in the  West Indies,  1793, 
I.  D.  333. 
D  Vide mpa,  p. 184. 
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adventurers themselves.  Besides, an important element in the operations 
of this company consisted of  trade with the mainland for which capital 
was  required'.  Finally,  it is worthy of  note that, while the re-adjust- 
ment of  England's foreign relations after the peace of 1630, was beneficial 
to most of  the colonizing enterprises, it was detrimental to those on the 
extreme margin of  the plantation area both to the north and the south. 
On the one side there was  the Canada company  and on  the other  the 
Guiana adventurers.  There was  a  clause in the treaty with France in 
1632 that England should give up the recent acquisitions of territory in 
Canada,  and  therefore  the Adventurers  were  compelled to withdraw 
from the trading stations they had established ;  but since they managed 
to retain a large quantity of  furs they had secured, it is not improbable 
that  they  realized  more  than the capital  subscribed2.  At the same 
time, the secret treaty with  Spain  resulted  in  the mainly privateering 
ventures, based  on the project for planting Guiana, being  discouraged 
by the Crown; and, up to 1637, there is little trace of  activities in this 
direction3. 
The same spirit of  enterprize extended to the home trade.  Here it 
is  necessary  to distinguish  between  the appearance  of  activity  and 
legitimate progress.  Industrial  inventions  again  become prominent- 
indeed these are niore marked  than they had  been  since the early part 
of  the  reign  of  Elizabeth.  With invention  came  the  endeavour  to 
revive  former industries and to start manufactures  in England already 
established  abroad.  These developments produced  changes in produc- 
tion; and, as  a  consequence,  eff'orts  were  made  to improve transport, 
both by road and river, as well as to extend the postal serviced.  From 
the mass of  seeming progressive movements, there must be distinguished 
a number of  so-called inventions which were either wholly or in the main 
fiscal devices intended to augment the Crown revenue.  Postponing these 
for investigation later, there remain many extensions of  the home trade 
-several  of  which were  formed  by joint-stock companies.  Apart from 
the  Elizabethan  societies  of  the  Mines  Royal  and  the  Mineral  and 
Battery Works-the  former still earning a revenue and the latter giving 
employment to "  many thousands5"-there  was  much attention paid to 
the recovery of  land by drainage.  It will be remembered that, at the 
close of the sixteenth century and again in the reign of  James I.O,  such 
enterprizes had constituted a  favourite form  of  speculation.  Prior to 
1630, these schemes had not been successful on any large scale.  In fact, 
1  Vide infra, 11. p. 331.  Ibid., 11.  p.  321. 
3  Ibid., n. p.  325. 
4  Fadera,  XIX. pp.  130,  397, 649, 686, xx. pp.  6, 47 ;  The  HGtory  of' the  Post 
Ofice, by Herbert  Joyce, London,  1893, pp.  15-22. 
5  Vide infra, 11. pp. 402, 426.  "ide  mpra, p.  131. 
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it would  appear that previous eff'orts  had  failed,  in part, through the 
want of  sufficient resources.  In this period  there was  again a boom in 
drainage  propositions,  most  of  which  were  carried  on  by  small  com- 
panies.  The Bedford  Level in Cambridgeshire  and adjoining counties 
was reclaimed at a cost of 293,000 up to 1638.  On this basis the land- 
dividend cost about 21. 2s.  6d. an acre which  compares with 2s. 6d. to 
5s. an acre in Virginia1. 
The success of  the Dutch in the herring fishery off the coast of Great 
Britain  had  long been  a  subject  of  envy  to those  who  were  desirous 
of  increasing  the volume  of  trade2.  In  the deep  sea  fisheries  near 
Newfoundland, as well  as in whaling, English mariners  more than held 
their  own.  In  the latter,  despite the financial  errors  of  the Russia 
company,  very  large  profits  were  sometimes  made,  and  the  average 
annual yield  of  oil  was  considerable.  In 1634 the capital employed in 
the Newfoundland fishery was close on 2300,000, and the profit obtained 
was  12  per cent.  This must  be counted a  satisfactory return in a year 
acknowledged to have been, through  special circumstances, a bad one3. 
In 1630 a commission was appointed to enquire into the prospects of the 
home fishery, and it reported in favour of  the foundation  of  a powerful 
joint-stock  company to carry on  this enterprize.  It was estimated that 
a capital of  2167,000 would suffice at  the beginning, and that it would 
yield  a  profit  of  70 per  cent. per  annum4.  The company, which  was 
incorporated in 1632, was  noteworthy  in  several respects.  It was  the 
first venture  which  was  explicitly national in  the widest  sense, since it 
was  intended to send  fishing fleets, not only to the English coasts, but 
also to both Scotland and Ireland.  For this reason, it was  incorporated 
as  the  Society  oj' the  Fishery  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  with  a  . 
governing body  consisting  of  one  half  English  and the other half  of 
Scottish members.  The organization was  intricate.  Besides the society, 
there  were  several  subordinate unincor~orated  companies, to each  of 
which a certain area was assigned.  These subsidiary undertakings were 
intended to attract local support and to secure a more efficient manage- 
ment,  while  the parent  society  not  only  interested  itself  in the trade 
generally but negotiated large contracts, such as those for the navy, or 
for export, besides maintaining its own herring boats5. 
Elsewhere  there  were  other  industrial  developments,  such  as  a 
corporation,  formed  in  1631,  to amalgamate  existing potash  works6. 
About  the same time  the glass  industry  was  making  progress, and a 
Vide infra,  11. pp.  354, 355.  2  Ibid., 11. pp.  101, 102, 362, 363. 
State  Papers,  Domestic, Charles  I.,  CCLXXIX.  73 ; Cabndar, 1634-5,  p.  293 ; 
cf. infra,  11.  pp.  302-4. 
Vide infra, 11.  p.  363.  Ibid., 11. pp.  363, 364, 370, 371. 
State Papers, Domestic, Charles I., CCCVII. 84 ;  Calendar, 1635-6,  p.  38. Causes of comnbercial  Uwest  1633-5  [CHAP.  XI. 
partnership was formed with  a view to the utilizatiol~  of  coal in several 
processes1. 
It is unfortunate that there were tendencies, beginning to manifest 
themselves,  which  had  the  ultimate  effect of  checking  the  tide  of 
prosperity.  These were connected in different degrees with the ~ersonal 
government  of  Charles I.  The religious troubles not  only caused dis- 
satisfaction amongst an industrious class of  the community, but ~roduced 
a growing stream  of  emigration to the colonies, and, in a less degree, to 
the continent.  Thus the descendants of  the Walloons in  Norfolk  and 
Suffolk were forced to leave the country, and, on their obtaining excep- 
tional inducemerlts to establish themselves in the Low  Countries, they 
transplanted  their trades  therez.  Then the  question  of  tonnage  and 
poundage  remained  unsettled.  It is true that, after the dissolution  of 
the Parliament of  1629, the Crown was able to collect these duties ;  but, 
at the same time,  the friction, which  had  shown  itself,  remained  and 
gave  rise  on  the  one hand  to suppressed  dissatisfaction  amongst the 
mercantile  class, while  on  the other  it tended  to increase the risk  of 
the farmers of  the Customs and therefore to prevent the rent from rising 
with the improvement of trade. 
Moreover, government without a Parliament necessarily involved the 
cessation of  subsidies, and the position  of  the Crown finances was such 
that the Ordinary Revenue did not suffice for the expenses of  the govern- 
ment.  The deficit in 1629 was provided  for by the levying of  a forced 
loan, but it is obvious that this could be  only a temporary expedient. 
In order to estimate the situation, it is necessary to frame some calcula- 
tion of  the outlay of  the State about 1630 and the resources available 
towards meeting it.  At the beginning  of  the reign of  James I. it was 
estimated that the total Ordinary Expenditure should have been about 
2260,000, and it has already been shown that many of  the difficulties of 
his times were due to the laxity of  supervision in the disbursements of 
the  ordinary  charges and still more  by  the extent  to which  "extra- 
ordinaries"  were  permitted3.  Under  Charles I.  efforts were  made to 
reform the extravagance at the Court, and a period  of  rigid economy in 
the royal  household was begun.  At the same time,  the habit of  pro- 
fusion had been in existence for a generation, so that a complete reform 
would  have  required  many  years  and a  different  class  of  ministers. 
Allowance,  too,  must  be  made  for  the  growth  of  the  country  and 
changes which had increased the unavoidable  expenditure.  Taking all 
these  elements into account,  it may  be  estimated  that the Ordinary 
1 Federa,  XIX.  p.  189 ;  vide infra,  11.  p. 465. 
A Detection of  the Court and State of  England, by Roger Coke, 1719, I.  pp. 311, 
312. 
3 Vide supra, p.  136. 
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Expenditure  in  a  time  of  peace  would  be  about  2600,000  a yearl. 
Then as to the Extraordinary Expenditure, attention  must be  paid  to 
the fact that the years  up  to 1629-30  were  affected  by  the  cost  of 
the  various  expeditions,  when  the country  was  at war,  while  after- 
wards  the increased  attention  to the navy, which  led to the writs  for 
&ip-money, began  to manifest itself.  Probably, the fairest basis for a 
calculation of  the necessary annual amount of  the extraordinary charge 
would be  to take  the  average  of  the  three  financial  years  1627-28, 
1628-29,  1629-30,  omitting all items connected with the war as well as 
the repayment of loans.  This leaves Navy  Extraordinaries, Resumption 
of Grants, Special and Secret  Services, Gifts, Jewels and Plate, Pictures 
and Statuary, Masques, Extraordinaries for Ambassadors, Entertaining 
foreign Visitors and Sundries.  The annual average of  these items is in 
round numbers &100,0002, which, added to the ordinary charge, g'  ives a 
total  of  &?700,000 a  year.  This calculation, however,  makes  no  pro- 
vision for the payment  of  the Crown debt, which had grown to be very 
large, and which  in 1635 amounted to 21,173,1983.  To have provided 
for the extinction  of  that part, which had  been  borrowed up to 1630 
(and for the greater portion composed of anticipations and charges of  the 
various  services, accrued  due but not paid)  would have  required,  as a 
minimum  estimate,  an  addition  to  the  extraordinary  issues  of  the 
Exchequer of at least &150,000.  Therefore, the total charge, ordinary 
and extraordinary, would  have  been, with  economy, about 2850,000 a 
year, until the debt had been liquidated. 
To meet  this large  liability there  was  first  the estimated Ordinary 
Revenue,  as augmented  by the new  impositions of  James I.  Making 
allowance for the fact that there was  no  increase in the rent receivable 
from the Great Customs, it is probable  that, about 1630, the estimated 
Ordinary Revenue would not be much in excess of 8550,000 a year4.  In 
other circun~stances,  extraordinary receipts would be available to  increase 
the Ordinary Revenue.  Unfortunately, at this period, the whole of  the 
items  ux~der  this  head  consist  of  arrears  of  Parliamentary  subsidies, 
money  borrowed  and sales of  property5.  Therefore, in estimating the 
financial position, apart from  subsidies and new sources of  revenue, the 
estimated  Ordinary  Revenue  of  2550,000  was  all  that  was  strictly 
The estimated  Ordinary  Expenditure  in the year  1635, which was a time of 
great economies, was  £636,536--Ordinary  Expenditure of  the Exchequer,  printed 
by  Gardiner,  History  1028-37  (1877),  11.  p.  345. 
Ibid.,  11.  pp.  346, 347.  Ibid.,  11.  p.  350. 
The estimate  for  1635 was  £618,379  (Gardiner,  History  1628-37  (1877),  11. 
P 341) which included £30,330  composition for purveyance,  besides the proceeds of 
new sources of revenue rendered available in the interval. 
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speaking available  to meet a total charge of  about  9850,000 a year, 
leaving  an annual deficiency of  approximately  .&2300,000. 
E.~timted  normal jnancial position  of  Charles I. about  1630. 
..................  Ordinary expenditure 
Extraordinary  expenditure  without  provision  for  repay- 
..................  ment  of debt 
............  Provision for  repayment of debt 
..................  Ordinary Revenue 
Extraordinary Revenue apart from subsidies, sale of Crown  .........  property, loans or new taxation 
..................  Estimated deficiency 
It follows, then, that the policy of government without a Parliament 
involved both constitutional and financial difficulties.  The latter might 
be formulated as the problem  of  raising an additional &150,000 a year 
to meet  the annual charge,  but before providing  for the payment  of 
debt.  Including the service  of  a  sinking  fund  for  extinguishing  the 
indebtedness  of  the  Crown,  it would  have  been  necessary  to raise  a 
further &150,000 annually for a number of years, making the total sum 
to be found 2300,000 or the exact  amount  of  the estimated Ordinary 
Revenue at the beginning of  the reign of James I. 
This  estimate  only  provides  for  carrying  on  the government  on 
the same lines that had been followed  up to 1630.  Any new  develop- 
ment would  mean  an addition  to the sum  to be  raised.  The circum- 
stances, which led to the issue of  the writs for ship-money constitute, to 
a considerable extent, such an addition to the estimated annual deficiency. 
In the situation there were two  diverse elements involved.  There is no 
doubt that in  1630 the fleet was  insufficient for the protection of com- 
merce, even i11  the immediate vicinity of  the English coasts.  It is to be 
presumed that the addition to the estimated ordinary expenditure of the 
navy  as well  as  the navy  extraordinaries, amounting together  to over 
220,000 a  year,  was  intended to meet  this need2.  Superimposed  on 
l  On the whole, this estimate  is confirmed by that of  Mr Gardiner for the year 
1635.  He  calculates  the  annual  deficiency,  at that  time,  as  S118,000,  before 
provision was  made for  the payment of debt-History  1603-42 (1891), VIII.  pp. 81, 
82.  It is  to be  remembered that,  in  the interval  between  1630  and  1635,  new 
sources of revenue  had  been  made available. 
a  Estimate Ordinary Navy 1G23  ............  £20,703 
............  99  2 9  ,,  1635  41,570 
Addition to Ordinary Expenditure ............  11,867 
.........  Average Navy Extraordinaries 1627-1630  12,060 
523,927 
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this outlay, which is included  in  the previous estimates, was the idea of 
the dominion of the sea, and therefore, in so far as ship-money was devoted 
to the latter purpose,  it was not available  towards a reduction  of  the 
deficit.  Thus Charles I. was  faced by the dilemma  that, if he imposed 
this tax, he  was  compelled  to provide  increased naval forces to afford 
some justification  for the impost.  Hut, if he increased the navy, ship- 
money would leave only a small surplus, if any, towards the reduction of 
the deficit.  The most that could be expected would be the relief of  the 
existing revenue from  the recent  increase in  the charge  for  the navy. 
Supposing that this had  been feasible, the nett result of  the imposition 
of ship-money would have been to reduce the deficiency by about &20,000, 
leaving a balance of  2130,000 a year still to be provided to make ends 
meet, and that without any allowance for the reduction of  debt.  In any 
case, prior to 1635, the hypothetical surplus from  ship-money towards 
the previous additional charge for the navy, would not be available; and 
it remained  necessary  to provide  for the estimated  annual deficiency. 
Numerous  expedients  were  adopted,  which  may  be  divided  into  the 
following classes.  first, some efforts were made to augment the existing 
Customs, as for instance by an increase on the export-duty on coal of 4s. 
per chaldron in 1632l.  But in view of the recent opposition to tonnage 
and poundage, it was  obvious that this device could only be used with 
the greatest circumspection.  Then, some additional income was expected 
from trading by the Crown.  Thus Charles I. became the sole-merchant 
of gunpowder in England, which con~modity  he re-sold at a profit of  50 
per  cent.2  Similar profits were estimated  on a royal playing-card and 
dice nlonopoly ;  while  that of  tobacco,  already  in existence, was  made 
more lucrative3.  There was this to be said for the policy, that gunpowder 
was essential to the national defence, while the other commodities were 
luxuries.  Until the tobacco monopoly had been extended, although the 
ratio  of  profit  was  large,  the increase of  income  was  not great; but 
there was the danger that an attempt would be made by the Crown to 
extend  the system to some commodity  in  common  use.  This was  the 
case  with  the coal trade.  Though  the farm  of  the duties  on  it was 
described as "  the bravest  the King has4," it was  proposed at the Com- 
mittee of  Trade that he should constitute himself "  sole-merchant," but 
it was recognized that, to obtain any considerable increase in revenue, it 
State Papers, Domestic, Charles I., ccrv. 42 (1) ;  Calendar,  1631-3,  p. 200 ;  An 
HGtorical, Geoioglcal and Descriptive View  of  the  Coal Trade of  the  i'iorth  of  England, 
by Matthias Dunn, Newcastle,  1844, p. 15. 
"tate  Papers, Domestic,  Charles I., cc~xxrx.  48; Calendar, 1634-5,  p. 387. 
Bid., ccLxxxvr.  Notes by  Windebank, April 4,  1635;  Calendar,  1635,  p.  8 ; 
dde infra,  rr.  pp.  291, 202. 
* State Papers, Domestic, Charles I., ccwrxxv.-Notes  of Meeting of Lords of the 
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Therefore, for  the revenue to be increased by  a hypothetical  240,000 
would have meant a direct loss to the country ef 2200,000, to which was 
to be  added the restriction  of  industries in which  salt was  used as raw 
material.  While the scheme was  still  in  its initial stages,  fishermen, 
salters and fishmongers joined  in protesting against it, at the same time 
professing their willingness to pay any imposition  that would be  levied 
directly1.  In reply to these petitions, the promote'rs pointed  out that 
the ilnposition of  a direct tax on a commodity, ~roduced  at home, would 
raise difficult constitutional questions2; and it was eventually decided to 
issue  a charter of  incorporation, which  was  signed on  December 23rd, 
1635 constituting the "  projectors " the  Governor, Assistants  and Com- 
monalty of  the Society of  Salt-makers at the North and Sozeth Shields in 
the counties of  Durham arid Northumberland3.  By an indenture of  the 
same date, between the Crown  and the society, it was  agreed  that the 
stated price  should be £3 a wey  (or  Is. 6d. a bushel), instead of  24  as 
originallj proposed.  This arrangement  applied to all the ports,  with 
the proviso  that salt, purchased  for fishing, should  be supplied at 50s. 
the wey.  The effect  of  this stipulation would  be  to reduce the direct 
loss to the consumer to about &100,000 a year, on the supposition that 
the Crown exercised its right of  supervision and prevented the company 
from advancing the price beyond the sums stipulated4.  The preference, 
granted to the fishing trade, led to a revision of  the royalty reserved to 
the Crown, which  was  agreed  to at 3s.  4d.  the wey  for fishing salt and 
10s., as originally proposed, for the remainder  sold under the terms of 
the contract.  Finally, the arrangement was  to last definitely for three 
years, and thereafter, during the next three years, it was  determinable 
on six months notice by  the King5.  Though this grant did not apply 
directly to the Yarmouth works, provision was made for the co-operation 
of Murford and his partner, who signified their adhesion to the terlns of 
the contract in 16366. 
Another scheme of  a similar character was designed to  draw a revenue 
l  State  Papers,  Domestic,  Charles I., ccvr. 61, cccr~.  69-71; Calendars, 1631-3, 
p. 239, 1635, p.  501. 
Ibid., cccrr.  72;  Calendar, 1635, p.  501. 
Ibid., cccv.  Docquet,  Dec. 23, 1635; Calendar,  1635, p.  589. 
As a matter of fact the immediate result of the establishment of  the company 
was  to enhance  the price  of salt  at  Shields-Ibid.,  cccv111.  5;  Calendar,  1635-6, 
p.  43; An Answer  to those  Printed  Papers  published  in March  last  1640  by the late 
patentees  of Salt in their Duence and against Free Trade, composed by John  Davies, 
1641, p. 6. 
State  Papers, Domestic,  Charles  I., cccv. [Docquet], Dec.  23, 1635; C'alendar, 
1635, p. 589. 
"bid.,  cccxrx.  3;  Calendar, 1635-6,  p.  373.  Arl  account  of  the salt  and  soap 
monopolies is given in Engli,~h  Patents of Monopoly, by W. Hyde Price, Boston, 1906, 
pp. 112-28. 
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from  the soap-making industry.  At the same time there were  certain 
important differences, both in the inception and the execution of  the two 
proposals.  The beginnings of  the particular  branch  of  the soap trade, 
which  later became a matter of  national  iinportance, are  to be  dated 
from a patent of James I. of February 1623, granted for a new invention 
to make hard soap with  barilla, to which a further grant was  added a 
year later for the production  of  soft soap by sundry motions, instead of 
by boiling.  For six years nothing was heard of  the new  processes.  In 
1631 Sir Williain Russell and others alleged that they had perfected the 
earlier  invention, and a new  patent was  signed, conferring a  monopoly 
of  these processes for 14 years.  This grant was  transferred  to Sir W. 
Compton, who stated that he had discovered a method for the production 
of white soap by the use of  home materials only1.  In order to encourage 
the  syndicate,  which  had  purchased  the patent,  a  proclamation  was 
issued  in  its favour,  which  authorized  the  use  of  a  special  seal  for 
marking the new soap, with powers to enter premises in search of  any 
that was  suspected  of  infringing  the patent2. 
These  privileges  constituted  the basis,  on  which  there was  erected 
a  corporation  destined  to make  great  changes  in  the trade.  It was 
estimated  that  the  total  a~~nual  consumption  of  soap  was  at least 
10,000 tons,  of  which  5,000  tons  were  produced  in  London.  Besides 
the imported soaps, there were  only two qualities, which were described 
as "  the best,"  sold by  retail at Rid. to 3d  a lb. and "the  coarse,"  sold 
at 2d. per lb.  It was  calculated  that the foreign  commodities, used  in 
the manufacture of these, such as whale-oil and potash, came to 230,000 
a year.  Therefore, if the new soap, using rape-oil and other domestic raw 
material, were encouraged, home production in these commodities would be 
correspondingly increased.  The promoters calculated that, if  they were 
authorized  to sell their soap all round at 3d. per lb., they could  make a 
profit of  gd. per lb.  This, on the estimated productiori of 4,000 tons in 
1632,  would yield a profit of &28,000 ;  and thereafter, supposing they could 
nlonopolize the whole ~roduction,  the profit would be 270,000 a year3. 
In view  of  these  prospects,  the syndicate believed  itself  to  be  in 
a position which would justify it in making a large offer to the Crown, 
on  condition  that it obtained  still wider  privileges.  Accordingly,  in 
a petition for incorporation, an offer was made of  24  a ton as a payment 
to Charles I., or alternatively that the company was prepared to sell all 
the soap  it made  to the King's  agents.  Supposing that these  agents 
sold to the public at 3d. per lb., the profit would  have been &l5  a ton4. 
'  A  Short and  True  fiefation conce~ning  the  Soap  Business,  London,  1641, p.  4; 
Fmdera, xrx. p.  323. 
Fcedera, xrx. p.  328. 
State Papers, Domestic,  Charles I., cux.  94 ;  (Jabndar, 1631-3,  p.  263. 
Ibid., cc~v.  115; Calendar,  1631-3,  p. 213. 
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The charter  of  incorporation was  duly signed  on  January ROth, 1632, 
creating  the  patentees  the  Governors,  Assistants  and Fellows of  the 
Soci~ty  of  S0aper.s of  Westmi~tster  ; and, by an indenture of  May 3rd, it 
was agreed between  the Crown and the society that g4  per  ton should 
be paid to the former, while  the new  soap was  to be sold at 3d. per lb. 
At this stage of  the scheme, much  may be said in favour of  the policy 
of Charles I. and his advisers.  The soap of the society would encourage 
home industry, it was  believed to be equal in quality to the best of  that 
made from  train-oil  and was  not liable to become  offensive, if  stored. 
Further, the Crown was  within  its rights  in  bargaining  for a  share  in 
the econonlies anticipated from  the new  invention; since, in  so  far as 
the soap of  the society displaced that already in use, there would be loss 
of  the Customs on imported potash, which were fixed at a comparatively 
high  rate1.  It would  appear,  too,  that on  this  supposition, while  the 
consumer might suffer to some slight extent in price, he would gain in 
quality.  Averaging the cost of  the old soap at Rid. per lb., there would 
be  a  direct  loss  to consunlers, on  an  output of  5,000  tons,  of  about 
283,000 a year.  Since the cost  of  production  was  calculated  at Rid. 
per  lb.,  the  manufacturers'  profit  on  the  same  quantity  would  be 
&35,000, out of  which &20,000  was  payable to the Crown.  Finally, 
the nett gain to the Revenue would be the latter sum, less the deduction 
of  any decline in the Customs on potash and oil. 
It follows,  then, that at the beginning of  the year  1632 the whole 
question  turned  on the quality of  the new soap.  In April 1632 a trial 
had been made by a committee of  Aldermen of  London, which  reported 
that it would wash  coarse linen as well as the best  sort of  ordinary soft 
soap.  They added, however, that more labour  was  required, and  that, 
generally speaking, the new  soap was far inferior  to the old!  In spite 
of  this unfavourable verdict, the society obtained a proclan~ation,  dated 
June 28th,  1652, which  empowered  it to appoint a  searcher, who  was 
authorized  to forbid  the sale of  any  soap,  which  did not conform  to 
a standard which  he himself  fixed.  Thus the soap-boilers were  placed 
at  the mercy of  their competitors3. 
The soap-boilers were  men  of  energy and possessed  of  considerable 
wealth.  They were not prepared to acquiesce in the domination of  the 
trade by the Soapers of  Westminster.  Complaints of the new soap were 
frequent.  It was said to burn  the hands of  the washer-women, and to 
destroy linen4.  Half  of  it was stated to be lime and chalk5, and crowds 
A  History  of  the  Custom-Revenue of  England, by  Hubert  Hall,  London,  1892, 
11. p. 250. 
State Papers, Domestic,  Charles I., ccxv. 111 ; Cabndar, 1631-3,  p. 321. 
Federa, xrx. p. 383. 
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of  women  and "mean  persons"  marched  through the City, circulating 
these  statements  and others of  like  nature1.  Another trial was  made, 
on  this  occasion  by  the  Lord  Mayor  who  certified that the new  soap 
was as good as the old, and this verdict was  supported by the testimony 
of  some eighty persons, varying in rank  from  countesses to laundresses2. 
The machinery of the Star-Chamber was  brought to bear on soap-boilers, 
who  did  not  submit  to the assay-master?  Any  part of  the defences 
entered, which  was  held  to reflect  on  the new  soap, was  ordered  to be 
suppressed  as  "impertinent"  or  "scandalous4."  Even  a  shopkeeper, 
who  embodied  the complaints  of  his  customers in a petition, was  com- 
mitted to Newgate5. 
More conviilcing evidence of  the failure  in  the manufacture of  the 
new  soap is to be  found in the course of  prices.  Already  in January 
1634 it is recorded in a proclamation that the old soap was then sold at 
"  intolerable  rates6,"  and in July of  the same year  it fetched 6d. per lb. 
in London and was  as high as 1Od. and even  Is. in the country7.  Such 
an  increase  of  price  points  to the silent  working  of  economic forces, 
which  fixed the value  of  the new  soap  much  below  that of  the old 
"coarse" variety with  the result that, when on the one side the former 
was  to be sold at 3d. per lb. and the output of  the latter was  restricted 
by seizures, the price inevitably  advanced.  Under these circumstances, 
there is little wonder that it is recorded in September  1GS4  that there 
were more soap-boilers than evers. 
The rise in the price  of  old soap introduced a new  element into the 
situation.  It is  clear  that, if  the creation  of  the society  of  Soapers 
caused a general rise in the value of  the product of  the boilers, it would 
be  to the  advantage  of  some  of  these  to obtain  licenses  under  the 
society.  By this means  the boilers, who compounded, would be exempt 
from the arbitrary exactions of  the assay-master, and they would know 
what quota they would  be permitted to produce.  In 1634 the agents 
of  the  society were  busy  seizing  unsealed  soap  in  Bristol,  Taunton, 
Kingston-on-Hull and other places.  Many boilers, both in London and 
l State Papers, Domestic,  Charles I., ~~LII.  21 ;  Calendar,  1633-4,  p.  316. 
Ibid.,  CCLIV.  34,  34  (1);  Culendar,  1633-4,  pp.  337,  338;  Federa,  xrx. 
p. 509. 
Federa, xrx. p. 506. 
State Papers, Domestic, Charles I.,  ccxxxvrr. 46 ;  ccx~rv.  24 ; Calendar, 1633-4, 
pp. 30, 172, 173. 
Ibid., C~LIX.  59; Culendar, 16334, pp. 437, 444, 461, 515. 
Federa, x~x.  D. 510.  This is the longest proclamation in the Collection of the 
Society of Anti~uaries. 
Federa, xrx. p. 566. 
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the provinces, agreed  to work  under  the orders  of  the society.  Two 
different kinds of  agreements were  made.  In a few instances the boiler 
was bound to sell the new  soap, receiving a salary from the society1.  In 
most  cases,  he  undertook  to ~roduce  a  certain  specified  quantity per 
annum, paying the royalty of  24  to the Crown  and a percentage to the 
society.  In Bristol, for instance, the quota of  the boilers was 600 tons, 
which was produced on these terms2. 
The  later  modifications  of  the  scheme  involved  changes  in  the 
positions of  the different  interests.  Obviously, if  the soap-boilers were 
forced to pay the same duty to the Crown as the society, and were also 
to be  liable for the cost of  licenses,  it might be  cheaper  for them  to 
deal  with  the King directly,  and it was  not long  before  negotiations 
were opened.  Then the exaction of  the payment of  g4  a ton, from all 
the chief  makers of  soap, would  tend to augment the sum due to the 
Crown.  These  sums  were  collected  by  the society, and,  if  it became 
involved in financial difficulties or  if  there was  dishonesty, the share of 
Charles I.  might  not be  readily  recovered.  There  is  no  doubt  that, 
through the opposition to the monopoly, the expenses were much greater 
than had  been  expected3, but on  the other  side of  the account there 
should  have  been  an  increase  in  revenue  from  the payments  of  the 
compounding  boilers.  Lastly,  there  were  the consumers, who  suffered 
necessarily from the rise in price.  This seems to have affected different 
districts in  varying  degrees, but every indication  points  to a  general 
advance which in some places was very great, amounting to 200 per cent. 
In the chief  soap-using towns, qualities, that had  cost  2d.  before  the 
patent, sold at 4d., and those that had been 22d. were now 5d. and even 
6d.4  If, for purposes of  a rough estimate, the advance be averaged at 
Rd.  per lb. (i.e. from 24d. to 44d.) the direct loss to the consumer would 
be  about 2140,000  a  year  on  a  reduced  consumption  of  7,500  tons. 
Therefore, at the beginning of  1635, taking the payments to the Crown, 
that were due from the monopolies in starch, coal, salt and soap, almost 
280,000 a year  gross might be  expected.  This was  raised  on a rough 
estimate at a direct  loss  of  between 2200,000 and 2300,000 a year  to 
the consumer, to which is to be added the further loss falling on trades 
affected by  the artificial  increase in  prices.  The general  consequence 
was  that a hypothetical  increase of  revenue of  280,000 certaillly cost 
the consumer at  least &'200,000.  It may have been  that the payments, 
made by  the monopolies, did  not exceed  the very  moderate  amounts 
l  State Papers, Domestic,  Charles I., ccc~vr.  147 ;  Calendar, 1637, p.  127. 
Ibid.,  cccvrrr. 15 ; Calendar, 1635-6,  p.  45. 
a  A Short and True 12elution ofthe  Soap Businexs, p.  10. 
Federa, xrx. p.  566; cf. State Papers,  Domestic,  Charles I.,  ccccx~rx.  36 (1); 
C'alendar,  1639-41,  pp.  601, 602. 
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recorded in the accounts of  the Exchequer, but there is evidence which 
tends  to show  that  many  of  the  payments  due  were  dealt  with  in 
a  manner  which  renders  thein  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  trace. 
When  the sum, reserved  to the Crown, consisted of  a fixed yearly rent, 
it was assigned to some creditor, to whoa the patentees were  authorized 
to pay  it direct-this  was  the case  with  the rent reserved  under  the 
grant to the starch-makers1.  Where the amount  receivable was  con- 
tingent on the output (as in the case  of  the society of  Soapers), money 
was borrowed on account of  the income expected, and thus the gain to 
the Crown  might  not appear  under  its proper  head,  or  would  not be 
traceable except in a reduction of  general  indebtedaess2.  Even making 
allowance for such  increase in  the apparent  profits of  the Crown  from 
these  monopolies,  the  actual  receipts  fell  considerably  short  of  the 
original estimates, so that the loss to the consumer was  great, while the 
gain of  the Crown was relatively very small. 
Applying these data to the financial situation from 1630 to 1635, it 
will be apparent that some reduction  in the adverse balance was effected. 
At first, the bulk of the improvement was due to the receipts from fines. 
Thus  in  the financial  year  1630-31  a  sum  of  274,311  was  actually 
received  from  compositions for  knighthood, and in  the following year 
280,997 was  obtained from the same source3.  As yet, the income from 
the new monopolies, increased taxes and offices for the alleged supervising 
of  trade was  not great,  so  that the total income to be  added to the 
estimate  for  the  year  1630 would  not  exceed  ~100,000,  leaving  a 
deficiency  of  250,000,  before  provision  was  made for the payment  of 
debt.  In 1632-3  fines for knighthood had fallen to 212,007, but there 
was  an exceptional  payment  of  over  250,000  from  Ireland,  whereby 
this year  was  only slightly below the average of  1630-2.  In the two 
succeeding  years  (1633-4,  1634-5),  the  fines  only  yielded  a  small 
amount; and, making  allowance  for  the undisclosed revenue from  the 
society of  Soapers and other grants, it seems probable that the deficiency 
was about 2100,000 in each year. 
At  the beginning of  1635 the condition of  the finances was alarming. 
The debt, which had been very large in 1628, had been increased by the 
deficits of the intervening years, and future income had been anticipated, 
State Papers,  Domestic, Charles I., c~xxx.  23; Calendar,  1629-31,  p.  430. 
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in some cases, until the end of  163Y1.  The position  soon engaged the 
attention  of  Laud,  and  steps  were  taken  to  increase  the  estimated 
revenue.  In spite of  the protestations of  the society of  Soapers, it was 
compelled to undertake  to increase the sum, payable to the Crown, by 
22  a ton (i.e.  from g4  to 86)  for the next two years, and thereafter to 
f  8 per ton2.  The immediate  effect of  this fresh modification would be 
to make the royalty about 830,000 a year, or an addition of  ~6'10,000. 
Then the payments arranged with the salt-makers were now accruing to 
the extent of  about 230,000 a year.  A further increase was  made in 
the Customs, which  was  expected  to produce  an addition of  830,000 
a year, and the tobacco monopoly was  raised by &20,0003.  Augmenta- 
tions were also made in the rent from the tin  farm, from playing-cards, 
from  the  Forest  of  Dean  and  from  the sale  of  dyewood4.  A  large 
revenue was  anticipated  from  a  proposal  for a  monopoly of  making5. 
Altogether, the effect of  these impositions  of  various kinds would  have 
been, had anticipations been fulfilled, to make the normal revenue suffice 
to meet the normal  charge, leaving a small estimated surplus available 
for the reduction of debt. 
The finance of  the advisers of  Charles I. was in its essence a system 
of  indirect  taxation  of  commodities, produced  at home,  and  that too 
raised in a most wasteful manner by the grant of  very wide privileges to 
so-called  trading  societies,  which  were  brought  into  being  for  the 
collection of  the money accruing to the Crown  and which  secured  for 
themselves large profits6.  Both the new revenue and these profits were 
obtained, not only at the expense of  the consumer, but also at that of 
the trader and manufacturer.  In 1636 and 1637 industry had begun to 
feel the effect of  these grants.  The great staple trade-that  in wool- 
suffered doubly through the manipulation of  the soap-trade, first in the 
increased cost of  that commodity and secondly by the scarcity of  potash 
which  was  due  to  the  suspension  of  imports  and  the  demands  on 
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home-supplies by the society of soapers and the King's  saltpetre makers'. 
Similarly,  the restriction  of  the production  of  old  soap was  a  serious 
blow to the Greenland company, since the chief  consumption of  train- 
oil was that of  the soap-boilers2.  The operations of  the salt-monopoly 
were  prejudicial  to  the  Fishery  society,  and  in  1636-7  both  these 
undertakings  were  in difficulties3.  The same policy affected  the other 
trading bodies.  The tobacco  inonopoly was  highly  detrimental to the 
Bermuda company4 ;  while the East India merchants were  exceptionally 
unfortunate, in  so far as they failed  to provide what was  judged  to be 
their  share  towards the royal  necessities and, as  a  consequence, at the 
end of  1635 a rival  company was  authorized, in which Charles I. was to 
receive a share of  the profits.  The result was a fall in the price of  the 
stock to SO5.  A  similar  breach of  faith is shown  in the treatment  of 
the  New  River  company.  Under  the  agreement  with  James  I.  the 
Crown was entitled to one-half the profit.  In 1631 Charles I. commuted 
his right for an annual rent of 2500 a year, and he immediately granted 
facilities  to rival  schemes,  which  promised  larger  payments6.  The 
position  of  two companies was  exceptional.  The African Adventurers 
were  not greatly affected by  the various  interferences with  trade, and 
the difficulties of  that company are to be attributed to want of  capital'. 
The original  Russian  trade (which  was  now  carried on  by  a  separate 
company, apart from whaling) was one of  the few  joint-stock companies 
which  gained at this period, since the increase in  the supplies for  the 
navy meant an added demand for the chief goods it importeds. 
A preliminary  warning  of  the cessation of  prosperity,  through  the 
increased cost of production and the dislocation of  trade, was occasioned 
by  the  plague  of  1636-7"  The  tendency  towards  depression  was 
accentuated  by  religious  troubles in  Scotland in 1637-8,  and in  these 
years there were symptoms of  a minor crisis, which was  the precursor of 
that  of  1640.  The  parallel  between  the  two  decades  1610-20  and 
1630-40  is,  in  several  respects,  remarkably  close.  Both  began  with 
great activity  in  trade, which  developed towards  fishing and drainage 
enterprizes.  In either period  there is the same tendency to stake the 
State Papers,  Domestic, Charles I., cccxlx. 42, cccxxr~.  51 ;  G'alendar, 1635-6, 
pp.  383, 465. 
Vide infra,  11.  p.  71;  State Papers,  Domestic,  Charles I.,  cctxxrx.  71, 72; 
G'alendar,  1634-5,  pp.  392, 393. 
Vide infra, rx.-pp. 71, 366. 
Ibid.,  11. p,  201. 
Ibid., 11. p.  127.  Ibid., 1x1. p.  25. 
Ibid., rr. p.  15.  8  Ibid., 11. pp.  65, 66. 
"The  number  of deaths  in  both  years from plague  in  London  was  13,482- 
Natural and Political  Observations. ..upon the Bill8 of  Mortulity, by Capt. John Graunt, 
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future of  an important trade on  the success of  a new  process.  Again, 
there are the same dangerous  offices  of  supervision, the same arbitrary 
imprisonments, in  the early ~eriod  of  gold  and silver thread-maken, in 
the  later  of  the soap-boilers.  Still more  remarkable,  the serious in- 
dustrial crises, which began in 1620 and in 1640, were prefaced by minor 
ones about three years earlier, namely in 1617 and in 1637. 
If there were any of  the advisers of  the Crown, who saw that trade 
was  already bearing as many burdens  as  it could carry without  serious 
danger, the necessities of  the Exchequer  made it impoisible to heed the 
warning.  Pressure  was  put  on  the  existing  monopolies  to force the 
holders to increase their royalties.  The society of  Soapers was  unable 
to make good  its  promises of  the  increased  royalty,  and  the  boilers 
renewed  their  offer  of  28 per  ton  to  the  Crown,  together  with  an 
advance of 210,000 and security for 240,000.  The  Westminster company 
signified its readiness to surrender  its charter, whereupon its rivals were 
incorporated in May 1637 as the  Governor, Assistants and Commonnlty 
of  the Soap-makers of  London, as a regulated company1.  The reinstated 
soap-boilers undertook to take over the houses and stock of the dissolved 
company at the valuation  of  the latter, which  amounted  to 223,050, 
and also to pay  £40,000  for  the goodwill  of  the monopoly2.  There 
can be no possible defence of  the action of  the Crown  in accepting the 
offer of  the soap-boilers.  When  the original agreement  was  made  in 
1632, it could have been urged that the royalty, payable  to the Crown, 
might be secured, without  injury to the producer  or to the consumer, 
by the economies of a  new  process.  The economies, as a matter of  fact, 
had  not  become  actual;  and  the new  company,  working  by  its old 
methods,  would  be  forced,  in  justice  to itself,  to recover  the Crown- 
royalty as well  as the sums paid  to the members of  the late society of 
Soapers.  Moreover, when it obtained a monopoly, it was  not in human 
nature  for  the soap-boilers  to abstain from  obtaining pecuniary  com- 
pensation for their past sufferings by surreptitiously advancing prices, in 
spite of  proclamations to the contrary effect.  Therefore, it follows that 
the consumer was  destined  to pay  heavily  for  the disturbance  of  the 
trade during the past five years ;  and, until the abolition  of  monopolies 
of  this character, the price was  close upon  double what it had been  in 
16303. 
In other commodities there were  similar  increased  demands by the 
Crown, which  led  to very  great rises  in prices.  By 1638 the farm  of 
1 State Papers, Domestic, Charles I., CCCLVII.  171 ;  Laud,  Works, ut suyra, VII. 
pp. 318, 326, 336 ;  Gardiner, History, 1603-42  (1891), VIII.  p.  284. 
2  A Short and  True Relution of the Soap Business, pp.  24-6. 
3 State Papers,  Domestic, Charles I.,  ccccx~~x.  36  (I.),  (11.);  Calendar, 1639-40, 
p. 601. 
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wine and currants had been advanced to over 260,000, and the vintners 
were compelled to pay the King 230,000 a year1.  Naturally, the result 
of  this  tax  was  a  marked  rise  in  prices,  and  the same  consequence 
followed  a  patent  for  searching  for  leather  shipped,  laded,  tanned, 
curried,  bought  or  sold  contrary to the law, which  had  been  granted 
early in 163g2.  Two other monopolistic companies deserve notice,  the 
one that of the Starch-makers, incorporated in 1638, which was  the only 
body in this group constituted on a strictly joint-stock basis.  Its capital 
was 25,000, and the reserved rent to the Crown, beginning at 21,500 
and rising  to 23,500, was  to be paid  before any dividend was  made to 
the shareholders.  This grant was  justified  as one  in favour  of  a  new 
invention, and rates for the sale of  starch were  fixed3.  How easily such 
rates were  evaded is shown  in the case  of  the coal  trade.  The inner 
monopoly  of  some  of  the  Host-men  at Newcastle  had  produced  an 
increase in price  at London  and  along  the east  coast.  For  instance, 
coal, used  by  the salt-~ans  at Shields, had  advanced  by  about  40 per 
cent.4  In 1637 there was  a  dispute  between  the specially  privileged 
Host-men, who supplied the London market, and the shippers, relative 
to what was  known  as  the "gift  coal,"  which  was  an old  allowance of 
five  chaldrons,  thrown  in  without  payment,  upon  every  20 chaldrons 
purchased.  On  the  complaint  of  the  shippers  that  they  no  longer 
received  the full  measure of  "gift  coal,"  the Privy Council intervened 
and ordered  that this allowance should be abolished and that a further 
duty of  1s. per  chaldron was  to be paid  to the Crown.  The effect  of 
this ingenious device was  that, whereas formerly  the King received 20s. 
on 25 chaldrons  (counted as RO),  he would  now obtain 50s.  Since the 
price  at Newcastle  remained  nominally  fixed at 11s. per  chaldron, the 
merchant would  have  to pay  275s.  for  the 25 chaldrons he  had been 
supposed  to  obtain  previously  at  ~ROS.~  The ship-masters  naturally 
objected, protesting their right to a free  and open  trade, at the same 
time  offering an  annual  payment  of  &3,000  a  year,  in  lieu  of  the 
proposed additional impost and petitioning for a charter of  incorpora- 
tion6.  On  April  4th,  1638, the ofXer  to the Crown  was  increased  to 
Gardiner, History, 1603-42  (1891), ~III.  p. 287. 
State Papers, Domestic, Charles I., ccccxv. [Docquet],  March 29,1639, ccccxxv~~. 
101 ;  Calendars, 1638-9,  p.  624, 1639, p. 464. 
Ibid., cccc~v.  [Docqwts], Grant of incorporation  and Indenture of covenants, 
both  dated  Dec.  13,  1638; Calendar,  1638-9,  p.  165; Proclamation for  the  well 
rrit.  Mus. 816.  m .  13  ordering  of  the  making of  white  starch 
163 
L  -I 
State Papers, Domestic, Charles I., cc~xxxrx.  109 ;  Calendar, 1635, p. 101. 
"bid.,  cccLvrr. 111 ;  Calendar, 1637, pp.  159, 160. 
Ibid., ccc~xxxv.  28; C'alendar, 1637-8,  p.  295. The  Coal-shippirzg Monopoly  1638-9 
&10,000 a year',  and on May 2nd it was arranged that a corporation of 
ship-masters for supplying London with  coal should be  erected, subject 
to the proviso  that the new  body should not charge  more than 17s. per 
chaldron  in  summer  or  than  19s.  in  winter2, this  being  a  material 
reduction  in  the recent  price, which had been  26s. the chaldron at the 
ship's  sides.  At the  beginning  of  the  winter  1638-9,  there  were 
nunlerous coinplaints of  the "  immoderate price of  coal."  The recently 
constituted company maintained that sales were  made at the price fixed 
in the agreement with the Crown, while the brokers and other middlemen 
also potested that they each  received  no  more  than the normal  profit. 
Still the consumer  was  forced  to pay  more  than  formerly, and it was 
necessary to appoint a committee to ascertain how the advance had been 
effected.  This body distributed the blame over all the interests involved 
in the handling of the coal.  The company of  shippers adopted a device 
of nominally selling a cargo at 19s. the chaldron, while there was a secret 
understanding that 21s. the chaldron should actually be paid.  Through 
division  into  smaller  measures,  the  various  middlemen  retained  3s. 
amongst  them,  so  that  the  consumer,  who  bought  in  comparatively 
small  quantities,  had  to pay  at the rate  of  24s.  the chaldron4.  The 
whole inquiry is instructive, as showing  the futility of  the limitation of 
prices added to monopolistic grants, in which  the Crown exacted a tax 
that could  not be  paid  without a  considerable  advance in quotations. 
At the  same  time,  it is  interesting  to notice  that,  although  many 
monopolies were  recalled  by proclamation  in  1639, none were  included 
which were either actually producing, or which were expected to produce, 
any considerable revenue6. 
It was  about this period  that the various  patents  were 
the maximum  estimated revenue.  Including the different taxes  levied 
upon the home  trade, either by monopolistic  grants to combii~ations  of 
producers,  to municipalities  and to officers  for  thc  supervision  of  in- 
dustry,  it  is  calculated  that  2200,000  a  year  was  payable  to  the 
Exchequere.  According  to another  account,  based  on  the  income 
1 State Papers,  Domestic, Charles I., cccr,xxxv~r.  19; Calendar, 1637-8, p. 347. 
"bid.,  ccc~xxx~x.  17; Calendar, 1637-8,  p.  397. 
3  Ibid., cccxc. l ; C'alendar, 1637-8,  p.  422; England's  Grievance  Discovered  in 
relation  to  the  Coal  Trade, by  Ralph  Gardner,  London,  1655  (reprint Philipson, 
North Shields,  1849)) pp.  92, 93. 
4  State  Papers,  Domestic,  Charles  I., ccccr.  18,  27,  77, ccccrl.  4;  Calendar, 
1638-9, pp. 88, 91, 104, 106; Analytical Indexes to vols.  11.  and VIII.  of.  ..the fZemern-  . -- 
brancia, pp.  98, 99. 
Fcedera,  xx.  p.  340;  Enylish  Patents  of  Monopoly,  by  W. Hyde  Price, 
pp.  173-5. 
6 The  Royal  Treasury  of  England,  London,  1725,  p.  281.  On the other  hand 
Clarendon, History of the Rebellion, Oxford,  1712, I. p. 68, puts the whole sum "drawl1 
from the subject"  at this amount. 
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accrued in 1640-41,  the total of  the grants, then in being but exclusive 
of  those  relating  to salt,  silk,  starch,  gold-thread  and  powder,  was 
&120,955l.  It need scarcely be added that the Exchequer only received 
a  portion  of  this amount.  Some  of  the "projectors"  failed  to make 
their  schemes  profitable,  others  it  is  to  be  feared  were  dishonest. 
Moreover, in the growing financial difficulties, the Treasury had become 
disorganized;  and payments which were due, but were difficult to collect, 
became  involved  "in  a  circular motion  from  office  to office,"  without 
effective pressure being brought to bear on the defaulters2.  Then, when 
the Ordinary Revenue  had  been  anticipated  to a remarkable  degree- 
such as the alum  profits which, in 1640, were drawn in advance to 1645 
and those  of  the wine  liccnse till  16513-it  was  a  distinct  convenience 
for  the  Crown  to borrow  on  the  security  of  the  income  from  the 
nlonopolies, and the payments, made by the patentees, were  collected by 
the creditor.  Under these  circumstances, it is impossible to determine, 
even  approximately,  the benefit  received  by the King from  the whole 
group of  monopolies.  All that can be said is that it cannot have  been 
very great, but that at the same  time it must  have  been  considerable. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  injury  to 
consumers, as a  whole, by the rise  in  prices  was  immense.  An  effort 
was  made, in  the Rem~~strance  of  the  Cornrno~~s  of  December lst, 1641, 
to calculate the annual loss by the four great monopolies which  affected 
the soap, salt, wine and leather trades.  This was estimated at a million 
a year, to which uras to be added that of  all the rest "which,  if  it could 
be  exactly computed, would  make  up a  great sum4."  The cost to the 
consumer, occasioned by the four chief monopolies, is divided as follows- 
soap  6100,000,  wine 2300,000 "while  the leather  must  needs  exceed 
both and salt could be no less than that."  It is natural-indeed  almost 
inevitable-to  distrust the statement of a controversial document of this 
character, but the figures, already adduced, tend to show that, as far as 
soap  was  concerned, there was  a  rise  in price  which would  have  meant 
an average loss to consumers of over ~100,000  ayear5.  The interference 
with the leather-trade was comparatively brief;  and the meagre  records 
of  prices,  which  survive,  do  not  support  the  increase  stated  in  the 
Remonstrance.  It is probable that in the remaining cases-those  of  salt 
and the wine-trade-there  is some over-statement but that the advance 
in  rice occasioned a very great annual loss.  With regard to the latter, 
it is to be noted  that Pym, in his speech of  April 17th, 1641, estimated 
Vide infra, 111. p.  528. 
State Papers, Domestic, Charles I., cccc~xxx.  85; Calendar, 1640-1,  p. 592. 
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the annual loss through the rise in price at  &232,000, of  which the King 
received  &30,000  and the farmers made  a  profit of  k'80,0001.  It has 
already been shown  that the proposals for the creation of  the society of 
Salters would in 1635 have cost the consumers at least 2200,000a.  By 
l640 this patent had  been  surrendered; and, during the later years of 
the society, there had been complaints of  the great price of certain kinds 
of  salt.  Although this society  was  dissolved, the monopoly remained, 
and the new  undertakers,  incorporated  in  1639 as the  Corporation  of 
Salters in the Salt  Works near Great  Yarmouth, had no reason to reduce 
valuess.  Therefore collating the statistics available, relating to the total 
consumption and the rise in prices of  the commodities affected between 
1628-30  and 1638-40, it may be estimated that the advance at the later 
date meant a difference, against  consumers, of  at least three-quarters  of 
a million a year. 
The question  remains  as  to how  far  this  rise  in  prices  is  to be 
attributed to the action of  the monopolistic  grants, since it is possible 
that this phenomenon  might  have  been  only  one  aspect  of  a  general 
movement  towards  a  higher  level  of  values.  Fortunately,  there  is 
sufficient evidence to decide this problem, by  separating the commodities 
acted on by monopolies from those that were unaffected, or influenced by 
these  in a very slight degree.  Prominent in the latter groups are the 
great  staple  products,  grain  and  wool.  Comparing  the  ten  years 
1621-30  with 1631-40  the increase in the price of  wheat is only about 
2 per cent. in the later decade, while the highest quotation of the twenty 
years is in the earlier period"  Wool, according to Rogers, was station- 
ary5.  Moreover, the scarcity of  silver about 16366, in conjunction with 
the slackening  of  trade, would  tend pro  tanto towards  a  lower  rather 
than a higher level of  general  prices.  It follows that the loss, arising 
out of  the increase in the cost  of  monopolized commodities, is  to be 
assigned, almost altogether, to the influence of  these monopolies. 
The pressure of  the rise in prices of  the goods affected was wholly 
out of  proportion to the benefit accruing to the Exchequer.  Assuming 
that benefit (either as disclosed in the accounts or not) to have been  in 
the  two  most  fruitful years  P100,OOO  a  year,  the position  might  be 
1  State  Papers,  Domestic,  Charles  I.,  cccc~.  108 ; Calendar,  1640,  p.  47 ; 
Rushworth,  Collections, 111.  p.  1136. 
Vide supra,  p.  209. 
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stated in the following terms1.  Of  the whole revenue, other than that 
from this source, the only portion  that could  be  described as consisting 
of  taxation  was  the Customs.  Since the cost of  collection was  about 
one-sixth2 of  the total duties,  a  tax on consumers of  about 2420,000 
produced  2350,000.  To add a  possible  extra  2100,000,  by  indirect 
taxation through  monopolies, cost the people, if  the foregoing estimate 
is well-founded, at least  three-quarters  of  a  million-that  is  in  other 
words nearly twice as much as their previous burden, or about the same 
sum as all the receipts of the Exchequer from all other sources. 
It cannot be a matter for surprise that the pressure of the monopolies 
was  a powerful influence in alienating the affections of  his subjects from 
Charles I., and also, when he appealed to the arbitrament of  the sword, 
in depriving him of  the support of the mercantile classes.  A quantita- 
tive  valuatioil  of  the injury, inflicted  on industry by  this policy, gives 
reality  to  expressions  that  seem  to  be  the  outpourings  of  excited 
rhetoric.  When account is taken of the increase of  the direct burden in 
rise of  price  by the curtailment  of  trade, a reason  can  be  seen  for the 
complaints  that commerce  alike in London,  the provincial  towns  and 
the country  was  "greatly  decayed"  through this cause,  and that the 
merchants  were  much  impoverished  by their estates  being "  squeezed" 
from  them by the agents of  the monopolists3.  For these  reasons, the 
nation  was  described  as  "groaning  under  the mountainous weight  of 
these  exactions,"  or  as  being  overrun  "with  swarms  of  projecting 
cankerworms4."  Indeed,  according  to  one  writer,  "it  was  a  thing 
somewhat  dangerous  for  merchants,  foreign  or  native,  to  export  or 
import  merchandize  upon  paynlent  of  the ancient  Customs.. .without 
a second fee or fine to Sir John, Sir Paul or Sir Thomas5." 
When matters were  in this condition and the nation was  distracted 
by political unrest, any untoward events would  result in a serious crisis. 
Such causes were  not wanting in  the sumiller of  1640.  Charles I. was 
in  great  straits through  want  of  funds.  The  royal  treasury  was  in 
danger  of  bankruptcy, if  Parliament chose to be  obstructive.  Out of 
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a total  revenue  of  6862,660, only  2334,480 was  certain, and, of  this, 
g267,454 had been  anticipated.  Therefore, Charles I., apart from the 
grant  of  tonnage  and  poundage,  could only  count  on  receipts to the 
meagre amount of  967,026, against a normal expenditure of  about ten 
times that amount1.  London, disgusted by the attack on its property 
in  Irelanda and  suffering  from  a  slackening  of  trade,  for  which  the 
King's  advisers  were  blamed,  refused  to  make  advances.  After  en- 
deavouring to borrow without  success from the Pope, Spain, France and 
Genoa, he had before him a proposal to debase the coinage.  Rejecting 
this  scheme,  he  seized  bullion  to the value  of  2130,000,  lodged  by 
goldsmiths and merchants at the mint  in the month  of  July3, and in 
August the stock of pepper of  the East India company4.  The abstraction 
of  the bullion  caused  a serious crisis,  for  it represented a part of  the 
metallic reserve of  the London  traders.  Credit had been shaken by the 
breach with Scotland, and foreign merchants had been  steadily reducing 
their commitments in England5.  The sudden diversion of  this bullion 
prevented  many,  engaged  in  commerce  abroad,  from  meeting  bills  of 
exchange  they  had  accepted.  The protestation  of  these  bills  led  to 
a  cessation  of  shipments  of  coin  to  London.  This  reacted  on  the 
exchange-"  the only sinews and livelihood of  all trade."  The disorder 
of  trade abroad afected the home market.  The crisis was followed by 
failures,  and the purchases  of  cloth  and  other  goods for  exportation 
were  greatly reduced6.  Bankruptcies became numerous;  and, with the 
suspension of credit, the amount of  losses inultiplied7. 
It is characteristic of  the period  from 1631-40  that the joint-stock 
companies gained less from the prosperity of  the times than might have 
been  expected,  unless  allowance is made  for  the interference, to which 
most of  them were  subjected, and for the peculiar  circumstances of  the 
case.  Even  at the beginning  of  these  years  of  prosperity,  trade had 
begun  to be  affected by  the coming  political  strife, and  most  of  the 
recently formed undertakings were influenced by this tendency.  Besides 
the  Massachusetts  Bay  company,  the  Adventurers  for  the Mosquito 
Islands were  mainly  Puritans;  while,  on  the other hand,  the Fishery 
society, the African  company  and  the  new  association  for  the  India 
trade were formed by the Court party.  Such divisions were likely to be 
l  Vide infra, 111. pp. 528, 529. 
Ibid., 11. p.  341. 
History of  the Bank of Engkund, by A. Andre'adks, London, 1909, p.  18. 
Vide infra, 11. p.  116. 
State Papers, Domestic, Charles I., cccc~xxv111.  86; Calendar, 1640-1,  p.  524; 
Rushworth, C'ollections, v. p.  233. 
State  Papers,  Domestic,  Charles  I.,  cccc~x~.  104 ;  Calendar,  1640, pp.  543, 
544. 
St Hihry's Tears, 1642,  in Harleian Miscellany,  11. p.  199. 
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disadvantageous  to any organization  of  traders.  Besides, the tendency 
of  the Crown  to make  sudden  changes  in privileges,  already granted, 
produced an unsettling effect, more especially on the companies immedi- 
ately affected.  The East India undertaking was  especially unfortunate. 
No  sooner had  the evil  effects of  the competition  of  the Dutch  been 
followed by the brighter era of  the Persian Voyages than profits again 
suffered by the licensing  of  Courten's  Association  at the end of  1635. 
For this reason profits declined, and the showing of  the ten years from 
1631 to 1640 was,  on  the  whole,  poor.  The aggregate  gains  of  the 
Second and Third Persian  Voyages  and of  the Third Joint-Stock, for 
this  period,  amounted  to  about  2300,000.  Meanwhile  the  Dutch 
company had  paid  dividends of  between  four and five times as much in 
the same ten years1.  Possibly, in  this calculation, allowance should be 
made  for  the results  of  Courten's  Association,  so  as  to  compare  the 
return on English capital, invested in  this trade, against  that employed 
in  Holland.  Though  at first  Courten's  syndicate  made  profits,  these 
were succeeded by large losses before 1640, so that it is doubtful  if  any 
thing can  be  added  to the account  of  the  English  profits  from  this 
sourcea.  The consequence of  the treatment of  this  trade by Charles I. 
was not only a meagre return on the capital employed3, but a weakening 
of the position of the English in the East. 
For  various  reasons  by  1640 a  number  of  other  companies  had 
suffered loss, and some were  either wound up, or on the verge of  failure. 
The Greenland company and the Fishery  society were  bankrupt'.  In 
1638 the Russia  company was  again  in debt, and the payment  of  an 
assessment on  the stock was  only enforced by  the imprisonment  of  the 
governor5.  The Bermuda  company was  weighted  by the manipulation 
of  the  tobacco  trade  by  the Crowns.  Fortunately  there  were  some 
exceptions.  About 1636 a fresh discovery of  silver was  made in Wales 
and  was  mined  by  a  subsidiary  company  of  the Mines  Royal  which 
met with some success7.  In spite of  the encouragement of  rival water- 
supply  schemes  by  Charles  I., the  New  River  company  was  able  to 
commence the payment  of  satisfactory dividends.  In 1623 the return 
on  the nominal  value of  an  adventurer's  share  appears  to have  been 
under  4 per  cent.,  rising  to 41 per  cent. from  1631 to 1633, while  by 
1640 it had  increased  to over  l2P per  cent.'  The company  for  the 
l  G.  C. Klerk de Reus,  l\.Tiederlundisch-O~tindischen  C'ompagnie, Appendix  vr. 
Vide infra, 11. pp.  113-19. 
The average annual  profit per  cent. on the Second  and Third Persian Voyages 
was close on 20 per  cent.  That on the Third Joint-Stock under 5 per  cent. 
Vide infra, 11. pp.  71, 72,  366, 367.  . 
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drainage of  Bedford Level had achieved, at least, a  partial  success, and 
the  land  recovered  was  divided  to the shareholders  in  1637l.  Then 
there seems reason  to believe  that, although the Mosquito Islands were 
captured  by  the Spaniards  and the English  settlement destroyed,  the 
shareholders,  not  only  recovered  their  capital,  but  may  have  made 
a  respectable  profita. 
During this period, some changes began  to show  themselves in the 
manner in which the union of  amounts of  capital, belonging to different 
persons, was effected.  To  a large extent, the favourite direction for the 
search for profit was  towards one of  the monopolies for the control of 
a home trade, which  could be  obtained from the Crown.  The orgaai- 
zation  of  these,  where  not  controlled  by  an  individual,  was  through 
a  group,  nearly  resembling  a  regulated  company.  For  all  practical 
purposes,  the body  incorporated  for  the shipping  of  coals to London 
was  formed  on  this model.  Of  the other  important monopolies, that 
which  stands  closest  to the  joint-stock  company  was  the  society  of 
Soapers of  Westminster.  While the capital  required  was  owned  and 
used  by individual members, these were bound to sell to the society at 
a fixed price,  and the profit  made,  in  retailing, was  divisible  amongst 
the generality.  Thus, as a producer, this organization conformed to the 
regulated, as a merchant, to the joint-stock  type.  The closest analogy 
is to be found in the Bermuda  company, after the division  of  land had 
been  made3.  In the society  of  Soapers, the estimated  production  of 
5,000 tons was  divided  into 40 parts, and the possessor  of  $th  of  the 
monopoly had  the right of  making  125  tons of  white  soap annually4. 
These parts were further sub-divided into fractions, and one-fourth part 
of  one of  them was  sold at 23005.  Such a payment would correspond 
to the fine  for  the freedom of  a  regulated  company.  The difference 
arose from  the fact that with the Westminster  Soapers, profits  accrued 
from the sales made by the company in its corporate capacity, and these 
were  tlivisible,  rateably,  amongst  the  members,  as  in  a  joint-stock 
company.  Similarly, in the case of  the vintners and the wine monopoly, 
there was  another instance  of  the grafting of  a merchants'  company on 
a  species  of  joint-stock  company.  The  vintners,  having  taken  the 
opinion "of  the best counsel that gold could buy,"  which declared the 
new  impost  of  40s. per  tun was  legal, elected  ten  of  their number  to 
nlanage  the farm.  This committee was  empowered  to invite  twenty- 
seven  others  to join  them.  The members were "  to underwrite  and 
Vide infra, 11.  p.  354.  Ibid., 11.  335-7. 
,' Ibid., 11.  pp.  289-97. 
4  Indenture  between the Society  of Soapera  of  Westminster and  Sir  James 
Ragg, July 4, 1636-State  Papers, Domestic, Charles  I., Case D. No. 8 ; Calendar, 
1626-7,  p. 51. 
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bring in" A'1,OOO  each, and the capital, so provided, was to pay the two 
sums of  ~230,000  and 27,000 due to the Crown for the first year.  This 
body was  entitled to any  profit  on  the farm, while  the whole  body of 
vintners secured that made on the retailing of the wines.  Owing to the 
advance in  prices,  there  was  opportunity  for  very  considerable  gains. 
For instance, there was a difference, as between the wholesale and retail 
prices of sherry, of  as much as 165 per cent.  Even after the new duties 
and  working expenses were  deducted,  it is  obvious there should  have 
been a substantial margin, the greater part of which is to be assigned to 
the retailing]. 
The type of  incorporation was altered to some extent by the revival 
of  the word  "society,"  which had  been  used  in  the time  of  Elizabeth. 
Thus  both  the  soap  companies, as  well  as  the  members  of  the  salt 
monopoly and the fishing undertaking, were  described in  their  official 
titles as "  societies."  In the two cases, namely those of the Westmi~ister 
Soapers and the Fishery society, a new  element was  introduced into the 
constitution by the inclusion of "fellows," as well as the usual governors, 
assistants and commonalty. 
Amongst  the true joint-stock  companies, new  legal  incorporations 
were  comparatively  few.  When  an organization  had  been  constituted 
by charter, no  special legal  status was  sought for subsidiary companies 
formed under it.  It has already been shown that the society of  Mines 
Royal had created such partnerships at a very early period2, and similar 
subordinate  ventures  were  constituted  by  the East India  company  in 
the  Persian  Voyages3, by  the  Fishery  societyQnd  by  the  Mosquito 
Islands con]pany5.  Some important  undertakings, such as the African 
adventurershad Courten's  Association7, did not seek  a formal charter 
of  incorporation ;  while it is still more remarkable as showing how,  at 
the very time of  a rigorous interpretation of  the prerogative, the maxim 
that only the King can  make a corporation was  not  strictly observed, 
that  partnerships  began  to  be  recognized  as  possessed  of  a  quasi- 
corporate  character.  This is  shown  by  the  appearance  of  a  type of 
description  A. B.  and conipany as for instance  Chevania and company 
(1632), Lopex and Thomas White and corrzpant~  (1631). 
With regard  to the shares in  companies the practice  still varied as 
A  True Discouery of  the  Projectors of the  Wine Project out  of the  Vintners' own 
Orders, 1611 [Brit. Mus.  E.  165 (13)],  pp.  7, 26; Remonstrance  of  the  Farmers  and 
Adventurers  in the  Wine Farm of 40/R per  tun to the House  of Commons, [1641]-Coll. 
Broadsides Soc. Antiq. No. 316 ; The History qf  the Twelue Great Livery Companies M 
London, by William Herbert, Lo~lclorl,  1834, I. pp.  156, 157. 
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between  large  and  small  denominations.  The  Bedford  Level'  and 
Mosquito  Islands  companiesa were  instances  of  the former  tendency ; 
and,  as in  similar  cases  previously,  such  shares became  divisible  into 
fractional  parts.  The  peculiar  positio~l of  the  Bermuda  company 
necessitated careful regulations being framed for the transfer of  shares to 
prevent the voting of  "titular  men;'  who  still attended  meetil~gs  after 
having  sold  their  shares.  It was,  accordingly,  ordered  at a  Quarter 
court in 1629 that both parties to a transfer should produce evidence to 
the company of  the sale and purchase, whereupon the new  adventurer 
should be registered as the owner of the shares3. 
' 
It is remarkable that some progress towards a limitation of  liability 
was  made at this time.  In the Fishery society, there had  been a loss in 
1633 and  1634, and  it was  resolved  that  further  capital  subscribed 
should  be  held  exempt  from  any liability for  this deficit.  It follows, 
therefore, that under these  conditions, capital, the same in every other 
respect, was rated differently ;  and, while an original adventurer, besides 
losing the amount he subscribed, was  compelled to pay 254  per cent. as 
an assessment, the subscriber in  1637-8  received  back 268  per cent, of 
his investment"  Again in the Mosquito Islands company it was  agreed 
that any member who  had paid  calls up to 21,000 a share might elect 
''  not to go farther,"  in which case he should be free from further calls5. 
This resolution would  have raised  some interesting legal questions, had 
it been  necessary to assess  the shareholders  for  the  payment  of  the 
company's  debts. 
Some light is aflorded on the conduct of  meetings of  shareholders at 
this time.  Since 1629, votes in the East India company had been taken 
by ballot6.  The consequence was  that, on  a division, the voting right 
of  each  holding  must  have  been  equal.  Though  the vote  by  ballot 
was not universal-as  for instance  in the Mines Royal and the Mineral 
and  Battery  Works7 votes  were  proportionate to the shares  owned- 
this  method  was  in  vogue  an~orlgst  the  Regulated  companies.  An 
interesting event in this connection affected Charles I.,  Edward Misselden 
and the Merchant Adventurers in 1637.  The King had"recommended" 
the company  to choose Mibselden,  as  its deputy  at Rotterdam.  The 
members, on a vote by ballot, refused to accept  the nomination  of  the 
Crown,  whereupon  the  King  in  Council  ordered  that,  in  future,  no 
company should use a ballot-box in the conduct of  its business8. 
1  Vide infra,  11. pp. 331, 337.  "Ibid.,  11. p. 354. 
3  Rawl. MS. Bod. Lib. D.  764, f. 23". 
'  Vide infra,  11.  p.  367.  "Ibid.,  11.  p. 331. 
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The change in the fortunes of  the East India company had  tended 
to introduce acrimony at its meetings.  Since, however,  the opposition 
to the governor  and committees  was  largely personal, few  questions of 
constitutional  importance  emerge.  Many  of  the  charges  made  were 
unsupported by proof.  It  was said that Sir Morris Abbott, the governor, 
had endeavoured to make himself  a  perpetual  dictator,"  a  statement 
which  is contradicted  by his  refusal to allow himself  to be  nominated, 
and his deciding  all questions, where  there was  a difference of  opinion, 
by the vote of  the majority1.  After  the amalgamation of  the Persian 
Voyages with the Third Joint-Stock had been fully discussed and settled 
by  a  general  court,  a  motion  was  made  for  the appointment  of  a 
coinmittee  of  inspection.  The governor  refused  to put this motion to 
the meeting  and directed  the secretary  not  to take  any  notes  of  it5. 
Owing  to the factious  nature  of  the  opposition,  it was  found  that 
stockholders, who  had  copied  accounts and documents, were making an 
ill-use"  of  the transcripts by  divulging  secrets of  the company.  It 
was, therefore, resolved that no one should be pern~itted  to read or copy 
documents,  or  to "ravel  and  dive"  into  the  accounts,  without  the 
consent  of  the committees3.  This order was  confirmed in 1634; and, 
when  the danger of  a rival  company became a reality a year  later, stilI 
more striugent measures were taken to preserve secrecy4. 
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CHAPTER  XII. 
THE  DEPRESSION  FROM  1640 TO 1650. 
THE  crisis of  1640 was  followed  by  ten years  of  great depression. 
for a long period  English  commerce had gained through the disturbed 
condition of  the chief producing countries on the Continent.  From the 
end of  1640, this process was reversed, and the beginning of  the decline 
is clearly shown by the shock to credit through the seizure of  bullion  at 
the mint.  Foreign  merchants, who  had debts due to then1 at I.ondon, 
eildeavoured to secure payment  as soon as possible;  while the resources 
of  English  traders  were  restricted,  not  only  by  the  seizure, but  also 
through their inability to mllect outstanding accounts.  For this reason 
even  those  "of  good  estates and credit were  hardly able to go on with 
trade or  to pay their  debts and maintain their charge1."  The political 
unrest  prevented  the  natural  process  of  recuperation;  and,  as  goods 
were sold, the vendors preferred to hold the proceeds, or even  to deposit 
them with foreign bankers, rather than to run new and unknown risks in 
trade at homez.  It follows  that, on  the  one  side, foreign  capitalists 
were  anxious  to reduce  their engagements  in  England;  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  London  merchants  desired  to keep  their  resources  in  a 
form which should  be  realizable on  short notice.  Some of  those,  who 
had  been  engaged  in  the  working  of  the  monopolies  of  Charles I., 
suffered from  the abrogation of  these,  as  well  as  from  the  efl'orts of 
Parlia~nent  to exact  restitution  where  their proceedings  were  held  -.  to  .  - 
have been  oppressive. 
- 
Other capitalists,  whose  assets were  in a liquid 
form, foreseeing serious trouble,  emigrated  with  their  effects3;  and,  in 
view  of  these  circumstances, it was  reported  that the trade of  the City 
was  "  n~~lch  decayed."  The eLct of  the crisis was  shown by the failure 
of  the East India company to secure a reasonable amount of  subscriptions 
1  Hushworth,  Collectim, v.  p.  505. 
2  Ibid.,  v.  p.  509; Anarchia  Anglicana:  or  the  History  of  Independency,  by 
Theodorus Verax [Clement Walker],  1649, Part 11.  p.  197 ; Court Book of  the East 
India Company, xvrrr., Aug. 25, 1642. 
3  State Papers, Domestic, Inter., IX.  61 ;  Calendar, 1650, pp.  178-80. 
for its Fourth Joint-Stock in 1640; and it became necessary to revert to 
the system of  independent  undertakings by  the formation of  the First 
General  Voyage  in  1641,  the nominal  capital  of  which  was  fixed  at 
&80,450  l. 
An  outbreak of  the plague in 1640-12, together with the menacing 
nature of  the political situation, the frequent riots in London  and the 
rebellion in  Ireland in 1641, tended  to add to the existing difficulties. 
"No  man," it was  stated, "could  follow his trade cheerfully, whilest the 
lives of  himselfe and family and the publique safety  of  the Kingdome 
were in jeopardy,"  whence the trade of the City was "  much more of  late 
decayed  than  it hath beene  for  many  yeares  past3."  Merchants,  who 
remained in  London, attended the Exchange rather to learn  the latest 
news  than  to  do  business4.  The  great  staple  trade  in  wool  had 
suffered  seriously.  I11  January  1642 Pym  had  pointed  out that  by  reason of  the ill vent  of  cloth and other manufactures, great multitudes 
...  who live for the most part by  their daily gettings, will in a short time 
be brought to great extremity, if not employed.  Nothing is more sharp 
and pressing than necessity and want,  what they cannot  buy  they  will 
take, and from then1 the like necessity will be derived to the farmers and 
husbandmen and so grow higher and i~ivolve  all in an equality of  misery 
and distress, if  it be not prevented5."  That this was  no highly coloured 
picture,  meant  as  an object  lesson  in  the  constitutional  struggle,  is 
show11  by  the similar language used  by  Charles I. in  a message  to the 
House  of  Lords in  the following month, where reference is made to the 
great  decay  of  trade,  more  especially  of  the  cloth-trade,  which  had 
brought extreme want and poverty  to many  thousands, and which,  in 
a very short time, would exert a marked influence on  the very substance 
of the nation6.  The outbreak of the Civil War in the following August 
made these gloomy prognostications  but weak  anticipations of  the actual 
effects on  the cloth-t13ade.  In the midst  of  a great struggle, involving 
such  vital  issues,  the distress  of  the weavers  and other artificers finds 
little mention.  Not  only was  there the diversion of  a considerable part 
of  the population  from  productive  occupations together with the usual 
destruction  of  property  involved  in  the  operations  of  warfare,  but 
localities, outside the actual spheres of  hostilities, sufbered in their trade 
l  Vide infra, 11.  pp.  117, 127. 
%e  deaths from plague  were 1450 (1640), 1375 (1641), 1274 (1642),  996 (1643), 
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by  the proclamations  of  both  sides,  which  aimed  at controlling  trade 
with  London.  More especially the orders of  Charles I., prohibiting the 
free  passage  of  cloth,  was  a  staggering  blow  to the wool trade.  The 
whole  national  system  of distribution of  commodities was  based on the 
principle  that London  should  be  the chief  port  for  export, and any 
interruption of the supplies to the capital meant a very serious restriction 
of  trade.  In several districts the weavers  were  unable to obtain work ; 
and, being left without resources, they emigrated in large numbers to the 
Netherlands1.  The resultant  loss  to the English  cloth  trade  is  only 
comparable to that sustained through the interference  of  James I.  from 
1613 to 1617. 
In addition  to these elements, arising out of  the political situation, 
there  was  the financial strain  involved  in the preparation for, and the 
carrying on of  the Civil War.  It is true that, from 1640, the country 
was  freed  from  the  burden  of  the  great  monopolies,  and  therefore 
Parliament  had  done  all  in  its power  towards lessening the weight of 
what  had  been  virtually  indirect  taxation.  But,  while the mercantile 
classes  as a  whole  gained  from  this source, they  suffered  through  the 
considerable borrowings that were  necessary as early as 1640 and which 
added  to the stringency of  the money-market.  From  the  time  that 
Parliament took  control of  the finances, it found itself  in arrear.  The 
six  subsidies, it had  voted,  did  not  suffice  for the purposes  to which 
they were to be assigned;  and, in June 1641, there was owing 2427,8002 
and at the end  of  the year  the deficit  was  over  ;E500,0003.  In June 
1642 the liabilities  outstanding had  increased  to  2583,945.  9s.  9d. 
These  were  in addition to disbursements  of  21,262,185.  9s.  Id. since 
November  3rd,  1640"  It  might  be  expected  that  a  better  showing 
would  be  made  when  the  rest  of  the  Crown  Revenue,  besides  the 
Customs, had been made available ;  but the political disturbance,  which 
State Papers, Domestic,  Inter., IX. p.  61 ;  Calendar, 1650, p. 178. 
"ournab  of  the House of  Commons,  11. p. 177. 
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..................  Poll-Money  256,720  18  2 
Customs  ..................  165,000  0  0 
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disorganized trade, would  diminish  the receipts  from  this source.  The 
average Crown Revenue, both ordinary and extraordinary, from 1637 to 
1641 was  2895,819.  5s. 0d.l  Of  this 8210,493. 17s. 4d.  consisted of 
payments,  such  as  ship-money,  receipts  from  monopolies  &C.,  which 
Parliament  had  declared  illegal.  The  remainder,  aniountiiig  to 
2685,325.  7s.  Sd.,  included  between  8300,000  and  2400,000  from 
Customs, in addition to which  there were the rents of. Crown property 
with  miscellaneous sources of  income2.  Since the rent of  the Customs 
was  reduced to 2165,000 and it would be difficult to collect many of  the 
other payments, it may  be doubted if  in the year  1642 more than half 
the 8685,325. 7s. 8d.,  apparently available, could be  actually collected. 
Now  a  revenue  of  2340,000,  eked out by  voluntary contributions  and 
the  poll  tax,  would  have  been  totally  insufficient  to  carry  on  the 
government, if there had been unbroken peace.  The need for money, to 
keep armies in the field after the outbreak  of  the war, involved a huge 
burden  on  the country.  The expenditure on the Royalist  forces  was 
defrayed  partly  from  loans  made abroad, partly from  contributions  of 
supporters  and lastly  from  assessments  made  on  the  districts  which 
supported the Crown.  While such outlay was an important item in the 
national  account,  the financing  of  the  forces of  the  Parliament  was 
more immediately  important as affecting trade, owing to the facts that 
London  was  the stronghold  of  this party  and, at the same time,  the 
City  occupied  a  position  of  outstanding  importance  in  the  foreign 
commerce of  England.  The cost of the war to be  defrayed by Parlia- 
ment was enormous for the times.  It was estimated, in December 1642, 
that the annual expenditure on the army would  be  over a million and 
that on  the navy  more  than  2300,0003.  Allowing  for  the  cost  of 
government, Parliament was  faced by  a  demand for close on a  million 
and a  half  in  the first  year  of  the struggle.  It  became  necessary  to 
provide funds, through the authority of Parliament, without the assent 
of  the  Crown.  In  Noveniber  1642  an  assessment  on  London  and 
Westminster  had  been  proposed  at the  rate  of  5  per  cent.  on  the 
estimated  value of  real  and ~ersonal  property,  and in  February  1643 
Commissioners were appointed with powers to make requisitions, at  their 
discretion, over the whole  country.  It was  calculated  that, if  the tax 
l  State Papers, Domestic,  Charles I., DIII.  112; Calendar, 1644-6,  p. 214. 
Journals of  the  House  of  Commons,  vIrI. p. 158.  Mr  Gardiner,  starting from 
an estimate of the Revenue of  Charles I., before the Civil War, of  £819,000,  given 
in Purl.  Hist.  IV. p.  118,  calculates the  amount  receivable  by  the  Parliament  in 
1647 at £450,000  a year.  Considering that the yield of the Customs had increased 
by £97,000  between  the two dates,  probably the estimate  in the text is relatively 
higher for  1642 than that of  Mr  Gardiner for  1647-History,  1642-9  (1893),  1x1. 
p. 103. 
3  Gardiner, History 1642-0  (1893), I. p. 72. Expenses  of  the  Arm?/ 1645-6 
could have  been  collected  in  all  the counties,  it would  have  exceeded 
f  l$OO,OOO1.  Since,  however,  the  authority  of  Parliament  was  not 
recognized  in  a  large  area,  it is  plain  that, even  on  the basis of  the 
estimates, there  would  be a deficit, apart from  borrowing.  Moreover, 
it was  almost inevitable that the estimates should be exceeded.  Larger 
- - 
forces than had been  expected were required, and an improvised army 1s 
a costly army.  Not  only so, but there  were  grave suspicions as to the 
purity of  the administration of  the Parliament.  The system of  super- 
vision  of  expenditure, by  means of  independent committees, was  faulty 
in principle  and was  subject to abuses in practice.  For these reasons a 
contemporary  critic  wrote  that "Parliaments  were  bona perilura,  they 
cannot  keep  long without  corruption,"  and that one ''  might  as easily 
find  mercy  in  hell  as justice  in  a  committee2."  Specific  instances  of 
bribery are on record:  and complaints were  made of  the sums voted to 
members of  the House4.  Information as to the state of  the finances was 
withheld from the people, who could only judge of  the situation by their 
knowledge  of  the  vastly  increased  taxation,  partly  in  the  form  of 
assessments and of  the excise6 on commodities, partly in an addition to 
the Customs, by the revision of  the book of  rates. 
How  far the estimated  expenditure  was  exceeded may be gathered 
from  the  account  of  the  outlay  on  the  army  of  Fairfax  from 
March 28th, 1645, to March  lst, 1646.  There had actually been  paid 
&1,110,115.  138.  3d. and the dragoons were  in arrears for no less than 
Journals ofthe House of Lords, v. pp.  601, 602, 619. 
2  Relutions  and  Observations Historical  and  Politick  upon  the Parliament  begun 
in 1640,  by  Clement  Walker, London,  1648,  in Maseres,  Civil  War Tracts,  I. 
pp.  339-50. 
3  Gardiner, History, 1642-0  (1893),  IV.  p.  76. 
The Royal  Treasury of England,  London,  1725,  pp.  298-301.  Controversial 
writers formed very large estimates of the total expenses of the Parliament at this 
period.  In London's  Account:  or  a calculation of  the Arbitrary taxations within the 
lines of  Communication (1647) the expenditure for  the five years  1641-6  is  stated 
to have  been  $17,512,400.  Clement Walker asserts  that  in the same  period 
~40,000,000  had been "  milked " from  the people-Histwy  of  Independeny, Pt.  I., 
p.  8.  In An abstract of money raised in  England by the Long Parliament from Nov. 3, 
1640 to November 1659 the outlay for that period  is variously stated as from between 
83 millions  to 95  millions-Harleian  Miscellany,  vr.  p.  203,  Royal  Treasury  of 
England,  pp.  295, 296 ;  Historical  Sketches  of  Churles I.,  Cromwell,  Charles II.,  to 
which  is  annexed  an  account  of  the  sums  exacted  by  the  Commonwealth from  the 
Royalists, by W.  D. Fellowes,  1828,  p.  LXXIV. (in Appendix) ;  History of  the Public 
Revenue, by Sir John Sinclair (1803), I.  p.  284. 
6  It has been shown in the previous  chapter (suva, p.  216) that, from the fiscal 
point of  view, the monopolies of  Charles I. represented  a disguised system of  excise- 
duties.  Howell mentions (Epistolr~  Ha-Eliana, 1737, p.  389) that, wl~er~  Sir  Dudley 
Carleton suggested this impost in Parliament, he was in danger of  being sent to  the 
Tower. 
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43 weeks.  The whole  arrears  on  this  army  alone  were  estimated  to 
amount to P331,000, making a total charge, on this part of  the forces, 
for  337  days  of  81,441,115l.  The  City  of  London  expressed  the 
prevalent dissatisfaction with the existing system of peculation and waste 
in  the following terms-the  Mayor and Aldermen  stated  "they  could 
not  be  unsensible how  much  arbitrary power  hath been, during these 
-. 
U  distempers,  exercised  by  Committees -aid others,  by  whom  the  good 
subject  hath  been  oftentimes  more  oppressed  than  the  delinquents 
suppressed and  who  have  arranged  the  receipts  and revenues,  which 
were  designed  to maintain  the publick  charge,  so  disorderly  and  in- 
effectually that the Kingdom  cannot but be  unsatisfied concerning the 
due  employment  thereof  and doubt that much  of  the  publick  money 
hath been  enlployed to private  ends and remains obscured in the hands 
of  such  as were  intrusted  with  the collection of  those  assessments and 
the improvement of all sequestration to  the publick and best advantage2." 
Members  of  the  administration  were  charged  with  "artificially  con- 
founding the accompts  by laying on a m~~ltiplicity  of  taxes; so (for the 
same  reason)  they  set  the  money  run  in  so  many  muddy,  obscure 
channels,  through  so  many  Committees  and  officers'  fingers,  both  for 
collecting, receiving, issuing and paying it forth, that it is impossible to 
make  or ballance any publique account  thereof;  and at least one-halfe 
thereof  is knowne  to be  devoured by  Committees and officers and those 
that for lucre protect them3."  In siqlilar terms, Thomas Violet describes 
the  abuses  and  confusion  of  "petty  exchequers,"  adding  that  the 
Customs and excise had been  specially subject to embezzlements, since 
he knew  of  as much as 2323,500 that had been  appropriated by forty 
persons4. 
It was  unavoidable  that the necessities and the extravagance of the 
government  should  tend  towards  increasing  the serious  depression  of 
trade.  In November  1643 the City was described "as  drawn dry.  Our 
rich  men  are gone because the city is the place of  taxes and  burdens, 
trade is  decayed and our shops shut up in a great measure, our poor do 
much  increase5."  It was  recognized that, as  long as the war continued, 
whether  the expenditure  was  necessary or not, little remission could be 
expected;  but, once the resistance of the followers of Charles I. began to 
die  out  in  England,  attention was  drawn  to the burdens  imposed  on 
l  Journals of the House of Commons, v. p.  126. 
The History of London, by William Mnitland, Lolldon,  1756, p.  394. 
History of Independency, by C. Walker, Pt.  I. pp.  6, 7. 
'  Proposals fv the  calling to  a  True  and  Just  Accompt  all  Committee-Men, by 
Thomas Violet, 1656,  pp.  31-9. 
The  Purliatnentary  or  Lbn8titutional  HiYtory  of  England,  London,  1753,  XII. 
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trade, which  prevented  business  from  coming  to London  and  left  the 
merchants  with  insufficient  resources to recover  the ground  that  had 
been lost.  Thus the "poor tradesmen"  asked in 1647 that taxes should 
be  removed  "so  that  trading  may  revive,  and  our  pining,  hungry, 
famishing  families be  saved1."  These  accounts  of  the miseries  of  the 
great trade depression obtain definiteness from the decline in the revenue 
derived  from  the Customs-a  decline  which  is  larger  than it appears, 
owing to revision of  the book of  rates in 16422.  The income from this 
source was  only 2225,000 in 1644 (or three-fifths of  what it had been 
before the war), rising  to 2276,000 in 1646.  So far from the cessatioll 
of  serious hostilities in  England producing an improvement, the return 
for 1647 shows a slight decrease, being 2262,0003. 
Besides the direct consequences of  the situation, there were  certain 
remote effects, more or less closely connected with it.  As a special branch 
of  the general  condition  of  trade,  there  is  the  position  of  the  great 
incorporated  companies under  the Long  Parliament.  In  view  of  the 
exceedingly strong language, used in the condemnation of  monopolies in 
the years  1640 and 1641, it might have been expected that these bodies 
would be fortunate if they escaped condemnation.  It seems paradoxical 
that the same Parliament, which endeavoured to penalize the Soapers of 
Westminster,  confirmed by  legislation  the Merchant  Adventurers  and 
the  Levant  company  in  all  their  former  privileges  and  immunities4 
(1643);  and,  in  1646, an  ordinance,  in  favour  of  the  East  India 
campally, was  passed  by  the Commons,  but rejected  by  the House of 
Lords5.  These  declarations in favour  of  bodies, vested  with  extensive 
immunities for  foreign  trade,  apparently point towards the conclusion 
that there  was  a  consensus of  opinion,  as between  the advisers of  the 
Crown and the members of  Parliament, that trade abroad was necessarily 
subject to different conditions  from that at home.  The need for ships 
of  large  size and armaments might be adduced as a strong argument in 
favour  of  the State giving  special concessiolls to such companies, which, 
either expressly or tacitly,  became responsible for  the  safety  of  their 
respective properties.  Arguments such as  these  may  have  had  weight 
with  some of  the members,  but in  a  time  of  acute political feeling it 
would  be  idle  to neglect  the influence of  party  motives.  The  East 
l  The  Mourfull  Cryes of  many  Thousand  Poore  Tradesmen  who  are  ready  to 
famish  through  decay  of  Trade, 1647,  quoted  by Cunningham, Growth of  English 
Industry  in Modern  Times,  pp.  182,  183. 
Vide supra, p.  234. 
3  Gardiner, History, 1642-9  (1893),  111. p.  193.  Mr  Gardiner gives the Customs- 
revenue for 1645 as %192,000, whereas 1Mr  Hall  in History of the Custom-Revenue in 
England,  I. p. 184, returns it for that year  at 2277,000. 
4  Anderson,  Annuls of C'ommerce, 11.  pp. 528, 629. 
fi  A  History  ofBritish India, by Sir W.  W.  Hunter, London, 1900, 11.  p.  42. 
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India company had suffered grave damage at  the hands of Charles I., and 
the members of Courten's Association belonged to the Court party, while 
it may  have  been  suspected  that the  King  himself  had  a  pecuniary 
interest  in  the  latter'.  Therefore,  the  ~roposed  recognition  of  the 
company would be designed chiefly as a blow to its rival.  The Merchant 
Adventurers  were  in  a  somewhat similar position.  The older members 
would  remember the seizure of  its charter by James I. ; and, within its 
recent  history, there had been vexatious interferences with the meetings 
of  the members by  Charles 1.'  Such  "grievances,"  though  less loudly 
voiced  than others,  were  sufficiently  real  and  were  likely  to  receive 
sympathetic  consideration  at Westminster.  Moreover,  the  Merchant 
Adventurers  were  able to claim  the indulgence  of  the  Commons.  In 
February  1643 the King had  written  to the governor  of  the company 
asking for  a  loan  of  &20,000.  This letter  was  conlmunicated by  the 
company  to Parliament, with  the result  that it received the thanks of 
the House and was  offered a convoy to the Elbe3.  At the same time, 
the  wording  of  the  ordinances  shows  a  tendency  to strengthen  the 
position  of  the  companies,  far  beyond  what  can  be  accounted  for 
exclusively  by  political  motives.  While,  in  the case  of  the Merchant 
Adventurers, the ordinance  apparently opens the company to all, there 
were  various  restrictions  introduced,  which  made  entrance  in  reality 
more  difficult  than  before.  The  fine  for  admission  was  doubled,  all 
' 
previous privileges  of  the charters were confirmed ;  and, most important 
of  all, in  both instruments no  one  was  eligible, as a free-man, who was 
not  "a mere  merchant"  or as it was  elsewhere defined  had  not been 
bred  a  nlerchnnt."  Thus legislative sanction  was  given  to the idea of 
limiting membership of the regulated companies to  persons who were later 
described as "  legitimate merchants,"  which device enabled  these organi- 
zations to maintain  themselves as close corporations4.  In view  of  these 
facts, it is highly probable  that the ordirrances are not the result of any 
principle, but constitute an instance of the recognition that the companies 
"had  shown  themselves serviceable to the State,"  by  ministering  to its 
financial necessities.  How great these were can be understood from the 
pressure  on  the resources  of  the  Parliament.  As  alread~  shown5, it 
started with a deficit ; and, in spite of  the vast sums levied by taxation, 
the army  often brought to a standstill through want of  funds.  The 
borrowings described as "  the London loans" were of relatively moderate 
amounts and were far from tiding over the difficulty.  Various expedients 
were  devised  to bring  in money.  In 1642 a  discount  of  no  less  than 
15  per  cent.  was  offered  to merchants,  who  advanced  money  on  the 
Vide infra, 11.  pp.  113-18.  Wide  supra, p.  228. 
Journals oj'the House qf  Commons, 11.  p.  982. 
li'dr  infra,  chapter xv. ;  also 11.  p.  141.  "  Vide mpra, p.  232. 238  Ordinances in Return for  Aoans  1643-6  [CHAP. XII. 
Customs dues, for  which  they would  become liable in the future1.  Ten 
per cent. was offered for loans in 1641a, but in a short time the real rate 
became  much higher.  For  instance  when  aC200,OOO  was  borrowed  in 
London,  it was  alleged  that Parliament was forced to pay interest, not 
upon  this sum  but  upon  &230,0003.  When the financial pressure was 
so great,  it is not surprising that application  was  made to the great 
trading companies.  The Merchant Adventurers provided 230,0004, the 
Levant  company  at least  28,0006 and  the  East  India  undertaking 
promised to find &6,0006.  Therefore, in these instances, there were  the 
double facts of  loans, made by  the companies to the Parliament, and of 
a  disposition  shown  by  the  House  of  Commons  to  encourage  the 
companies.  The natural  inference is  strengthened  when  it is  noticed 
that  other  companies,  which  failed  to  ~rovide  money,  received  no 
recognition  of  the privileges they had previously acquired, and that, in 
the special case of  the Russia company, the House of  Commons ordered 
the imprisonment of  the governor in 16447. 
Another  indirect  effect  of  the  monetary  stringency  was  the great 
development  of  banking.  Very  soon  after the closing of  the Mint by 
Charles I.  the goldsmiths  began  to receive depositss; and, by 1643 the 
financial  necessities  of  the  Long  Parliament  had  caused  an  influx  of 
Jewish  capitalistss.  The continued insecurity of  property had brought 
about  a  considerable extension  of  deposit-banking  by  the goldsmiths 
about 16451°.  Several causes co-operated  towards producing this eff'ect. 
The seizure of  the bullion at the Mint had given a great shock to credit 
which  was  increased by the number of  failures.  It was  estimated that 
at this date there were 8000 debtors in confinement throughout England 
and Wales".  At  first the want of  confidence led to hoarding, which still 
l  Parliamentary History of England,  ut supra, XI. p.  344. 
Journals of the House of Commons, 11.  p.  178. 
Clement Walker, Relations  and  Observations  in Civil  War Tracts, ut mpra, 
I.  p.  343. 
Journals of the House of Commons, 11.  p.  605. 
State Papers, Domestic, Charles I.,  111.  16; Calendar, 1644, p.  45. 
G  Vide infra, 11.  p.  119. 
Ibid.,  11.  p.  66. 
The  Rise  of  the  London  Money  Market,  by W.  R.  Bisschop,  London,  1910, 
p.  43. 
g  Die  Juden  und  dm Wirtschaftsleben,  by  Werner  Sombart,  Leipeig,  1911, 
p.  55. 
l0  Sir  'l'homas Roe,  speaking in 1641, described  banking  as  an important trade 
in relation to  the foreign exchanges-Sir  Thomm  Roe's Speech in Parliament.  Wherein 
he sheweth the Cause of the Decay of'  Coin and Trade in  this Land  in Harleian Miscellany 
(1746),  IV.  p.  412. 
l'  Cunningham,  Growth  of  English  Industry  and  Commerce  in  Modern  Times, 
p.  191. 
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further diminished  the available  supply  of  money.  When  Parliament 
was a frequent borrower  at high rates,  the tendency  would be for mer- 
cantile loans to be  still dearer; so that persons, seeking capital, had to 
offer terms  that would be tempting to lenders.  Moreover, owing again 
to the stringency,  some  method  of  organization  was  required,  which 
would economize the scanty supply of  metallic money available.  Several 
circumstances made the goldsmiths the class  fitted  for, and desirous to 
establish banking businesses.  Owing to the war, much  of  their trade in 
plate had been lost to them, and they naturally sought some new  branch 
which  would  partly  repair  this  loss.  On  the other  side, in  a  time  of 
frequent scares, hoarding was  dangerous ;  and, besides, retail tradesmen, 
who had been in the habit of trusting their till-money to their apprentices, 
were  forced  to make  new  arrangements,  owing to many  of  the latter 
departing to serve in the army.  In these circumstances, the goldsmiths 
offered  to keep  deposits at call, allowing a  small rate of  interest; and 
they lent out a part of  such resources in discounting mercantile bills, and 
in  making  other advances1.  Later, these  embryo bankers  endeavoured 
to attract  additional  deposits  by  dealing  with  the  apprentices,  who 
remained in the city, and to whom they offered 4d. per cent. per day (or 
about 6 per cent. per annum) for the use of their "running cash."  Then 
their resources  were  increased by deposits of rents, derived from country 
estates; so that, as time went  on, the funds, rendered  available by  the 
great increase of  banking facilities, exercised an important influence on 
the monetary situation. 
The progress of banking shows that about 1645-6  there was a revival 
of confidence, and  further evidence in the same direction is to be found 
in the formation of a Second General Voyage by the East India company 
in  1647-82.  Unfortunately, the  adverse  influences  had  not  yet  been 
exhausted.  After a series of  five  years, ending in 1645, when the price 
of  wheat  had been  below  the average,  the  harvest  of  1646  was  bad. 
Corn rose by close on 50 per cent.  The increased cost of  living entailed 
great  distress,  and  in  April  1647  the  dearth  was  characterized  "as 
sharper  than the late  devouring  swords."  The south-eastern  counties 
suffered  about the same time  from  the  march  of  the  army  towards 
l  The Mystery of  the New fashioned  Goldsmzths or Bankers, 1676, pp.  1, 2 (repro- 
duced  in  The  Grasshopper in Lomburd  Street,  by John  Biddulph  Martin,  London, 
1892,  pp.  285-92); The  Rise  of  the  London  Money  Market,  1640-1826,  by W.  R. 
Bisschop,  London, 1910, pp.  43, 44. 
Vide infra, 11.  pp.  120, 128. 
"ushworth,  Collections, VI.  p.  451.  It  is noteworthy that in 1643, owing to the 
departure of yeomen  and  farm-labourers to the wars, the destruction of crops  and 
seizures of  horses for the army, a famine was predicted-England's  Petition to  their 
King,  1643 ;  Englalad'n  Tears .for the  present  Wars, 1644,  in Somers'  Tracts, ~111. 
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London.  These  causes  together  completely  arrested  the  returning 
confidence.  The City  was  subject to riots,  and for  several days  at a 
time all shops were  closed  and business suspended'.  It was  estimated 
that the loss  of  trade at this period  was  as much as £200,000  a week, 
and the distress was  increased by a great rise in the price of  coal in the 
winter  of  1648-9,  so that it was  said  that many of  "the poor perished 
with cold and hunger," while amongst shopkeepers there were ccthousands, 
who  formerly had trading and work for subsistence, now sitting hunger- 
starved in  chimney-corners  without  employment  to get  them  bread2." 
The feeling  of  insecurity  was  greatly  increased by  the losses  of  ships, 
sustained  by  merchants  engaged  in foreign  trade, since, not only were 
merchantmen liable to seizure by the fleet of Prince Rupert, but privateers 
of  all  nations  took  advantage of  the want  of  convoys,  and "most  of 
these traders  were  discouraged and many  undone3."  The premium for 
marine  insurance had advanced  by  400 per  cent., being  increased from 
2  per  cent.  to 10 per  cent.4  The Levant  company  had  suffered  very 
severely, and early in February  1649 the damage  it had sustained  was 
estimated at 2300,0006.  During the greater part of the year 1648, this 
subject  was  considered by  the House of  Commons and the Admiralty 
was directed to supply convoys when it was possible6. 
Meanwhile, the effects of  the great dearth in the rural districts in the 
vicinity of  London  were  intensified  by the exaction  of  free-quarters by 
the army.  In Essex it was  stated that the burden was as great as that 
of  all previous charges put together7.  Besides, the drought continued, 
and wheat became dearer.  In 1648 the average price was nearly double 
that of  the five  years from  1641 to 1645.  Comparing this period with 
that from  1646 to 1650, in  the former the average  was  34s.  lld. per 
quarter  as against  60s.  7d.  in the latters. 
These causes all tended towards intensifying the depression ;  and, in 
addition,  there  was  the  continuation  of  the  war  in  Ireland  and  in 
Scotland, involving the raising of additional resources by the government 
Memorials  of  English  Afairs,  by  B.  Whitelock, London,  1'732,  pp.  252, 
291,  299. 
"History  of  Independency,  by C.  Walker, Part I.  pp.  38,  129,  I'art  11.  p.  151 ; 
The  British  Bellman,  1648,  in Harleian  Miscelluny  (1746)) vrI.  p.  591 ; Epistolce 
Ho-Elianm,  by Janles Howell,  Lorldot~,  1737, p.  431. 
3  State Papers, Domestic, Inter., rx. 61 ;  Calendar, 1650, p.  178. 
4  Howell, Epistola Ho-Eliana, p. 431. 
State Papers, Domestic, Inter., I.  10 (1);  Calendar, 1649-50,  p.  12.  In April, 
1650, the losses were returned at a million.  Ibid., IX.  34. 
Whitelock, Memorials,  ut supra, p. 206 ;  Journals of the House of  Commons, vr. 
p.  45. 
7  Rushworth, Collectim, VI.  p.  451. 
8  A  HGtory  of  Agriculture  and  Prices,  by  J. E. T. Rogers,  v. pp.  270-3 ; 
Chronicon Pre~ioaum,  p.  126. 
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and ~roducing  a  feeling of  insecurity.  Owing to the pre-occupation of 
the chief departments of  the State in the serious exigencies of the time, 
there is  comparatively little mention  of  the great decline in commerce. 
The joint-effects of  the great dearth and the reduction  of  exports, with 
a  further falling off  in  the cloth  trade,  are shown  in  the danger  of 
starvation  amongst  the very  poor.  John Cooke,  writing  about  1648, 
says that "good  magistrates  should  save the lives  of  many  thousand 
poore men  and  women  and children, who  are likely to be famished and 
perished  to death1."  In  1649 orders  were sent to commanding  officers 
not to remain  for more  than a week  in one place and that they should 
pay for quarters "  lest the poor, whose sufferings were so heavy by reason 
of the great dearth, should be further oppressed2" ;  and, in the followirg 
year, it  is noted that the meaner sort of people had become poor, and those, 
who  had already  been  poor, were  now  in danger of "perishing3."  An 
instance of the general poverty is to  be found in a report on the condition 
of  Dover  in  1649.  The revenue for the repair of  the harbour had been 
derived  from  dues  on  foreign  shipping, and this  trade  had  become  so 
reduced that the piers were greatly  damaged, through want  of  money to 
effect repairs.  From  1642 no less than 60 sail, owned locally, had been 
lost.  Many of  the merchants  had failed, and  others had left the town, 
so that there were then 200 vacant houses4.  Under these circumstances, it 
was  inevitable  that the cloth trade was  in a  most  depressed condition. 
The disorganization  of  agriculture,  by  military  operations, aff'ected the 
supply of  wool.  Some of  the weavers had become soldiers, and many of 
them  had emigrated6.  Abuses had  crept  into  the  manufacturing  of 
cioth, so  that men  were  not  wanting  who  predicted "the utter ruin of 
the  drapery  of  England,"  unless  some  measures  were  devised  for  its 
regulation  and encouragement6. 
During a period  which  began  with a serious crisis, succeeded by ten 
years  of  trade-depression,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  the  joint-stock 
companies  would  be  affected.  Before  the crisis of  1640 many  under- 
takings  had  already  become  embarrassed.  The  Russia  and  African 
companies were  involved  in financial difficulties, and the current joint- 
stock  of  the former  came to an  end about 1646, when  its agents were 
expelled  from  Russia7.  The  African  Adventurers  were  unable  to 
prosecute  their  trade,  though  they  tried  to  obtain  a  royalty  from 
Poor Man's  Case, 1618, p.  27. 
State  Papers,  Domestic,  Council  of State to Col. Reynolds,  May  5, 1649; 
Calendar,  1649-50,  p.  125. 
State Papers, Domestic, Inter., IX. 34; Calendar, 1650, p. 107. 
Ibid., 111. 2;  Calendar, 1649-50, p. 360. 
"bid.,  I. 34, IX.  61 ; Calendar, 1649-50,  p.  64, 1650, p. 178. 
T bid.,  IX.  6 ;  Cakndar, 1650, p.  21.  Vide infra, ~r.:p.  66. 
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merchants, who  were  prepared to risk single voyages to parts within the 
limits covered  by  their  charter1.  The Greenland  company,  possibly, 
met with some success, since it continued to fit  out whaling expeditions ; 
and  the fact that other vessels were  sent by adventurers, who were not 
members,  tends  to show  that  there  were  profits  to be  made1.  The 
effect of  the Civil War on  the societies of  the Mines Royal and of  the 
Mineral and Battery Works was  in some respects peculiar.  The leading 
shareholders  in  both  were  prominently  identified  with  the  cause  of 
Charles I. ; and therefore, from the outbreak of  the Civil War until the 
Restoration, no governor was chosen by either company, and no meetings 
were  held.  At  the  same  time,  mining  operations  were  not  wholly 
suspended ; for,  in  1642, a  subordinate  undertaking had  been  formed 
with a capital of  23,700, and a year's  output was estimated to be worth 
&'5,000.  This body  continued  working  till the mint  at Aberystwyth 
was  seized by  the Parliamentary troops, and thereafter traces are to be 
found  of  work  being  carried  on  by  another member of  this subsidiary 
company  3. 
In many respects the East India company was the most unfortunate 
of  all.  When  its organization was  being  improved  in  1634-5,  a rival 
association  had been  founded  with  the full  sympathy  and  support  of 
Charles I.  Such competition  depressed  the  value  of  the shares,  and 
the company was unable to secure adequate capital to carry on its trade. 
Under  these  circumstances, it was  an  additional  hardship  that great 
inroads were  made on  its scanty resources by the contending parties of 
the State.  Between the "  Pepper loan " and advances to the Parliament 
(&6,000 in 1643-4  and 24,000 to &10,000 in  1649), the company  had 
funds of  about 880,000 diverted from its trade.  Against this loss, is to 
be set the coincidence  of  the loans and Parliamentary support-that  of 
1643 being followed by a favourable  draft ordinance  and the later one 
by an effort to mitigate the competition of the rival body4. 
To a certain extent the restricted trade of the joint-stock  companies, 
during a  period  of  remarkable  depression,  is  to be  attributed  to  the 
rudimentary form, which the system had as yet assumed, and to erroneous 
financial methods.  There was  always a tendency  to revert to the plan 
of a number of CO-existing  undertakings, which tended towards weakness 
and confusion.  A still graver error was the habit of  dividing the profits, 
without  reserving  sufficient sums  to  provide  against  any  exceptional 
calamity.  Quite apart from all other elements, this dicerence of  method 
was  an immense aid to the Dutch company in the years of  strife for the 
trade  of  India.  If  the  English  company  had  had  sufficient capital, 
which  it could have kept  available for trade, opportunities  would have 
Vide infra,  11. p. 16.  "bid.,  11.  p. 72. 
Ibid., 11.  pp. 402, 403.  4  Ibid.,  11.  pp. 116-20. 
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arisen for making profitable expeditions.  As things were, the company 
was  not  in  a  financial position  to undertake large risks.  Thus it was 
forced  to reduce  its ventures, and in  1649 it was  resolved to send no 
ships to the East. 
Though a convulsion such as the Civil War was  highly detrimental 
to  the joint-stock  companies,  it also  affected  the  regulated  bodies. 
Prominent  members  of  both,  who  became  delinquents,"  lost  their 
freedom.  In the joint-stock  undertakings  this resulted  in forced sales 
of  stock ;  and, as in the case of  landed property, the prices realised were 
low1.  But in the joint-stock  company, on a revival of  confidence, there 
would  be a fresh inflow of  capital, so  that the restriction of  trade would 
be at a minimum: whereas in the regulated body, once the ordinances had 
been  passed  limiting  membership  to  merchants,  who  had  served  an 
apprenticeship to a particular kind of business, the process of recuperation 
after the depression was  unduly  delayed,  owing  to the fact that new 
resources  could  only  be  provided  from  the savings of  those  who  were 
already freemen  or from  borrowings  made by them.  Besides, the con- 
fining of  participation  in  certain  trades  to  what  was  in  practice  an 
hereditary caste  of  merchants  cut off  such  industries from two valuable 
accessions of  strength.  A commercial body stood to gain, 011  the whole, 
by the adhesion of  self-made men, who had raised themselves from srnall 
beginnings by exceptional ability or industry.  Also younger sons of  the 
landed families frequently devoted themselves to comrnerce ;  and, unless 
these  men  started  as apprentices,  they  would  find  it difficult,  if  not 
impossible, to enter the regulated company.  In so far as the joint-stock 
undertakings were open to either class, they gained by  the energy of  the 
one and by  the relatively wide outlook of the other.  Thus the attacks, 
made later on the joint-stock company by the regulated bodies, originated 
in the restriction of  the membership of  the latter, and at the same time 
constitute indirect evidence to the growing success of  the former type of 
organization. 
l It appears to be to this period that the  statement  in the pamphlet-Strange 
News from India (1652)-refers,  namely  that "actions" or  shares were sometimes 
sold at much more than 40 per cent. discount. CHAP. XIII.]  The East  India Company in 1650  245 
CHAPTER  XIII. 
IT  is only to be  expected that, after the Civil War in Great Britain, 
the commerce of  the country would remain  depressed for a considerable 
period.  The combination of  unfavourable  circumstances was one which 
involved the disorganization  of  industry and a very great destruction of 
wealth.  Added to this was the continuance of  bad harvests until 1651, 
and the pressure of  high taxation.  For these reasons the full force of 
the losses  of  the Civil  War was  felt  for  several years  afterwards  in 
a scarcity of  capital for the prosecuting of  existing industries or for the 
starting  of  new  ones.  Therefore,  the  recovery,  when  it began,  was 
tentative in character and was subject to frequent counteraction. 
Despite the continuance of  the dearth  and  the alarming military 
situation in Ireland and Scotland, the beginning of a revival of confidence 
can be traced in the year 1650 in England.  Scotland had  been affected 
to some extent by diflerent  tendencies, and new  enterprize showed itself 
there a few  years earlier.  This development is marked by the establish- 
ment  of  three  factories  for  the production  of  broad  cloth,  at Ayr, 
Bonnington and New mills (Haddingtonshire), not long after the passing 
of  the act of  the Scottish  Parliament  for  the encouragement  of  this 
industry  in  1645l.  In England  the state of  trade had  been  causing 
serious anxiety in 1649, and the extent of  the depression had aroused 
the attention of  Parliament.  The position of  the East India company 
was  unsatisfactory ; since, besides the events which  had been prejudicial 
to other  branches  of  commerce,  it suffered  from  the  mal-practices  of 
Courten's  Association, which,  being  on  the verge  of  bankruptcy,  had 
circulated  base  money  in  India.  The  original  company  had  lost 
k'100,OOO  by these practices ;  and, what was more important, the native 
princes held the body, to which they had granted concessions, responsible, 
The litcords  of  a  Scottish  Uoth  Manufactory  at  it'ew  Mills, Haddingtwwhire 
(1681-1703),  edited  hy W.  R.  Scott (Scottish  Hist.  Soc.,  1005), p.  xxxiv. 
with  the result  that Engljsh trade with  India, as a whole, was  reduced 
to very  narrow dimensions.  It was  clear  that the situation could  not 
continue, and in January 1650 the House of  Commons resolved that the 
trade should be carried on by one company with one joint-stock1.  After 
negotiations  between  the  two  bodies  and  with  the encouragement  of 
Parliament,  lists  were  opened  for  the  formation  of  a  fresh  stock, 
described as  the United  Joint-Stock.  For the first  time, as  far as  is 
known,  the  capital  orered  for  subscription  was  limited  to a  definite 
amount, namely P300,000 nominal;  and, in the preamble for applications, 
it was  explicitly  announced  that the voting  rights should  be  one vote 
for each P500 of stocka. 
Though  the whole  capital  offered  to the public  by the East India 
company  in  1650 was  not  taken  up,  the fact  that it was  possible  to 
make the floatation is an index of  an improvement;  and evidence in the 
same direction  is to be  found in the purchase, up to January 1652, of 
fee-far111  rents,  formerly  belonging  to  the  Crown,  to  the  value  of 
2273,0003.  These land-sales, which continued for the next three years, 
were  absolutely  necessary  to supply  funds  for  the  necessities  of  the 
government, which, after pushing taxation to the highest possible point, 
would  have  otherwise been  faced by  a  series of  deficits so  large as  to 
make its position impossible4.  At  the same time, although the purchases 
show a revival of  confidence, these sales had a doubly prejudicial  effect. 
In relation to trade in general, the provision  of  several n~illions  by the 
trading  classes  diverted  capital  from  commerce  where  it was  greatly 
needed.  Then,  as  affecting  the  fi~ture  of  the  State,  there  was  the 
l  Vide  infra,  11.  pp.  118-19 ;  Journals of  the  House  of  Commons,  VI.  p.  353 ; 
A  HGtory  of  British India,  by  Sir W.  W. Hunter,  11.  pp.  115,  116. 
Vide infra,  11.  p.  120. 
Gardiner, History,  1649-60 (1804),  I. p.  281. 
The estimates for the year 1651 were as follows : 
Army  ...  ...  ...  ...  £2,115,849  4  8 
Navy  ...  ...  ...  ...  659,219  0  0 
Add other expenses, say  .  .  .  200,000  0  0 
22,875,068  4  8 
The navy  was  in  debt to  the extent of  £406,514.  An  assessment  of  £120,000 
a month was  imposed, which with  the addition  of  the Customs and excise would 
leave  an  estimated  deficit  (apart  from  land-sales)  of  about three-quarters  of  a 
million-State  Papers,  Domestic,  Council of  State,  Proceedings,  March 17,  l651 ; 
Calendar,  1651,  p.  90; Journals  of  the  House  of  Commons,  VI.  pp.  550,  580,  617. 
The foregoing  estimate  exceeds  that  framed  by  Mr  Gardiner  (History,  1649-60 
(1894)) I. p. 417), who seems to have taken the year's charge for the army as twelve 
times the month's charge.  It  is clear from Carte MS. ~xxrv.  f. 7 and other accounts 
that the month was  a lunar one, and the basis of  calculation was  to take twelve 
times the "month's  charge" and then to add another month to obtain the aritrual 
charge.  In the case of  assessments  only twelve  months  went to the year. Revival  in  Trade  1650 
sacrifice of  a  valuable  national  asset.  These  lands were  sold for from 
eight to ten years' purchase on the rents.  But, in many cases, rents were 
about half what they had been  before 16401.  It  follows, then, that the 
sales by the Commonwealth only realized about five years'  p~~rchase  on 
the old  rents,  which,  under  ordinary  conditions, would  be  the normal 
ones.  Under the circumstances, some of the purchasers must have made 
bargains  exceedingly favourable  to themselves.  The most  remarkable 
group of  cases was that in which full advantage had been  taken of  the 
financing  of  the  army-arrears.  Debentures  had  been  issued  against 
these, which were  sold by the soldiers at a discount  of  60 per cent.  It 
is  alleged  that  persons  with  funds  at their  disposal  bought  these 
debentures at the depressed price,  and,  on being  paid  off  at par,  they 
invested  the proceeds  in  Crown-lands, thus obtaining the latter at two 
or three years'  purchase, in terms of  the sum originally used in purchase 
of  the debentures2.  That the mercantile  classes  were  becoming  more 
hopeful was  shown  also by the appearance of  a considerable number of 
new  schemes and inventions, prominent  amongst which was  one for the 
foundation of  a State-bank, with branches in the chief  foreign monetary 
centres3.  Finally, that there was some real advance in trade by 1650 is 
attested by the returns of  the Customs, which for that year amounted 
to 6350,0004.  This sum  closely approximates that reached  before the 
Civil War; but,  in  such  a  comparison,  allowance must  be  made  for 
some increase in the rates.  Taking the average for the two years 1646 
and 1647, the revenue from  this source in 1650 shows an improvement 
of  about 30 per cent.6 
One effect of the want of  capital was a great extension of  the joint- 
stock  system  in  the  formation  of  unincorporated  companies.  The 
tendency, already noticed6, towards the adoption of  the style ''  A.B. and 
Co."  increased during the Commonwealth  and  Protectorate  to such an 
exte~t  that notices of  enterprizes, controlled by companies, exceed those 
owned  by  individuals.  How  far  these  unincorporated  bodies  were 
partnerships,  how  far  they  had  a  sufficiently  large  membership  to be 
called companies in a strict sense, it is difficult to determine.  Certainly 
in some instances  the membership was  large7, and in others there was 
l  Gardi~ler,  History, 1642-0  (1893),  111.  p.  196. 
The British Bell-man, 1648, in Harleian  Miscellany (1746), vrI.  p.  589 ;  History 
of  Independency,  by C. Walker, Pt.  11.  pp.  155, 207. 
3  Vide infra,  111.  p.  201 ; Anderson,  Annals  of  Commerce,  11.  pp.  553,  544; 
Andread&,  History  of  the  Bank  of  England,  pp.  26,  27. 
4  Hall, Custom-Revenue, ut supra, I. p.  184. 
5  Vide supra, p.  236. 
0  Vide supra, p. 227. 
7  E.g. in l652 Mainwaring, Hawe.7,  Payne and  Company consisted  of 30 persons, 
interested in the  ship Elizabeth-State  Papers  Domestic, Inter., xxvr. 82 ;  Calendar 
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a regular constitution with a committee of management1.  The following 
are some of  the titles of  unincorporated  companies-Samzlel  Vassatl and 
Company, Samuel Lemott and Company, both in the African tradel.  In 
the whaling  industry,  besides  the  Greenland  company, there were  at 
least  four others,  some  of  which  had a  considerable  membership,  one 
being described as the Hull Company or the Hull  AdventurersB.  Trading 
to the East Indies, there were Thomas Barnardiston, Thomas Bludworth, 
William Love and Company, also Thomas Kendall and Compar~y'.  Other 
similar  organizations, connected with  shipping, include lIenrty St. John 
and  Compan9,  James  Pickering  and  Company,  Thomas  Cowell  and  - 
Company6, Thomas Fowke  and Company, Thomas Drawatter and Com- 
pany6.  Connected with honie  trade there were  competitive offers from 
two partnerships for the working of  the postal service7,  and from 1653-6 
there was  an undertaking, known  as John Jervase,  Molym, Richardson 
and Company, which owned  the powder-mills by which  the government 
was supplieds. 
The formation of  the large group of  unincorporated companies was 
occasioned also  in  part by the position  of  the chartered  organizations. 
During the Civil War, the privileged  bodies  had  suffered from  having 
no constituted authority, that could give time to consider their position; 
and,  meanwhile,  any  group  of  capitalists,  which  was  prepared  to risk 
a  voyage  within  the areas, reserved  by  the charters, had  a  reasonable 
prospect of  enjoying the proceeds of  the expedition undisturbed.  It has 
already been shown that the urgency of the case of  the East India trade 
caused  this branch  of  the general  question  to be  dealt  with  hastilyg. 
In  the  remaining  departments of  foreign  commerce, where  chartered 
companies existed, there was a full enquiry by the Committee for Trade 
and Foreign  affairs.  Ample opportunities were afforded for the estab- 
lished  companies and their  opponents to give evidence and to submit 
their main contentions in writing.  In the special circumstances of  the 
Turkey trade, the arguments for and against the existence of a regulated 
company  were  interchanged  between  the  parties,  and the Committee 
undertook  to consider the replies,  which  it invitedlo. 
The Adventurers in the Ship  William to the East Indies-Home  Miscellaneous, 
XXVI.  at the India Office,  cf. Hunter, History of British India, 11.  p.  122 (note). 
Vide infra,  11.  p.  15 ; State  Papers,  Domestic,  Inter.,  CLIV.  84; Calendar, 
1656-7,  p.  341. 
Vide infra, 11.  pp.  73, 74.  Hunter, History of British India, 11.  p.  121. 
j  Calendar State Papers, Domestic, 1651-2,  pp.  217, 342, 34.5,  1655-6,  p. 350. 
State Papers-Board  of  Trade Commercial Series 11.  vol. 691. 
Vide infra, 111.  pp. 41, 42.  --  - 
Calendar State Papers,  Domestic,  1655-6,  pp.  130-1 ;  cf. infra,  11.  p.  472. 
Vide supra, p. 245. 
l0 State  I?ape;s,  Domestic,  Committee  of Trade,  Proceedings,  May  7,  1652; 
Calendar,  1651-2,  p.  236. Committee  for  Trade on  Conlpanies 1650 
The most  interesting  proceedings were  those  affecting the African 
and Greenland trades.  As against the two old companies, were  arrayed 
several partnerships composed of  those who had entered on these trades 
or who proposed to do so.  Out of  the mass of  arguments, put forward 
on  both sides, a number  may be disnlissed  as irrelevant, as for instance 
the contention  of  a  company  of  independent  adventurers  to Guinea, 
which  promised to import 2300,000 of  gold dust the first year and to 
double that amount after  six  years1.  Equally  illusory  were  the pro- 
fessions of  public  spirit  and  the desires  of  a  freer  trade,  which  were 
nlade by  the newer  partnerships ;  since it appears that, in  several cases, 
the same persons, as  independent  adventurers  in  one  of  these  trades. 
argued in  this way ;  while, as members of  some privileged  company, in 
that capacity, they participated in petitions for  maintaining the most 
exclusive  Thus the chief  opponents of  the African  under- 
taking-Samuel  Vassall  and company-were  members  of  the chartered 
East India body2; while Thornas Horth, who  with his  partners offered 
a determined  opposition  to the Greenland  company:  appears to have 
been the same penon who had been the moving spirit in the coal-shipping 
monopoly of  1639, which was condemned as oppressive4.  On  the other 
hand,  it was  clear  that  neither  of  the  conlpanies  could  make  out 
a reasonable case for an absolute monopoly, whether  of  the whole west 
coast  of  Africa  or  of  all  the whaling  grounds.  While  some  of  the 
petitioners were new-coolers, others had gradually built up an established 
business, and it was equitable that their enterprizes  should be respected. 
For similar reasons the argumeot, in favour of  the old companies, based 
on  the right  of  discovery, can  have  little weight,  since  the African 
undertaking had  possessed  a  nominal  monopoly  for  twenty  years  and  " 
that for the whale-fishing for about half a century. 
Omitting the extreme contentious on  either side, the Committee for 
Trade had  to deal with  the actual  facts as they were, and there  were 
grounds pointing towards two different conclusions.  It was argued that 
the established companies had not taken  the fullest  advantage of  their 
opportunities; as for instance that the African Adventurers had failed 
to establish trading posts on more  than half  the area within the limits, 
prescribed  by  the  charter,  and  that  the  whaling  organisation,  by 
reducing  its fleet, had  enhanced  the price  of  train-oil5.  The former 
State Papers, Colonial, xr.  13 ;  Calendar, Colonial,  1574-1660,  p. 331. 
"We humbly conceive that they [Vassall and  Co.] speak not agair~st  the East 
India company because most of them are members thereof"-Ibid.,  XI. l5 ;  Cuiel~dar,  - 
Colonial, 1574-1660,  p. 339. 
Vide infra,  11. p. 74.  r  Vide supra, p. 220. 
b  It is Stated by Thornas Violet that,  if there had  been 110 Greenland compally, 
the price of  oil would have been 200/0 to 30  less-Mysteries  and Secret8  of  T~uda 
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company replied  that it had a  quick-stock  of  640,000, unemployed in 
Africa, which it had not been  able to invest  in commodities or negroes 
there, while the Greenland adventurers  complained that the restriction 
of their trade had been due to attacks made upon their men  by the rival 
whalers.  The  aggressive  nature  of  seventeenth  century  competition 
constitutes  one  important  element  in  the situation.  The evidence  is 
clear that great violence was used on both sides and, certainly, not least 
by  the independent  traders.  For instance, in  the case  of  the African 
dispute, the chartered  company had purchased a station from the local 
chief  at Wyamba  about 1633.  Buildings  were  erected, and  the place 
had  been  in  constant use,  until the capture of  some ships  by  Prince 
Rupert involved a re-arrangement of  the staff.  On the arrival of a new 
factor and his party, it was  found that the agents of Vassal1 and company 
had  seized  the station,  burned  it and then  fired  on  the boats  of  the 
company.  Even in the far north, there were  similar  scenes of  violence. 
At this period, it was  usual for the boiling of  the blubber to take place 
on shore, and  there were  frequent collisions, accon~panied  by bloodshed, 
between  the crews  of  the various  companies.  Considerations  such  as 
these suggest that the solution was to be sought by way  of  the grant to 
each company of a reserved area. 
On  the other hand,  it was  argued  that, in  the African  trade,  the 
freer  it was,  the greater  the export  of  English goods  would  be;  and 
similarly, in whaling, a perfectly open trade would  increase the quantity 
of  shipping.  Recent  experience had  afforded some guidance  on  these 
points.  Just as had happened in the case of  Hawkins nearly a hundred 
years  before1, the reckless  comnlander  of  some  isolated  expedition, by 
seizing negroes forcibly, aroused the hostility of  the natives over a wide 
area against  all the regular  English  traders.  This had happened  not 
long before  the enquiry of  1650, and many of  the members of  such an 
expedition  had  been  killed.  Again,  it  was  urged  that  the  e&ct  of 
competition  had  been  to reduce  the price  of  English  goods, sold  in 
Africa, and to increase that of  the commodities, received  in exchange. 
This element was important in relation to the profits of  the trade;  but, 
in addition, it was argued that competition at any given point increased 
the working  costs  of  an  expedition.  Where  a  ship  could  count  on 
obtaining a cargo, it was possible to return to England in about nine or 
ten months : if  the vessel was  delayed by  having to wait for  her  lading, 
thc time of  absence was almost doubled.  Prior to the adoption of  lead 
or copper  sheathing2, such  a  protracted  absence on  the African  coast 
meant  that the cost  of  repairing  the ship  was  almost as much as the 
original outlay. 
Vide infra, rr. p.  9.  "bid.,  111. pp.  105, 106. The Nwigation Act  1651  [CHAP.  XIII. 
The settlement made in both cases was  based on a common principle, 
with some slight variation in the details.  That affecting the African 
trade was  reached  in 1651, and it assigned a monopoly to the company 
of  the commerce of  the coast-line, where  it had  factories  established1. 
Two  years later, the whaling problem was dealt with by the appointment 
of  a committee of  management, elected by the different companies.  A 
few  years afterwards this arrangenlent  was  modified, and here  also the 
idea  of  reserved  areas  was  adopted, the ~reenland  company obtaining 
the  monopoly  of  Bell  Sound and  Horn  Sound,  while  other  whaling 
grounds  were  left  open1. 
The arrangement  for regulating the African  trade was  a  return  to 
the methods of  the time of  Elizabeth, when it will be  remembered that 
a similar solution had been adopted in the establishment of  the African 
company, known  as the Senegal Adventurers3.  Another aspect  of  the 
commercial policy  of  the Long Parliament, namely its attitude to the 
shipping  industry,  is sometimes  regarded  as  a  return  to Elizabethan 
methods.  This  policy  finds  expression in the Navigation  Act,  which 
was  passed  on October 9th, 1651 and which was to come into operatiorl 
on December 1st of  the same year.  In so far as this measure aimed at 
building up English sea-power, it represented  an ideal which  had been 
constantly before the mind of  Charles I., and which had resulted  in the 
imposition  of  the tax of  ship-money.  Besides  the fostering of  naval 
force, the Navigation Act was designed to effect a revival of  the English 
carrying trade.  Towards the end of  the sixteenth century, the  importance 
of  this industry had been  the envy of  the chief  commercial nations of 
Europe'.  In  the  first  quarter  of  the  seventeenth  century,  through 
various causes, while it had advanced considerably, English shipping was 
less supreme than it had been.  There was an improvement up to 1640 ; 
but, during the Civil  War, there had  been  a very  great decline.  The 
volume of  trade had been much reduced;  and, of  that smaller amount, 
English ships carried a less proportion.  The reason  for this is obvious. 
The merchant,  who  consigned  his  goods  in  an  English  bottom,  was 
subbject  to quite exceptional risks, owing to the activity of  the privateers 
of  Rupert and of  the countries  in  sympathy  with  the Royalist  cause. 
During the Civil War, English  merchantmen  were  an  easy  prey,  and 
there was  little risk  of  reprisals.  Therefore, it was  inevitable that the 
merchant,  who  had  any  choice,  would  decide  against  employing  an 
English  vessel. 
The accounts of  the great losses of  ships, as well  as the statement 
that those which remained were not fully employed, show the consequences 
of  the war  on  the carrying trade.  In spite of  the statement of  Adam 
1  Vide infra,  11. p. 16. 
8  Ibid., 11.  pp.  10, 11. 
Ibid., 11.  pp. 72-4. 
Vide zupra, p.  83. 
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Smith, it may  well  be  questioned  whether,  on  the  whole, the Act was 
wise,  and especially  whether  it was  desirable  at this particular time'. 
It is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  several  distinct  considerations,  in 
investigating the causes and  effects of  the measure.  If  any parallel be 
drawn  between  England  in the time  of  Elizabeth and  in  that of  the 
Commonwealth,  it must  be  noted  that  Burghley  was  on  the  whole 
opposed  to this type of  legislationa.  Moreover, weight  must  be given 
to the feeling in Holland before and after the Act, since much depended 
upon  whether  war  between  the  two  countries  was  inevitable  or  not. 
Judging from  the proposals, made by  the Dutch Commissioners in June 
1651 (that is  nearly  four  months  before the passing of  the Act), they 
were prepared to grant England substantial commercial concessions.  It 
was proposed that colonies of  both countries  in America and the West 
Indies  should be  open to the subjects  of  either, and that Englishmen 
should not be  called upon  to pay higher taxes in  Dutch  territory than 
the  natives  and  conversely3.  It follows,  then,  that  neither  on  the 
grounds of precedent nor of  national security was the Act an immediate 
necessity.  Further, as far as can be gathered, the passing of  this measure 
in 1651 was a serious error.  The chief  cause of  the decline of  shipping 
was  the series of  circumstances, arising  out of  the Civil  War,  which 
~recluded  the attention of  the government  being  given to the carrying 
trade.  With the re-organization  of  the administration, it should have 
been  possible, within  a  short time, to have effected a remedy.  Instead 
of trusting to the natural development of trade, which had already begun 
and which would have gained increased momentum once the main causes 
of  the depression had  been  removed,  Parliament made  the mistake  of 
legislating to remove a temporary decline in trade, as if  it were likely to 
be  a  permanent  one.  Moreover, the  decay of  shipping  was  not  an 
isolated  phenomenon,  it was  symptomatic  of  the  general  industrial 
situation  at the close of  the Civil War.  After the immense losses of 
wealth  during the struggle, the country had  an  insufficient  capital  to 
re-open immediately the trades that had diminished or ceased since 1641. 
Not only so, but many of  the skilled workers had emigrated or fallen in 
the  wars,  and  therefore  the process  of  recuperation, under  the  most 
favourable  conditions,  would  have  been  slow.  The  passing  of  the 
"It  is  not impossible, therefore, that some of the regulations of this famous 
act nlay have proceeded from  national animosity.  They are as wise, however, as if 
they had  all  been dictated  by the most  deliberate  wisdom.  National animosity at 
that particular time aimed at the very same object which the most deliberate wisdom 
would  have recommended, the diminution of the naval power of Holland,  the only 
naval power which  could  endanger  the  security  of  Erlgland-  Wealth  of  ATations, 
rv.  ii.  (Ed. E.  Carman,  I.  p.  428,  contrast  however,  11.  p.  115.) 
Cunningham, &owth  of  English Industry and Comme~ce  in Modern Times, p. $0. 
Gardiner, History,  1649-60 (1894), r.  p. 365. 252  Efits of the  Navigation Act  1652-4  [CIIAP.  XIII. 
Navigation Act involved a further disorganization of  trade, superimposed 
on that occasioned by the Civil War.  The immediate eflect of  the Act 
was  that there was  a great  interruption of  trade; since it was  alleged 
there was not sufficient English shipping to carry the imports and many 
merchants were  unable to obtain  supplies of  goods or raw  materials'. 
It  was  not  long  before  the  administration  perceived  some  of  the 
inconveniences of  the change, and for several years the Order Books of 
the Council of  State contain numerous entries, permitting certain persons 
to  be  freed  from  the  operation  of  the  Act2.  In  addition  to  the 
immediate dislocatioll of  the national production, through the temporary 
interruption  of  imports,  there  was,  to a  certain  extent, a  permanel~t 
burden  placed  on  several  trades,  chiefly  those  dealing  with  foreign 
countries  and enterprizes  in remote places.  In theory, it was supposed 
that ships would  be  required, not  only for the colonial  trade, but for 
that with Europe.  At the same time, this change meant that, in sotne 
cases, trade was  restricted ;  in others the cost of  freight was  increased ; 
or again  the profits  of  vessels  were  diminished,  and the cost  of  ship- 
building  was  advanced  by  one-third;  while,  in  the  working  of  the 
Greenland trade, it was found that the outlay on the voyages was higher 
than had  been  usual in the pasts.  It follows, then, that the estimated 
benefits were  remote:  while  the losses  were  immediate and, in certain 
instances, pressing.  From  the point of  view  of  the industrial situation 
early in 1652, the effects were exceptionally unfortunate, in so far as the 
trade-revival which had just begun was  to some extent checked; and the 
free interchange  of  commodities, which was  required  to enable capital 
to be  accumulated  to restore  the  losses  of  the war,  was  greatly in- 
terrupted. 
All the consequences of  the Navigation Act, already indicated, would 
have followed had there been no Dutch War ;  and it cannot be doubted  -  - 
that, while there were other causes tending towards a rupture, one of the 
main  grounds of  the conflict  was  the irritation, caused in  Holland, by 
the operation of  this Act.  It is to be noted that the first engagements, 
in the Channel in May 1652, were the immediate outcome of interference 
with  Dutch  shipping,  which  were  occasioned by  the provisions of  the 
measure4. 
The official justification  of  thc war is of  great interest, since claims 
were  explicitly olade by England on Holland for the damages sustained 
1 Anderson, Annals of Commerce, 11.  p. 562. 
2  A Detection of the  Court and State of England, by R. Coke, 1719, 11. p. 76. 
3  Discourse  on  Trade, by Roger Coke, London,  1670,  p.  5 ;  A  Detection  of  the 
court  and  State  of  England,  by R.  Coke,  1719,  1.  p.  418. 
4  Lrtter.r  and  Papera  Relating  to  the  First  Dutch  Wur, 1652-1664,  edited  by 
S.  R. Gardiner, t',~b/ieations (Navy Records  Soc.,  189!)), I.  pp.  197,  234. 
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by  the East India, the Russia  and Greenland  companies, through  the 
action  of  Dutch subjects.  Such a claim raised an important matter of 
principle,  governing  the whole  question  of  the monopolies of  trading 
companies.  It was  urged, at a later date with  considerable force, that 
a  strong  argument  in  favour  of  such  grants  was  that  thereby  the 
con~panies  undertook the obligation of self-defence.  Upon such grounds 
then, supposing  they suffered loss, they were  barred  from securing  the 
intervention  of  the State on  their behalf  at the risk  of  a  serious war. 
On  the other hand,  if  the State undertook,  and  was  able,  to protect 
English commerce in the most distant parts of  the globe, a strong claim 
for the making of trading monopolies falls to the ground. 
The war  lasted  from  the  summer  of  1652 until  July 9th, 1654. 
During that period Dutch commerce suffered very greatly.  Trading in 
Holland was  described as "dead,  corn dear, fishing prevented  and the 
people very unquiet1" ;  while the loss of  ships, captured by the English 
fleet up to the end of  1653, was  estimated  at 700 sail2,  and the total 
prizes, over the whole  war, taken  by the British at 1,700"  Naturally, 
the captures were  not on  one side only, and many English vessels were 
seized  by the enemy.  Trade to the Baltic and to the Mediterranean 
had almost ceased, and the interruption  extended to other branches of 
commerce,  apparently  outside  the range  of  hostilities.  In 1654 the 
African company and the independent traders had sustained an aggregate 
loss of  &300,0004, while all the undertakings, engaged in whaling, were 
unable to import any oil in  that year6.  Partly through the war, partly 
owing to a want  of  assimilation  of  the original East India adventurers 
and the members of Courten's Association, who had joined  in the United 
Joint-Stock, there were  great dissensions in this body.  In 1653 it was 
resolved that no ships should  be  sent to India; and, in  order to retain 
the trade, the Council of State licensed persons, who were not free of  the 
company,  to make  voyages  to the East, irrespectively  of  the existing 
joint-stock.  At the same time, the renewed  depression, caused  by the 
war,  was  to some  extent  mitigated  in  certain  exceptional  directions. 
The  East  India  company  received  &85,000  from  the  rival  Dutch 
undertaking,  while  in  1654 the  Russia  company  formed  a  new  joint- 
stock and secured re-admittance to Russia.  Up to August 15th, 1655, 
this body had exported from Archangel goods to t,he value of 2330,0006, 
l  Menzorials  of  the  English  Afairs,  by B.  Whitelocke,  London,  1722,  pp. 553, 
569, 561. 
Anderson, Annals of C'on~merce,  11.  p.  562. 
A Detection of the Court and Stato of Englund, by R. Coke, 1719, 11. p. 67 
Vide infra, 11.  p. 16.  5  Ibid., 11. p. 74. 
[bid., 11.  p. 67;  I'hurloe, State Papers,  1x1. p. 713. The Strain  on  the  Finances  1651-4  [CHAP. XIII. 
and about the same time at home an influential company was formed (in 
which Cromwell was interested) for the smelting of  iron with coal in the 
Forest of Dean1. 
Not  only  had  the Dutch  War been  prejudicial  to trade  but  it 
produced a grave strain on the finances.  Owing to the cost of  military 
operations in Scotland in 1651, the estimated expenditure  for  that year 
had been over two and three-quarter millionsa.  For 1652 it was  about 
two and a half  millions ;  and, since it is recorded that the Treasury was 
''  much distracted,"  it is probable that the actual  outlay was very much 
more"  Although on June 2nd a committee was  appointed  to consider 
how a  considerable  retrenchment  of  the army and an improvement  in 
the revenue might be effected',  the estimate  for both  services in 1653 
showed an increase, which brought the total to  over two and three-quarter 
millions".  On the estimate, there was a deficit of 2508,504 ;  which was 
increased by the excess of  the actual expenditure on the navy, making 
the adverse balance,  irrespective  of  the army,  over 2800,000 for  the 
year6.  For 1654 the actual cost of the navy was 21,059,382.  18s. 9d.' 
The financing of  the repeated  deficits, each of  which  was  approxi- 
mately  equal  to a  year's  revenue  of  Charles  I., was  an  exceedingly 
difficult  problem  for  a  government  which  had  already  exhausted  its 
Vide infra,  11.  pp. 460, 461.  Vide supra, p.  245,  note 4. 
S State  Papers,  Domestic,  Council  of  State,  Proceedings,  Sept.  30,  1652 ; 
Journals of  the  House of  Commons,  VII.  52, 70,  122, 128, 208.  The estimate for the 
army is from  Xmas  1651 to Xrnas 1652, that for the navy is framed  on different 
bases according to the changing conditions.  It  varies from 2829,490 to %1,085,315. 
Taking it at ;E1,000,000 the following estimate may be arrived at : 
Army  ...  ...  ...  ...  %1,328,579 
Navy(asabove) ...  ...  ...  1,000,000 
Other expenses  .  .  .  .  ..  .  .  .  200,000 
%2,528,579 
'  Journals of  the Home of  Commons,  VII.  p.  138 ;  Whitelocke, L%morials, p.  634. 
Journalo  of  the Houre of  Commons,  VII.  pp.  224,  300- 
Army  .  .  .  ...  .  .  .  ...  $1,443,680 
Navy  ...  ...  ...  ...  1,115,000 
Other expenses  ...  ...  ...  200,000 
£2,758,680 
Navy estimate  .  ..  ...  .  .  .  £1,115,000 
,,  actual  ...  ...  .  ..  1,410,312 
295,312 
Add estimated deficit  ...  ...  508,504 
2803,816 
-MS.  Rawlinson (Bod.  Lib.),  A.  195a, f. 241;  Journals of  the House of  Common*, 
VII.  p.  300. 
MS.  Rawl. A. 195a, f.  241. 
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credit.  The taxation imposed in 1650 could not be maintained, so that 
there only remained one resource, namely the sale of Crown, Church and 
forfeited  lands.  From  this  source,  as  well  as  the  fines  imposed  on 
delinquents, which  amounted to 21,304,957.  28.  Id., the greater part of 
the deficiencies had been  met1.  At the dissolution of  the Long Parlia- 
ment in April 1653, the State was indebted to the extent of  2700,000. 
But this form  of  statement only disguises the magnitude of  the strain 
on the finances.  Had it been possible, through a more developed system 
of  credit"  for the government to have effected loans to the extent of  its 
annual deficits, though the debt would have stood at a very much higher 
figure, the valuable  assets  of  Crown  and  forfeited  lands  would  have 
remained intact.  As it was, apart from peculation and irregular dealings 
by officials, by far the greater part of  this property had  been  disposed 
of, and that at a very great sacrifice1. 
Altogether apart from the question of  the financial methods adopted 
by  the Long Parliament,  it is  clear  that the situation,  as  it actually 
existed, would ultimately affect the policy of  the Protectorate.  It had 
only been  possible to maintain  the forces, at the level of  the last  five 
years,  by  drawing on  resources  which  were  now  ~ractically  exhausted. 
Moreover, it was found impossible to retain taxation at the great height 
of  recent years.  In September 1654 Cromwell admitted that the purse 
of  the  nation  could  not  have  been  able  much  longer  to bear  war- 
expenditure4, and in  November  it was  stated in  Parliament that "  the 
counties are generally exhausted  of  all the monies.  Men are forced to 
mortgage their lands and to sell in some places the very beds from under 
them to pay the taxes; and the cheapness of  commodities is not so much 
from  the plenty,  as  from  the scarcity  of  money,  which  is  drained  so 
A Catulogue of  the Lords, Knights and Gentlemen that have  compounded for  their 
Estates,  London,  1685 ; reprinted  by  Fellows,  Historical  Sketches  oj' ChurZes I., 
Appendix, pp.  xiii.-lxxiv.  The oppressiveuess of  the proceedings to obtain  money 
from fines aroused the sympathy of  Cromwell who said "that  poor men, under this 
arbitrary  power,  were  driven  like  flocks of  sheep by  forty in  a morning  to the 
confiscatioll of  goods  and  estates,  without  any man  being able to give a reason 
why two of  them had deserved to forfeit a shillingw--Oliver Cromwell's  Letters and 
Speeches,  edited  by  l'homas  Carlyle  (Copyright edition),  IV.  p.  40. 
It is from this point of  view that the various  proposals of  Benbrigge,  Gerbier 
and Lambe for the foundatio~~  of a bank (tide infra,  111.  pp. 200,  201) are explained 
In addition to these,  Cromwell made  overtures to Francis Frescobaldi with a view 
to the establishment  of  a  bank,  in which  Cromwell  himself  proposed  to invest 
60,000 ducats-The  Interest  of  Ireland  in its Trade and Wealth  slated,  by  Richard 
Lawrence,  Dublin,  1682,  Part  I.-Preface. 
Wromwell,  speaking  on  September 17,  1656,  said  that "we  had  no benefits 
of  those  estates at all considerable"-Carlyle,  Cromwell,  ut  supra,  IV.  p.  214. 
Carlyle,  Cromzuell, rv. p.  32. 256  Finance  arm?  the  Spanish  War 1654  [CHAP. xm. 
continually from the country by their monthly taxes as it never returns 
again in such plenty.  And if  this drain should run long,  it would, nay 
it is to be feared, that it will  make the poor  tenant and farmer  to run 
too;  and  ere  long  the  very  landlord  himself1."  Therefore,  if  the 
Protectorate  was  to remain  solvent,  being  without  the extraordinary 
receipts  of  the  Long  Parliament  and  being  compelled  to reduce  the 
assessnients,  it  must  carefully  avoid  any  policy of  adventure.  There 
remained  one  alternative,  namely  the  continuance  of  both  forces  on 
a war-footing by means of  new extraordinary receipts.  It was supposed 
that, by  reverting to the practice  of  seventy years  before,  a  war  with 
Spain in  the West  Indies could  be  made to pay  its way2, and in  the 
latter half of  1654 the fleet sailed on this mission.  The analogy to the 
time  of  Elizabeth  was  misleading.  Then  England  had  no  American 
possessions : whereas now colonies had been  founded, and, as far as the 
Navigation  Act  was  effecting its purpose,  a  reserved  trade  was  being 
built  up  with  the plantations.  Thus,  in  the changed  circumstances, 
England  was  subject to reprisals.  Besides, the successful Elizabethan 
expeditions had been those of  small syndicates of  adventurers ;  while, as 
shown  elsewheres,  the  large  ventures  had  failed  to  make  any  very 
considerable captures.  The sending  of  the fleet would  be  open to all 
the disadvantages  of  previous  extensive  equipments  and also to grave 
diplomatic  objections.  A11  through the earlier  raids on  Spanish com- 
merce, considerable care was taken that the State should not be ostensibly 
involved;  while  the sending of  the fleet of  the Protectorate could not 
fail  to  be  regarded  as  an  unfriendly  act,  reacting  seriously  on  the 
considerable trade of  England with Spain.  For these reasons, it follows 
that the anticipated gain from the expedition to the West Indies could 
not be realized, and that the country would be  forced sooner or later to 
face the expense. 
The estimates for the year 1655 were made to balance, owing to the 
assessments  in  England,  Scotland and Ireland  being  calculated  at the 
very high figure of  21,320,000.  The total outlay provided for was  two 
and a quarter millions4; but in the case of  the navy, the estimated charge 
The Diary of Thomaa Burton from 1656 to 1659 with an account of the Purliament 
of  1654 from thp journal  of  Guibon Goddard, edited by J.  'l'.  Rutt, London,  1828, I. 
p.  lxxxvi. 
The  World's Mistake  in Oliver Cromwell:  Or  a short  political  Discourse,  shewing 
that Cromwell's Male-Administration ...  lnid the Foundation of our present  Condition in 
the  Decay  of  Trade,  1668,  in  Harleian  Miscellany,  I.  p.  283. 
Vide supru, pp. 85, 98. 
4  This was  exactly the amount  of  the estimated  revenue  (Gardiner,  History, 
1649-60  (1901), III.  p.  82, where the details are given).  The assessment however 
should at the most have brought in  $900,000  (Journals of  the House  of  Commons, 
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was  exceeded by close on 290,000' ;  and, in addition, there was probably 
a large deficiency in the sum, received from the assessments, as compared 
with  that  estimated.  For  the year  1656  the  estimates  showed  an 
adverse balance of  over 2350,000 ;  but, by the exercise of  economy, the 
outlay on the navy was reduced below the estimate by 2131,4612.  The 
following year (1657), the estimates showed an increase, almost repeating 
the figures of  1655s.  On  this occasion, there was  no deficit on  paper, 
and the actual expenditure on the navy was less than that calculated'; 
VII.  pp.  387, 392, 395).  This would  reduce the estimated revenue to $21,842,000. 
The estimated  expenditure is as follows: 
Army  ..................  $21,508,000 
Navy  480,285  .................. 
Other Expenditure  ............  258,000 
-- 
$22,246,285 
-Add.  MSS.  (British  Museum)  4,156  f.  89,  28,854  ff.  1-7,  32,471  ff.  53,  54; 
Burton,  Diary,  ut  supra,  I.  pp.  lxxxvi.,  cxxi. 
l Estimate Navy  ...............  $2480,285 
Actual  ,,  ...............  569,512 
Excess Expenditure over estimate  ...  $89,227 
2  Estimated Expenditure (1656) 
...  Army  ...........  £1,051,819  12  0 
Navy  ...............  900,000  0  0 
Miscellaneous  ............  124,220  15  10 
S. 
One year's actual 
deficit Ireland  }  3,475  3  94  I 
$2,076,040  7  10 
Estimated Revenue  .........  1,720,478  4  0 
Estimated Deficiency  .........  355,562  3 10 
Deduct saving ou the Navy  ......  131,461  11  81 
$224,100  12  1% 
-Carte  MS. ~xxrv.  f. 7 ;  MS. Rawl. A.  195 a, f.  241 :  cf. Gardiner, History, 1649-60, 
111.  (Supplementary Chapter 1903), p.  4 (note), where the details of  the receipts are 
printed. 
Estinlates 1657 (for Great Britain only) 
Army  ...... 21,132,489  0  0  Assessmeltts  ...  S1,464,000  4  0 
- 
E2,330,464  3  94  / 
From Thurloe, State Papers, vr.  p.  596. 
*  Estimate for Navy  ............  3394,500  0  0 
Actual cost of  ,,  ............ 742,034 12  3# 
Saving on estimate ............ $252,465  7  8& 
The actual cost of  the navy in 1658 was  ;E599,108. 18s. 8hd. (MS. Rawl.  A.  195 a, 
f.  241), and the saving 011 the estimates is probably to be assigued to the captures of 
Spanish plate ships,  S130,000  being realized  up to January  1667  from the sale of 
I. C.  I.  17 
Navy  ......  994,500  0  0 
I\.liscellaneous  ...  200,000  0  0 
Customs and Excise  700,000  0  0 
Miscellaneons  ...  198,000  0  0 
22,326 989  0  0  $2,362,000  4  0 258  The East  India  Company  1655-7  [CHAP.  XIII. 
but this apparently  favourable showing depended upon the large amount 
estimated  for  the assessments  being  actually  received,  and  the total 
authorized by Parliament  was  likely to have realized  very  considerably 
less than that calculated1. 
Thus the first years  of  the Protectorate  were  beset  with  financial 
difficulties.  The expected aid from the rapture of  Spanish ~rizes  had 
proved, to a large degree, an illusive hope ;  and little assistance could be 
obtained  from  the dispersion of  the few  ren~aillillg  realizable  assets of 
the State.  The condition of  the Exchequer  brought  the government 
into relations with the East India company, through  the borrowing by 
the former of 250,000 in 1655 and a further sum of 210,000 in October 
of  the same gear.  For the past three years, the status of  the trade had 
been precarious.  Although the United Joint-Stock had made a reason- 
able profit-namely  105 per cent.',  which, if  taken to have been  gained 
in the six years ending in 1656, compares with 107f per cent. earned by 
the Dutch compang3-the  effect of  voyages  under license had not been 
satisfactory, either to the members or to the independent adventurers. 
The pressing needs of  the government  caused an intimation to be made 
to the company that the making of  a loan "would  be taken for a high 
favour4."  Such a hint, at a time when an enquiry was about to be made 
into the best  means  of  conducting  the trade,  foreshadowed a report, 
favourable to the wishes  of  the company-once  it had found the funds 
required of it.  The report was duly presented on December 18th, 1656, 
and Cromwell  signed a charter, which  explicitly recognized  most of  the 
privileges claimed by  the company, on October 19th, 16575.  Under  this 
grant, a fresh  subscription of  capital was  made, and the New  General 
Stock was begun.  The total applications represented stock to the extent 
of 2739,788. 10s. Od.  on  which calls of 50 per cent. were madee. 
The financial  assistance, afforded by  the East India company, was 
relatively small in the face of  the repeated  annual deficits.  At the end 
of 1655 the debt was  at least &781,345. 2s. lOd.',  and it was little aid to 
the credit  of  the administration  that a  report was  current  that  the 
bullion alone to a single firm (State Papers,  Domestic,  Inter.,  CLIII.  20).  It was 
unfortunate that the savings made in this way appear to have been more than con- 
sumed by excesses on the estimates for other spending departmenb, so that as shown 
below (p. 259) the debt kept on increasing, till it became unmanageable. 
Journals  of  the  Home  of  Commons,  VII.  p.  487;  Burton,  Diary,  ut eupa, I. 
D.  377. 
Vide infra,  11.  p.  128. 
G.  C.  Klerk de Reus,  Niederliindisch-Ostindischen  Compgnie,  Appendix  VI. ; 
Anderson.  Annuls  of  Commerce  (edited by  David  MacPherson),  1805,  rv.  p.  188.  - - -  -  -  - - 
4  Court Book XXIII.  October 26, 1655.  -  - - 
6  Vide infra,  Ir. pp.  122, 123, 128, 129. 
6  Ibid.,  11.  p. 130.  7  Carte MS. wx~v.  f.  '7. 
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amount  owing  was  as much  as two  and a  half  millions1.  With  the 
addition of  the deficits for 1656 and 1657, the pressure on  the finances 
was  more  arid  more  apparent.  The debentures, issued in lieu  of  pay, 
were  selling  at  an  immense  discount;  and,  in  1657,  the debt  was 
described as "  instiperable,"  so that the public faith, on  which  loans had 
been  raised, began  to be  known  as  "the public despairz."  Money was 
wanting  to pay the pensions  of  wounded  sailors  and  of  widows;  con- 
tractors and officers were threatened with arrest, on account of liabilities 
incurred on behalf  of  the State, and still further debts were  contracted 
through there being no funds to pay off  ships on arrival, with the result 
that the crews were  kept  on  the pay-rolls.  In 1658 the army was said 
to be  going barefoot in the winter-time4 ; and their "clamours,"  as we11 
as those of the navy, were "  SO great that they could scarcely be borne6." 
It was  even  alleged  that great difficulty had  been  found in  paying for 
the state-funeral of  Cromwe116.  The reality of  these various aspects of 
financial embarrassment, so great that it verged on a bankruptcy of  the 
government,  may be judged  from  the fact that in  1659 the debt was 
calculated  at between  two and a  half  and two and a quarter millions'. 
Of  this amount, over  one  half  (&1,300,285)  was  owing  by  the navys. 
I11  spite of  this load of  indebtedness, the estimate for 1659 could not be 
reduced much  below two and a quarter millions, and it turned out that 
the actual cost of  the navy exceeded the estimate by about 30 per cent.g 
Carlyle,  Cromwell,  IV.  p.  214 ;  A  True  and Impartial  Narrative  of  the  most 
material Debates and Passages in the  last Parliament,  by  Slingsby Bethell,  16.59, in 
Somers'  Tracts,  IV.  p.  531.  Burton, Diary, ut supra, 11.  pp. 199, 238. 
Calendar State Papers,  Domestic, 1657-8,  pp.  xiv.-xvi. 
Burton, Dia~y,  PL~  supya, 11.  p.  366. 
Thurloe, State Papers,  vIr.  p.  99.  0  Ibid.,  VII.  p. 415. 
7  Journals of  the  House  of  Commons,  VII.  pp.  641,  675 ; Thurloe,  State Papers, 
VII.  p.  667. 
"state  Papers,  Domestic,  relating to the Navy,  CCXII.  24 ; Calendar,  1658-9, 
p.  568. 
Estimate for 1659, dated April 7,  1659 : 
England 
Army  ...  ...  £764,481  15 10 
Navy  ...  ...  453,986  0  7 
Miscellaneous  ...  329,320  8  64 
£1,547,788  4 ll+ 
Scotland-charge  -..  307,271  12  8$ 
Ireland  ,,  .  -----P--  346,480  18  3 
22,201,540  1.5  11 
Assessments  ...  £420,000  0  0 
Customs  ...  ...  411,414  12  32 
Excise  ...  ...  584,170  8  2 
Miscellaneous  ...  101,689  16  T& 
&!G17,274  17  1 
Scotland-receipts  .  ..  143,652  11  11 
Ireland  ,,  ...  207,790  0  0 
21,868,717  9  0 
Estimate for Navy  .  ..  .  ..  .  .  .  £453,986  0  7 
Actual cost of  ,,  ...  ...  ...  601,601  710 
Excess  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  $147,615  7  3 
--MS.  Rawl. A. 195  a,  f.  241 ;  Journals of  the  lfoiol~se  qf  C'ommnns, vrr.  pp.  627-31.  It 
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There could be few stronger arguments for a change of  the whole form of 
government  than  the  financial  errors  of  the  Long  Parliament,  the 
Protectorate  and  the re-called  Long Parliament, which  threatened  to 
culminate  in  national  bankruptcy,  and  which  had  already  produced 
a  crushing  debt.  The  average  expenditure  of  Charles  I.  had  been 
trebled, according to  the estimates, and probably much more than trebled 
by the actual disbursements.  The Crown  property and the confiscated 
lands had been  sold, and there yet  remained a  debt more than double 
the largest recorded Crown liability before  1641.  At the beginning of 
the constitutional  struggle, great stress had  been  laid, not only on  the 
method of raising supplies, but also on the cost of these to the tax-payer. 
But even if  everything that Pym said in  1641, concerning the cost  to 
the consumer through the monopolies, be accepted and the whole of  the 
rise  in  prices  be  assigned  to the operation  of  these  grants,  while  his 
figures are taken for the loss occasioned by this rise-if  moreover to this 
be added the other items of  expenditure, raised by taxation-then  the 
total, so obtained, would be less than the estimates  from 1651 to 1659, 
and therefore  considerably less than the average  actual  outlays in any 
one of these years1. 
The war with  Spain proved  highly prejudicial  to the commerce  of 
the country.  Not  only had the cost involved grave financial strain but 
the interruption of trade was greatly felt, especially at a time when there 
had not been a sufficient interval for recuperation after the destruction 
of  wealth  during the Civil War and the struggle with  Holland.  The 
cloth and shipping trades were  specially affected.  The former had not 
recovered from the peculiar  injuries it had  sustained  during the period 
before  1647.  It suffered  from  the prohibition of  the export of  wool, 
and the interruption  of  supplies  from  Spain added  to the depression. 
The Spanish reprisals  on  shipping constituted  another injury to trade. 
The captures, made by England, were much less than had been expected, 
and  the  proceeds  went  into the  Exchequer;  whereas  the  individual 
merchant  or  syndicate had  to bear  the loss  of  the seizures,  made  by 
Spain.  By the end of  1657 these had reached a large total.  Weymouth 
had  suffered severely in this way, Bristol  alone had  lost 250 sail;  and, 
was on these figures that subsequent criticisms of  the financial methods of the Long 
Parliament  and  Protectorate were based, as  for  instance when it was said  that the 
''  barbarous  rebells took up arms against taxes of .32200,000 a year and by their own 
arbitrary exactions loaded  their fellow-subjects  with two millions"-A  Speech made 
the 21st of June 1715 upon the Question about impeaching his Grace the Duke qf  &mon.de, 
1715, p.  7. 
Awake  0  England:  Or  the  People's  Invitation to  King  Charles.  Being a Recital 
of thx  Ruins over-running the  People and  their  Trades, 16W, in Harkian Miscedlany, 
I.  p.  269. 
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in a petition of  the merchants and traders of  England, the number  of 
vessels taken was  estimated at 1,800 "almost  to our ruin and the over- 
throw  of  thousands  of  families1."  During  1658  complaints  of  the 
hindrance  to, and deadness of, trade continueda, which were  intensified, 
early in 1659, by the depredations of  privateers  in the Irish Channel to 
such an extent that trade with Ireland had almost ceased3 ;  while, at the 
same time, many busses of  the fishing fleet on the East Coast had been 
seized4.  Early in  the same year  it was  reported  that there never had 
been greater complaints in the City of want of  trade : nine-tenths of the 
Spanish merchants  had incurred  losses, and house-rent  had fallen by an 
average of  ten per cent.5  Towards the close of  the year  the depression 
tended towards a crisis.  The price of grain, which had been exceptionallv 
low in  1653 and 1654, was  relatively  high  from  1657 to 165g6.   he 
depression of trade, through the war and other causes, made the pressure 
of  taxation  very  severe.  The  indebtedness  of  the administration  had 
becorne  extreme, and, added  to all  these causes of  panic, there was  the 
great political  uncertainty  which  occasioned  fears lest there should  be 
a renewed civil convulsion.  As had happened just before the Civil War, 
there was  a considerable export of  bullion, which was  transferred by the 
English goldsmiths to bankers abroad for safe-keeping on behalf of  their 
clients7.  In London, in December 1659, business was frequently suspended 
through riotss, and it was stated, in a petition signed by 23,500 persons, 
that through loss  of  trade ''  many thousand  families have nothing now 
to do!"  The petitions, presented  on behalf  of  the contending political 
parties, all agree in showing the country as in the throes of an industrial 
crisis during the winter of  1659-60.  Allusion is made, again and again, 
to the pressure of  taxes, the general depression of  trade and, particularly, 
that in cloth, the miseries of  the poor and the impaired state of  credit. 
Doubtless, there is some exaggeration, attributable to political motives, 
but there  can  be  little doubt that the crisis was  a  serious one.  The 
Yorkshire trade in cloth was described as "  ruined "  and "  dead by reason 
of  the  warres  with  Spain."  Trade  in  general  was  pictured  as  very 
State Papers, Domestic, Inter., CLVIII.  17, 109; Calendar, 1657-8,  p.  204; The 
World's Mistake in Oliver Cromwell, 1668, in Hurleian  Miscellany, I.  p. 284. 
Sir  Rich.  Browne  to [Sec. Nicholas]  May h, 1658  (State  Papers,  Flanders 
Correspondence); Calendar,  Domestic,  16.58-9.  D.  114. 
, . 
3  state papers,  Domestic,  Inter., 'CCII.  53, CCIII.  82; Calendars, 1658-9,  p. 322, 
1659-60,  P.  24.  .  A  * Ibid., ccrv. 11 ;  Calendar, 1659-60,  pp.  128, 129. 
6  Thurloe, State Papers, vrI. p.  616. 
D  Rogers, Agriculture and Prices, ut supra, v. p.  272. 
7  An Appeal to Caesar, 1660, p.  22.  8  Whitelocke, Afemorials, p. 689. 
0  The Engagement  and  Remembrance  of the  City of  Lotidon,  priuterl  by 
Dr Cunningharn, Growth of English Indust~y  and  Commerce in Modern Times, p. 927 262  "  Heart-piercing Cries of the Poore " l659  [c~P.  XITI. 
defective "to the utter ruin of many and fear of the like to others."  In 
a petition from Kent, allusion  is made "  to the loud and heart-piercing 
cries of  the poore and the disability of  the better sort to relieve them 
through  the total decay and subversion  of  trade."  The credit  of  the 
mercantile  class  was  in  a  precarious  condition,  and  the general  dis- 
satisfaction was so great that there were very great numbers  of  refusals 
to  pay  taxes1.  The  position  of  the  Long  Parliament  now  became 
untenable, it was overwhelmed with debt, and the end of  its credit had 
been  reached.  The pledges  of  large bodies  of  men  not to pay  taxes 
would  have  meant little, if  the army could have been depended on to 
exact payment, as it had done in the past; but the army was  divided, 
and  therefore  it would  be  impossible  to  raise  fresh  supplies.  The 
declaration  of  Monk  for  "a  free  parliament"  (February  1660)  was 
accepted in London as an omen towards the termination of  the existing 
unrest, and about the time of the Restoration there was an improvement 
in the commercial outlook, which, in time,  was followed by  a revival of 
trade. 
l  State Papers, Domestic,  Inter.,  ccx~x.  28,  29,  30,  31,  36,  37, 38, 39, 41, 42; 
the portiorls of these petitions relating to trade have been printed by DC  Cunningham 
in Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Hodern Times, Appendix E (pp. 921-7). 
CHAPTER  XIV. 
INDUSTRIAL  RECUPERATION  AFTER  THE  CIVIL WAR  (1660-71). 
WITH  the Restoration  there came a revival of  confidence, and trade 
began to improve.  The depression, occasioned in part by the want of  a 
sufficient ~eriod  of  peace for recuperation after the losses  of  the Civil 
War, had culminated in the crisis  of  the winter  1659-60.  This crisis 
was  caused  by  the disturbance of  trade through the wars with Holland 
and  Spain, by  the high  rate of  taxation  and also by  anticipations  of 
serious  political  disturbances  at home.  It  was  believed  that, by  the 
Restoration, tranquillity  would  be  secured  in  Great Britain  and  peace 
would be  made with foreign powers;  while Parliament considered that, 
after certain liabilities of  Charles I.  and the Protectorate,  which  were 
held to be debts of  the nation, had been discharged1, the ordinary Crown 
expenditure would not exceed  &'1,R00,0002,  or  about half  that of  the 
government  since  1650. 
It was  almost  inevitable  that  many  of  the  expectations,  formed 
towards the end  of  1660, should be  disappointed.  The period  of  civil 
war  had produced, not only direct results, but also indirect effects which 
were  difficult to estimate.  Given  peace  and  a  stable government,  it 
would  not require many years to repair the direct losses of  the struggle. 
The indirect consequences were  not so apparent, and these had resulted 
in a great change  in the relative position of  the commerce of  England, 
as compared with that of  certain foreign countries.  The Dutch and, to 
a less  extent, the French  had extended their  trade  during the war  in 
England;  and therefore,  when  the latter country  was  able to give  its 
undivided attention to trade, it found conlpetition keener, and its capital 
resources were  insufficient to finance all the enterprizes which were open 
to it.  Moreover, the famine of  the year 1661, when wheat reached the 
1 The items and the provision to meet them  are printed in the Introduction to 
DC  W. A.  Shaw's  Calendar  of  Treasury Books,  1660-7,  pp.  i.-xx. 
2  JourmLs of the Hwe  of. Commons, VIII.  p. 160;  The Charges issuing forth of  the 
Crown Revenue of England  and Wades, by Captain Lazarus Haward, London,  1660. The  industrial Position  1660-5  [CHAP.  XIV. 
highest average  price  of  the century, tended to check  ~roduction  for a 
time1. 
Regarded  from the point of  view of  industry, the period, beginning 
in 1660, represents  the continuation of  the era of  reconstruction,  which 
had  begun  in  1651, but which  had  been  hitherto subject to frequent 
interruptions.  With  peace,  both  at home  and  abroad, it at length 
became possible for the individual to devote himself  to his business with 
some prospect  of  security, and for responsible persons to endeavour  to 
take stock  in a systematic manner of  the position of  the country.  The 
latter tendency is shown by the labours of  the Committee of  Trade, and 
by the appearance of a number of  treatises which at least profess to deal 
with trade in general and its tendencies from different aspects. 
In many respects the most  valuable  contrib~ltion  to this discussion 
is  the calculation,  made by  Sir Wjllian~  Petty, of  the national  wealth 
and the national income within a few years after the Restoration.  While 
exception may be taken to some of  his  results, the basis of  calculatioll 
is more reliable  than that adopted later by  other writers,  in so far as 
each total is arrived  at independently, instead of  the whole series being 
based  on a series of  ratios, all dependent on  a single datum2.  Thus an 
error  in the total,  under  one heading,  is  confined  to that part of  the 
calculation,  instead  of  influencing all the rest  of  the estimate. 
Petty's  Estimate  of  the Wealth of England  and  Wales circ.  1665. 
Agricultural Land (exclusive of  houses) 8 mil.  S. rent  @ 18 years' 
.........................  purchase  144 mil.  S. 
Farming Stock, Game, Fisheries @ 4 the capital value of  the land ...  36 ,, 
Houses hased on the returns of  Hearth Money  @ about 12+ years' 
........................  purchase  30 ,, 
..................  Merchandise,  Furniture,  Plate  31 ,, 
Ships, 500,000 tons @ £6  per ton  ...............  3  ,, 
Coin  ...........................  6  ,,  -  ........................  Total wealth  250  ,, 
The National  Income. 
Rent of  Land  ........................  8  ,, 
Profit of Personal Property  ..................  7  ,J 
.....................  Labour of the People  25  - ,, 
.....................  Total income3  SO,, 
l  A History of  Agriculture and Prices, by J. E.  T. Rogers, v.  p.  214. 
This was  the method  adopted by Andrew Hooke in An  Essay on  the  National 
Debt  and ATational Capital, London,  1750.  Hooke gives an estimate of  the national 
wealth  and income from  1600; but,  for the reason  stated in the text, I have been 
unable to use it.  The results of  his method will be suffciently indicated by men- 
tioning that in the 20 years,  1640 to 1659, he supposes the total wealth increased by 
836 millions,  Essay, p.  58. 
3  Verburn Sapienti, Appendix  to The  Political survey  of  Ireland,  London,  1719, 
pp.  3-9. 
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In the estimate of  the income, it does not appear that allowance has 
been  made for the rent  of  house-property,  since the item of  "profit  on 
personality" relates  to profit made on trading capital generally.  Rents 
of  houses, at this time, were estimated at  about 14  millions, so that the 
annual income would be 414 millions;  and, according to Petty's estimate, 
the outlay was 40 millions a year, leaving a balance to be added  to the 
national  capital of  14 millions.  This on  the whole  confirms another 
estimate, namely  that  in  1664 "the  annual increment"  in stock  was 
about  la millions1. 
Allowing  a  considerable  margin  for  under-statement  or  for  over- 
statement, this  calculation  is  important in  several respects.  It shows 
the relatively large ratio of  fixed capital to that wealth, which was  free 
to be used as capital in any direction, where it  was required.  It follows, 
then, that the industrial revival, under the most favourable conditions, 
would  be  comparatively  slow,  since it would  be  ultimately  conditioned 
by the rate of the accuinulation of capital.  Moreover, should the owners 
of land become extravagant, most of  the new capital must come from the 
savings, made out of the income of that already employed in trade ;  and, 
if  Petty is  correct, the whole trading profits were  only 7 millions.  In 
view  of  these inferences the question of  future taxation  might become 
a serious one.  While a revenue of  dCl,ROO,OOO  a year,  most  of  which 
was  raised by  Customs  and excise2, did not  constitute a  heavy  strain, 
if  well  distributed  over an income of  above 40 millions, an additional 
assessment which fell heavily on rent or profits, even if of  comparatively 
small amount, would have the effect of checking the inflow of new capital 
to trade, where it was greatly needed. 
A  number  of  indications  point  to  the  conclusion  that  foreign 
commerce had not recovered from  the disturbance  of  the recent  wars. 
At the beginning of  the reign of  Charles 11.  the income, received by  the 
Crown  from  Customs3,  was  less than it had been  twenty years  before. 
l ATatural  and Political Observations m  the State of  Great Britain, by Gregory King, 
Edinburgh,  1810, p.  47;  A  Letter from  a By-stander  to  a  Member  of  Parliament, 
London,  1741, p.  97. 
Estimate for 1663 : 
Customs ...................  $600,000 
Excise  .................. 550,000 
Hearth-money  ...............  181,000 
Small Branches  ............  57,000 
$1,358,000 
-State  Papers, Domestic, Charles II., LxxxrrII. 129.  The settled revenue, apart from 
special parliamentary grants,  for Easter 1663 to Easter 1664, as returned  by  the 
Exchequer,  was  under  $850,000,  Calendar Treaeury Books,  1660-6,  p.  xxix. 
3  That is the sum actually received at the Exchequer which was  only about half 
that estimated in 1660 and again  in  1663-vide  aupra,  note2. 266  Foreign  Trade  1662-3  [CHAP.  XTV. 
Further, a detailed account of  the total exports and imports of  London 
for the year Michaelmas 1662 to Michaelmas 1663 has survived',  which 
is as follows : 
Foreign  Trade of the  City of London  1662-3. 
...............  Exports  %2,022,812  4 
...............  Imports  4,016,019  18 
...............  Total  $6,038,8325 
Davenant notes  that the imports are overvalued, and  that no account 
is taken  of  foreign goods re-exported2;  but this error applies rather to 
the adverse balance  than  to the total  trade.  Further,  at this  time, 
judging by the Customs-returns, the foreign trade of the rest of  England 
and Wales (other than  London) was  about  28  per  cent.  of  the total. 
Thus  the  total  for  the whole  country  might  be  estimated  at about 
72 millions-an  amount  slightly  in  excess  of  Petty's  valuation  of  the 
annual profit  on  trading capital and giving 81.  59.  per  head  of  the 
supposed population3. 
The deliberations of  the Committee of  Trade were  concerned with 
two main classes of  problems-those  relating to commerce generally and 
others to special industries.  Amongst  the former, may  be  mentioned 
the relation of  the State to the control of  bullion  and to the fostering. 
of  shipping arid  fishing.  In December 1660 the Committee '(enquired 
what loadstone attracted these metals by force of  nature to itself, against 
all human providence or prevision, and soon found that it was alone the 
present  course of  trade and trafique throughout the world."  England 
"  hath of  its own  growth, manufacture and produce  always enough  to 
oblige the importation of  money and bullion upon all occasions, beyond 
any  other  nation  whatsoever  in  Christendom."  Accordingly,  it was 
recommended that there should be no restriction on the export of bullion, 
"because foreign mercharits prefer to lodge it where there is no restraint 
on withdrawals," and the financial importance of Amsterdam and Leghorn 
was  attributed,  in  part,  to  their  adoption  of  this  policy4.  These 
1  An Accompt of all goods and Merchandises, exported from the City of London, 
and the value thereof,  and  of  the severall goods and merchandises and  the value 
thereof, imported into the said city,  in the years 1663 and 1669-Add.  MS. (Brit. 
Mus.)  36,785;  Anderson,  Annals of  C'ommerce,  11.  p.  633. 
Add.  hlS. (Brit. hlus.) 36,785,  f. la. 
3  Comparing this result with  the figures of  Misselden  for  the year  1613 (The 
Circle of  Commerce, p. 121), the total foreign trade shows an increase at  the end of the 
fifty years of  about 83 per cent.  As indicated in the text, there was a considerable, 
but not a uniform improvemellt up to the later years of  the reign of Charles I. after 
which there was a large decline, followed by the beginrli~lgs  of a period of expansion. 
4 Minutes of  Committee of  Trade 1660-2,  Add. MS. (Brit. Mus.) 25,115,  ff.  44, 
47,  54; A  Colbction of  Scarce and Valuable  Tracts on Money,  ed. J. R.  McCulloch, 
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conclusions represent  a great advance on the attitude of  Thomas Violet 
ten years  before, who  considered he  had  claims on  a  pension  through 
having secured the convictioil and  fining  of  exporters  of  bullionl,  and 
they are the more enlightened since the revival  in trade had raised the 
rate of  interest.  A  similar breadth of  view is shown by the answer of 
the  Committee to the  petition  of  certain  London  shopkeepers,  who 
sought to increase the restraints on aliens.  Not only was it pointed out 
that foreigners, already in  England, had introduced many useful trades, 
but  it was  suggested,  subsequently,  that  the  cloth  trade  would  be 
improved,  if  foreign  artificers  were  induced  to settle in  England2. 
On  the  question  of  the development  of  the fishing industry,  the 
Committee  continued  the traditional  policy.  As  early as  July  1660, 
Charles 11.  had written  to this Committee, recommending the trade as 
a method of  employing the poor3, and in 1661 the first steps were taken 
towards the formation of  a company which was later incorporated as the 
Cornparty of the Royal Fishery4. 
Much  of  the time of  the Committee was given to the consideration 
of the position of the existing chartered bodies.  The regulated companies 
had fallen  upon evil days,  The Merchant Adventurers had been forced 
to borrow  money,  in  order  to meet  the demands  made upon  them by 
both the Crown  and Parliament.  By the time of  the Protectorate, the 
company  was  unable  to raise  further  sums;  and,  in  1657, the  then 
Committee of  Trade passed a resolution in favour of  the "free"  merchants 
by a large in?jority6.  The new  Committee after the Restoration was of 
opinion  that the company  was  deserving of  support, if, and so  far as, 
it was a national company6.  Early in 1662, the peculiar  constitution of 
the organization involved it in difficulties.  Having no joint-stock,  the 
London,  1856, p.  145.  Slingsby informed  Pepys in 1665 that "the  old law of  pro- 
hibiting bulliori  to be  exported is,  and ever was a folly and an injury, rather than 
good "-Diary  (Chandos edition),  p.  231. 
l  A True Discoverie to  the Commons of  England how  they have been cheated of  almost 
188. b.22  all the gold and silver coin of  this nation, Londor~,  l651 
la  ),  P. 46. 
State Papers,  Domestic,  Charles II.,  xxr.  108-10,  XLI.  4; Calendars,  1660-1, 
p. 363,  1661-2,  p.  80 ; The  Grand Concern  of  England explained,  1673,  in Harleian 
Miscellany (1746),  VIII.  pp.  533,  553. 
Mercnrius Redivivus,  Add.  MS. (Brit. Mus.) 10,117, f.  170. 
Vide infra,  11.  p.  372. 
Burton,  Diary,  ut supra,  I.  pp.  308,  309.  Burton,  for  family  reasons,  was 
hostile to the company.  There are some amusing sentences in his  report of  the 
debate.  "Sir  Christopher  Pack,  who  is  master  of  the  Merchant  Adventurers' 
company, turned in the debate like a horse and answered every man.  I believe he 
spoke at least thirty times. ...  He did cleave like a clegg and was very angry he could 
not be heard ad infiniturn." 
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only convenient  method  of  meeting  the interest  on its loans was  either 
by  assessing the members  or by  levying  so  much  on  the cloth.  The 
latter method was  adopted, arid an imposition  of  about 1 per  cent.  of 
the value had been exacted for many years past.  This impost was held 
to be a grievance by cloth-nlerchants of Exeter.  It appears that, though 
at one time there had been a brarich of  the company at this place, during 
the depression of  the woollen  industry from  1646, all the free-men, but 
one, had retired.  In 1661 some cloth-makers in that district had again 
begun  to export, but they were  either unable  or unwilling to join  the 
chartered organization.  They complained of  the levy on cloth, exported 
to Holland;  and  the company  replied  that, by  its exertions,  English 
exporters received a remissiori of  Customs and other charges, which was 
valued at about 3 per cent.  It follows that, according to the contention 
of  the Adventurers, the existence of  their company produced a balance 
of  advantage,  after  payment  had  been  made  of  the levy,  which  was 
rendered necessary, in order to secure the support of  the home government 
at various periods in the past.  Other allegations, made by the Exeter 
clothiers,  accused  the  companv  of  confining the trade to London,  of 
limiting  exports  and  of  giving  preferential  treatment  to  prominent 
members1.  To  the two last charges the Adventurers replied by a simple 
denial, but they had a better answer to the statement that trade wa~ 
confined to London, by showing that free-men might ship cloth from the 
nearest port, and that there were branches of  the company at York, Hull, 
Beverley, Leeds, Newcastle,  Hartlepool,  Stockton, Norwich,  Yarmouth, 
Lynn,  Ipswich and Colchester.  The main  weaknesses of  the position 
of  the  organization  were  partly  financial,  partly  due  to  industrial 
progress.  Within  a  few  years  the  dyeing  and dressing  of  cloth  was 
established  in  England,  with  the result  of  a  reduction  in the export 
of  undressed cloth2.  Moreover, once the company had  been  compelled 
to borrow largely, the regulated type of  organization was  ill-adapted to 
preserve its credit.  By  1664 the debt was  &75,000, and, in that year, 
it was  unable to pay  the interest  when  dues. 
The state of  the Levant  company  at this time  is  instructive.  It 
would naturally be supposed that one of the advantages of  the regulated 
type of  organization over the joint-stock company would be that, in the 
former, the merchants, being skilled in a certain trade, would be able to 
control  the proceedings of  the factors and agents abroad.  But,  as a 
1 State Papers,  Domestic, Charles II.,  1.1.  64; Anderson,  Annals  of  Commerce, 
XI. pp.  617-20. 
2  Anderson,  Annals of Commerce, 11. p.  6-51. 
3  State  Papers,  Domestic,  Charles  II.,  ctxxxvr. 73;  Calendar,  1666-7,  p.  403. 
In  1674  the company  was  still  in default, Reports  Hist.  MSS.  Corn., rx.,  Pt. XI., 
p.  47. 
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matter of  fact, the failure of  this company to exercise an efficient  super- 
vision was  even  more remarkable  than that of  the Russia company had 
been1.  In 1661 the frauds of  the factors in the Levant had almost ruined 
the  company.  The governor  admitted  that  he  was  ashamed  of  the 
excessive rates imposed on goods exported, which were  to be  attributed 
to this cause.  Not  only  so,  but it was  conceded  that some  members 
defrauded  the  rest,  by  paying  less  than  their  due proportion  of  the 
charges, through entering false bills of  lading which were accepted with 
the connivance of  the factors.  Like the Merchant Adventurers this body 
was  heavily in debt, though its obligations had been incurred mainly in 
places abroad2.  It  is significant that an effort was  made to remedy these 
abuses by  separating off  the trade to Morea,  which  was  conducted  by 
a  group of  free-men, who  traded  as  a joint-stock  company, which was 
known as the Morea  Adventurers.  In January 1661 an effort was made 
to close  the  accounts,  the  capital  having  been  subscribed  only  for a 
definite  period,  but at the end  of  1663 this undertaking  was  still in 
existence3. 
The joint-stock  companies had also suffered seriously from the effect 
of  adverse circumstances before the Restoration.  The Russia company 
was barelv able to carry on its trade; and, since 1658, its off-shoot, the 
Greenland  Adventurers, had ceased to have an active  existence4.  The 
African  trade had resulted in loss for several years, owing to captures 
of  ships  by  the Dutch.  It  was  stated that the independent  traders, 
during  the  few  years  prior  to  1660, had  suffered  to the  extent  of 
&?300,0005; and,  about  1659, the value  of  one  ship, which was  taken, 
was  returned  at aC1R,84R6.  Accordingly, the  in  1660 was that 
the forts and trading stations, already established, had been abandoned; 
and there was  no regular trade or, according to some accounts, no trade 
at all.  In  1662 it was  decided  to re-establish  the company  with  a  -  - 
monopoly of  the whole of  the west  coast  of  Africa,  and an influential 
body of  shareholders was  incorporated as the  Governor and  Company of 
the Royal Adventure?-S  of England  trading into Africa7. 
-  - 
l  Vide infra, 11. pp.  42, 46, 47, 51, 54. 
State Papers, Levant, I.  p.  118, rv. pp.  320,349, 352, 357 ;  Calendars, Domestic, 
1660-1, pp.  491, 501, 592, 1661-2,  p.  605. 
Ibid.,  IV. pp.  346, 396, v. p.  68; Calendars, Domestic,  1660-1,  p. 484, 1661-2, 
p. 421,  1663-4,  p.  388. 
Vide infrcc, 11. pp.  67, 54. 
Certain  Consideratiorls  relating  to  the  Koyul  African  (!orr~pany  @ England ...  in 
which the  Original,  Growth and  A'atural  Adtrantages of  the  (iuiney Trade are demon- 
strated  as  also that  the  Trade cannot  be  carried  on  but  h?/ a company and Joint-Stock, 
1680,  p.  8. 
State  Papers,  Board  of Trade  Commercial  Series  II.,  vol.  691-Petition  of 
Bernard  Sparke. 
Vide infra, 11.  p.  17. The East India company was, by far, in the best financial condition, 
as  compared  with  the  other  joint-stock  bodies.  After  obtaining  its 
charter  from  Cromwell  in  1657, it proceeded, as  soon  as  possible,  to 
re-open its factories and to obtain new concessions in the East.  It was 
unfortunate, in so far as the time for paying calls on the aC739,782.  10s. 
stock  subscribed  extended  to March  lst, 1660.  Owing  to the acute 
depression  of  1659, followed  by  the  crisis  of  1659-60,  it was  found 
impossible to enforce the payment of  the later calls; and eventually the 
paid-up capital was  fixed at one-half of  the nominal amount.  Possibly, 
in the enthusiasm of  the first months after the Restoration, the fact that 
a charter had been  obtained from Cro~nwell  would not have been to the 
interest of the company.  Measures were taken to  suppress this document, 
and a fresh grant was  signed on  April 3rd, 1661.  Up to this date no 
dividends had been paid, such profits as were made were used in increasing 
the capital; and,  partly  for  this  reason  partly  through forced  sales of 
stock by prominent supporters of the late government, the price of  g200 
stock nominal, or g100 actually paid, was  only 90'. 
There are several points  of  interest  in  the charters granted imme- 
diately after the Restoration.  In those of  the African Adventurers and 
the Royal  Fishery  company,  the assistants  reached  the  comparatively 
large  number  of  36.  In the East India charter  of  1661, the voting 
rights of the members were settled, and &500 stock entitled the proprietor 
to one vote.  Persons, holding less than this amount, might join together 
and authorize  one  of  their nuniber  to vote  for  their  aggregate  stock. 
While  the capital  of  the East  India  company  consisted  of  stock,  the 
sum  of  2122,000, subscribed by the Adventurers to Africa, was divided 
into shares of  2400 each, divisible into half-shares.  The qualification 
of  an  assistant  was  the holding  of  one  whole  share2. 
The most remarkable  feature, connected with  the companies of  the 
Restoration, was  the act of  1662, which  created  a  species  of  limited 
liability in favour of  shareholders in the East India, African and Fishery 
companies.  It was enacted that subscribers to these undertakings should 
not pro tanto be subject to the law of  bankruptcy, in the event of  losses 
being incurred by any one of  the companies named3.  The effect of  this 
statute was that a shareholder was  only liable for the amount unpaid  on 
his  shares, and it is clear that such legislation  was  disadvantageous  to 
unincorporated  companies or syndicates4. 
l  Vide infra, 11. pp.  130, 131, 177.  2  Ibid., 11.  pp.  17, 131, 372, 373. 
"4  Car. 11. c. 24. 
4  Such companies continued to exist, e.g. Sir Francis Topp and  Company, French 
merchants, 1669 (State Papers, Domestic,  Charles  II., ccr,Ix. 3), Richard  Thomnpson 
and Company, bankers, 1670-5  (Case of Richard  Thompson and  Company, l678), Elim 
Adrinn  and  Company, Jeremiah  Bonneel  and  Conrpany,  John  Bryant  and  Company, 
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The tendency of  opinion  upon  the problem of  privileges for foreign 
trade, in the years immediately following the Restoration, began  to be 
concentrated upon  certain definite issues.  On  the one  side,  there  was 
the argument, based  on  the price of  the commodities affected.  It was 
contended that an open trade would result in English goods commanding 
higher prices abroad,  while  the foreign  goods  imported  would  be  sold 
more  cheaply  than  by  the  privileged  bodies.  This point  of  view  is 
expressed in a  concise form by Samuel Fortrey-"  Mercantile companies 
sell  at what  unreasonable  rates  they  please.. .whereby  the  people  in 
general  are  very  much  damnified  and  the  companies  onely  enriched: 
whereas,  if  the  trade were  free,  our  own  commodities,  having  more 
chapmen, would sell at  better rates, and what is brought home in return 
would  be  distributed at much cheaper prices amongst the people1."  111 
the specific case of  the African trade, it was alleged that, from 1662 to 
1664, the company had increased the price of  negroes in the plantations 
by 30  per  cent.,  that the workers  in  ivory could  obtain supplies more 
cheaply from Holland and some of  them found it advantageous to carry 
on  the industry there'.  This statement was  made by Roger Coke, and 
it was  contradicted by the company which was able to produce evidence 
from the  that its cash-prices for negroes compared favourably 
with those charged by the interlopers.  On the other hand, it is probable 
that, owing to the effect of  the more stringent Navigation Act of  1663$, 
the price of slaves, smuggled into the plantations by the Dutch, would be 
lower  than the average rates of  either the company or of  independent 
traders.  There is ample evidence that this measure alone was  sufficient 
to account for an addition to the price of  a commodity of  about 25 per 
cent.  Prior  to  the  Act,  for  reasons  already  explained4, the  Dutch, 
Hamburgers and Flemings were able to charge so much lower rates for 
freight that much of  the reduced English shipping was unable to obtain 
Edward  Brown  and  Cbmpany,  Edward  Clark  and  Company, Richard  Dunidge  and 
Cbmpany,  Charles Kerle  Junior  and  Company, Nicholas  Holloway  and  Company, Mr 
Coll~t  in  Company,  Tho.  Houghton  and  Bereclif  in  Company,  Thomas  Merry  and 
Company, James  Pickering  and  Company, Linc.  Bobinson  and  Company, John Scopen 
and  Company,  George  Willington  and  Company,  John  Addis  and  Company,  John 
Mawson and  Compan,~,  Samuel  Burlingham  and  Cbmpany  (A Collection of  the Names 
of  Merchants  living  in and  about  the  City of  London,  1677  [reprinted  18781). 
l  England's  Interest  and  Inzprotrement,  Cambridge,  1663,  p.  40; Reprint  (ed. 
J. H. Hollander,  Baltimore,  1907)) p.  35. 
ReJlections  on  the  East  Indy  and  Royal  African  Companies,  1695,  p.  11 
Brit.  Mus.  l=!!?). 
6 
This Act was very prejudicial  to  Scottish Trade-The  Grievances of  Scotland in 
Relation to  their  Trade with England  1668 in Miscellanea dulica: or  A  Collection of 
State  Treatises never  before  Published,  edited  by T. Brown,  1702,  pp.  199,  200. 
Vide supra, p. 250. Opinion on foreign  Trade 1663-5  [CHAP.  XIV. 
employment'.  After the Act it  was inevitable that rates should be much 
higher.  Partly  owing  to its effects,  partly  through  other  causes,  the 
cost of  working an English  ship was  relatively great.  The vessel itself 
cost more per  ton than one built in Holland.  Through the Navigation 
Act timber was  dearer2;  and,  for  a  few  years  after 1660, the Swedish 
monopoly  of  pitch  had  advanced  prices  by  upwards  of  75 per  cent.3 
Then the Dutch had a certain advantage in their methods of  managing 
their  mercantile  marine.  They were  able to work  trading ships with 
smaller crews ;  so that, in proportion to the tonnage, the capital outlay 
was  less  and also  the wages-billd.  It follows that the argument from 
the price  of  commodities is affected by the influence of  the Navigation 
Act; and that,  out of  the rise  in prices  of  commodities  impoi-ted by 
privileged companies, it is impossible to assign the proportion attributable 
to the monopoly as such.  On the whole, the argument from cheapness, 
considered quite abstractedly, is to  some extent adverse to the companies ; 
but perhaps  not so  much  so, as  might  have  been  expected,  when  the 
effects  of  the Navigation  Act are allowed for. 
On  the  other  side,  these  considerations  were  met  by  others  of  a 
different character.  As against the a priori  deductions as to  the benefits 
of open competition, there had to  be set the experience of the Protectorate, 
when  the experiment had been  tried, and it had been found that there 
had been violent fluctuations in prices and that there was a tendency for 
the trades affected to decline.  The best example of  this is that of  the 
African trade6; and the granting of the charter of  1658 to the East India 
company, after three years of  open trade, would be conclusive evidence in 
the same direction were  it not that Cronlwell may have been influenced 
by certain  causes, other than the merits of  the case6.  In fact the crux 
of  the whole  question  lay  in the relations of  the different  nations  in 
remote  places, such as the whaling districts or  India or Africa.  If, by 
international agreement, the merchants of each country might have traded 
freely, without  being  subject to their ships and goods being seized  by 
their rivals, or if, again, England had been strong enough to protect its 
subjects in distant places, it might  have been  possible to dispense with 
the privileges of  the companies.  As things were, the element of  force 
had to be  reckoned  with.  Where the Dutch  had  established  fortified 
'  Fortrey, England's Interest, ut supra, p.  36. 
A Discourse of Trade by Roger  Coke, London, 1670, pp. 23-6. 
Minutes Committee of  Trade, Add. MS. 25,115,  f. 103. 
Coke, Discourse of  Trade, p. 59.  Coke says that the cost  per  ton of a Dutch 
ship was half that of an English one, and that the crew of the latter was twice that 
of the former. 
6  Vide infra, 11. pp.  16, 17. 
Vide supra, p. 268. 
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harbours',  English  vessels ran an excessive risk.  Some might succeed in 
making the voyage in safety and in realizing large profits, but eventually 
the captures wore  out the enterprize of  the adventurers and expeditions 
became  fewer  and fewer.  For these  reasons,  it became  necessary that 
English traders should  possess  fortified stations, where ships might find 
refuge and load  in safety.  Fortifications required a considerable initial 
capital outlay, and there was  a further annual charge for garrisons and 
up-keep2.  To provide this, some kind of organization was required, with 
certain powers of  enforcing contributions  and of  regulating the trade. 
Therefore, the drift of  opinion  fluctuated between the preference for a 
joint-stock  company with a monopoly or a regulated company which, as 
far as  its privileges were  concerned, would  be  equally  exclusive.  The 
argument, advanced in favour of the latter form of  management, was  the 
natural  one  that the competition of  the members would be beneficial to 
the English  producers  and consumers; and, while this should have been 
so in theory, there had been frequent complaints of  avowed combinations 
between  the free-men  of  the regulated  companies3.  In favour  of  the 
joint-stock form of management, it was urged that it  would be exceedingly 
difficult  to collect  a  sufficient  levy  from  all  the  traders,  who  made 
occasional  voyages,  while  to raise  the whole  sum  required  from  those 
who  sent ships frequently would  be unjust.  If  the proposed regulated 
company were  to be  in  reality open  to all,  it would  be  impossible to 
exact  payment  in  England,  while  to enforce it on  the African  coast 
would  prove  a temptation  to the factors there.  An even more weighty 
argument  arose  from  the consideration  of  what  would  happen,  when 
England was  at war with a naval power.  The risks of  shipping, at such 
a time, would be greatly increased, and the crews of  merchantmen were 
liable to be pressed to help in manning the fleet.  Therefore, under these 
circumstances very  few  ships  would  make  the voyage;  and,  as a  con- 
sequence, the revenue for the maintenance of  the forts would be greatly 
reduced and that, too, at a time when exceptional outlays were necessary, 
if  the defence of  the factories was  to be effective4.  Though the whole 
question  was  narrowed  down  to this  point  soon  after  1660, opinion 
remained  divided,  with  a  leaning  towards  the  joint-stock  type;  and, 
when  the controversy became acute at a later date, it centred round the 
difl'erences  in the two  methods  of  organization. 
The  re-establishnient  of  a  Fishery  and  an  African  company,  as 
well  as the activity of  the Committee  of  Trade, are indications  of  the 
l  Histoire  de  rExpansion coloniale des Peuples Europt!ew-Nierlande  et  Danernark 
(XVII~  et  XVIII~  siicles), par  C.  de Lannoy et H. V.  I,intlen,  Bruxelles, 1911, p. 127. 
A New Discourse of Trade, by Sir Josiah Chiltl (4th ed.), p.  111. 
Vide supra, pp. 219, 220. 
Certain C'onsiderations  relati~  to the Royal African  C'ompany, ut szcpra, p.  7. 
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commercial revival which  began  in  1660.  There was  a  great increase 
in invention, and there were many proposals for industrial improvements 
of  various  kinds.  Prominent amongst these were  two propositions  for 
the foundation of  a bank in 1661' and for a marine insurance company, 
which the promoters expected would  be the leading office for the whole 
of  Europea.  Meanwhile,  business  amongst  the  private  bankers  had 
increased enormously.  Most  of  those,  who  had entered  on  this trade, 
had managed to maintain  their credit; and their services, in the safe- 
keeping  of  money, had met with  increasing demand ;  while the scarcity 
of  capital had brought them a lucrative business, through the making 
of loans and the discounting of bills.  Moreover, the financial difficulties 
of  the  Protectorate  had  compelled  that  government  to  be  a  large 
borrower;  and,  after  the  Restoration,  the  need  for  such  asiistance 
became even  more  marked.  Parliament had provided  Charles 11.  with 
funds  for  paying  off  certain  specified  debts  and  for  carrying  on  the 
administration  in the sense that, when  the various  imposts  and taxes 
were  collected,  these  liabilities  would  be  liquidated,  provided  the 
estimated  revenue was  actually  received.  But  first  of  all,  since  the 
Exchequer  was  practically empty at the Restorations,  many  payments ' 
had to be  made  from  day to day; and, to meet  these, it was  necessary 
to borrow in anticipation of  the actual receipt of  the Customs and other 
taxes.  Moreover, the ordinary revenue, settled on  Charles II., failed to 
reach the estimate of  &1,200,000.  Parliament had not taken sufficient 
account of  the effects of  the alterations made in the rates of  the Customs 
and excise, and these sources of  revenue fell  far short of  the estimate. 
To make good the deficiency, the tax of  Hearth-money was added and, 
subsequently, other special grants; but, for the period ending at  Easter 
1664, all the receipts  of  the Exchequer  (after the deduction  of  loans) 
only averaged  about &860,000 a  year, or less than three-fourths of  the 
estimate.  Expressed  in another form,  the actual revenue fell short of 
the specified &1,200,000 for this period by an average of  about 2340,000 
a year4.  It was  inevitable, therefore,  that the Crown  should  soon  be 
heavily in debt, and in a short time most of  the revenue passed into the 
Vide infra, 1x1.  p.  201.  Ibid., 111.  p.  365. 
Calendar of  Treasury Books,  1660-7,  edited  by W.  A. Shaw,  pp.  i.-xxiv. ;  The 
Beginnings of the National Debt, by W.  A. Shaw, in Owen's College Hiat. Essays (l902), 
p.  402; Pepys, Diary (Chandos edition), p.  23. 
The  actual receipts are printed  in Calendar Treasury Book8,1660-7,  pp. xxviii.- 
xxxi. ;  cf. A  Full Answer  to a By-stander, by R. H. [Thomas Carte],  London, 1742, 
p.  142.  In A  Letter from  a  By-stander  to a Member of  Parliament, pp.  68-86, it is 
calculated that, after paying  for the navy and army, there remained  a surplus from 
Christmas 1660 to Christmas  1663  on a average  of over $1,650,000  a year.  This 
estimate  takes  the  produce  of various  tax&  at  the  estimated,  not  the actual 
amounts. 
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hands of  the bankers as against their advances.  In view  of  the demand 
for  capital,  through  the activity  of  trade  and the increasing  amouilt 
of  the Crown  debt, the goldsmiths were  able to obtain high rates  of 
interest1; and it was  not long before their charges amounted to about 
10 per cent., so that it was said that the King and kingdom had become 
"the slaves of  the bankersz."  The severity of  the strain on the finances 
is shown by the fact that Charles 11.  was forced to pay as high a rate of 
interest as Elizabeth had a century before, and that, too, at  a time when 
there  was  no  cause tending  to produce  an  exceptional  disturbance  of 
credit. 
Another sign of  the improvement in trade is to be found in the effort 
to develope Scotland and the Plantations.  As instances of  the former 
may  be mentioned the Scottish Act of  1661, which promised substantial 
privileges to those who introduced capital or new industries3; and of the 
latter, the  formation  of  a  company  in  1663 for the re-settlement  of 
Carolinab.  In Ireland, also, steps were taken to develope the commerce 
of  the country.  A  Committee of  Trade was constituted in 1664, which 
reviewed  the whole  situation;  and,  partly  through  its efforts, several 
manufactures  were  established,  one  of  which  was  a  cloth  company  at 
Clonmel described as "the most considerable one that Ireland had as yet 
seen6."  Coincident  with  the broadening  of  industrial activities,  there 
were  certain  improvements  in  the  conveniences  of  life,  such  as  a 
development  of  the Post  Oflice6  and  of  the water-supply  of  London. 
In October  1660 Pepys  "was  very  much  pleased"  with  the ease  with 
which pumping engines carried up water from the Thames7,  and in 1663 
he was  informed  by the Lord Mayor that "the City was as well watered 
as any in the world and that the bringing of water to the City hath cost 
it first  and last  above sC300,0008."  This estimate  would  include  the 
outlays on  the conduitsg, that on  the New  River (on which  large sums 
had  been  expended out of  revenue, in addition to the original capitallO) 
and on the pumping engines on the banks of the Thames and at London 
Bridge ll. 
A New Discourse of Trade, by Sir Josiah Child (4th ed.), p.  51 
The &[ystery of the hTeew;fihioned Goldsmiths or Bankers, London, 1676, p. 3. 
Vide iigfra,  111.  pp.  126,  127.  The liecords  ?f  a  Scottish  Cloth Llfa7tufactory at 
New Mills, Haddingto~rshire  (1681-1703), edited  by W.  R. Scott  (Scottish Hist. Soc. 
1905), p.  xxxiv. 
Andersou,  Annals of C'ommerce, 11. p.  628. 
The  Interest  v'  Ireland  in its Trade and  Wealth stated, by Richard  Lawrence, 
Dublin,  1682,  Part  I., Preface,  Part  II.,  p.  189. 
History oJthr  I'ost  Osce, by A. Joyce, p.  28; cide infra, 111.  p.  43. 
Diary, ut supra, p.  55. 
Ibid., p.  176.  0  Vide inyra, III.  pp.  4, 12. 
l0  Ibid., 1x1.  pp.  21-6.  11  Ibid., 1x1.  pp.  11, 12. 
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The period  of  active trade lasted only till towards the end of  1664, 
when  it became  apparent  that England  and  Holland  were  drifting 
towards war.  There were  thus four prosperous years during which time 
the East India company paid dividends of  60 per cent.',  and the African 
adventurers stated that they had added to their original capital no less 
than 210 per cent.2  It  lay with the latter body to provide an ostensible 
cause  for  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  by  ejecting  the Dutch African 
company  from  most  of  its  forts.  Reprisals  followed,  greatly to the 
detriment of  the English  capitalists, and the struggle between the two 
companies proved only the prelude to that between the rival nations3. 
From  the concluding  months of  the year 1664 until the summer of 
1667, England,  and more  especially London,  experienced a  succession 
of  misfortunes.  Beginning  with  the  Dutch war, there  followed  the 
Plague in 1665, the Great Fire in 1666 and finally the forcing of  the 
defences of  the Thames by the Dutch fleet in June 1667.  The joint- 
effect of  these calamities upon commerce was necessarily serious.  Even 
prior to the outbreak of  the war, some of  the more timorous merchants, 
engaged  in  foreign  trade,  had  begun  to reduce  their  commitments 
abroad4.  At the end of  1664, shipowners were  afraid  to expose their 
vessels  to war-risks, and there  was  a  marked  contraction  of  over-sea 
commerce.  Moreover, the pressing of  merchant sailors for the navy left 
insufficient crews available for the export of  the cloth produced;  and, to 
mitigate the resulting distress, it was proposed to suspend the Navigation 
Act, so that the goods might be carried by neutrals6.  Then the ravages 
of  the plague  produced  a  total dislocation  of  business.  After  fifteen 
years of  almost complete  immunity from  this scourge, there  came the 
dreadful visitation of  1665, when the deaths from pestilence in London 
were  returned at 68,596, being almost double those in 1603 and 16259 
The panic was  so  great that most  people were  much too anxious about 
escaping the deadly contagion to pursue their ordinary avocations.  Many 
fled from the infected area, making no provisiorl for the payment of  their 
debts; and there was  an unavoidable  delay in winding up the affairs of 
those who had perished by the epidemic7.  Trade was described as being 
1  Vide infra, 11.  pp.  132, 177, 178. 
"State  Pa~ers,  Domestic, Charles II.,  cx. 10; Calendar, 1664-5,  pp.  159, 160. 
A  - 
Vide infra, 11. pp.  17, 18. 
Pepys, Diary, ut supra, p.  105.  "bid.,  p.  230. 
Natural and  Political Observutions ...  upon  the Bills of  Mortality,  by Capt. John 
Graunt, 1665, pp.  65, 175,  176; London's  "Lord  Have  Mercy  upon us."  A  True 
fitation  of  Seven  Modern  Plagues  or  Visitations in London  viz.  1592,  1603,  1625, 
1630,  1636, 1637-8,  1665; in Somers'  Tracts (1750))  vr~.  pp.  56, 57; An Historical 
Account  of the  Several  Plagues ...  since  1346, by Dale  Ingram,  1755,  pp.  4, 5. 
7  State Papers, Domestic, Charles II.,  cxxxrx. 68; printed  in  Calendar, 1665-6, 
pp.  X.,  xi. 
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"very  low1:'  and Change was  almost  deserted2.  There was  very  great 
distress, through want of  employment and the high price of fuel.  Since 
so much  of  the trade of  the whole cou~~try  passed through London, the 
cordon, drawn  round it for sanitary reasons, caused the great depression 
in the City to react on the provinces;  and, by June (1665), the woollen 
trade was  in  a declining condition3.  Even  as far north as Edinburgh, 
the effects of  the adverse circumstances were felt to such an extent that 
there was  great discontent owing to the decline of  trade4.  In August 
of  1666 confidence had been so shaken that there was  no discounting of 
bills, and wholesale business was  reduced to the transactions connected 
with  the realization  of  prizes5.  The previous  losses  of  property  were 
however  inconsiderable, when  compared  with  the devastation  wrought 
by the Great Fire, which began on  September 2nd, 166Ci6.  The damage 
was  estimated as follows: 
St Paul's Cathedral  .  ..  .  ..  ...  .  ..  22,143,200 
Other buildings  .  ..  .  ..  .  .  .  6,972,800 
Contents of  buildings  .  .  .  .  .  .  ...  1,600,000 
Total loss7  .  ..  .  ..  ...  .  .. S10,716,000 
The rental of  the properties  destroyed  was  calculated  at 2600,000  a 
years.  Not  only had  capital to be found for rebuilding, but large sums 
were  being  raised for the carrying on  of  the war.  Up to Michaelmas 
1666 the charge of  the navy, since the outbreak of  hostilities, had been 
~3,200,000,  and there was  a debt of  &900,00OB.  The condition of  the 
service was  exceedingly bad.  Even  before  the war,  the  seamen  were 
compelled to sell navy-bills at  a discount of  15  per cent.lO,  and Pepys was 
much  troubled and perplexed  at heart "because  of  the horrible crowd 
and lamentable moan of  the poor seamen that lie starving in the streets 
for lack  of  money ...  and more at noon  when  we  go through  them, for 
then  above a  whole  hundred  of  them  followed  us;  some cursing,  some 
swearing, some praying to us"."  Up to Michaelmas the loss by the Fire 
State Papers,  Domestic, Charles 11.)  CLIX.  41 ;  Calendar, 1665-6,  p.  447. 
Pepys, Lliary, ut supra, p.  254. 
3  State Papers,  Domestic, Charles II.,  cux. 119; Calendar, 1665-6,  p.  459. 
Ibid.,  CL.  80; Calendar, 1665-6,  p.  292. 
Ibid.,  cLxvr.  19 (l),  cLxvr1. 166; C'abndar, 1666-7,  pp.  4, 46. 
In one of the informations, which attributed the Fire to  a Popish Plot, it was 
asserted that Johrl Graunt turned off  the water-supply of  the New River company on 
the night prior  to  the Fire-Maitland,  History of London,  I.  p.  435. 
The Insurance  C'yclopaedia, hy Cornelius ll.'alford,  rv. p.  31. 
Pepys,  Diary,  ut  supra,  p.  323.  Even  allowi~lg  for  additions to buildings 
between the date of  Petty's  estimate and  the Fire, the above figures tend to show 
that he somewhat  undervalued  the house  ~~~~~~~ty  of London. 
Ibid.,  p.  325.  10  Ibid.,  p.  149.  "  Ibid.,  p.  263. Pressure  of  the  War-Taxes 1665-7  [CHAP.  XIV. 
and the additional taxes, authorized for war-expenditure,  amounted to 
close on fifteen millions or about 6 per cent, of  the estimated total wealth 
of  the country.  This would  represent  the savings of  about ten  good 
years. 
The pressure of  these cumulative misfortunes may be arrived  at by 
another method.  The loss on the Customs alone through the Plague, 
Fire  and  the  War, during  the  two  years  September  29th,  1665 to 
September 29th, 1667, was 6319,905. 144. 7d.1, and the reduction of the 
whole settled revenue during this period was  P600,0002.  Although the 
Dutch had spent eleven millions on the contest, the raising of &4,355,047, 
by increased taxation  in England',  was  found to be a crushing burden, 
in  view  of the misfortunes that had happened since the beginning of  the 
contest.  It was  calculated, that, owing to the area on which new  taxes 
could  be  placed being so small, if  the war were continued till Christmas 
1667, on  the same  scale  as  in  1665, some  persolls  wonld  have  been 
compelled to pay to the State one-third of  their whole estates4; and, for 
this reason  as well  as the unmanageable  amou~lt  of  the Crown Debt, it 
was  decided to reduce the expenditure  on the navy in 1667 in  view of 
the negotiations  for  peace  which  were  then  in  progress.  The Dutch  m 
increased the captures of  British merchantmen  and  often, for weeks  at 
a  time,  sailings  from  the threatened  ports  were  suspended.  Thus in 
L)ecember 16665,  the merchants of the Tyne and the Humber "murmured 
cruelly"  of  the want  of  convoys, and  it was  openly said  that trade was 
better  guarded  in  the time  of  Cromwell.  At Newcastle  the frequent 
interruptions of  the coal-trade had deprived many of  the colliers of  work, 
and numbers of them were forced to beg.  On two occasions, the collectors 
of  Hearth-money  had  been  driven  out of  the town.  From  Plymouth 
round  to the Severn  similar conditions prevailed, and in June 1667 no 
English ships could sail  in  safety  from  these  ports"  These  results  of 
the  unavoidable,  but  premature  retrenchment  of  the  navy  were  in- 
considerable,  as  compared  with  the  consequences  of  the  national 
l  Calendar Treasury Books,  1667-8,  p.  xvii. 
State Papers,  Domestic,  Charles II., ccxvrr.  84; Cakendor,  1667, p.  471.  A 
Full Answer  to a By-stander,  p.  142. 
Calendar Treasury Books,  1667-8,  p. lxiv. 
Petty, Verbum Sapienti, ut supra, p.  3. 
State Papers, Domestic, Charles II., CLXXVIII.  92, c~xxx.  127 ; Calendar, 1666-7, 
pp.  266, 327.  The value of the prizes, taken by the English fleets, was great, but it 
was  said that the proceeds were  riot  devoted  towards relieving the strain on the 
Exchequer-Letter  from Sir Henry Bennet to the Duke of  Ormond, September 11, 
1665, printed  in  Miscellanea  Aulica, p.  361; A  Detection  of  the  Court and State of 
~n~land,  by  K.  Coke,  1721,  Ir.  p.  141. 
6  State  Papers,  Domestic,  Charles  II.,  CCIII.  80,  cc~v.  80;  Calendar,  1667, 
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humiliation, when  the Dutch  fleet made its appearance in  the Thames 
in June 1667 and obtained command of  the North Sea.  There was  a 
panic  in  the  City1;  an  invasion  was  expected,  and,  in  the  desire  to 
escape from the threatened district,  those,  who  had  deposits  with  the 
goldsmiths, denlanded payment  of  their balances.  Thus, there resulted 
the first run on  English  banks.  One of  the leading firms, that of  the 
Viners, had  &'100,000  available, at the beginning of  the panic, but this 
was  soon  exhausted.  Indeed, it was  said  that, in  this  case,  certain 
influential persons obtained early and full payment"  Even in this first 
run, the bankers  were  sufficiently astute to adopt every possible device 
to procure time, in the hope that the alarm would abate.  To  applicants 
for withdrawals  they replied-"It  is payable at twenty days,  when  the 
days are out we  will pay you  and those that are not so, they make tell 
over their money, and make their bags false on purpose to give cause to 
retell it and so  spend time3."  The shock to confidence was  too severe 
to be  repaired by such  methods, and there was  a  universal  suspension 
of  cash  payments,  the  liabilities  of  the bankers  being  estimated  at 
&?1,200,000<  Merchants,  who  were  depositors,  were  thus  unable  to 
meet  their  obligations, and failures were  numerous.  On June 15th the 
state  of  feeling  was  graphically  described  by  John  Rushworth,  who 
writes  that "the people were  readie  to tear the hair off  their heads5." 
The suspension  of  credit  was  intensified by  the distress  of  the poor, 
and all classes suffered by the interruption  of  the supply of  coal from 
Newcastle.  In  July fuel  had  reached  famine-prices, and  sea-coal was 
quoted at g6  the chaldron6.  The "deadness"  of commerce was so great 
that collectors of  taxes were unable to enforce payments, owing to "the 
infinite wants  of  all  men"  in  their districts7.  It was  the opinion  of 
experienced  merchants  that the nation  was  greatly  impoverished, and 
that none  of  them  had  known  trade to be  so  bads. 
l  "The  alarm was  so great that it put both  cou~itry  and city into fear, a panic 
and consternation such as 1  hope I shall never see more; everybody was flying, none 
knew why or whithern-John  Evelyn,  June 8th, Diary (Boh~i's  edition),  11.  p.  27. 
Roger  Coke,  who was  in Loridor~  at the  time,  describes  "the  consternation  and 
confusion" as greater than that in the time of the Great Plague and Fire-Detection 
of  the Court and State of  h'ngland,  11.  p.  156. 
Pepys, Diary,  ut supra, p.  403;  A Handbook of  London Bankers, by F. G. Hilton 
Price,  London, 1890-1,  pp.  168-71. 
Pepys, Diary, ut supra, p.  398. 
Of  Trade, by J. P. 1700 [Brit. Mus. 08226. ee .2],  p.  67. 
State  Papers,  Domestic,  Charles  11.,  ccv.  76,  ccvii.  113;  Calendar,  1667, 
pp.  188,  246. 
Mercurius Politicus Redivivus, Add. MS. (Brit. Illus.) 10,117,  f. 693. 
7  State Papers,  Domestic, Charles IJ., ucxx. 67;  Calendar, 1667, p.  289, 
Ibid.,  cc~x.  149; Calendar,  1667,  p.  302; Onlnia Comesta a  Bello,  1667, p. 
[Brit.  Mus. 67. a]. 
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The crisis of  the years 1665 to 1667 was very severe.  It begall ~ with  - 
an interruption of  trade, followed by the successive misfortunes of  the 
Plague  and the Fire and ending with the panic of  June 1667.  During 
this period, the new undertakings experienced their share of  the general 
de~ression. Some of  them  had been started too recently to withstand 
I 
the accumulation of adverse circumstances they had to face.  For instance 
the Fishery  company  was  unable to complete  the subscription  of  the 
necessary  capital,  and  it was  reduced  to dependence on  lotteries  and 
other adventitious  sources for any funds it secured1.  The effect of  the 
crisis on the East India and African companies is of  great interest, for 
different reasons  in  each case.  The capture of  the forts  of  the latter 
by  the Dutch left  it in a  position  of  very  great  difficulty.  The loss 
of  its ships  and their cargoes converted  the  surplus  of  1664 into  a 
considerable deficitz.  The apparent inference from  these  events would 
be that the superiority, claimed for the joint-stock  over the regulated 
con~pany  for a trade of  this kind3, was  illusory.  At the same time, there 
were  special circumstances, affecting this particular case.  The company 
had sufered, not so much from  the rival Dutch organization, but from 
the  fleet  under  De Reuter.  Therefore,  its losses  were  subject to the 
issue  of  the subsequent  war;  and,  had  England  fared  better  in  the 
struggle,  compensation  could  have  been  exacted  for  the company. 
The  East  India  company  had  prudently  conserved  its  resources 
during the war;  and, while it was  subjected  to little direct  loss, it was 
forced  to reduce its operations.  The capital, subscribed  in  1658, had 
been  adventured for seven  years only, and this period was  due to close 
at the end of  1665.  Had the stock been wound up, it would have been 
difficult,  if  not impossible, to have  obtained a sufficient amount of  new 
capital.  The extent of  the depression may  be  gathered  from  the fact 
that, though the balance sheet of  December 1664 showed total assets of 
130 per cent. and a dividend of  40 per cent. was actually declared (which 
was  payable  in  August  1665), the stock  cum  dividend  was  selling at 
70 per cent. of  the amount actually paid.  Therefore, the final transition 
from the old system of  terminable undertakings to a permanent capital 
was  due to the coincidence of  the proposed  winding up of  the General 
Stock  with  an  exceptionally  unfavourable  state of  the money-market. 
But, while the committees were  forced to depart from  the practice  of 
making  a new  subscription, they continued what had been the essential 
evil of  that system.  Although it was decided that the stock should not 
be wound  up, the court acted as if a new  subscription  were  inevitable, 
by  distributing  in  the nineteen  months  between  July 3rd,  1665 and 
February 2Oth, 1667 no less than 90 per cent. in dividends4.  The reason, 
1 Vide irlfra, 11. p. 373.  2  Ibid., 11.  p. 18. 
3  Vide supra, p. 273.  4  Vide infra, 11.  pp. 133, 178. 
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assigned for this course, was that the company had cash to this amount, 
and that, as a  consequence of  the war, it could not employ it.  Under- 
lying  this ostensible  explanation,  there  were  doubtless  other  motives. 
Owing to the great depression of  the time and the need of  capital, there 
can  be little doubt that the stockholders would have put great pressure 
on the committees, had they refused  to make  substantial distributions. 
Moreover, the condition of the national finances was an element of danger 
to any body with  large liquid assets.  As it was, the company had been 
compelled to lend the Crown &50,000 in April 1666, a further &20,000 
in July 1667 and de50,000 on December 4th of  the same year1.  It  was 
doubtless recognized that the future of  the trade would be on the whole 
less  precarious,  if  the  stockholders  were  returned  nearly  the  whole 
subscribed capital (which could be called up again when it was required), 
than if  that capital were  in the hands of  the Crown,  when  repayment 
might be greatly delayed.  On  the other hand, if it proved impracticable 
to call up fresh capital on the declaration of  peace, the company would 
be  left with  very meagre resources.  Little profit could have been made 
during the war;  and, after the payment of  the dividends of  1667, there 
would remain, according to the valuation  of  1664 a balance in property 
and cash of  not much more than &150,000.  Of  this sum Q120,000 was 
lent to the Crown;  and, pending repayment, the company was left with 
scarcely  any  capital  to purchase  and fit  out ships. 
One  consequence  of  the great scarcity of  capital during the crisis 
had  been  the appearance  of  proposals  for  the extension  of  credit  by 
means  of  the establishment of  an  institution for the accommodation of 
merchants.  It was  to be  neither  "a  bank  nor  a  Lumbard"  but  both 
combined, the intention being to make advances to traders up to three- 
quarters or even,  in  special cases, to nine-tenths  of  the value of  their 
goods2.  This  scheme was  propounded  in  1665; and,  in  the following 
year, another was  mooted  for the issue of  inconvertible paper, based on 
the "satisfying  security"  of  land  or monies  granted  to the Crown  by 
Parliament3.  The second  suggestion  is  of  interest  as  an  anticipation 
of  the land-banks, which  became important  in the closing years of  the 
century.  The discredit  of  the  private  bankers  in  1667 delayed  the 
realization  of  these projects, and trade did not begin to revive till peace 
had been made with Holland.  Thereupon merchants everywhere started 
to fit out ships, while in the first week  of  September the herring-fleet 
l  Hunter, Hist. of British India, 11. p. 182 (note) ; Court Book of  the East India 
Company,  XXIII.,  July G, December 4,  1667. 
A  Description oj' the Oflee of  Credit, London (printed by order of the Society), 
I665 [Brit. Mus.  1339. f.  131,  pp.  1, 11. 
Experimental  Proposals  how  the  bring muy  have  money to  Pay  and  Maintain hi8 
FZeets,  by Sir Edward Forde,  1666, in Barleaan Miscezlany (1746),  IV. p.  186. 282  Revival  of  Trade  1667-9  [CHAP. XIV. 
had already sailed'.  The return of activity showed itself in the beginning 
of  fresh  undertakings.  Prominent  amongst  these  was  the commence- 
ment  of  modern  fire-insurance  in  1667,  in  an  office  founded  by 
Barbon,  which  was  subsequently  carried  on  by  a  company2.  The 
expedition, sent out in  1668 by a group of  adventurers, resulted in the 
incorporation  of  the Hudson's  Bay  company  in  1670S.  At the same 
period  an effort was  made to recover  land for the growing of  hemp by 
drainage4.  In 1670 a subsidiary company, formed by the old  societies 
of  the Mines Royal and Mineral  and Battery Works (which had been 
re-established  soon  after  the Restoration) was  floated  under  the title 
of  the  Undertaking  for  the  working of  Mines  Royal  in  the  counties  of 
Cardigan and  Merioneth,  with  a  nominal  capital  of  64,2005.  The 
improvement in trade extended to Scotland, where a company for making 
wool cards had been established in 1663=.  This was followed by a whale- 
fishing and soap-boiling partnership in 1667 with a capital of  &11,700, 
two  sugar refineries  in  1667 and 1669 and a Fishery company in 16707. 
The latter had a proposed capital of  225,000 sterling, but it is doubtful 
if much of this amount was paid up, owing to the jealousy of the gentry 
and the merchants, and the enterprize was a failure.  The other companies . 
met with  considerable success, and all of  them were in existence in the 
eighteenth century,  while  the Soaperie  was  not wound  up  till  1785. 
In England it was  inevitable that the recovery should be slow, owing 
to the inroads made  on the national  capital by  the funds required for 
the rebuilding of  London and for the carrying on of  the war.  In 1668 
complaints of  bad trade continued and also of  the high rate of  interests. 
During the year 1668-9  the total trade  of  London  had  only increased 
by about 4 per cent., as compared with  166R-39.  When  the improve- 
ment  had  made  further  progress, it was  calculated  that, since  1630, 
London  had  about  doubled  in  valuelO,  while  it was  claimed  that the 
whole  trade of  Holland was  twice as  much  as  it had  been  in  164811. 
The greater weight  of  Customs in England was compared unfavourably 
with  the lighter duties at the Dutch ports,  where, through  the larger 
volume of  trade, "they  receive more Customs and duties to their State 
in one year  by the greatness  of  their commerce than England  does in 
1 London Gazette, No. 188, September  2-5,  1667. 
Vide infra, 111.  p. 375.  Ibid., 11.  p. 229. 
4  Evelyn, Diary, ut supra, 11.  p. 53.  Vide infra, 11. pp.  403, 404. 
0  Ibid., 111.  p. 176.  7  Ibid., 11. p. 377. 
8  Vox et  Lacrimae  Anglorum [l6681 ;  Usury at 6 per  Cent. Examined, by Thomas 
Manly, 1669, Preface, p.  15. 
Q  Add. MS. (Brit. Mus.) 36,785,  ff.  5, 58, 59. 
10  Several  Es8uys  in Political  Arithmetic, by Sir W.  Petty, London, 1755, p.  169; 
A New Discouroe of Trade, by Sir Josiah Child (4th ed.), pp. 9-13. 
11 Andersou, Annals of Cornn~erce,  III. p.  7. 
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two by the greatness of  its Customs1."  For this and other reasons, it 
was  stated  in  1671 that the trade of  Amsterdam  was  ten  times  that 
of  London2. 
Such  comparisons  tend  to disguise the real  advance in prosperity 
that had  been  made in  the face of  great difficulties from 1668 to 1671. 
The shipping  trade  had  shown  considerable  expansion,  and allusions 
occur to "the  multitude of  ships at sea and the floating fo~est  of  masts 
in  the Thames:"  It  was  agreed, also, that there had  been an increase 
in the number of  rich merchants, as compared with any period since the 
beginning  of  the Civil  War4.  On  the  rebuilding  of  London,  it was 
calculated  that  the new  houses  commanded  double  the rent  of  those 
which  they replaced, while by  1673 buildings  on  new foundations were 
said  to have  let at .&300,000  a  year5. 
To sonie extent the leading companies failed  to obtain full  benefit 
from  the  activity  of  trade.  The African  Adventurers  were  in  such 
difficulties that no  progress  could  be  made  until an  arrangement  had 
been  effected with  their  creditors6.  Capital was  needed;  and, although 
the act of  1662 protected  the shareholders  from  liability  to pay  any 
debts in excess of the assets, this measure would not preclude the creditors . 
from claiming to be paid out of  any fresh capital subscribed.  This fact 
was  sufficient  to prevent  new funds from  being  raised  by  the issue  of 
additional shares ; since, naturally, no one was  willing to provide money 
for the payment of  liabilities, for which he was not personally responsible. 
The situation, therefore, resolved itself into the problem of a re-construc- 
tion  of  the company.  With a view to the provision of  further capital, 
it was  agreed  that the shareholders  should  receive 10 per cent. of  their 
hoIding in the new coinpany and the creditors about 40 per cent. of  the 
sums due to them 7.  This arrangement was  agreed  to in 1671, and the 
colripany received a  new  charter in the following year by which the title 
was changed to the Royal African Company of Englands. 
The position  of  the East  India  company  exemplifies  the  danger 
of  drawing  hurried  conclusions  from  the  statistics  of  this  period. 
l  A  Discourse of Trade, by Roger Coke, p. 6. 
A  Treatise wherein is demonstrated  that  the  Church and State of  England are in 
equal danger with the trade of it,  by  Roger Coke,  London, 1671  Brit. Mus.  [ 
1029ie.10], 
p. 69. 
Regale hTecessarium,  by Fabian Philipps, 1671, p. 621. 
A  New  Discourse of  Trade, by Josiah  Child (4th ed.),  p.  10;  Usury at 6 per 
Cent., by Thomas Manley, I'reface. 
The  Grand  Concern of  England Explained, 1673, in Harleian Miscellany  (1746), 
VIII.  p. 527. 
6  Vide infra, 11. p.  18.  7  For the details, wide infra, 11.  p.  19. 
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The dividends  paid  from  1658 to  1671 may  be  divided  into three 
groups : 
1658 to 1664  60 per cent. 
1665 ,, 1667  90 ,,  ,, 
1668 ,, 1671  10 ,,  ,, 
1658 ,, 1671  160 ,,  ,, 
The apparent inference from these figures is that the years from 1665 
to 1667  were the most prosperous and those from 1668 to 1671 were the 
least successful.  Whereas the facts of  the case, when  fully investigated, 
point  to  exactly  the  contrary  conclusion.  As  already  shown1,  the 
payments made from 1665 to 1667 constituted a division of  the capital 
of  the undertaking; and, since the shareholders  did not subscribe fresh 
funds when  trading was resumed, it was necessary to retin all profits to 
replenish  the depleted resources.  Therefore, though only one dividend 
of  10 per  cent. was  paid  from  1668 to 1671, the trade was prosperous. 
This is shown by the advance in the price of  the stock which had risen 
from  70 in  1665 to 108-130  in  1669-702. 
The effect  of  the inadequate  capital of  this  company is  shown  by 
a comparison of its dividends with those of the rival Dutch organization. 
From 1659 to 1671 the latter had  distributed R60 per cent.3; as com- 
pared with  160 per cent., divided  by the English undertaking4.  More- 
over, the credit of  the former was very good, and in May 1671 its stock 
changed hands from 560 to 570, these being the highest prices hitherto 
reached$. 
During this period  some peculiarities  in  the organization of  joint- 
stock companies emerge.  The Hudson Bay company followed the model 
of  the East India body in having a governor and committees6, while the 
Royal  African  company was  the first  to introduce  a  sub-governor  in 
addition  to a deputy-governor'.  In some cases a long interval elapsed 
between the declaration and the payment  of  a dividend, and it was the 
practice  of  the East  India  company  to  allow  proprietors  to  obtain 
immediate payment, subject to discount8.  Connected with the holding 
of  stock,  it may  be  noted  that on  a transfer  being  lodged  with  the 
company in 1668, the question  arose  whether  the stock was  owned by 
a native  of  England  or by  a  foreigner,  and it was  resolved  that the 
Vide supra, p. 280.  Vide  infra,  11.  pp 132-4,  177,178. 
G.  C.  Klerk  de Reus,  Niederldndisch-Ostindischen Compagnie,  Appendix  VI. ; 
Anderson, Annals of  Commerce  (edited by  David MacPherson),  1805, IV.  p. 488. 
Vide  infra,  11.  pp. 177, 178. 
State Papers,  Domestic,  Charles 11.) cc~xxx~x.  173, cc~xxxx.  201 ; Calendar, 
1671, pp.  219, 317. 
6  Vide infra,  11. p. 229.  Ibid., 11. p. 20. 
8  Court Book, xxr., Feb. 2,  1666. 
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transferor and transferee must  make an oath that the beneficial owner 
was  not an alien1.  At this period a special form of  deed was drawn up 
by the company, which was as follows:  "I, A. 13., doe sell and assign to 
C.  D. 21,000 subscription in the New  General Stock of  the East Indies 
Company2 (on  which  was  paid  2500)  with  all  present  and  future 
proceeds, and in confirmation hereof as my act and  deed I sett my hand 
ye  day and year  above  written3."  During the year  1668 transfers of 
East  India  stock  (or  as  they  were  termed  "transports")  were  very 
numerous.  The committees, after approving of the transaction, recorded 
it in  the court  books;  but,  except  in special  circumstances, the price 
realized  was  not  entered.  It remained  for the undertaking  for  the 
Mines Royal of  Cardigan and Merioneth to introduce the principle of  a 
maximum  vote.  In this company each  share  was  entitled  to a  vote, 
subject to the important proviso that no proprietor might use  more than 
three votes4. 
It was  exceedingly unfortunate  that the returning activity of  trade 
was  temporarily checked in January 1672, through the financial ~iecessi- 
ties  of  Charles 11.  It has been  expected  that a  portion of  the cost of 
the war from 1665 to 1667 should  have  been  defrayed  from  prizes, but 
the sums, realized  by  the Exchequer, were  comparatively  small.  The 
money,  voted  by Parliament  for  the navy,  had  been  spent  on  it and 
other  sums  in  addition5.  It follows that the deficit  on  the Ordinary 
Revenue, which was inevitable, would be  still further increased, and the 
reduction  of  the Customs  during hostilities  added  to the  deficit.  In 
1667 the debt on  the navy was  Y1,100,000"and  the expenses of  the 
Household were returned at 2817,207. 7s.'  It was  reported that "  the 
King  intended to make some retrenchments in his family, and to take 
ofl'one half of  his officerss."  The financial enlbarrassments are shown by 
the state of  the Exchequer in the following year.  The settled  revenue 
was  estimated to produce  slightly over a million, and efforts had  been 
made to reduce  the expenses of  the Court.  While the actual revenue 
was  about two-fifths of  the estimate, the actual outlay, on such  of  the 
l Court Book, Jan. 3,  10,  1668. 
It is noteworthy that the cornpally in this document does not call itself  by  the 
name  given it in  its charters.  It  was  held  in  law  that,  while  a  corporatiou  by 
prescription might  use any of  several names, one by  charter could only act legally 
under that  give11 it  in  the  instrument  by  which  it was  created-&ports  of  C'ases 
1  Will. and Mary to  10 Anne,  by  \V.  Salkeld,  1795, 111. p. 102. 
S  Court Book, xxv~.,  Sept 4, 1668.  *  P7ide infra,  11. p. 404. 
The whole  financial  situation  is  ably  analysed  by  Dr  W.  A.  Shaw  in  the 
Introduction to the C'alendar of  Treasury Hooks,  1667-8. 
State Papers, Domestic, Charles 11.) ccxvrr. 84; CaZendar,  1667, p.  471. 
Ibid., ccxxxvr. 146; C'ulendar,  1667-8,  p. 287. 
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departments of  the household  as can be  checked, was slightly in excess 
of  that allowed1.  In view of  the fact that it was  necessary to ~rovide 
&100,000 to pay interest  on loans, the pressure of  the debt was  fou~ld 
to be  very  heavya;  and,  in  addition  to these  obligations,  there  were 
immense arrears of salaries, for instance the salary of  the King's  falconer 
had  not  been  paid  for  six  years3.  In his  speech  at the opening  of 
Parliament  Charles  11.  had said  "When  we  last  met, I asked  you  a 
supply; and I ask  it now  again with  greater instance: the uneasiness 
and streightness of  my agairs cannot continue without very  ill  effects4." 
One method, adopted to reduce the indebtedness  of  the Crown, was the 
sale of Crown property in 1670.  This course was a continuation of  the 
practice  of  the Long Parliament, and in this case  also the lands were 
sold at a considerable sacrifice.  The total sum realized  is said  to have 
been  iC1,300,0006; t~nd  if  the whole  amount had  been devoted towards 
the extinction of  debt, Charles 11.  would  have remained liable for about 
a  million  and  a half  in  16716.  At that date, although many  salaries 
still remained  in arrear and the revenue  was  heavily  anticipated7,  the 
financial situation was less difficult than it had been since the conclusion 
of  the Dutch  War.  The outlook  for  the future  introduced  several 
elements  of  danger.  By  the  secret  Treaty  of  Dover  (May  167O), 
Charles 11.  was bound to aid France  against Holland.  The subsidy, he 
received in return for the promised assistance, would not suffice to equip 
the fleet, and it was thought that Parliament would not vote  money for 
such  a  contest8.  Thus to earn  his subsidy,  Charles 11.  was  bound  to 
make war on Holland, and there was little prospect of  his obtai~iing  the 
necessary  funds  by  legitimate  means.  The plan,  eventually adopted, 
was  to commit England  to the war, and  trust that Parliament would 
grant supplies when  if  was  called  together after hostilities  had begun. 
It was  known that the Dutch merchant vessels, returning home fro111 the 
Levant, which were  valued  at a  million  and a  half, would  sail early in 
1672, and it was hoped that, by capturing these, a  rich  booty would  be 
Vide infra, 1x1.  p. 531 ; Ca:ale,zdar Trea8ur.y Books, 1667-8,  pp. xxviii.-xxxiii.  : 
Actual  Outlay-Chamber,  Household,  Works 
--Rlich.  1667 to  Rlich.  1668  ...  ...  2127,429.  OS. 102d. 
Estimate calendar year  1668  ...  ...  ...  2110,000.  OS. Od. 
Vide inj'ra,  111.  p.  531 ;  Journals of  the House of Commons, Ix. p. 98. 
State Papers, Domestic, Charles II.,  cc~xx.  84, 85; Cabndur, 1668-9,  p. 650. 
Journak of the House of C'onrmons, IX. p. 121. 
A  Letter frorn  a  By-stander  a Member  oj' Parliament,  London,  1741, p. 88; 
An  Account of the  Growth of  Popery and Arbitrary Government, by Andrew hlarvel, 
1677, in State  Tracts, being  a  Collection of  secera1  Treatises j~rzvutely  printed  in the 
Reign oj' h-ing Charle.~  11.)  (1693), I.  p.  78. 
6  Charles IZ.,  by Osrnund  Airy, loll dot^, 1904, p. 269. 
7  Add. MS. (&it.  iius.) 28,078, f. 63. 
8  Journals of  the ZIozlse of  C'ommons, IX.  p.  247. 
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secured1.  The state of the finances was so bad, that funds were required 
to despatch  the fleet  and to make  other preparations;  and, while  the 
King's advisers were at  a loss to obtain money, it was suggested that the 
difficulty could be met by the closing of  the Exchequer for payments on 
assignation.  By this operation the incoming revenue, which should have 
been  paid  out  to bankers  against  their  previous  advances,  would  be 
liberated for the purposes of  the coming war  and would  carry it 011  for 
some months. 
The "stop of  the Exchequer1' was ordered on December 18th, 1671, 
and  the consequences  were  disastrous,  not  only  to the  credit  of  the 
Crown, but to the trade of  the country2.  Apparently only the bankers 
immediately concerned  were  aff'ected,  but it is  to be  remembered  that 
most of  the funds, lent by then1 to the Crown, had been borrowed from 
their  depositors.  The bankers  were  unable  to  obtain  the  payment 
promised  them at the due dates, and, consequently, they could not meet 
their obligations.  About one-half of the whole number failed, and from 
them the area of ruin extended to the merchants, until it reached many 
widows  and  orphans,  whose  income  was  derived  from  the interest  on 
their capital3. 
Some effort was  made  to maintain a  vestige  of  the royal  faith, by 
the promise of 6 per cent. interest on the sum of 21,328,526,  which was 
stopped4; but,  even  had  this  promise  been  punctually  performed,  it 
would  have  been  small compensation  to those whose  credit  had  been 
lost in the crash.  Altogether it was computed that nearly ten thousand 
families  were  serious  sufferers, and "that  many  of  them were  entirely 
ruined5." 
Evelyn, Diary, ut supra,  XI. p. 73; History of the Public Revenue  of the British 
Empire, by  Sir John Sinclair, London, 1803, I. p. 314. 
State Papers, Domestic, Charles IJ.,  cccxx. 76; Calendar, 1671-2,  pp. 87, 88. 
Evelyn, Diary, ut supra, XI. p. 76; History of England, 1660-1702,  by R. Lodge, 
1910, p.  109. 
Sinclair, History of  the Public Revenue of the British En~pire,  I. p.  315 ;  History 
of  Banking, by W.  J. Lawson, 1850, pp. 197-200 ;  AndrCadks, History of the Bank of 
England, p. 39. 
Anderson, Annals of Commerce, 111.  p.  32; Growth of Popery,  by A.  Marvel, in 
State Tracts of the Reign of  Charles II., X.  p. 79 ; Menzoirs of Ar  John Rereshy,  1735, 
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CHAPTER  XV. 
THE  stop of  the Exchequer  constituted  the beginning of  a period 
of  depression,  which  lasted  from  the first  months  of  the  year  1672 
until early  in  1674.  Some  measure  of  the extent  of  the  shock  to 
credit  may  be  obtained  from  the statements that in  1672 one of  the 
bankers had obligations outstanding to the extent of  &l,lOO,OOO1 ;  and 
that, in  1673, the business  of  lending  money  was  described as  having 
been effectually suppressed2.  The time was spoken of as one "of  general 
poverty3,"  when  many were  unemployed  and  the  indigent  in  England 
and Wales were said to number between one hundred and fifty thousand 
and half a million persons4.  Attention was directed to "the usurpation" 
by  foreign countries of  the trade of  Britain, and the Dutch were charged 
with various commercial immoralities, while it was  said that the French 
aimed at "  an universal  commerce as  well  as  an  universal  monarchy!." 
In spite of  foreign competition, had  the suspension  of  credit  been  an 
isolated  event,  it is  probable  that commerce  in  London  would  have 
begun to reassert its previous activity about the end  of  1672. but "the 
stop" was closely connected with the war with Holland, which  involved 
losses  and a  considerable outlay.  Moreover, the financial situation  in 
1674 resulted  in  a second, but a less  serious run on  those bankers who 
had re-conimenced business.  The methods, adopted for the provision of 
Some Considerations of the Consequenc~s  of the Lowering  of  Interest, in Works of 
John Locke, London, 1727, 11.  p.  5. 
The History and Proceedings  of the House of  C?vnmons, London, 1742, I.  p.  182. 
TWO  Seasonable  Discourses  concerning  this  present  Parliament,  1675,  in State 
Tracts of the Reign of C'harles ZI.,  I.  p.  68. 
The Art of  Good Husbandry,  by R. T., 1675, in Harleian  Miscellany,  I.  p.  378; 
Hou) to Advance the Trade ofthe ~Vation,  by M'illiam Gosse, in Ibid., IV. p.  366. 
6  The Dutch  Usurpation, by  William de Britai~~e,  1672, in Harleian Miscellany, 
111.  p.  14; The Present State of  C'hri.\te,rdom  and the Interest of En.yland  with regard to 
France, 1677, in Ibid.,  I.  p.  245; A Discourse  of  Trade wherein  is plainly  discovered 
the True Cause ofthe Great  Want of Money,  1675, pp.  1-6. 
resources  for  the war, were  exceedingly involved.  The funds, diverted 
from the payment of the liabilities to which  they were assigned, became 
in reality a forcible postponement of  the satisfaction of  the creditors of 
the Crown.  Therefore, although ready money was provided, the liability 
remained.  The war was  unpopular',  and the House of Commons granted 
a  supply,  estimated to produce  &1,260,000, unwillingly;  and enquired 
closely into the disbursement  of  this and other sums, available  for  the 
carrying on  of  the contest.  It was  estimated that there was  received 
from the Parliamentary grant, the sale of  prizes, the Dutch indemnity, 
and  portion  of  the  Customs revenue assigned to the navy, a total  of 
.&?3,040,000:  while  the outlay on  the war  was  returned at aC2,040,000, 
leaving exactly a million unaccounted for2.  This investigation, like that 
of  the finances of  the previous struggle with  the Dutch, does  not take 
account  of  the normal  shortage  of  the  Ordinary  Revenue  and of  the 
failure of the grant to reach the estimated amount, as well as the falling 
off  in  the Customs during the period  of  hostilities.  For instance, the 
whole  amount  collected  (apart from  recent  increases of  rates) for  the 
three  years,  Michaelmas  l671 to  Michaelmas  1674,  in  England  and 
JVales, showed  a  reduction  of  about  one-third, as  compared  with  the 
figures of 166g3. 011  the other side, the funds at  the disposal of Charles 11. 
were augmented by the subsidy from France, which  is said to have been 
spent  on  the navy? 
In spite of  the known and secret resources of  the Crown, by the end 
of  1673 the finances were in an exceedingly embarrassed condition.  The 
estimate for the financial year Michaelmas to Michaelmas was  framed on 
the basis of  a reduced income from Customs, and it was  found that the 
whole  settled  revenue  was  anticipated  with  the  exception  of  about 
&150,0006.  In addition, it was  reported that there was  no fund to pay 
the  fees  and  salaries  in  the Exchequer,  for  secret  service, interest  on 
money  already  borrowed  and  the arrears  of  the household-"all  of 
which  amount  to a  very  great  sum  of  money6." 
The explanation  of  the difficulties  of  financing the Crown  involves 
The Grand  Question  Resolved  ulhrther  a  King  of England  can  make  Wars and 
Alliances without n'otijying  it to Parliament [1673], in 4lisce/lanea Aulica, p.  260. 
Hist. and Proceedings ofthe House of' Commons, I. p.  238. 
I11  both cases the statistics  relate to the actual  collection, not the rent of the 
farm- 
1668  .  ..  ..  .  ...  ...  .  ..  .  ..  .  ..  ;E828,200. 17s. 4d. 
1671-4,  annual average, deducting additional duties ...  ;E558,566. 5s. 62d. 
-Add.  MS. (Brit. Mus.) 36,785,  ff.  59, 60; Add. MS. 28,078,  ff.  201 -2; cf. An 
Estimate of the comparative Strength of  Great  Britain, and  of  the Losses of her  Trade 
from every  Wur  sinre the Revolution, by George Chalmers, Loudon, 1794, p.  49. 
Vide infra, 111.  p.  530, note (10).  Add.  MS. 28,078,  f.  116. 
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takillg note of a number of  varying influences.  The positiol~  from 1672 
to 1674  might  be  described  in  the  following  terins.  The estimated 
settled revenue, together with the special grant for the war, would about 
meet the estimated expenditure1.  But there was no allowance made for 
interest on  the large outstanding  debtz.  Contingent receipts, such  as 
Prize-nloney and the indemnity, should have sufficed to meet this charge 
to have provided a moderate amount towards the reduction  of  the 
anticipations.  This statement of  the situation, however, was only true, 
to many provisos.  First, the estimated revenue arid the supply 
for the war must reach the sums expected, and the estimated expenditure 
must not be  exceeded.  As a  matter  of  fact, all these conditions were 
violated,  and  hence  the  difficulties of  the year  1674.  Mention  has 
already been made of  the decline of the Customs through the war"  and, 
in addition to this cause, there was  another  which  tended  to produce 
a diminution in the settled revenue.  The farming of  the Customs and 
of  the excise  was  subject  to grave  abuses.  Petty estimated  that the 
total Customs duties, which  should have  been  collected, ought to have 
reached  a  million  a  year.  Out of  this, owing to false declarations of 
merchants,  the charge of  collection and the profit  of  the farmers, the 
Crown only obtained one-half4.  Moreover, the fixing of  the rent, pay- 
able by the farmers, was affected by various indirect practices.  In 1673 
the Commissioners of  excise were interested in the farni to the extent of 
seven thirty-second parts of the whole.  On this share of the profit, they 
succeeded in raising 290,000, besides an income of 26,000 a year during 
the  currency  of  the  lease,  "whereby,"  according  to  the  report  of 
Godolphin, "contrary  to law, they were become both farmers and com- 
missioner~~."  In other  cases,  the Crown  suflered through  the persons, 
who tendered, offering large bribes, with the result that the highest offer, 
with the best security, was sometimes not accepted6.  The same corrup- 
tion extended to the Exchequer,  and it is significant  that, at a  later 
date, it was  discovered by Dudley North, that one of  the auditors had 
systematically falsified a whole set of  books7.  In view of  these circum- 
stances  and  the  original  insufficiency  of  the settled  revenue,  it was 
unavoidable  that  the  actual  receipts  of  the  Exchequer,  under  this 
heading,  should  fall  far short of  the estimates. 
Vide infia,  1x1. pp. 530. 
"eresby  states that in 1675 the debt was  returned at four million $3, besides 
what was due to the bankers through the stop of the Exchequer-Memoirs,  p. 27. 
3  Vide supra, p. 289. 
'  Several Essays in Polilical Arithmetick,  London,  1755, p. 161. 
6  State Papers, Domestic, Charles II., Entry Book, ~xxr.  p. 77. 
6  Burnet, History of  His Oum Time,  Oxford, 1833,  XI. p.  103. 
7  The Lives of  Francis North, Baron Guilford and Sir Dzulley hTorth,  by the Hon. 
Roger xorth,  London, 1826, 111. p. 150. 
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On  the other hand,  the actual  outlay largely  exceeded  that  esti- 
mated.  In  the spending departments  there  was  similar  corruption ; 
and,  in  addition, certain  large  sources  of  expense were  either  greatly 
under-estimated or did not appear in the estimates at all.  What might 
be described as the expenses of  the Court for the two years  (Easter  to 
Easter)  1661-3  were  under  a  quarter of  a  million  a  year1.  For  the 
same length of  time from 1672-3,  the estimate was  close on 2350,000, 
and the actual disbursements for the two years 1673-5 came to over half 
a  million annually, or more than double the average sum  that sufficed 
for 1661-32.  The greater part of  the increase is accounted  for by the 
alarming  addition  to the pensions and bounties.  For 1672 and 1673 
the total estimate was  2160,000, whereas,  in  the two years  1673-5  no 
less than 2387,233 was distributed under this heading, or over six times 
what  had  sufficed  between  1661 and 1663.  These were  the payments 
out  of  the Exchequer,  arid  to these  must  be  added  the gifts to the 
mistresses of  Charles 11.  from other sourcesa.  That popular opinion was 
alive to the causes of  the increase of  expenditure is shown by  the clause 
in  the impeachment  of  Arlington  in  1674,  which  charges  him  with 
having  sanctioned  or advised, during his  tenure  of  the secretaryship, 
grants  amounting  to  at least  three  millions4.  In  addition  to  the 
pensions, there was a comparatively small, but an almost general increase 
on the estimate  in the expenses of  the Court; so  that, on  the whole, 
apart from the services, the actual expenditure was  much  greater than 
that allowed  for.  But the revenue was  much less than that expected, 
hence it follows that, if  the ex2enses  of  the war were  paid, there would 
be a large addition to the arrears, already due on the Ordinary Expendi- 
ture.  When  Sir Thomas Osborne (afterwards Earl of  Danby) became 
Treasurer, the Crown  had reached  the end  of  its credit.  The bankers 
were extremely dissatisfied;  and it was  found impossible to borrow until 
the existing anticipations had been materially reduced6.  The  sit~iation  was 
further complicated by the advisability of  providing funds to pay interest 
on the bankers' debt, and it was feared that this liability would "devour" 
any  savings  that  might  be  niade  in  the  ordinary  course7.  Further, 
Danby required money to carry out his scheme of  purchasing a majority 
of  votes  in the House of  Commons8.  He proposed to take advantage 
l  Calendar Treasury Books,  1660-7,  p. xxxii.  Vide infra,  1x1.  pp. 530, 531. 
State Papers,  Domestic, Charles 11.,  cccxxxvx~.  171. 
*  Journak  of  the  House of  Commons,  IX.  pp. 294, 296. 
State Papers, Domestic,  Charles II., cccxxxv~~.  163; Calendar, 1673-5,  p. 5. 
Add. MS. (Brit. Mus.) 28,078,  ff.  11, 12.  r  Ibid., f. 16. 
In the Session of  1674 one member was  reported to have said he expected to 
make it worth  £5,000  to him  (Journals OJ the  House  qf Commons, rx. p.  301).  It 
was  stated  that the usual  rate at this time was  a guinea a vote and a dinner every 
day in the week during the Sexeioll, "  uuless the House be upon money or a Mi~lister 
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of  the provision, which  exempted the Secret Service payments  from a 
detailed accounting, by  making his bribes through this fund1.  Owing to 
' the war  expenditure, the necessity  of  making  some  disbursements  for 
carrying on the government  and the absence of  credit, Danby was  left 
without any available resources to discharge current liabilities, much less 
to make a new  class of  outlays.  The method, by which  he managed to 
finance the Crown, was to lessen the anticipations  by effecting a  drastic 
reduction in the pensions.  With reduced anticipations, he expected  to 
be  in a  position  to borrow enough  to tide  over the present  dieculty 
until  the Commons panted a  supply, or relief  came  from  some other 
direction.  This policy  had  certain  important  indirect  results.  The 
report of  the proposed retrenchments produced  great uneasiness, and it 
was supposed to be only the prelude to another stop of  the Exchequer. 
People remembered the consequences of  the failure  of  the bankers  two 
years before, and there was a general desire to withdraw deposits so that 
there  was  another  run ; and,  for  a  short time,  credit could  scarcely 
be  obtained? 
The depression from  1672 to 1674 was  noteworthy  in so  far  as it 
began and ended with a panic, in each case  occasioned  by a  run on  thev 
bankers.  At the same  time, it is  to be  remembered  that credit  was 
in its infancy, and that therefore the suspension of  cash-payments  by 
a number of  the goldsmiths did not produce  such serious consequences 
as might have been expected.  Thus the effects were much less permanent 
than those of  the great crisis from  1665 to 1667.  The burden  of  the 
war, both  in  extraordinary  taxation and losses, was  less;  while, on the 
later occasion,  there had  been  no remarkable catastrophe such  as  the 
Plague or the Fire.  For these reasons, the years 1672 to 1674 represent 
rather a check to the recovery of  the previous losses than the incurring of 
new  ones.  Similarly,  soon  after the peace  with  Holland  in  February 
1674, a period  of  great activity in trade began, which (with the excep- 
tion of  a small crisis in 1678) lasted until the middle of  1683.  Many 
circumstances contributed towards this prosperity.  Already much of the 
wealth, destroyed by the Fire, had been replaced by fresh accumulations. 
of  Statew-A  Letter from  a Parliament  Man  to  his  Friend, 1675, in State  Tracts of 
the Reign of Charles II., p.  55. 
1 Total Secret Service 1661-1663  two years  ...  ...  ...  256,025 
,>  ,,  ,,  1671-1673  ,,  .  ...  ...  %124,282 
9 9  7,  ,,  1677-1678  one year  .  ...  ...  %104,307 
9)  ),  ,,  1676-1679  three years  ...  ...  .  ..  2'252,467 
-State  Papers,  Auditors'  Declaration  Books;  Cakndar Treas~rry  Books,  1660-7, 
p.  xxxii. ;  infra, III. p. 531 ;  A Collection of Some  Memorable and Weighty Transactions 
in Parliament in the year  1678  and  afkmards, in relation to th  Impeachment of the 
Earl of DanOy, London, 1695, pp.  6, 23. 
Charks II., by Osmund Airy,  London,  1904, p.  295. 
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The unsatisfactory position of  England in foreign politics tended on the 
whole  to an increase of  trade.  France  and Holland were  still engaged 
in a destructive war;  and, while  this lessened the purchasing  power  of 
each, England gained  by the reduction, and in  some cases the cessation 
of  competition  in the remaining  foreign  markets.  The woollen  trade 
especially  benefited,  particularly  in  manufacturing  for  the  Levant, 
where  for  several years  English  merchants  secured by  far  the greater 
part of  the tradel.  For the time being, too, the con~modities,  that had 
formerly been  purchased  by Holland from  France, were imported  from 
Britain, and, immediately on the declaration of  peace  in  1674, London 
merchants obtained more orders than they could execute.  It is recorded 
that, on one occasion in the winter 1674-5, there sailed from Rotterdam 
no  less  than  300  vessels, all owned  in England,  Scotland  or  Irelandz. 
The abatement of  Dutch competition  was a temporary advantage to the 
East  India  and  African  trades3, while  the  preoccupation  of  France 
enabled the Hudson's Bay company to establish  itself, free from serious 
interruption 4 
The industrial activity manifested itself in an increasing demand  for 
credit.  By  1676 the office  for  the discount  of  mercantile  bills was  in 
operation5, but  it was  ~b~jected  that such an  institution  "having  no 
fund,  anchorage  and secl~re  foundation  would  come  to nothing6."  A 
much more elaborate scheme was  propounded  by Andrew Y arranton for 
the establishing of  a  bank  in  each  iinportant trading centre, based on 
land security, and dependent on a register  of  titles'.  A combination of 
this idea with that of  a  foreign trading company, to be  established  in 
Ireland, was  worked out in considerable detail by Richard Lawrences. 
In addition  to the general  activity in the home trade, the return of 
l Hist.  and  Proceedings  of  the  House  of  Comn~ons,  I. p.  249.  On  October  26th 
(N.S.),  1674, Sir W.  Temple wrote from the Hague:  "But  what makes the bent of 
the people in general so passionate  for a peace is the immeasurable burden of  their 
taxes and the interest of  the trading towns; they say upon  all occasiol~s  none gets 
by  this war  but  England and that if  it should co~ltinue  a year  or two longer the 
general course of  trade would  run so far into our channel that they should be in 
danger never to recover it,"  Works, IV.  pp. 57, 68. 
Anderson, Annals ~Commerce,  III.  p.  47. 
Vide infra, 11. pp.  21, 134, 135.  Ibid., 11.  p.  231. 
Proposals for  the Advancement  of  Trade upon such Principles as must necessarily 
enforce it, by  R. Murray,  1676, pp. 5,  6, 
-  --  . 
England's ~~rovekent  by Sea and Land, by Andrew Yarranton,  1677, p.  22. 
Ibid., pp.  18-36 ;  Reasons  and  A.oposa1.s for  a Registry  or Remembrancer of  all 
Deeds and Incumbrances of  Real  Estates, by  N. Philpot,  1671 ;  A  Treatise concerning 
Registers to be  made of Estates, by W.  Pierrepoint, in Harleian Miscellany (1746),  111. 
pp.  302-11. 
The Interest  of  Ireland  in its  Trade and  Wealth stated, by Richartl  Lawrence, 
Dublin,  1682, Part 11.  pp.  4-6,  10-18, 33-42. Progress in Inventions  1673-80  [CHAP.  XV. 
confidence is indicated  by  the progress of  invention.  The development 
of  the cloth  trade  is  shown  by  the  proposal  to patent a  mechanical 
device, whereby the cessation of  work, through want  of  water  to drive 
water-wheels in  the summer time, would be  avoided1.  Another scheme 
was  designed  to effect great improvements  in  the wheels  themselvesP. 
Then, in connection  with  the  progress  of  shipping, a  new  method  of 
buoying vessels was  propounded, and an engine, which would  tow ships 
in  and out of  harbours without  the use  of  oarsd; while  the company, 
formed in 1670 and known  as the Milled-Lead Adventure, for supplying 
a new  sheathing for ships, was  apparently becoming  successful4.  There 
were a number of  ideas, intended to increase the comforts  of  domestic 
life; such  as  a secret method  of  producing  suet  candles, by  which  the 
usual  orensive  smell  of  these,  when  lighted,  was  avoided5.  Then,  a 
process had been discovered for the more expeditious printing of  textile 
stuff's to be used for hangings in rooms, and another for the production 
of  artificial  marble  for  mantelpieces6.  A  patent was  applied  for  to 
protect an invention for the making of .' crystalline  glass " and another 
for an engine to crush apples to abstract the juice,  from which cider was 
produced'.  Between the end of  1673 and 1677, there were at least four 
different  plans  for pumping  engines, designed to raise water to houses, 
or to drain  mines and marshess.  The rebuilding of  London  had  occa- 
sioned  an  increased  demand  for  a  water-supply.  The  New  River 
company, after making slow progress for nearly half  a century, was  now 
advancing rapidly.  It was  able to distribute a dividend of  2145. 1s. 8d. 
on  each adventurer's  share in  16809,  the London  Bridge Water Works 
had  been  rebuilt  after the fire10  and the patentees,  who  had obtained 
a concession for supplying Thames water  in  the Westminster  district in 
1665, had begun to sell shares in the undertaking in 1675". 
The progress  towards  the repair  of  the losses of  the Great Fire is 
indicated on the one hand  by the appearance  of  a  directory of  London 
merchants in 167712  and in another manner by  the calculations of  Petty 
l  State Papers,  Domestic, Petitio~l  Entry Book, xxxv~.  p. 317 ; Calendar, 1673-5, 
p. 65. 
Ibid., Petition Entry Book,  XI.VI.  p.  151. 
Ibid., H. 0. .(\'arrant  Rook, I. p.  24,  I'etition  Entry Book,  XLVI.  p.  33. 
F'ide  itfra,  111.  p.  106. 
State l'auers,  Domestic, Charles 11.) CCCLXII.  43,  44;  Calendar, 1673-5,  p.  390.  .  - 
Ibid.,  l'etitio11 Entry Book,  XLVI.  pp.  17, 151. 
Ibid.,  Petition Entry Books,  XL.  (minute),  XLVI.  p.  139;  Evelyri,  Diary,  ilt 
mpra, 11.  p.  115. 
S  State Papers, Domestic,  Petition Entry Books, XL.  p.  166, XLVI.  pp.  l?, 31. 
Vide  infra,  111.  pp.  25, 31.  10  Ibid., 111. p.  12.  11  Ibid., 111.  p. 419. 
l2 A  Collection of. the Kames of  Merchants living irr  und about the City of'  Londolb, 
1677 (reprinted 1878). 
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in  his  Political Arithmetick, which  was  written  about this time'.  He 
estimates the national  dividend  of  England  and  Wales  at about  49 
millions, showing an increase of 2 millions as compared with 1664.  The 
income  of  the  whole  Empire  he  supposed  to be  70  millions.  The 
foreign  trade of  the world  is  returned at about 45  millions, of  which 
Britain possessed two-ninths, while the proportion  in shipping was  one- 
quarter of  that owned  by  the other nations of  Europe.  The housing 
of  London was supposed to have doubled in value since 163G2. 
While the tendency through the country was to resent the determina- 
tion  of  the foreign policy of  Great Britain  by  France, the attitude of 
isolation, which  Charles 11.  had  so  far preserved, caused  Parliament  to 
grant only meagre supplies and to take note of abuses in the administra- 
tion  of  the  finances.  In  l675 the  House  of  Commons  resolved  to 
present an address to Charles II., pointing out that the anticipation of 
the Customs was a disservice to the kingdom, and asking that the exist- 
ing practice should not be continued"  The point at issue in this case, 
between the Crown and Parliament, was pithily expressed in the following 
dilemma-"  either the ~ublick  revenue is sufficient to answer the necessary 
occasions  of  the Government, and then there is no colour for anticipa- 
tion~:  or  else, by  some  extraordinary  accident, the King  is  reduced  to 
want an extraordinary supply, and then he ought to resort to his Parlia- 
ment4."  At the same time, an attempt was  made  to impeach Danby, 
who was  charged with perverting  the ancient course of  the Exchequer, 
whereby the accounts were brought into confusion and the credit of  the 
Crown  destroyed6. 
In spite of  the venal  party, which had been  bribed into supporting 
the Court, there was  a powerful opposition, which was  endeavouring  to 
1  force a breach with France as the only condition on which supplies could 
be  obtained.  In the session, which began in October 1675, Charles II., 
while admitting that "by a late account he had taken  of  his expenses6, 
It appears that the MS, was begun  in  1671 and that Petty was  still working 
at it in l671 and 1672.  There are references in the work, as published,  which show 
that either it was completed not earlier than 1676 or else that, if finished earlier, 
portio~~s  were added which relate to events up to 1676-The  Economic  Writings of 
Rr WiMiam  Petty,  edited by H. C.  Hull,  Cambridge,  1800, I.  pp.  235,  236. 
In  his  estimate  of  the total  British  and  Irish  trade at ;E10,180,000,  Petty 
takes account  of  the earnings of  shippi~~g  which he states at l&  millions.  At the 
same time the imports from the countries of Europe are omitted ;  and, as a result, 
the imports as a whole are under-stated.  Such under-statement necessarily reflects 
on the adequacy of  the estimate of the world's  foreign trade. 
Journals of  the House of  Commons,  IX.  p.  323. 
* A Just and Modest  Vindication of  the ...  Two  Last Parliaments of  King Charles ZI. 
in State Tracts of  the Reign of  Charles IZ.,  p.  173. 
Journclk of  the House of  Commons,  IX.  p. 323. 
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he had not been altogether so good a  husband  as he might have been," 
asked for a supply to reduce the anticipationsl, which  were admitted to 
amount to about a niillion2.  The House of  Colnmons expressly refused 
funds for paying the King's  debts, and, in granting money for an addi- 
tion  to the navy, it took steps that the amount collected should only be 
spent for this purpose. 
It is  clear  that  the settled  revenue, even when  augmented  by  the 
French subsidy, would not suffice for the payment of  the fixed charges, 
interest, pensions and secret service money with  a  concurrent reduction 
of  the debt.  As time went  on, salaries fell more and more into arrears, 
and many  of  the payments  were  made  by  means  of  tallies.  Seamen 
and soldiers  had long  suffered  from  this  method;  but,  when  it was 
applied  to the servants of  the Royal  Household, there were loud  out- 
cries.  About  November  19th, 1678, the "  servants  below  stairs,"  in a 
petition  to the Board  of  Green  Cloth, demanded that the best of  the 
tallies  and  nearest  to payment  should  be  given  to  them  and  those 
remotest left  for the servants above-stairss.  By  this time, partly from 
financial reasons, partly owing to other causes, Charles 11. had decided at 
least  to make  a  pretence  of  falling in with  the foreign  policy,  which 
commended itself  to the majority in Parliament;  and, by  the beginning 
of  the year  (1678), a  supply  of  over 2  millions was  proposed  for  the 
purpose of  waging war with  France'.  The declaration of  hostilities, so 
anxiously  awaited,  never  came,  but  the  expectation  of  it occasioned 
a  run  on  the bankers  towards the end  of  the year, and the crisis was 
prolonged by the revelations made in support of  the Popish Plot5. 
On  March  31st,  1679, the Crown  debt was  returned at close on  a 
million and a half, of which 2200,000 was for arrears of  pensions.  This 
statement took no account of  the bankers' debt, or other sums borrowed 
at interest6.  With the revenue so  heavily  anticipated and the Parlia- 
nientary supply definitely  earmarked  for  specific  purposes, such  as  the 
building  of  men-of-war  or  the disbanding  of  the  standing  army,  it 
became necessary to make a fresh investigation of  the finances.  On the 
fall of  Danby, it was  believed that retrenchments  could be  effected, by 
l Journals of  the House of  Commons,  rx. p. 367. 
Hist. and Proceedings qf  the House oJ  Commons,  r.  p.  239.  The estimate before 
Parliament was as follows-  ............  Settled and other Revenue  &!1,600,000  .........  Navy, Army arid Government  S700,OOO 
3  State Papers, Domestic, Charles II., CCCCVIII.  120.  ..................  4  Provision Navy  S1,414,920 
,,  Army  ..................  637,000 
...............  Total annually  £2,051,920 
-Journal8  of  the House of  Commons,  IX. p. 438. 
6  Burnet, History, 11. p. 155.  Vide infra,  1x1. p. 644. 
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which a quarter of  a million annually would  be available  for the reduc- 
tion of  the anticipationsl.  What saved the situation for the advisers of 
Charles 11.  was the advance of the settled revenue, under the stimulus of 
the improvement  of  trade.  The estimate for  1679 was  framed  on the 
basis  of  over 21,200,000, and the actual receipts exceeded this amount 
by more than 2400,000, chiefly by the high yield of the excise.  Extra- 
ordinary Parliamentary grants and casual  income brought  in  an equal 
amount, so that the whole receipts (apart from loans) came to over two 
millions.  The expenditure, including a considerable payment of pensions 
and secret service money, but without repayments of specific borrowings, 
came  to iE1,940,000.  There was  thus a  surplus of  close on 2115,000, 
all of  which was  used, with  the addition of  money withdrawn  from  the 
cash-balance, in paying  off  &137,800 of  tallies on  the excise.  In the 
following year, a further 862,000 of  these  obligations was  discharged2. 
In 1681 the House of Commons resolved that any person, who advanced 
money on  any branch  of  the settled  revenue or who  bought  any tally, 
"shall  be  adjudged  to  hilider  the  sitting  of  Parliaments  and  be 
responsible therefor in Parliaments."  In that year  it was  proposed  to 
effect  considerable reductions  in the expenditure.  The settled revenue 
was  estimated  at close  on  21,200,000  and the ordinary outlay at less 
than  &900,000<  The actual  expenditure  (other  than  repayment  of 
loans) was  21,163,000,  but the receipts  again  exceeded  the estimate, 
and  there was  a surplus of  over a  quarter of  a million, which was used 
for  the extinction  of  a  part  of  the  debt6.  There had  been  a  large 
l  Diary,  Life  and  Times  of  L'harles  II.,  edited  by  R.  W.  Blencowe,  1843,  I. 
p.  189. 
For the details wide  infra,  111.  pp. 630-41. 
Estimated Settled Revenue  ............... 
Actual  ,,  ...............  1  J 
.....................  Casualties 
Parliamentary Grants  .................. 
Total (exclusive of loans)  ............... 
Expenditure,  exclusive  of repayment  of tallies and  other 
advances  ..................... 
Surplus  ..................... 
Journals of  the House of  Commons, rx. p. 702. 
Vide infra,  111.  pp. 530, 531. 
Estimated Settled Revenue  ............... 
,,  Expenditure  ............... 
Settled Revenue (actual)  ............... 
Other Receipts (exclusive of loans)  ............ 
Total ........................ 
Actual Expenditure  .................. 
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repayment  of  loans  in  1680,  so  that  altogether,  in  the  three  years 
~~d~-Day  1679 to Lady-Day 1682, there had been  a great reduction of 
the indebtedness of  the Crown.  There is one element which  makes it 
difficult to  determine  the  exact  amount  paid  off  on  balance.  The 
acco~nt~  show  the issues  for  principal  and interest, thus they  tend  to 
produce  the impression  that  the  repayments  were  larger  than  they 
actually  were.  Since  the  estimate  of  the  year  1681 provides  for  a 
charge of £120,000  for interest, the whole amount, over the three years, 
may be roughly estimated at thrice that sum.  When allowance is made 
for this and for the discharge of  f200,000 of  tallies  on the excise from 
1679 to 1681, the whole amount of  debt, paid off  on balance from 1679 
to 1682, was close on £1,100,000,  or just about the estimated amount of 
a year's  settled revenue. 
The increasing yield  of  the Customs  and excise only  reflected  the 
great activity of  trade during the period, bounded  on  the one side by 
the crisis of  1678 and on the other by that of  1682.  This activity was 
marked  in  several  directions.  There was  a  fresh  series of  inventions, 
such as one for the smelting of  minerals in  16801, another for an engine 
to raise foundered ships, and a third for an improved  log2.  Attention 
was directed to the rapid depreciation of  vessels trading into the tropics, 
and there were several proposals to preserve their timben.  One method 
was impregnating the wood "with a bitter sulphurous matter3," and the 
other was  the rolled-lead  invention, which  had  now  been  in actual use 
for  several  years4. 
Several  comparisons  made  during this  period  show  traces  of  the 
prevalent  industrial  progress.  It was  estimated  in  1678 that,  in  the 
thirty-six years 1620-56,  7,500  new  houses had been built in London : 
whereas, in  twenty-one  years from 1656 to 1677, the increase had been 
10,000,  the rent  of  which  was  £70,000'.  From  1660  to  1666 the 
bullion imported averaged P60,000 a year ; while, from  the latter date 
to  1680, it was  returned  at £372,000,  annually6.  The expansion  of 
trade had made it needful to increase the stock  of  metallic  money, and 
in the two years 1679 to 1681 there was coined P1,618,746.  4s. 9$d., as 
against only Y540,583. 138. 8;d.  in the same period from 1672 to 1674'. 
This growth is the more significant, as proceeding side  by side with the 
extension of  credit by  means of  banking facilities.  For some time after 
the stop of the Exchequer, confidence in the goldsmiths had been shaken, 
but  the facilities,  they  afforded,  tempted  those  possessed  of  floating 
l  State Papers, Domestic, Petitiou Entry Book, LXI. p.  4. 
Ibid., LV.  pp.  110, 278.  3  Ibid., Entry Book, ~xxr.  pp.  29, 119. 
Vide infra, III.  pp.  106, 107. 
State Papers, Domestic, Charles II., CCCCVIII.  21.  6  Ibid., CCCCXVI.  94. 
i  Ibid., ccc~x.  172 ;  CC~LXVIII.  94 ;  ccccxvl. 185, 187. 
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capital, to avail themselves of  the services offered; while the high rate of 
discount  induced  others to enter the business'.  I11  1678 proposals were 
printed  for  the extension  of  the system  from  London  throughout  the 
provinces, in order to increase the national capital available  for trade, 
whereby the circulation  of  money  would  be  made  more  rapid-which 
being  '6evpeditiously returned wiuld seem a great deal, doing the work 
of four times the same quantity moving slowly, as a stick  moved  round 
very quick seems to be  in every placez."  In 1679 goldsmith's  bills  had 
becorne so common, that numerous counterfeit notes were in circulation3. 
The growth  of  wealth  is  shown  by  the facility  with  which  the East 
India and African  con~panies  could borrow money.  Both  these  bodies 
had augmented their working capital, by accepting deposits, payable on 
demand  or at short notice.  About  1680 the former company was able 
to borrow at between  4 per  cent. and 5 per cent.-a  considerably lower 
rate  than  that paid  by  Charles 11.-and  in  1681 the interest  was  no 
more than 3 per cent.4  The phenomenon of a low rate of  interest, com- 
bined with  active trade, is   roba ably  to be  explained  by  the  fact  that 
a  check  had  been  experienced  in  the cloth  trade,  and  that  the new 
channels of  investment did not suffice for the employment of  the whole 
of  the funds  thus  liberateds. 
The broadening of  trade led to new  undertakings being started, and 
to some of  those, that had been  established  previously, being extended. 
In  1680 the fire-insurance ofice  founded  hy  Barbon  in  1667 was  re- 
organized on  a  broader  basis, and the ownership was  vested  in  a sniall 
company,  composed  of  "persons  of  condition,"  who  guaranteed  its 
solvency by  the security  of  ground-rents they  owned, which were  made 
liable for losses in  excess of  the premiums  received"  In the satne year 
the  postal  facilities  in  London  were  very  greatly  increased  by  the 
establishment  of  the  CT)zdertaking of  the  Penny  Post7.  About  this 
date there  was  a proposal for infant insurance, which, it was  expected, 
l  The Mystrry of the New Fashioned  Goldsmiths or Bankers,  1676, pp.  3, 4. 
Proposals to the King and Parliament, or a Large Model of U Bank, by M. L[ewis] 
D.D. 1678, p. 4. 
State  Papers,  Domestic,  Entry  Book,  LV. p.  28.  The type  of goldsmith's 
deposit  note  is  describer1  in  The  Grasshopper  in  Lonjbard  St.  by J.  B.  Martin, 
London, 1892, p.  127.  In addition to this there was the banker's  promissory  note, 
which appears  to have been known in 1668, and  a  specimen  is  in existence dated 
November  28,  1684-The  Rise  of  the London  Money  Market  1640-1826,  by W.  R. 
Bisschop, London, 1910,  pp.  56, 57. 
Journal8 of  the House  of  Commons IX.  p.  422; Anderson, Annuls of  Cbmmerce, 
1x1.  p.  75;  Collection of  Letters  for  the  Improcernent  of  Husbandry  and  Trade,  by 
John Houghtoll,  1681-3,  I.  p.  148;  England's  Improvement  by  Sea  and  Land,  by 
Andrew Yarranton, 1677, pp.  17, 23. 
Vide  infia, 11. p.  136.  6  Ibid., 111. p.  376. 
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would  give  the Crown  the use  of  a  million  sterling  for  about twenty 
years and yield a profit of  d?600,000.  It was  suggested that subscribers 
should  be  entitled to pay in  825 on  the life  of  any child  under  two 
years of  age, and the number of  nominated  lives should  be limited to 
40,000.  On  each  of  these, attaining the age of  R1 years, 2100 should 
be  paid.  Since 60 per cent.  of  infants  born  died  before reaching  the 
specified  age,  the policies  payable  would  only  amount  to 8400,000, 
leaving  a  gross profit  of  8600,0001. 
In addition to the water-supply companies already founded, another 
was  started in London in 1681 which was  incorporated as the  Governor 
and  Company of the  Waterwork and  Wnter-hozises in ShadweZP, and in 
the previous year a provincial  undertaking of  the same kind had  been 
established  at Newcastle-on-Tyne3. 
In Scotland, too, a  trade-revival  was  in progress, and a company for 
the  production  of  fine  cloth  was  founded  in  1681 at  New  mills,  in 
Haddingtonshire.  This venture is of  peculiar interest, partly because it 
is  the only  case  in  which  the minutes  and  documents,  corresponding 
to the articles of association and prospectus of  a British manufacturing 
company of this early period, have been discovered, partly as an instance 
of  the difference in the methods  of  establishing companies in England 
and in  Scotland.  Even during the Protectorate, it was  held  in theory 
(though not enforced in practice) that according to English law a charter 
was required to constitute a  trading corporation4;  and, in these  iastru- 
ments, minute  regulations were  framed for the conduct  of  business  by 
the bodies, so created.  In Scotland, on the other hand, the acts of 1661 
and 1662 authorized individuals  to incorporate themselves, without any 
formality.  Therefore,  it would  appear  that a  Scottish  incorporation 
would be  unable to obtain the privileges, which  constituted  a common 
part of  the English charter.  This difficulty was  met by the earlier acts 
promising  certain  franchises  to those  who  established  new  industries, 
such as exemption  from taxes for nineteen years and naturalization  for 
foreigners.  Though several companies had  been  founded  in  Scotland 
between 1662 and 1680, it was felt that the inducements, offered  by  the 
acts  of  1661 and 1662, were  not sufficient, and, in each  case,  specific 
privileges  were  granted  by  further  measures.  A  new  act  was  passed 
in 1681, which completed the protection of  Scottish infant industries by 
the  exclusion  of  competitive imports.  Therefore,  the main  difference 
between  the policy  of  the two  countries,  in encouraging  a  new  manu- 
facture, was  that, in England, persons who  provided  the capital might 
1 Add. MS. (Brit. Mus.) 28,078,  f. 462. 
2  Vide infra, III. p.  32.  3  Ibid., 111.  p.  34. 
4  Of  Corporations, Fraternities  and  Guilds, by W.  Sheppard,  1659 ;  Forms  and 
Presidents  of  Charters  Concerning  Corporations, pssinz. 
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obtain a monopoly for the process, but they were subject to such foreign 
competition  as was  deemed  advisable under  the existing fiscal arrange- 
ments.  I11  Scotlaud, on the other hand, though  a few monopolies were 
ganted, as a rule, the entrepeneur had to be  prepared  to face domestic 
competition, but he was  freed from that of  foreigners ; and, at this time 
and until  the Union,  England  was  reckoned  as  a  foreign  country  for 
comn~ercial  purposes. 
The Scottish company differed  from those chartered in England, not 
only in its relation to the State, but also in its constitution.  The direc- 
tion  of  English  companies  had  been  the  result  of  a  long  process  of 
continuous development  from the time when  the supreme authority had 
been vested in the governor, to whom  the other officials, elected  by the 
members, were subordinated to such an extent that at first they had no 
name1.  Prior to the adoption of  the joint-stock  system, the name  of 
those,  who  controlled  industrial  enterprizes,  had  been  fixed  as  the 
governor and assistants, and this nomenclature was continued during the 
reigns of  Elizabeth and the Stuarts, subject to the modification that in 
some cases  the court was  known as the governor  and committees2.  In 
Scotland the practice differed.  There the chief importance was assigned, 
not to a single head of the company, but to the group of  persons, corre- 
sponding to those  now known  as  directors, and who  were described as 
(6 managers."  These  elected  a "  prieses " for  each  of  their  meetings. 
,  There were other points of individuality in the constitution of  the New 
mills company, which may or may not have been typical of  contemporary 
undertakings.  At its formation, a "  memorial " or prospectus was circu- 
lated which fixed the share-capital at d?5,000, and elaborate calculations 
were made according  to which  a ~rofit  of  R5  per cent. was  anticipated3. 
The earnings  were  subject  to a  number  of  curious  provisos.  It was 
stipulated in the "Articles"  that none but "actual1 tradeing merchands" 
might become  shareholders4.  When cloth had been produced, the cost 
of  production was  noted, and to this was  added a proportion for profit 
on the capital of  the company.  Then the bales were distributed amongst 
the members by lot at the prices so arrived at.  By confining the member- 
ship in  this way, the New  mills company was  midway  between the true 
joint-stock  and  the  regulated  types  of  organization.  It was,  in  fact, 
a body in which the members were a regulated company, as retailers, and 
Vide supra, pp.  4, 7. 
E.g. the East India company, Carlile's plarlting  company, the adventurers for 
Lands  in Ireland, the Hudson's  Bay  company,  the Royal  Fishery  company-oide 
infra, 11.  pp. 92, 229, 242, 344, 374. 
The Records of a Scottish Cloth Manufmtury at New Milk, Haddingtonshire (1681- 
l703), edited W.  R. Scott (Scot. Hist. Soc. 1905), pp.  lvii., 1xxxiv.-lxxxix. 
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a joint-stock one, as manufacturers.  Though in the early history of  the 
East India company, the system of  commodity-divisions had resulted in 
a somewhat similar form of  constitution, no trace of  such a combination 
is discoverable in England in the later part of  the seventeenth century1. 
In fact, the evidence points to the contrary conclusion, since there are 
frequent notices  of  public  sales  of  the products  of  the chief  London 
manufacturing companies.  The profit of  the New  mills company being a 
fixed ratio to the value of  the whole production, it was provided that no 
dividend  should  be  paid  in  the first  three years  and only 5 per  cent. 
thereafter for a like period.  After six years, the funds available were to 
be  dealt with  by  first  providing  for  depreciation, secondly  interest  at 
5 per  cent.,  thirdly  the rent  of  the factory, and fourthly  a  bonus  in 
addition to the 5 per  cent. already  deducted.  After seven  years share- 
holders were at liberty to withdraw the capital they had subscribeda. 
Turning from  new  companies to those  already  founded, the period 
from 1672 to 1681 was one of  great progress, except in the case of  the 
Royal  Fishery  undertaking,  which  had  suffered  from  the want  of  an 
adequate capital.  An effort had been made to obtain funds in 1677 and 
in the following year the House of  Comn~ons  appointed a Committee to 
consider proposals  for  the revival  of  the  industry3.  About  1680 the 
company sold all its remaining property ;  and an unincorporated company 
made  a further attempt,  but found  the want  of  skill  of  the English 
fishermen  rendered  success  impossible.  This body therefore urged that 
the Navigation Act should be relaxed in its favour, so that Dutch fishers 
and  salters might  be  employed4.  At this time  a  small  company  was 
attempting to revive whaling, though  indications were not wanting that 
this venture  was  not  likely  to succeed6. 
The joint-stock companies, engaged in foreign trade, had experienced 
ten  years of  good fortune.  The East India, the African and Hudson's 
Bay undertakings had each made considerable profits, though the last- 
named body does not appear to have paid  any dividends6.  The African 
In 1700 there was  an isolated  case of  a glass comparly paying dividends in 
glass, but in this i~~dustry  wages were paid i11  the commodity produced-wide  infra, 
111.  pp.  112, 113. 
IZecords of  a Scottish C'loth Manufactory,  pp. lxxxix., xc.  The reason for making 
a dividend of 5 per cent. a charge, prior to the rent, was that one of  the promoters, 
Sir  James  Stallfield,  owned  buildings  where  a  cloth-makir~g business  had  been 
carried on before the Restoration, which he was anxious to let.  Cf. Ibid.,  pp. 2,  3 
(note),  151 (note). 
Vide idia, 11.  pp.  372, 373.  Writing about 1676, Yarranton offered arlyone, 
who  could  recover  him  Is.  in the £ of  his subscription, all the remainder of it- 
England's Improvement by  Sea and Land, p.  17. 
4  %ate Papers, Domestic, James II., v.  1-50.  Wide  infrcc,  11.  p.  76. 
" Ibid., 11.  p.  231.  1'he stock in l682 realised 350. 
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company, on receiving its charter in 1672, had to sink most of its capital 
in re-establishing its forts and factories, so that until the end  of  1675 
none  of  the profits were divided.  In the six years from 1676 to 1681, 
70 guineas  per cent. were  paid1, and the stock sold for 245.  The East 
India company was in a position to take advantage of  the wave of  pros- 
perity from the beginning; and, for the first time since 1617, its aggregate 
dividends, calculated in terms of the rate per cent., were largely in excess 
of those distributed by the rival Dutch organization.  From 1672 to 1682 
the latter paid  1668 per  cent.2, while  in  the same period  the English 
company divided altogether 3804 per cent., of  which 100 per cent. was in 
stock,  per cent.  in damaged  calico, and the remaining 280 per cent. 
in cash3.  Comparing these  two groups of  dividends, from the point of 
view  of  the total  profit  distributed,  it is  to be  remembered  that the 
capital of  the Dutch undertaking4 was  larger  than that of  the English 
one; and, taking account  of  this fact, it is  noteworthy that the latter 
had the advantage in the aggregate amount of  profit  divided, as well  as 
i11  rate per cent. 
This alteration in the relative positions of  the two bodies is reflected 
in the quotations of  their stocks.  In 1670-1  the price of  Dutch East 
India stock was  no less than five times that of  the shares in the English 
companys.  On  the outbreak  of  war  in  1672,  the quotation  of  the 
former fell from 570 to 4006, and in 1679, more than a year after peace 
had been made, the stock fetched 4227, and 434 in 16808.  At this date, 
the actions of the English company were steadily rising; and, before the 
end of  the year, 300 was  reached, whence  the price  advanced to 460 in 
1682, prior to the payment of  the stock dividend of 100 per cent.  The 
frequency  of  references to the quotations of  shares in the East India 
company, not so  rnuch  in the mention  of  actual  prices but in general 
terms  of  the rise  or  fall  of  the  stock,  shows  that,  at this  period, 
l  Vide infra,  11.  pp. 21, 33.  These distributions, being made in guineas,  realised 
close on 75 per cent. 
G.  C.  Klerk de Reus,  Niederlandisch-Ostindischen Compagnie,  Appendix  VI.; 
Anderson,  Annals of  Commerce (edited by  David MacPherson),  1805, IV.  p.  488. 
Vide infra,  11.  p.  178. 
The original  capital  of  6,449,588 fl.  4 st. was  reduced in 1664 to 6,440,203  fl. 
6. 8.  It was increased to 6,440,200  fl.  in 1691-A.  E. Sayous, Le Fractior~nement  du 
Capital social de  la  Compagnie  Ne'erlandaise  des  Indes  Orientales in  Nouvelle  Revue 
Historique de Droit Franqais et ~trar~~er,  1901, p.  622. 
Vide supra, p.  284. 
6  State  Papers,  Domestic,  Charles  II.,  cccrr.  13;  Calendar,  1671-2,  p.  65. 
Klerk de Reus notices a quotation of  250 in 1672, but without giving any authority 
for it-Xederliindisch-Ostindischen  Compagnie, p.  178. 
1  Diary, Liye  and Times of  Charles II., edited by R.  W. Blex~cowe,  Londoxi,  1843, 
I.  p. 65. 
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transactions  were  numerous  and  that  they  aroused  the  interest  of 
thoughtful  observers. 
The doubling of  the capital, reckoned as paid up, by the East India 
company in  1682 constitutes  a landmark  in the evolution of  the joint- 
stock organization1.  As long as the capital was divided into "portions" 
or shares, any appreciation of  the property was  reflected mainly in the 
dividend.  As  yet  there was  no  instance  of  the distribution of  bonus 
shares  from  the  reserve  fund.  The  fact  that  the  nominal  capital 
consisted of  stock on which there was  only 850  per  cent. paid  up made 
it natural for the court to decide to extinguish the liability, rather than 
to make  a  dividend  of  100 per  cent.  in  cash.  Another  inducement 
in the same  direction-and  a powerful one-was  the absence of  liquid 
resources  for  such  a  payment. 
At this period, the financial  position  of  the  company  was  one  of 
some  difficulty.  In  1667 it had  left  itself  without  working  capital. 
Undoubtedly the wisest course would have been  to have attracted more 
capital from the public.  For several  reasons, indicated elsewherez, this 
method was not adopted, and it became necessary to provide funds from 
the  profits.  By  1678 the assets (subject  to allowance  for  liabilities) . 
were valued  at nearly l* millions, or more than four times the paid up 
capital  at that  dates.  In  the  following  year,  the  company  had  not 
sufficient  cash  in  hand to pay its debts when  due.  At this point  the 
financial situation was  complicated  by other considerations.  Owing to 
various causes, there was a vigorous agitation against the company4, and 
it  was thought that this might be met, in part, by  increasing the capital. 
At  first it was proposed to call up the outstanding  50 per  cent. of  the 
&"739,782.  10s. nominal capital, but it was  eventually decided to fix the 
stock, reckoned  as  paid  up at this sum, by  crediting  each  shareholder 
with the bonus necessary to niake his adventure fully paid.  U~ldoubtedly 
the least  advantageous  scheme was  adopted.  While the company had 
assets (after providing for liabilities) of  more than twice  the capital  as 
re-arranged  in  168R5,  its financial condition was  not  satisfactory.  The 
free capital was too small ;  and, in another respect, the position was most 
insecure.  The borrowings  of  the  company  were  a  species  of  striving 
towards the modern  debentures6.  But,  as  yet,  the sums,  received  on 
loan, were  repayable  at short notice, and therefore  these  bonds closely 
Vide injra, XI.  pp.  144, 146. 
Zb~d.,  11.  pp.  144-7.  3  Ibid., 11.  p.  139. 
4  Ibid., 11.  pp.  13.5-43.  5  Ibid., 11.  p.  147. 
@  The loans of early companies were known as  "bonds."  These obligations are 
not to be  confused with the modern bearer bond.  The bonds, issued  by English 
companies in the seventeenth century, were all  registered, as is shown by the case 
uf  Mrs Brocas agaillst the Russia company, vide itgra, 11.  p.  59. 
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resembled  the  obligations  of  a  banker,  who  kept  a  very  small  cash- 
reserve.  Moreover, there was a  certain  insecurity in the legal position, 
and it had already been  openly stated that, since the conlpany was  not 
established  by  act of  Parliament,  its bonds  were  in a  precarious con- 
dition'.  It follows then that, during a crisis involving any considerable 
disturbance of credit, the company would almost inevitably be compelled 
to suspend payment.  Curiously enough  such an episode occurred a few 
months after the paid up capital  had been  doubled.  This crisis, which 
took place in the latter half  of  the year 1682, had its origin in the state 
of  politics  at the  time  and  constituted  a  stage in  the  events  which 
resulted  in the quo  warranto  proceedings  against  the City of  London. 
The Lord  Mayor, Sir John Moor, had  incurred  much  hostility by  his 
action, in the interest  of  the Court party,  at the disputed election  of 
sheriffs in June 168R2.  According  to the account  of  John  Houghton, 
the opponents of  Moor decided to obtain revenge by engineering a run 
on one of  his associates, who was a banker3.  It was found impossible to 
confine the withdrawals within  the area  originally planned, and several 
bankers  failed,  and  one,  named  Addis,  absconded.  At this  stage, 
"everybody  thought  it best  to secure  their  own  and  ran  with  open 
mouth on all the bankers for money, thinking it better to let it lye dead 
a while in their chests than to run a hazard  of  trusting such, who, for 
ought they knew, might do as Mr Addis and some others near  him  had 
done"."  The East India company was  affected by the run and that at 
a  most  unfortunate time,  since, there being  no  cash  available,  money 
was  required  to  fit  out  a  fleet  of  30 ships  for the coming  season. 
Instead  of  3 per cent. on  loans5, 5 per cent. and 6 per cent. was  offered, 
with  the  additional  attraction  "of  good  turns  to  be  done  by  the 
company for the lenders into the bargain."  Still the demands for  pay- 
ment were much in excess of  the loans that could be  raised, and it was 
necessary to suspend payment for a period of three months6. 
Anderson,  Annals of Commerce, III.  p.  60. 
Burnet, History,  11.  pp.  332-6;  Maitland, History of London, pp.  473-7. 
This run may have been connected with the Rye-House Plot.  The conspirators 
had planned  to make "a  suddeu push"  on the bankers and  then  "to borrow"  the 
funds remaining in the possession  of the goldsmiths  on  the security of the public 
faith-A  True Declaration of the Horrid  Conspiracy against the late liing, 1685, p. 44; 
Copies of  the Informations ..  relating to the Horrid  Conspiracy, 1685, p.  58. 
Collection of  Letters for  the  Improvement  of  Husbandry  and  Trcrd~,  by John 
Houghton,  1681-3,  I. p.  148. 
At  this period  the Dutch company was  also  ahle  to borrow  at  3 per  cent.- 
De Lannoy et H. V.  Linderi, Histoire de l'Expansion coloniale des Peuples Europeens- 
X6erlande et Danemark, pp. 345, 346. 
Houghton,  C'oll. for  Improoement  of  Husbandry and  Trade, I. p.  149 ;  A  Briqf 
Histo?.ical Relation  of  State  Afiirs, by Narcissus  Luttrell, Oxford, 1857, I. pp. 210, 
223,  244. 
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The crisis of  1682 was  not a serious one, except for bankers and the 
foreign trading companies.  The latter for some years had been  subject 
to a series of  organized attacks, which externally appear to resolve them- 
selves, on the one side, into a dispute between the regulated and joint- 
stock  companies and, on  the other, into a  controversy  concerning  the 
merits  and  demerits  of  the  woollen  and oriental  trades  respectively. 
In reality,  the  roots  of  the  whole  discussion  strike  deeply  into  the 
basis  of  English  commerce,  as  it  had  developed  almost  since  the 
Restoration, and the statement of  the ultimate  point at issue requires a 
brief  mention  of  several  tendencies  both in  international trade and in 
domestic politics, as well as certain elements in the existing condition of 
the companies of  both types. 
When England made a separate peace with Holland in 1674, leaving 
that country still at war with  France, it was  only to be  expected  that 
British  industry  should  benefit  at the  expense  of  that of  the  two 
contending powers.  The cloth  trade,  especially, experienced  a  great 
stimulus, and, in  all  the woollen-producing districts, there was  marked 
activity, which lasted  until after the peace  made  between  France and 
Holland in  1678.  The beginning of  the slackening of  trade resulted, 
somewhat paradoxically, from this very activity.  Much of  the carrying 
trade of  Holland had fallen to English ships-thus  partially balancing 
the converse  tendency  during the Civil War-and  many  French com- 
modities were re-exported from England.  A number of  different interests 
united  in disapproving of  the growth  of  imports  from  France.  The 
extreme mercantilists were alarmed at the unfavourable  balance  shown 
in this branch  of  commerce.  Those  who  supported the ideal of  plain 
living,  condemned  a  group  of  imports  which  consisted  mainly  of 
luxuries1.  Politicians  of  "  the  Country  Party"  hoped  to  off-set  the 
dependence of  Charles 11.  on Louis XIV. by an attack on French trade, 
while cloth manufacturers believed  that the limitation of  the imports of 
French  linens would  increase the demand  for their product.  In April 
1675 the weavers of  Essex, Gloucester, Devon, Somerset, Suffolk, Hamp- 
shire and Coventry joined in petitioning the House of  Commons2  against 
the excessive imports from France, and treatises were produced  support- 
ing their contentions3.  The effect of  this agitation was the act of  1678, 
l  Reasons  to prove  that  the  True  and  only  cause  of  want  of  Money  is the  pre- 
ponderance  of  Imports,  by  J.  H. (1673)  (State  Papers,  Domestic,  cccxxxv. 
264);  An  Account  of  the  French  Usurpation  upon  the  Trade  of  England,  1679 
;  Enghnd.6  Wants: Or  Several Proposals  probably DeneJiciaI 
to  England,  1685,  in Somers'  Tracts (1751), XIV.  p.  63. 
2  Journals of  the House of  Commons, IX.  p. 327. 
3  The Ancient  Trades Decayed  Repaired  Again, by R. L'Estrange,  1678, p. 1. 
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prohibiting  trade  with  France1,  which  resulted  in  a  considerable 
dislocation  in  the  foreign  trade  of  England.  At  this  date  also, 
the  peace  on  the  Continent  resulted  in  strenuous  effbrts  on  the 
part  of  the  Dutch,  more  especially, to regain  part of  the trade, lost 
during  the war.  By  1680 there  were  isolated  complaints of  distress 
amongst  the  clothiers.  It was  stated  that formerly  160 persons  had 
maintained  themselves at this trade in  Reading, and that the number 
had fallen to only 12, while ~auperism  had increased to such an extent 
that the relief  of  the poor  cost  the town  &1,000  a  year.  The total 
export of  broad cloths by the Eastland company had been 20,000 pieces, 
now it was  only 4,0002.  The citation of  the case  of  this company was 
an  unfortunate  one,  since  its circumstances  were  wholly  exceptional. 
It was  universally admitted that this trade had suffered from the Navi- 
gation  Act; and,  since  1672, it  appears  that the  company  had  not 
adjusted  itself  to the change,  which  had  made admission  open  to all 
on  the payment  of  a  moderate  fee3.  The other  regulated  companies 
(amongst  which  that trading to Russia  is  to be  included  since  about 
16694) were in far from  a,  satisfactory position.  The Levant company 
was  distracted by  the dissensions  of  its  members5, and the Merchant 
Adventurers were involved in financial difficulties.  The creditors of  the 
latter appealed to the House of  Lords in 1674 ;  and it shows how much 
way  had been made by the joint-stock principle, that a "leviation"  was 
ordered, as  if  there had  been  a  capital  on which  it could be  assessed. 
When  the mistake  was  pointed  out, the  levy  was  fixed  on  the cloth 
exported6.  Owing to its indebtedness, the company was  unable to afford 
financial  assistance  to  Charles  II., and,  for this  or  other  reasons,  it 
received  scant courtesy from  the Crown.  Sir William Temple, writing 
to the company on  March  26th,  1675, says  that "being  a  very plain 
man, I will  deal so with  you  in  this matter, and tell you that I believe 
the discouragements, given to your company in England by the liberties  , 
allowed  to  the  interloping  trade,"  accounted  for  certain  difficulties 
experienced at Dort.  He  adds significantly-"  but I hare not told you 
what I suspect, which is that, in  the present  state of  your  company in 
England, it will be very difficult to restore it to its former state here7." 
It was  the Levant  company which  suffered  most, or which  made at 
Cunningham, Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times, 1903, 
p.  463. 
Britannia Languens, London, 1680, in McCullough, Tracts on Commerce (1856), 
pp.  400-3. 
A~lderson,  Annd8 of Commerce, nr. p. 35. 
4  Vide infra, 11.  p. 67.  Vide supra, p. 269. 
6 report8 Hist. MSS.  Com. IX.,  Part II.,  p. 47. 
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least the greatest outcry, when it began to experience the renewed com- 
petition of the French and the Dutch, within the area assigned it.  No 
doubt,  the volume  of  its  trade  was  considerably  reduced,  but  such 
reduction was  not from  the normal  average, but from an exceptionally 
high  level,  dependent  on  a  concatenation  of  causes  unlikely  to  be 
repeated.  Just as the import of  cattle from Ireland1 and that of  com- 
modities  in general  from  France  had  been  prohibited,  the one  in  the 
interests of  English stock-raising and the other on  behalf  of  the cloth 
trade,  so  now  the foreign  trade  to tropical countries  was  attacked  in 
order to keep the woollen industry at  high water mark.  The East India 
trade, particularly, prejudiced the Levant company, by importing Eastern 
commodities at a relatively cheap rate, and for this reason it was chosen 
for special attack.  The main points in the controversy are recapitulated 
elsewhere2,  but what is of  interest is the comparison of  the regulated and 
joint-stock  types of  organization.  It was  admitted  by both sides that 
some kind of  monopoly was required, and the chief point in dispute was 
whether such a privilege  should  be granted to a regulated or to a joint- 
stock  body.  The Levant  company had undoubtedly  the  best  of  the 
argument, when  it charged the other  with  reckless  finance, though  its 
own  operations  of  this kind  were  not above  reproach.  011  the other 
hand, the East India company was able to show that the exaction of  the 
test  of  being  "a  legitimate  merchant"  from  intending members  was 
illiberal.  Though many  of  the statements,  circulated  by  the Levant 
company,  to the discredit  of  the joint-stock  orgallization  were  repro- 
duced vwbatim, during a debate in the House of  Commons (1680), some 
were  inexact  and  misleadingY.  It  was  asserted  that  the  stock  had 
become "  engrossed " by a few members ;  whereas, according to a return 
made in  1682, about one-third  of  the 500 proprietors  owned  &1,000 
stockd.  The East India company, like  the Royal African  undertaking, 
was able to make a strong case for the sinking of  a large capital in con- 
cessions, forts and factories ; and, it was  shown that where such "  dead 
stock " became  considerable, the joint-stock  type of  organization  was 
preferable  to the regulated.  It is surprising that the Levant company 
did  not lay  more  stress on  the arbitrary acts of  its rival  in the sup- 
pression  of  interlopers,  since  the  practice  of  the  seizure of  ships and 
1  A  Treatise of  Wool and  Cattel, London 1677 
'lo2 
h .  l)  ; Co~ye- 
9 
spondence  between Sir  Henry Bennet  und  the  Lkke  of  Ormonde  in MiscelZanea Aulica 
(1702),  pp.  413-26. 
4  Vide infra, 11.  pp.  135-43. 
3  Uist. and Proceedings of the House of Commons, I. pp. 410, 411. 
4  State  Papers, Domestic,  Charles II.,  ccccxxxv~r~.  104.  In  the previous  year 
there had  been 133  court  meetings  of which Sir  Josia  Child, the governor,  had 
attended 122 and Thornas Papillon, the deputy-governor,  123. 
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cargoes in the East made the company in effect both plaintiff and judge 
in the same cause.  On the whole, while the controversy had brought to 
light some  abuses and imperfections  of  the East India company,  the 
attack succeeded only in the detection of these, and the whole discussioll 
tended to show that the joint-stock  form of  organization was  possessed 
of several advantages for the prosecution of  a trade to distant countries. 
The failure of  the Levant company to reduce the operations of  the 
East India adventurers left the former face to face with a marked reduc- 
tion in the volume  of  the trade of  its members, as compared with the 
prosperous times  before  1678.  By  1686 the woollen  industry  was  in 
the throes of  a  crisis which was produced partly by the falling off in the 
purchases  of  the Levant  company.  This  depression  was  experienced 
most  in  the  districts  which  ~roduced  for  export.  Sales,  made  in 
Gloucester  to this  company,  had  declined  by  75 per  cent.,  those  of 
Coventry by 33 per cent.  The clothiers of  Suffolk and Essex complained 
that their  trade was  "almost  undone,"  and that they  were  unable  to 
employ numbers of  poor families, which had recently come to depend on 
this industry for support.  At Coventry some hundreds of  workers were 
ruined, and the city was described as being reduced to a deplorable con- 
dition, through the decline in the production of  cloth1.  In some of  the 
parishes in Gloucester one-fifth of  the whole annual value was distributed 
in  poor-relief, owing to multitudes  of  workers being unable to subsist2. 
The effect  of  the depression in the woollen  trade would  have  been  of 
comparatively little consequence, since it  was  confined to certain districts, 
had  it not  been  co-existent  with  a  credit-crisis  in  London.  The 
corpol*ation there  had  founded  a  bank  in  1683,  which  was  intended 
to make  advances  on  approved  mercantile  bills.  When  the news  of 
Monmouth's  rebellion reached the City in the summer  of  1685, there 
was  a  run  on  the banks,  and  this  one  failed.  Many  traders,  whose 
credit was  involved in the crash,  were  imprisoned  for  debt3; and such 
failures  involved  the  suspension  of  merchants  and  others  who  were 
sureties  for  those  who  had  fallen  into difficulties.  It was  calculated 
that the losses from the latter cause exceeded those from  theft, robbery 
and  fraud4.  From  the City  the great  bankruptcy  extended,  in  the 
words of  a contemporary writer,  "like a plague,"  to the country, where, 
for  some  time,  the  land  lay  desolate  and  untilled5.  A  distressing 
characteristic  of  the  crisis  was  the  locking  up  of  funds,  held  by  the 
Corporation in trust for widows and orphans, in the general suspension. 
l  State Papers, Domestic,  James II., v. 120, 121, 124-128,  166. 
Ibid., v. 117. 
Ibid.,  111. 134. 
A  Caution against Suretiship, by R. A., 1688, p.  11. 
"he  Happy Future State of England,  by P.  P., London, 1688, p.  257. Distress  after  the  Crisis 1686  [CHAP.  XV. 
According to the  case,"  drawn up by those who had suffered most, the 
Rebellion, though it <'failed to subvert the government of the nation, did 
strangely shake that of  this City and blasted the credit of  our bank and 
so overthrew in a moment the fortune and the hopes of  the poor widows 
and orphans."  The calamity was  too  great to be  relieved by  private 
charity, since  <'a vast number"  of  those dependent on  the fund  "had 
been reduced to the utmost necessitks of  poverty1." 
l State  Papers, Domestic, James II.,  111.  13%  A Dialogue  between Francisco and 
Aurelia. two unfbrtunate Oypham of  the  City of  London, 1690, in Harleian Miscellany  -..  . 
(1746), IV.  p. 556 ;  vide infra, 111.  pp.  64, 55. 
CHAPTER  XVI. 
AFTER  the  crisis  of  1682  the  course  of  English  commerce  was 
subjected to the play of  opposing forces, some of  which tended towards 
the  maintenance  and  even  to an increase  of  the previous  prosperity, 
while  others  pointed  towards  a  contraction  of  trade.  Amongst  the 
latter allusion has already  been  made  to local crises in the cloth trade 
of  certain  districts  in  1686l; and,  in  addition  to this,  there  was  a 
prevalent  political unrest,  which  had been  a contributory cause of  the 
crisis of  1682 and which  produced  the disturbance of  credit in London 
in  1685 arid  the more  serious panic  of  December 1688.  An eddy of 
the general  political  agitation led to the dissolution  of  one of  the old 
established companies, namely that for planting the Bermudas.  Unlike 
most of  the other colonizing bodies, this organization had continued to 
exist  after the land had  been  divided.  It followed  almost  inevitably 
that, after the lapse  of  nearly  three-quarters of  a century,  the share- 
holders  in the company  had  ceased to own  land in the islands;  and, 
not only so, but as time went on much  of  the property, which had been 
set  apart  at the  beginning  of  the  enterprize  for  the support  of  the 
government,  had  been  alienated.  It is  obvious that,  when  this  stage 
was  reached, the company had survived the age of  usefulness and that 
its interests  and  those  of  the planters  would  tend  to be  divergent. 
By  1680 the shareholders in the company were a small group of  traders 
in  London,  who  had  entered  the undertaking simply  as a  promising 
speculation.  The company, as then constituted,  imposed levies on the 
goods produced in the islands, and this occasioned much dissatisfaction 
amongst  the  inhabitants  there.  Still  the  company  remained  in  a 
comparatively secure legal  position,  being established  by charter.  But 
in  the years  1683 and 1684, through  political reasons, the Crown was 
attacking its own  charters and it was  decided to take advantage of  this 
movement by the institution of  gm  warranto proceedings.  Eventually 
these succeeded, and the company came to an end in 16842. 
1  Vide supra, p. 309.  2  Vide infra, 11.  pp. 295-7. The  Crown Finances  1682-9  [CHAP. XVI 
While the trend of  acute political disputes was an adverse factor in 
diminishing confidence, in another respect the tendon between King and 
Parliament was  not altogether unfavourable, in so far as it kept taxation 
low arid  caused  the revenue to be administered with  economy.  Up to 
1682 the debt had been very greatly reduced, and in the six years from 
1682 to 1688 the same process was continued.  The principal and interest, 
repaid  during  this  period,  was  in  excess  of  the borrowings  by  close 
on  2325,0001.  The  interest  paid  from  November  5th,  1688,  to 
September 29th, 1689, was  220,1072;  so that,  if  the average  annual 
payment  be  estimated  roughly  at 230,000  for each  of  the six years, 
there would be a nett reduction of debt of about 2150,0003. 
The rehabilitation  of  the finances was  aided  by  the improvement 
of  trade and a  more careful  supervision  of  the Treasury,  so that the 
settled revenue (including Hearth-money) for the three years  1682 to 
1685 was  almost  exactly equal to the sum  originally estimated4.  This 
was a fortunate circumstance since the special Parliamentary grants were 
inconsiderable,  and the average  total revenue (exclusive  of  loans)  was 
only 21,866,000,  while the annual expenditure (exclusive of  repayments 
of  principal  and interest) was  on an average £93,000  a year less ;  or in - 
other words the cost of  the services, the government and the Court was 
defrayed from the settled revenue. 
James 11.  started his reign by an endeavour  to reduce the allocation 
for pensions, and he received  a  grant from Parliament for discharging 
those  that remained  outstanding  at the death  of  Charles II., some of 
which had been in arrear since  16845.  However in  1687-8  this item 
was  again  as large  as  it had been  at the end  of  the previous  reign. 
The payments for  secret service were  also great.  Moreover, there can 
be little doubt that the services had been neglected, and it was believed 
that .a larger outlay  was  necessary.  To meet  this  increased  charge, 
additions were made to the existing indirect taxes and new duties were 
imposed on French goods (in  lieu of  the prohibition  of  1678) and on 
Vide infra,  111. pp. 534-41.  The loans and interest paid in 1686-7 and 1687-8 
were respectively $270,105.  OS.  2d. and $126,234.  8s. 4id. 
Lansd. MS. (Brit. Mus.) 1,216, f. 62. 
Principal  and  Interest,  repaid  Lady-day  1682  to  ...............  Lady-day  1688  ;E1,609,772  16  1 
..........  Sums borrowed during same ~eriod  1,185,811  15 11 
Difference  ..................  323,961  0  2 
Of which it is estimated there was paid for interest  180,000  0  0 
............  Principal repaid on balance  S143,961  0  2 
Vide infra,  111. pp. 632, 633. 
Pensions  due to Christmas  1684  2?,340,314.  17s.  82d.  Pensions  per  annum 
S184,608.  OS.  1ld.-State  Papers,  Domestic,  James  II.,  IV.  160. 
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sugar and tobacco.  The effect of  these changes was  to raise the total 
revenue (exclusive of  loans) to an average  of  over 22,040,000,  for the 
three years  1685-8,  or an increase of  about 60 per cent., of  which one 
half is to be  attributed to the new duties.  After making allowance for 
the fact that the receipts  of  the Post Office (which had been settled on 
James 11.  when  he  was Duke of  York) are now  included, this leaves a 
substantial gain in the income of  the branches  of  the settled revenue, 
which averaged close on 21,475,000 a year1. 
Another  cause  tending  towards an increase of  prosperity  was  the 
influx  of  Protestant refugees,  which had begun  before the Revocation 
of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, but which was more marked during and 
after that year.  It was  estimated  that these immigrants had brought 
with them valuables, tools and implements valued at three millions, but 
the addition they made to the immaterial wealth of  England, Scotland 
and Ireland was of  very much greater importance2.  Prior to this period 
England  had  made  relatively  slow  progress, as  compared  with  France 
and Holland, in the development  of  those manufactures and industries, 
requiring  a  high  degree  of  technical  skill.  Therefore,  apart  from 
shipping and the cloth trade, there seemed to be a want of inventiveness 
and adaptability to changing conditions, and it is not improbable that 
it was a consciousiiess of this fact which produced much of the restrictive 
legislation of the period.  Measures of this type were based on the ideal 
of  encouraging the old-established  trades at the expense of  others  of 
more  recent  date,  which,  from  past  experience,  it may  have  been 
feared would result in failure.  Remarkable evidence of the comparative 
backwardness of  Englishmen  in  mechanical  inventiveness  during  the 
first  three-quarters of  the seventeenth century  is  to be  gleaned  from 
a  study of  the  petitions  for  patents,  many  of  the  applicants  being 
foreigners;  and,  in  other  cases  where  a  native-born  subject  proposes 
to found  an industry  new  to England,  he  states  either  that  he  had 
discovered  the secret  of  the process  by  his  observations  abroad or  he 
was  prepared  to import foreign  artizans.  So great was the superiority 
of  method amongst  the most  advanced  nations  of  the Continent  that 
the Navigation  Act  was  relaxed  in  favour  of  adventurers  for whale- 
fishing,  and  a  similar  relief  was  sought  for  the  salting of  herring3. 
In Scotland, as  shown  elsewhere4, the immigration  of  skilled  workers 
was  encouraged  by  substantial  privileges,  promised  by  repeated  acts 
of  Parliament and of  the Privy  Council. 
In view  of  these  circumstances  the  ultimate  importance  of  the 
coming of  the Huguenots can scarcely be over-rated5.  What had been 
l  Vide infra,  111.  pp. 632-39.  Anderson, Annuls of  C'ommerce,  III.  p. 96. 
Vide infra,  11.  pp. 75,  374,  376, 377.  Ibid., 111. p. 128. 
6 Francis  Hutcheson speaks  of  "the  ingenious  artisans,  who,  persecuted  in 314  New  Indystries  started  1682-8  [CHAP.  XVI. 
formerly learned at second, or at third hand was  now  taught by experts 
in  the different  trades, and in many cases it was  not  necessary to re- 
create the more delicate machines since these were brought from France 
by  the  refugees.  Moreover,  following  close  on  the Huguenot  immi- 
gration, there  was  an influx  of  Dutchmen,  who  came  in the train  of 
William 111. in the first couple of  years  after the Revolution and who 
shared with the French the honour of  introducing a remarkable variety 
of  trades, new to England, during the epoch of  immense activity which 
will be described to some extent in the ensuing chapter. 
The activity in extending the home-trade between  1682 and 1688 
followed several well-defined lines.  Through the aid of French workers1 
and under the high duties levied on French imports, efforts were  made 
to start the manufacture of  white paper, linen  (which as yet had been 
a  failure2) and the fashionable  material  known  as  "a la  modes"  or 
lustrings  in  1685-Y3.  These  undertakings  were  all  developed by  im- 
portant joint-stock  conipanies.  Then there were  a number of  patents 
for minor industries such as the sawing of  wood, the tanning of  leather, 
for  pumping  engines  and  for  producing  a  compositioll  resembling 
marble4.  Details  are  too  scanty  to determine  the  character  of  the 
invention  of  Thomas Smith, a cabinet-maker, who  applied for a patent 
for "  a gilded speaking head or the improved echo5." 
Mention has already  been  made of  the attempt to establish a bank 
under  the auspices of  the corporation of  London, and about the same 
time there emanated from the Council a scheme for insurances on lives, 
based  on  the tontine  principle,  which  Houghton  condemned  as  not 
giving  "a penniworth  for  a  penny,"  since  the  majority  of  the sub- 
scribers were  certain to lose their principal6.  The success of  Barbon's 
Fire  insurance  office,  which  had  been  carried  on  by  a  company  since 
16807,  had  tempted the City  to promote  a  municipal  department for 
the same class of  business about 1682 which was closed soon afterwards, 
their own country,  flee  to ours  for  protection; they instruct us in manufactures 
which support millions of  poor,  increase the wealth of  every person in the State and 
make us formidable to our  neighbours "-An  Inquiry into the O~iginal  of  Our  Ideas 
of  Beauty  and  Virtue, p.  117; Lex  Talionis in A  Collection oJ' the  Writings of  the 
Author of the True-born Englishman, London  1703 [the unauthorized  ed. of Defoe's 
Tracts], p.  262. 
l  In  at least one case these industries, new to England, were started  by French 
Roman Catholics-vide  infra, III. pp.  73, 75. 
Houghton, Coll. for  Inzprovemevzt of Husbandry and Trade, ut suya, I. p.  111. 
3  Vide infra, 111.  pp.  64, 74, 90. 
State Papers, Domestic, I'etitioll  Entry Book, LXXI.  pp.  10, 275, 299, 302. 
6  Ibid.,  Petition Entry Book, LXXI.  p. 319. 
6  Houghton, Coll. for  Improvement of Husbandry and  Trade, ut supra, I.  p. 147. 
7  Vide infra, 111.  p. 375. 
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and  in  1683 the  Friendly  Society  was  established  on  the  mutual 
principle.  There  was  keen  competition  between  the  two  remaining 
undertakings,  and  in  1688 a  modus  vivendi  was  arrived  at, by  order 
of  the Privy  Council, under  which  one  office  might  issue  policies  for 
three months, while the other might not; in the next quarter the latter 
had the monopoly of  business and so on1.  During the same period the 
benefits of  marine  insurance were  greatly extended,  and in  1686 there 
were many underwriters of  this class of risk2.  Following on the previous 
inventions for the preservation of  the hulls of  ships was  another, relating 
to marine transportation, which  aimed  at providing drinking water  for 
the  crews  by  a  process  of  extracting  the salt from  sea-water.  This 
inventian, which  was  protected  by a patent, was worked  by a company 
described  as  the  Pa,tentees  for  making salt  water fresh  and  wholesome. 
The revenue  of  the partners was  calculated  on  the basis  of  any  ship, 
which  used  the apparatus, paying  a  royalty  of  6d. per  ton3.  Finally, 
as showing the progress made in adding to the conveniencies of  life, the 
formation of  another company may be  noticed, which  aimed at street- 
lighting by means of  oil lamps.  This venture, like that last mentioned, 
was  formed  on  the basis  of  a  patent,  granted  to an  individual  for 
reflectors ("convex  lights "),  and was  carried on by an unincorporated 
company (1684), which was  sometimes described  as  the  Convex Lights 
Company or as the Proprietors ofthe Convex Lights4. 
These  various  developments  are  typical  of  the activity  of  trade 
during  the years  immediately  prior  to the  Revolution;  and,  when 
conjoined  with  great  gains  in  foreign  commerce,  this  period  on  the 
whole was  one of  prosperity.  For this reason the authors of  works on 
political arithmetic speak  of  the year  1688 as the culmination  of  the  - 
good times and as representing the maximum of  national wealth during 
the seventeenth century.  Comparing the estimates of  Petty (1664-5) 
with  those  of  Gregory  King  and  Davenant  for  1688, the  national 
dividend  of  England  and Wales  had increased by  between  2  millions 
and  4  millions, an advance  of  from  5 per cent.  to 10 per cent.,  while 
the total capital had risen  by  70 millions, an improvement  of  no less 
l  Vide infra, 111.  p.  376. 
State Papers,  Domestic, Entry Book, LXXI.  p. 231. 
The Conditions upon which the Patentees for  making  salt water fresh  and  whole- 
some intend to conclude with such persons  that please  to agree with them for  the use of 
this Invention; Salt- Water Sweetned  or a true Account  of the Great Advantages of this 
New  Invention  both  by  Sea  and  by  Land  [by R.  Fitzgerald],  London,  1683; Fons 
Perennis,  a  Poem  on  the  Invention  of  making  Sea  Water fresh,  by  E.  Arwaker, 
London, 1686; Answer to Mr Fitzgerald's  State  of  the case  concerning the Patent for 
Making salt  water fresh,  by William Walcott, Lond.  1693  712 
l) 
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than 28 per cent.  The difference between the ratios of  increase in the 
income and the capital is accounted for by the fact that Petty's estimate 
of  the latter is six times the income, while King's  calculation works out 
at seven and one third years' purchase.  This difference is roughly pro- 
portionate to the decline in the rate of interest which was comparatively 
high from 1660 to 1667, very low in 1681 and moderate  from  1683 to 
the summer of  1688.  The following statement gives a comparison of 
the different estimates : 
Estimates  of  the  National  Income  and  Wealth of  England 
and  Wales'. 
Income  Wealth 
-A 
Petty  King  Petty  King 
1664-5  1688  1664-5  1688 
Ss millions  Ss millions 
Real  Property ...............  8  13  210  234 
..................  Labour  32  30.5 
............  Personal  Property  40  86 
40  43.5  250  320 
Probably  these  estimates  would  require  considerable  criticism,  if 
they  were  to be  used  as adequate statements of  the total wealth  or 
the total income, but they will serve the pdrpose of  the present enquiry 
as  a  rough  expression  of  the  progress  of  the  nation  between  the 
Restoration and the Revolution.  Moreover the same tale of  expanding 
resources  is  confirmed  by  other  considerations.  Though  there  were 
many  complaints  of  the growth  of  luxury,  there  is  every  reason  to 
believe  that  in  England  and  Wales  the  community  was  not  only 
spending  less  than  its income but that an increasing  sum  was  saved 
for new  production.  In 1688 this surplus was  calculated  to have been 
about &2,400,0002.  Then  there had been  a  remarkable  expansion  in 
foreign  trade.  The  total  imports  and  exports  in  1662-3  may  be 
estimated  at about  7$  millions,  or &l. 5s.  per  heads.  In  1688 the 
figures (also for England and Wales) had risen  to close on 114 millions 
for the whole recorded  external trade, or &R  per head4.  The progress 
made may be summed up in the following table of  percentages : 
l hhtural and  Political  Observations on  the  State  of  Great  Britain,  by G. King, 
Edin. 1810, pp.  47-9; Davenant  estimates the income in 1688  at 44 millions, and 
the  total  wealth  at  322  millions-Essay  upon  the  Probable  Methods  of  Making  a 
people  Gainers in tk balance of  Trade, London 1700, p. 95 ( Works, 11.  p.  266) ;  also 
Works, I. p.  375. 
Davenaiit,  Works, 11.  p.  276.  Vide supra, p. 266. 
4  Exports England  and  Wales in 1688  .........  34,310,000 
Imports ........................  7,120,000 
£11,430,000 
-Davenant,  Work8,  11.  p.  270;  King,  Aratural  and  Polilical  Observations  (1810), 
pp.  1-42. 
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Comparison of  varwt~  statistics  1662-5  and  1688 showing  the  inmease 
per  cent.  (England and  Wales). 
The national income  1664-5  and  1688 +  5 "1,  to 10 "lo 
9,  ,,  savings  1664  ,,  l688+  l00  O/, 
JJ  ,,  wealth  16665 ,,  1688+  28 "l, 
Total foreign trade  1662-3  ,,  1688 +  50 "1, 
Foreign trade per  head  ,,  ,,  ,,  +  60  O/, 
These results tend to confirm the conclusion, already arrived at on 
other  grounds,  namely  that  in  this  period  the main  source  of  the 
admitted  prosperity  was  the growth  of  foreign  trade and that  there 
may  have  been  stagnation,  or  even  a  slight  decline  in  the woollen 
industry;  while,  at the same time, new  industries were  being founded, 
but as yet these were in a rudimentary stage of development. . 
Further  light may  be  obtained as  to the success  of  foreign  trade 
from  the history.of  the companies engaged in it; and, for the purpose 
of  the present enquiry, it  will be advisable to isolate the results achieved 
by  these  undertakings  from  other  contemporary  industries.  Such 
separation is the more necessary, since, between the crises of  1682 and 
of  1696-7,  there is an interesting phenomenon which affects the position 
of  the two groups-those  engaged  in the foreign  and the home trades 
respectively-in  a  different  manner  in  each  case.  Until  the  crisis  of 
1682 each  previous  disturbance of  this kind  produced  an  appreciable 
effect on  practically  every company  in  existence  at the time.  In the 
same  way  the effects of  the crises  from  1685 to 1688 may be  traced 
on  companies concerned chiefly in the home  trade,  while  those  whose 
business  lay abroad were  unaffected  (except  in the case  of  the Levant 
company which may have suffered during the crisis of  1686).  Therefore 
the three joint-stock  bodies formed for  foreign  trade-the  East India, 
the Royal African and the Hudson's Bay companies-were  not materially 
influenced by  the domestic crises, and all of  them experienced a  large 
degree of  prosperity, until  the pressure of  the war  with  France began 
to be felt about the end of  1691.  This progress was not uninterrupted, 
but the checks  came from events  in the foreign  countries with  which 
each of  them  was  connected, as for  instance  the disputes between the 
Hudson's  Bay company  and the French in 1682 and 1686 and that of 
the East India company with Aurangzeb in 1688 and 168g1. 
On  the whole  the  ten  years  from  1682 to  1691  were  the  most 
successful in the history  of  English  foreign  trading bodies.  The East 
India company was  able to  justify the distribution of  a stock-bonus  by 
maintaining  its dividends  on  the increased  capital; and,  in  1690 and 
1691, the Hudson  Bay  and African  undertakings  followed its example 
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by  issuing  scrip dividends,  the  former  giving  its shareholders  one  of 
200  per  cent.  and the latter one of  300 per  cent.' 
The dividends  paid  in  cash  were  large,  in  the  case  of  the East 
India  company  very  large.  From  1683 to 1692 inclusive  the latter 
organization paid  200  per  cent.  on the doubled  stock or 400 per cent. 
to  an  original  adventurer2.  Apart  from  the  bonuses  in  stock,  the 
African  company divided  at least 494 per cent.3 and the Hudson's Bay 
company 275 per cent.4  Thus the East Indian undertaking distributed 
an average annual dividend  of  40 per  cent. on  its original capital, the 
Hudson's Bay company one of  274 per  cent. also on its original capital 
and the African paid at least an average of 5 per cent. 
While such a statement represents a convenient summary of  results, 
it is likely to be inisleading in several respects.  Once any business has 
been  established  for  a  considerable  period,  the nominal  capital is  of 
theoretical,  rather than practical  interest.  What is important is  the 
relation of the earnings to the price at which a share in the undertaking 
can  be  purchased.  Fortunately  quotatioas  of  East  India  stock  are 
sufficiently  numerous  between  1682 and  1690 for  an estimate  to be 
formed of  the course of  prices.  The lowest recorded  is l224 and the 
highest 500, both being for the stock  in its new form.  Further, there 
are many references  to transactions  in  the stock  which  are not dated 
and so could not be included in the table printed elsewhere5.  Curiously 
enough most of  these  quotations are 300 exactly ;  and, since 300 occurs 
several  times  in  those  returns  which  are  dated  and  at considerable 
intervals  of  time, this quotation  may  be  taken  as a  kind  of  index of 
the price  from  1682 (after the doubling) to 1690 (just before the last 
dividend  of  this  series  was  paid).  On  this  basis,  the  payment  of 
200 per cent. during eight years on 2100 nominal, costing 2300, would 
yield an average annual return of  about 89 per cent.  Deducting what 
may  be  considered  to have  been  the  usual  interest  on  a  first  class 
security in England at the time, there would remain between 2 per cent. 
and 3 per cent. as a provision for insurance against  depreciation of  the 
capital  invested-a  provision  which  later  events  showed  to be  sadly 
inadequate. 
A further insight into the position of  the company may be obtained 
by selecting for observation the outcome of  the investment in what may 
have been a few representative cases.  Suppose, for instance, an original 
adventurer  sold  his  stock  either  at 500 (the  highest  recorded  price) 
or at 300 (a frequent price  from  1683 to 1690), allowance would have 
1  Vide infra, 11.  pp. 21, 26, 232, 237.  Ibid., 11.  p. 178. 
3  Probably the dividends of the African company  were  more than the amount 
mentioned in the text-ibid.,  rr.  p.  34. 
4  Ibid., 11. pp.  231, 237.  Ibid., 11.  p.  178. 
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to be  made  for  the  stock-bonus  he  received  and  also  for  the other 
dividends.  If  the original  payment,  on  allotment, be  deducted  from 
the   rice realized plus the dividends, the balance cannot be fairly taken 
as ~rofit,  since ~rovision  must be made for the interest that would have 
accrued on the capital, if placed in a first class security.  For the whole 
period  from  1660 to 1688 such  interest  may  be  averaged  at about 
6 per  cent.,  and for the sake  of  simplicity colnpound  interest  may be 
neglected.  From these data the following result is reached : 
The ProJt  mode  6y  an original Aduentuzr in the  East  India Company 
who sold  in 1685 at 500. 
1658-1660 To 3200stock,  1685 By 3200 stock, fully 
23100  paid  ...  ...  S100  0  0 
1682 To S100 credited as 
paid (Bonus) ...  ...  ............... 
1685 To Profit  ...  ...  1,340  10  0 
paid, at 500  ...  ...  S1,000  o  0 
By Dividends (1662-82)  440  10  o 
1,440  10  0 
Allowance for interest on 
3100 for  25  years  at 
l0  O  1  By Gross Profit brought 
down  ...  ...  ...  1,310  10  o 
6 /  .  ...  ...  S150  0  0 
Balance, being nett profit  1,190  10  0 
Thus the fortunate adventurer, who  sold at 500, made a nett profit 
on his capital after allowance for interest of  1,1909 per cent.  Further, 
though this high  price  was  not maintained,  the fall  was  almost made 
good by the increase in the dividends, for by a similar calculation it will 
be  found that the original  adventurer, who  sold  in  1690, would  have 
made  a  profit  of  1,0604 per  cent.  Even  greater  gains were  made  by 
a few (of  whom  Sir Josia Child was said to be one) who ~urchased  stock 
at the reduced prices of  1665.  There may  be  added, in  special cases, 
certain contingent advantages which accrued from a large holding in the 
company, such as profit on India goods, or the opportunity of  obtaining 
lucrative  employments  for  the nominees of  an important  member,  or 
again a small additional income could be obtained from transactions in 
the company's  loans  on  bottomryl.  Since these  sources  of  additional 
gain were contingent, no exact valuation  of  them  can  be made, and the 
determinable  nett  profit  for  an  original  adventurer  (or  his  repre- 
sentatives)  up  to 1690 may  be  fixed at about  10 times  the original 
investment.  This was the maximum, since, after  1690 the price  of  the 
stock fell in a remarkable  manner, being  below par from 1694 to 1699 
inclusive.  The fall in the value  of  the stock  a change in the 
position  of  the investor, which  may  be  illustrated again by  a reference 
to the account of  an imaginary original adventurer and secondly to that 
of  a  purchaser  in 1690 at 300.  Even supposing that the former had 
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realized  at the  lowest recorded  price-332  in 1698-his  ~rofit  would 
over five and a half  times the original investment, after allowing 
interest  thereon  at 6  per  cent. to 1690 and thereafter at 8 per  cent. 
The case of  the investor  of  1690 was  very different.  If  he  sold at the 
lowest point, his loss, including interest, would  have been  no less than 
136 per  cent.,  while  in  the  more  normal  case  of  his  selling  at 50 
(which was a frequent price) say in 1696, it  would have been l14  per cent. 
Though  this  form  of  statement  is  in reality  the most  accurate, it is 
paradoxical in so far as it tends to suggest that a call was made, whereas 
this  was  not  so.  The difficulty  arises  from  taking  account  of  the 
rate  of  interest  on  the  capital  invested,  and  the  situation  may  be 
described in another form in the following terms.  Suppose that A. and 
B. have each of  them g300 seeking investment in 1690.  A. disposes of 
his capital in some form of  loan on the best available security.  In 1696 
his capital might be supposed to be intact, and he would have obtained 
an  aggregate  return  of  at least  2144, so  that  on  this  transaction, 
neglecting compound interest, he would  be worth 2444.  On the other 
hand, suppose B. invests his g300 in g100 East India stock, he would 
receive one dividend of  g50 (1691) and he would  have  obtained  only 
another 250 by  selling his  stock  or a total of  2100 in all, as against 
A.'s  2444, making the real loss of B.  114 per cent. 
The causes of  the decline of  the value of  East India stock are of very 
great  interest ; but,  before investigating these, it is  necessary  to deal 
with  the position  of  the investor  in  the  African  and  Hudson's  Bay 
companies, as far as the materials available will afford data.  In neither 
case  are there any fairly complete records of  prices before 1692, so that 
the enquiry is confined to the account of an original investor.  The prices 
of  Hudson's  Bay stock are incomplete.  Quotations exist  for the years 
1692  to 1700.  By means of a calculation similar to that made in respect 
of  the East India company,  an original  adventurer,  who  sold at the 
middle prices of  1692 and 1694, would have made a nett profit of  nearly 
seven  and three quarter times his capital in the former case and of five 
and a half times his original investment in the latter by 1694'.  Taking 
l1670  To Cost 100 Stock  £100  0 
1690  ,, Bonus 200 ,,  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
,, Gross Profit  .  ..  907 10 
.- 
%l  ,007 l0 
To  allowance  for  interest 
on£100  ...  ...  136  0 
,  ,  Balance (nett profit) .  .  .  771 10 
S907 l0 
1692  By sale £300 Stock 
at 2379  "1,  ...  23712  10 
,,  Dividends on 2100 
at 220  "1,  ...  220  0 
,, Dividends on 2300 
at25"/,  ...  75  0  -- 
£1,007  l0 
By  Gross Profit  ...  ...  907 10 
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the African  company  in  1692 (the  year  of  the  last  dividend  for  a 
considerable  time  and also  the year  after the crediting  of  the stock 
bonus of 300 per cent.) and again in  1696, at the middle prices in each 
case, the original adventurer would have made a  nett profit  of  at least 
79 per cent. in 1692 and he might have made a nett loss of  45 per cent. 
in 1696l. 
These results are useful  as showing the fate of  different  classes  of 
investors in  the important foreign  trading compailies towards  the end 
of the seventeenth  century, and they are of  the greatest importance in 
forming a judgn~ent  on  certain events during the great Parliamentary 
struggle  from  1689 to 1698.  It  may  be  premised that the Hudson's 
Bay company was  in a class by itself.  Circumstances had  forced it into 
being the pioneer of  the contest with France, and it had no difficulty in 
obtaining an act of Parliamenta, Therefore, having in addition a charter 
from  the Crown,  its legal  position  at this time  was  perfectly  secure. 
The East India and African  companies had  charters,  but not acts of 
Parliament,  though  curiously  enough  it was  the  Lords  aiid  not  the 
Commons  which  had  prevented  measures,  promoted  by  each,  from 
becoming law  3. 
Externally,  and  in  its final  results,  the action  of  the  House  of 
Commons at the beginning of  the reign  of  William  111.  was  directed 
towards  the control  by  Parliament  of  grants,  made  by  the sovereign 
relating to foreign trade.  In reality, the true inwardness of the situation 
depended on the relation  of  the companies to the party politics  of  the 
time.  The African company had  been the creation of James II., and it 
was natural that the Parliaments, held after the Revolution, should view 
it  with coldness.  The East Indian undertaking had also become involved 
in  the party-struggle  through  the action  of  Sir Josia  Child,  who,  as 
governor,  had  committed ,the company  to the  support  of  James  11. 
Hitherto the court had kept  out of  politics  as far as possible, and the 
change  of  policy  was  bitterly  opposed  by  a  minority  of  the  stock- 
holders, amongst whom  was Thomas Papillon.  Child was  able to carry 
the day,  and  the dissentient  members  were  forced  to sell  their  stock. 
After the Revolution  they had their revenge, since the party, to which 
they  belonged,  had  a  majority  in  the House  of  Commons.  The only 
difficulty was  the discovery  of  the means  by  which  they  could  make 
the best  use  of  their  victory.  The different moves  in the complicated 
financial duel are detailed elsewhere" and it only remains to sketch  the 
progress of the struggle in broad outlines.  Many of the ejected members 
'  A  further  calculation  in  which  no  allowarlce  is  made  for  interest  on  the 
original investment  will  be  found  infra,  11.  p.  28. 
Vide infru, 11. p. 231.  3 Ibid., 11. pp.  21, 119.  " Ibid., 11. pp.  14.5-65. 
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of the company had become interlopers, and they managed  to force the 
company to purchase  their  ships and goods at a bonus  of  25 per  cent. 
and to pay them half the profit  made1.  The object of  this manceuvre 
was  to exhaust the liquid resources of  the company, which  had already 
been  depleted  by  the payment  of  large  dividends.  It  is  usual  (and 
indeed  almost  inevitable  apart from  specific evidence to the contrary) 
to regard this contest as on;  between the rich corporation on the one side 
and a group of  independent merchants of  moderate means on the other. 
As  a  niatter  of  fact the contrary was  the truth of  the matter.  The 
minority, who  had  sold  their  stock, realized  at prices  not below  300; 
and it is probable that with reasonable prudence they would  have made 
as much or more by the use of  their capital as those, who  retained their 
shares, received in dividends.  By no stretch of  language can these people 
be described as "  poor interlopers,"  when they retired from the company 
having made the large nett profit  of  upwards of  1,000 per  cent., or  in 
some cases  of  even more.  Nor  were they conscientious advocates  of  a 
less restricted  foreign trade, since Papillon, their leader, had written in 
defence of the monopoly and advocated the formation of a new  company 
with equally extensive privileges.  The abrogation of  the monopoly was 
the ostensible end aimed at by  opponents of  the existing company, but 
it may well  be  doubted  whether  it was  their main  objective.  Traces 
are  discoverable  of  a  most  ingenious  secret  scheme,  which  had  two 
branches-the  one to force Child from his position  in the management 
of  the company by  limitation of  the votes that might be cast by any 
individual; and then, either by Parliamentary agitation or other means, 
to reduce the price of  the stock to a low level, or alternatively to compel 
the company to make a new issue of  stock  at par.  Obviously, it would 
be a dextrous manipulation of the situation if  men, who had sold out at 
300, could re-purchase at 100 or below it.  It should be carefully noted 
that  these  two  parts  of  the  scheme  were  mutually  interdependent. 
Forcing  the stock  to a  low  price  would  be  useless,  unless  the Whig 
faction could control the voting.  That nothing should be wanting in 
the organization of  the opponents of  the company, they formed them- 
selves into a  syndicate in  1692, and adequate funds were provided  for 
commencing their  campaign  2. 
The first  stage in  the battle  for  the  control  of  the East  India 
company  resulted  in  an  apparent  victory  for  the  opposition-faction. 
It had  almost  everything  in  its favour,  ample resources in hanci  and 
the support of  a large body of  capital behind it.  With feeling on the 
whole  on  its  side and  means  to purchase  votes  in  a  venal  House of 
1  A  Collection of the Debates and Proceeding8 in Pc6rIiument  in 1694 and 1695 upon 
the Enquiry into the late Briberies and Cormpt Practices, 1695, p. 11. 
1 Vide infka, 11.  p.  150. 
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Commons1, while many members of  the syndicate were also members of 
the Committee appointed  to enquire into the East India trade, it was 
easy to use the debates and resolutions in Parliament as a most effective 
device for "bearing" the stock of the conlpany.  The campaign succeeded 
in reducing  the price  and in  forcing  the committees  to receive  a  new 
subscription at  par in 1693 (which brought the total nomillal capital to 
very nearly one and a half  millions), although the average price  of  the 
stock  during  the previous  year  had  been  145.  While  the  apparent 
victory  remained  with  the syndicate,  its operatiolls  had failed  in  one 
important respect.  The allotment of  the new  stock,  created  in  1693, 
was to be made proportionately to the total applications ;  and, in spite 
of the complicated provisions regulating the holding of stock and voting 
rights2, it is clear that the control of  the undertaking would rest with 
the  old  members.  In  all  other  respects,  even  after  the  most  lavish 
bribery which probably exceeded that revealed at the enquiry of  1695, 
circumstances were  against  the  policy  advocated  by  the  party  which 
supported  Child.  It was  found  impossible to avoid  the regulation  of 
the company by  the State, and everything was  against  the supporting 
of  the market  in the company's  stock.  The declaration  of  dividends, 
that were  probably  not earned, and the interruption  of  trade through 
the war  tended  to depress the price,  while  the covering  of  bribes  by 
dealings  in  the stock  would  also have  tended  to reduce  quotations3. 
It is plain that the failure of  the opposition to the company in an 
esserltial element in its plan of  attack made it necessary to have recourse 
to the second and more doubtful scheme, and it was  resolved to secure 
the complete overthrow  of  the original  company  which  was  to be  re- 
placed by a new one.  This scheme was far from  tending towards a freer 
trade  with  India.  The idea  of  the syndicate  was  to form  another 
monopolistic  company, but to change  the membership.  The  illiberal 
spirit of  the House of  Commons is shown by its arbitrary treatment  of 
the Darien  undertaking,  which,  though it needed  modification for  the 
protection of  existing interests, scarcely merited the severity that would 
have been accorded to a treasonable plot4. 
The formation of the Scottish undertaking was a further blow to the 
company which  had barely survived the attack on it in  the Commons, 
While the bribery of the conlpany was exposed at the enquiry in 1695, that of 
its opponents was not made public but it is frequently alluded to by contemporary 
writers, e.g. The dnatonty of  Exchange Alley in Chronicles and Characters of  the Xtock 
Exchange, by John  Francis,  London,  1849, pp. 380,  381.  Even clearer  eviderice is 
afforded by the raising of  funds by the syndicate as early as 1692, which were not 
required for any legitimate purpose. 
Vide infra, 11.  p.  1.58.  Ibid., 11.  p.  158. 
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and its opponents succeeded in the same year  (1695) in  obtaining an 
enquiry  into  its corrupt  practices  in  1693.  As  the  result  of  these 
adverse factors, the stock had fallen as low as 50 at the end of  October 
1695, and  it was  clear  that the legal  and financial  position  was  pre- 
carious.  The second  stage of  the Parliamentary struggle  was  reached 
in  1698, when,  by  act of  Parliament, the monopoly of  the East India 
trade was conferred on  those who subscribed to a loan of  ~2,000,000  to 
the State and who  might  either trade independently (as in a  regulated 
company) or might form a joint-stock  and be  incorporated, or  finally 
some subscribers might  adopt the first  method  and others  the second. 
The original company, which was henceforth distinguished from the new 
organization  as "the  Old  Company"  or "the London  Company,"  had 
sufficient influence to obtain the insertion of  a clause in the act whereby 
corporations might subscribe to the two million loan ;  and, by availing 
itself  of  this provision, it remained  entitled to a certain proportion  of 
the  India  trade.  Thus,  in  the  short  space  of  ten  years,  the  Old 
Company had  experienced a  complete  change  in  its status.  In 1689, 
like  the African  company,  it had  been  in  the  habit of  licensing the 
ships  of  owners,  who  were  not  members,  to trade  within  the  limits 
assigned to it, subject  to certain conditions  and to the payment  of  a 
royalty.  Ten  years later  its vessels were  in  effect  "permission-ships," 
which  were  under the general  orders of  an outside body;  so that the 
company had fallen  from its former dominance to an inferior  position, 
entitled only to about one-sixth of  the trade, though still able to act as 
a corporation. 
Owing to the intricacy of  the capital accounts  of  the three foreign 
trading companies, something remains to be said, in  order to present a 
summary, showing how  they were  affected by the issues of  bonus  stock 
and by  the subscriptions made by  the East India and African  under- 
takings.  In  1689 the  total  amounts  paid  in  by  members  of  these 
ventures  was  under  half  a  million1.  Owing  to the doubling  of  the 
stock  of  the  East  India  company  in  1682,  the  aggregate  nominal 
capital (1689) was  over &850,000.  Then came the stock  dividends  of 
the  African  and  Hudson's  Bay  companies  (1690-1)  augmenting  the 
nominal  capital,  which  thus  became  upwards  of  12 millions2.  There- 
fore, at the end  of  1691, the capitalization  was  about two and a half 
times  the payments made by the members.  In 1692-the  first year  in 
which  there are  quotations for  the shares  of  all  three  companies, at 
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middle prices in each case-the  valuation on this basis is slightly more 
than an increase of 10  per cent. on the nominal capital : 
Particulars of  the  Capitalization  of  Foreign  trading companies, 
1689-92. 
Valuation at 
Paid in  Nominal  Nominal  middle-price 
cash  Capita1 1689  Capita1 1692  of  1692 
East India Company  369,891  739,782  739,782  1,068,985 
Royal African  ,,  111,100  111,100  444,400  213,312 
Hudson's Bay  ,,  10,500  10,500  31,500  74,812 
Totals  491,491  861,382  1,215,682  1,357,109 
In 1693 both the East India and African  companies made issues of 
stock which brought the whole nominal amount to close on .+!92,150,000, 
representing actual payments of  &1,300,000  and worth  at the middle 
market-prices  of  1694 less  than Y1,435,000  or a depreciation  of  one- 
third  of  the nominal  value: 
Particulars of  the  Capitulixatwn  of  Foreign  trading companies, 
1693-4. 
Valuation at 
Paid in  Nominal  middle-price 
cash  Capital 1694  of  1694 
East India Company 1  1,118,109  1,488,000  1,212,720 
Royal African  ,,  183,440  625,250  168,175 
Hudson's Bay  ,,  10,500  31,500  52,762 
-- 
1,312,049  2,144,750  1,433,657 
1 At the time of the subscription of the new  capital, that already in  existence 
was  2744,000,  which  was  doubled.  It appears  that  the  difference  between  the 
capital in  1689 and  that  immediately  before the new  issue  was  paid  for in cash. 
' Treating the  small  amount  of stock  issued  by  the African  company to the 
creditors  and  shareholders  in  the  previous  undertaking  as  cash-vide  infra,  XI. 
pp.  19,  32,  177,  237. 
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CHAPTER  XVII. 
ONE  of  the most striking differences between modern conditions and 
those  which  obtained  in  the  seventeenth  century  is  the  comparative 
absence of  interaction  between  direrent branches  of  commerce in  the 
earlier  period.  A remarkable  instance of  this tendency is to be  found 
in  the depression in the foreign trades from  1692 to 1695, while  there 
was  very  great  activity in  the formation  and  development  of  under- 
takings  for  home  and  colonial  industries.  This  activity  moreover  is 
of  special interest;  since, for  the first  time,  it might  be  described as 
Imperial rather than English-Scotland,  Ireland, Wales and the colonies 
falling  within  the scope  of  the  movement-while,  in  the  main,  the 
development took  place  through  the joint-stock  form  of  organization. 
Several causes contributed  towards  the boom  which  resulted.  The 
earliest  in  point of  time  was  one  which,  being  in  many  respects  acci- 
dental, stood outside the general historical evolution, though it produced 
an assignable portion of  the joint-effect.  This was  the salving in 1688 
by William  Phipps on  behalf  of  a  company formed in  London, of  the 
treasure from a  Sparlish plate  ship, which had been  lost in  1646 near 
Hispaniola.  The return  to the  adventurers  was  about  one  hundred 
times the respective sums they had subscribed1.  This was a wonderfully 
successful result;  and while the total bullion  recovered was  about equal 
to that divided to the shareholders in Drake's  voyage round  the world, 
the yield  per  cent.  was  twice as great in  the later  expedition2.  It is 
almost  unnecessary to add that many other treasure-seeking  companies 
were formed and that, as long as the news of  the success of  the original 
expedition  was  fresh,  the  shares  commanded  considerable  premiums. 
Particulars can be recovered of  ten of  these companies during the period 
before 1696, and more may be urged in their favour  than might at first 
sight be anticipated.  It  is true that as a general  rule two cases of  out- 
standing profits in the same kind of  venture rarely occur at  one period ; 
Pride  injra, 11.  pp. 48.5, 486. 
2  Divisions  to  shareholders-Drake's  expedition  1,700  per  cent.,  Expedition 
1687-8  10,000  per  cent. 
but,  in justification  of  the speculators  of  1690, the great advance of 
invention  must  be  remembered.  There were  several patents for  early 
types  of  the diving-bell  and  one  which  seems  an anticipation of  the 
outfit of  the modern  diver,  while  in  another case  it was  proposed  to 
raise  the  fragments  of  a  wreck  by  means  of  a  system  of  levers a~ld 
grappling irons, known  as "  the sea-crab."  Many of  these patents were 
developed by means of  companies, which  however were  dependent on a 
second group of  undertakings, which  received  a grant from  the Crown 
of  the wrecks  in  a  certain  area.  The latter class  of  company  either 
arranged  with  the syndicate owning a diving-engine  on the basis  of  a 
royalty, or ~roceeded  to effect salvage from any wrecks  they discovered 
by less scientific means.  In only one case was a charter of  incorporation 
obtained-that  of  the  Governor  and  Company for  raising  wrecks  in 
England-the  remaining  companies  were  founded  on  the  patent  or 
royal  grant to an individual, or to an individual and his partners, and 
wdre established by a deed of settlement1. 
Probably at any period  the success of  the Hispaniola  treasure-hunt 
would have occasioned the formation of  similar ventures, but since there 
was  no special reason for this discovery having happened  at the time 
that it did, the concurrence of  these schemes with a  number  of  others 
is  an  accidental,  rather  than  an  essential  element  in  the  movement. 
Including  wreck-recovery  and  foreign  trading  companies, at the  end 
of  1695 there  are known  to have  been  close  on  150 in existence, of 
which  two-thirds were English  and the remaining third Scottish.  The 
companies formed up to the Revolution  only amounted to about 15  per 
cent. of  the total in each  country.  In England  there were  the three 
foreign-trading  companies2, the Mines Royal, the Mineral and Battery 
Works3, the New  River4, the York-buildings5, and the Shadwell Water- 
works6, the Fire-insurance company7, that for making Salt Water freshs, 
the  Convex  Lightsg, the  White Paper  Makerslo, the Royal  Lustring 
company"  and lastly  a  provincial  water  supply  undertaking  at New- 
castle12.  In  Scotland,  besides  the  Newmills  company13,  there  was 
another  for  the  production  of  cloth14, the Wool-card  man~factory~~, 
a  Soaperiele,  two  Sugariesl7, a  glass18 and  also  a  fishing  companylg. 
l  Vide infra, 11.  pp. 486-9. 
Ibid., 11.  pp. 404, 405, 427. 
Ibid., III.  pp. 418, 419. 
Ibid., 111. pp. 375, 376. 
Vide infra, III.  pp. 52, 53. 
"  Ibid., 111.  p. 73. 
l3 Ibid., III. pp. 138-50. 
'"id.,  III.  pp. 176-9. 
'7  Ibid., 111.  pp. 133-5. 
l9 Ibid., 11.  pp. 377, 378. 
Ibid., 11.  pp. 21, 160, 233. 
Ibid., III.  pp. 25, 26. 
G  Ibid., 111.  pp. 32, 33. 
8  Vide supra, p.  316. 
l0  Ibid., 111.  p. 64. 
l2 Ibid., 111.  pp. 34, 35. 
l4 Ibid., 111.  p. 159. 
l6  Ibid., 111.  pp. 150, 151. 
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Thus  the companies  formed  between  1688  and  1695 constitute  up- 
wards  of  85 per  cent.  of  the total  at the later date;  indeed,  if  the 
companies already  established  in  England together with  the treasure- 
seeking enterprizes be  deducted, the new  foundations amount to nearly 
75 per cent. of the whole. 
The coincidence of  depression in foreign trade and immense activity 
in  new  schemes  for  the  development  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
colonies is to be explained  by the direct and indirect effects of  the war 
with  France.  There  can  be  little  doubt that, through  this  contest, 
British  foreign  commerce  suffered  very  severely.  [Jp  to 1692  it  is 
recorded that the French had captured no less than 3,000 British ships1; 
which,  according to another account, were  valued at 15 millions2.  In 
1696-7  the total exports and imports were  just  over  7 millions3, thus 
showing a  slight reduction  on  the figures of  1662-3  and a  decline, as 
compared with 1688, of  about 39 per cent.4  Similar results are arrived 
at by  investigation  of  the revenue  derived  from  the Customs.  Com- 
paring  the financial  year  1687-8  with  1691-2,  1692-3,  1693-4  the 
annual  falling  off  was  close  on  30 per  cent.6  It follows  that, at the 
beginning of  the war, there was a large portion of  the capital, formerly- 
used in extra-British trade, which was  perforce withdrawn.  For a short 
period,  namely  from  the  time  that  the shipping  trade  was  seriously 
interrupted until the great cost of  the war  began to demand  more and 
more of  the resources of  the nation, this floating capital was  available 
for  investments  at home  that  were  considered  promising.  But  the 
interruption  of  trade  with  France  suggested  the  establishment  of 
factories  to produce  goods, previously  imported  from  abroad-an  ex- 
periment which was the more likely to succeed owing to the conjunction 
of  technical  skill and adequate capital.  The war  was  also responsible 
for the formation of  armament companies and for banking and finance 
undertakings.  The latter group came into existence towards the end of 
the period of  activity when the strain of  the struggle began  to be  felt. 
Then the animated  dealings  in  the shares  of  these  companies turned 
attention  to  other  home  investments,  such  as  mining,  water-supply 
and miscellaneous  ventures.  Generally  speaking,  the majority  of  the 
companies  started in  this period  were  designed  to establish either an 
1 Anderson, Annab of Commerce, 111. p. 134. 
2  An Essay upon Projects [by  Daniel Defoe],  1697, p. 5. 
3  State of the  Trade of Great Britain, by Sir Charles Whitworth,  London, 1776. 
4  1662-3 total foreign trade  ...  ...  7Q mil. Ss. 
1688  9,  7,  ,,  ...  ...  114  9,  ,, 
1696-7  9,  ,,  9,  ...  ...  7  ,,,, 
6  Vide infra,  111.  pp.  536,  537;  The Manuscript8  of  the  House  of Lords  1693-6, 
pp.  60-92. 
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industry  new to the country, or to improve an existing one by a process 
not in ordinary use. 
It is fortunate that the whole  course of  this period  of  excitement 
has  been  chronicled  with  great  care  and  fulness  by  competent  con- 
temporary observers.  In March 1692 John Houghton began to circulate 
his newspaper, which was  intended to record  the industrial progress  of 
the time1.  After a leading article or essay, the rest  of  tbe publication 
was  devoted  to commercial intelligence, amongst which  was  included a 
list of  the current quotations of the shares of companies.  Though there 
had been previous occasional references in the press to the price of India 
stock,  this series of  prices,  compiled  by  Houghton,  was  (as  far as  is 
known) the first regular record  of  the fluctuations of  the share-market. 
It  begins with the prices of  only eight securities-which  are entered  as 
follows-"  India, Guinea, H[udson's]  Bay, Paper, Linnen, Copper, Glass, 
Wreck2."  Within a  month  the number  of  shares was  nearly  doubled 
and by  May  1694 the names  of  52 companies were  included.  Sub- 
sequently  twelve  other  undertakings  were  added,  so  that,  altogether, 
he  mentions  64  concerns  in  the  shares  of  which  there  were  active 
dealings.  It is  not to be concluded, however,  that prices are recorded 
in  every case.  When the list was  greatly extended in  1694, prices are 
printed opposite the names of  some ten companies, the shares of  which 
fluctuated  from  week  to week;  and  a  note  was  appended  that sub- 
scribers, who wished to possess a record of transactions in the remaining 
shares, could have these written  in  by hand  in their copies at a  small 
extra charge. 
Houghton's  list as revised in 1694 had two peculiarities which are of 
some interest.  He had a special notation for indicating the status of the 
companies-one,  which was incorporated by charter, had its name printed 
in black-letter type; another, founded  on a patent, but without  incor- 
poration,  was  ~rinted  in italics,  and the remainder,  which  had  neither 
charter  nor  patent,  in  ordinary type.  The study  of  such  a  record, 
intended for temporary use,  presents  certain difficulties; since, in  order 
to save space, Houghton described the companies, not under the lengthy 
titles by which  they were  established, but by those current amongst the 
brokers in the Exchange.  These names seem to dif5er even more widely 
from those in official use  than the "Coras,"  "Doras,"  or "Bags"  of  the 
end of  the nineteenth century.  For instance, the following are a few of 
the cases where there is a considerable diversity between the correct title 
and that employed by Houghton: 
Collections  for  Improvement  of Husbandry and  Trade 1691/2 to 1703. 
2  Reproductions of three types of Houghton's list will be found on p. 351. 330  Houghton's C2asaIf;eation  of  Cos. 1692-4  [CHAP.  XVII. 
Names  of Companies. 
Aa printed in Houghton's List  The  title in  the  charter or  (where  there 
was  no  charter)  that  used  by  the 
Company 
Copper-&ect~tt  5  The  Governor  and  Company  of  the 
Copper Millers inEngland1-(founded 
by Sir Joseph Herne). 
Saltpetre-Dockwra  = The Governor and Company for casting 
and  making  guns  and  ordnance  in 
moulds  of  metal2. 
*Leather  = The  Company  for  making  imitation 
Russia-leather 3. 
In  other cases  Houghton's  nomenclature  is liable  to mislead  a  modern 
reader.  Under the head of  "Engines "  he gives, "  Overal, Poyntz, Night, 
Lofting."  The first entry relates to a company formed to exploit the 
diving machine invented by John Overing or Overal, the second to  another 
for Captain Poyntz' draining pump"  One is inclined to assume that the 
third undertaking was  a syndicate to develope some engine, brought out 
by  a person  named  Night;  whereas, on  the contrary, the invention  in 
question was  the burglar-alarm  of  John Tyzacks.  Finally, finding that 
in this case  the reference is to a "night-engine,"  not to one invented by 
someone named  Night, the natural  inference would  be  that the  last 
company,  under  this heading,  was  connected  with  a  "lofting-engine." 
Once  more  the clue proves misleading, the correct title of  the company 
being the Company for the Sucking- Worm  Engines of Mr. John Loftingh, 
Merchant, at Bow  Church Yard, Cheapside, which was intended to quench 
firese.  In view of these and similar difficulties, connected with Houghton's 
list, it  will be advisable to re-classify the undertakings which he mentions 
with the addition of others drawn from an anonymous pamphlet-Angli~ 
Tutamen, and an Essay on Projects ascribed to Defoe. 
Leaving on one side for the present the companies for the recovery 
of  treasure  from  wrecks,  the most  convenient  method  of  classification 
will be  to collect together the various undertakings, which either came 
into existence or which received an impetus from the diversion of  capital 
from  foreign trade and the other circunlstances arising out of  the war. 
First of  all, there was  a group of  companies which aimed at producing 
commodities previously imported,  the supply of  which  had now  ceased 
or which was precarious.  The White Paper Makers and Royal Lustring 
companies received  a great stimulus7, and an undertaking was  promoted 
to consolidate several of  the mills which had long existed in England for 
1 FTide infra, 11. p. 430.  2  Ibid.,  rr. p. 473, 111. p. 109. 
3  Ibid.,  111.  pp. 119, 120.  Ibid., 11. pp 482, 487, 488. 
5  Ibid.,  11. p. 483.  "bid.,  11. p. 481. 
7  Ibid., 111.  pp. 66, 67, 76. 
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making  the common  brown-paper1.  A  "Blue  Paper Companyw  was in 
reality a  venture for the manufacture of  wall-papers2.  A serious effort 
was  made to produce the damask and fine linens, hitherto imported from 
France,  and companies  were  established  to  carry  on  this  industry in 
England, Ireland and  Scotland, while  another  organization was  incor- 
porated  for  the  production  of  both  linen  and  paper  in  the Channel 
Islands3.  Then  there  were  two  glass-making  companies-the  one  for 
plate-glass  and  the  other  for  bottles"  The title  of  the  Society  fir 
Improving Native Manufacture. .TO  as to keep out the Wet is self-explana- 
tory5,  and another venture of  the same kind was  the Company for  making 
"German  Balls"  to  preserve  Leather from  damp6.  Finally  the  same 
causes  led  to a  revival  of  English-tapestry  making, and  in  1691  the 
Royal factories  (established  in  1619)  were  transferred  to a  company7. 
The erect of  the war was  apparent in the formation  of  armament 
companies.  There were  three created to manufacture  powders, two to 
produce  ordnance9  and  another,  the  charter  of  which  had  a  curious 
history,  for  making  "hollow  sword  bladeslo."  To this group may  be 
added  the Goaernor and  Company for  smelting down Lead  zuith  Pit and 
Sea  Coal, since  the promoters  proposed  to cast  the lead  they smelted 
into shot and bullets1'. 
A third  group of  undertakings,  connected  with  the war,  were  the 
banking  and  finance  companies.  The  Bank  of  England  came  into 
existence through  the provision  of  a loan  to the government12.  The 
Million  bank  (1695) had  relation  to a  previous  state-debt, which  was 
in the form of  short term annuities, some of the holders of  which joined 
together  with  a  view  to using  the  aggregate  credit,  so  obtained,  in 
founding a  financing business which would continue to ~ield  an income 
after that of  the annuities had terminated13.  Then the scarcity of money 
produced the land bank schemes, which proposed to establish "a fund of 
credit"  on  a non-metallic  basisl4.  There was yet another bank, known 
as the Orphans',  which arose out of  the efTorts of  the City of  London t,o 
remedy  its previous mismanagement  of  the provident  fund in  its care. 
This bank, however, in which shares were sold to the public, was entangled 
in the speculative management which had caused the collapse of a former 
undertaking, started by the same promoters, and it was  soon wound up15. 
Vide infra, 111.  p.  71.  Ibid.,  111.  p. 72. 
Ibid.,  Irr.  pp. 71, 90, 99, 164,165.  Ibid.,  111.  p. 111. 
Ihid.,  111.  p. 120.  Ibid.,  111.  p.  120. 
Ibid.,  111.  p. 118.  8 Ibid.,  11. pp. 472, 473. 
Ibid., 111.  p.  109.  '0 Ibid.,  111.  pp. 109, 435. 
l1 Ibid.,  11.  p. 442.  Ibid.,  111.  pp. 204, 205. 
l3 Ibid.,  111.  pp. 275-7.  l*  Ibid., 111. pp. 246-52. 
15  According  to the author of the Anglice  Tutamen "it  had not the shadow or 332  Mining, Fishery and Land Cos. 1692-5  [CHAP. XVII. 
This  movement  extended  to  Ireland,  since  about  this  time  several 
merchants  at Dublin  proposed  to establish  a  public  bank  there1. 
The other side of the great activity lay in the development of  strictly 
localized industries.  Mining began to require more capital, and it, too, 
gained by the progress of invention through the recovery of several flooded 
workings by means of  pumping-engines.  Up to 1695 there were three 
coal companiesa, six for copper mining and smelting3, the same number 
for  developing  lead-mines&,  three  for  salts,  and  four  for  alum,  lapis 
caZaminaris, tin and antimony6.  Amongst these  are included  the two 
Elizabethan  societies for the Mines Royal and the Mineral and Battery 
Works, the former now appearing in Houghton's  list as "the mines royal 
of  Cumberland and Carolina,"  while in  several cases the rights of  these 
bodies were safeguarded in charters  granted prior to 1693 when an act, 
changing  the legal  position  of  mines,  where  there  were  veins  of  the 
precious metals,  was  passed7. 
Attempts were also made  to revive  industries,  which  had  formerly 
been  favoured.  Thus there  was  a  group of  fishing  companies,  which 
included  a  new  whaling  or  Greenland  undertaking"  a  revival  of  the 
society for the Royal FisheryQnd  organizations  for the taking of  cod 
at Newfoundland and for the seeking for pearls.  Another case of  the 
revival of bodies, sin~ilar  to those that had been popular in earlier periods, 
was  the establishment of  land and colonizing companies, amongst which 
are mentioned the Pennsylvania, New  Jersey and Tobago1° plantations, 
and  to this  group  may  be  added  the syndicate  for  Poyntz'  draining 
engine  which  was  said to have  added  to the quantity of  arable  land 
previously  available". 
The boom of  1692-5  brought into existence several new water-supply 
companies, and  in three cases  very  long-established  undertakings were 
transferred from private or municipal to  joint-stock management.  There 
were the London Bridge water works, dating back to 1582, which eiiter- 
prize was turned into a company before 16941a.  The City conduits had 
been  in the hands of  the Council since their inception, and these  were 
greatly improved by the expenditure of  capital in making reservoirs and 
laying new mainsI3.  In 1692 another water company was founded, which 
substance of  real good,"  in fact the "conduct of the Chamber had  been so bad that 
the City remained without credit," pp.  13-16. 
Public Record Office,  Dublin, Schedule  of Petitions  to Parliament, 11.  p.  672; 
&asonable  Proposals for  a Perpetual Fund or Bank in Dublin [l696]. 
Vide  infra, 11.  pp. 461, 462.  3  Ibid., 11.  pp. 431, 436-9. 
Ibid., 11.  pp. 440-4.  Ibid., 11.  p. 470. 
0  Ibid., 11.  pp. 427, 476, 476, Irr.  p. 417.  Ibid., 11.  pp. 404, 443. 
8  Ibid., 11.  pp. 75, 379.  9 Ibid., 11.  p. 375. 
10  Ibid., 111.  pp. 416, 417.  l1  Ibid., 11.  p. 482. 
12  Ibid., 1x1.  pp.  11, 12.  l3 Ibid., 111.  pp. 12, 13. 
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is specially noteworthy.  It was  known as the Hampstead Aqztedzlcts, and 
the property acquired was one with an exceedingly lengthy history, since 
it was  first authorized by an act in favour of  the City in  1546.  It is of 
interest  to note that this company  (which  still exists  in  its corporate 
capacity) brought together William Paterson, the founder  of  the Bank 
of  England, and John Holland, the leading promoter  of  the Bank  of 
Scotland1.  Other water undertakings owned by companies were described 
as the Southwark, the Mill-bank  and Marchmont's  Water-works2.  As 
is shown  elsewhere3, there was  keen  competition between these different 
bodies not only as to areas, but also in the engineering methods adopted. 
The New  River,  the  City  Conduits,  and  the  Hampstead  Aqueducts 
professed  to supply  spring-water,  flowing  to the  consumers  through 
gravitation.  On the other hand, the converse method was  adopted  by 
other con~panies  of  forcing  up  'names  water  by  means  of  pumping 
devices.  The  York-buildings  undertaking  obtained  power  by  using 
horses to work  the pumping apparatus4.  The London Bridge company 
availed itself  of  power  arising out of  the peculiar  construction  of  the 
bridge,  for  the generation  of  which  water-wheels were  employed5.  In 
the undertaking founded by Marchmoiit and others the idea was  similar, 
the fall of water for driving the wheel being obtained from the sewers6. 
Another  group  of  companies was  that  engaged  in  manufactures 
connected with  iron  and the other metals.  There was  for instance  the 
Goverrwr  nnd  Compan,~  for  making Iron with Pit-coal7, another for the 
production  of  Venetian  steeln, one  for  gilding  metals,  known  as  the 
Dipping company0, and a  fourth  "for  lacquering  after  the manner  of 
Japan  1°." 
Lastly  comes  a  group  of  miscellaneous  undertakings,  including  a 
sawing company, and those for running a stage-coach, for making whale- 
bone whips, for Russia leather, and the device, known as the night-engine, 
already mentionedll. 
These  companies were  formed  in  London  and  the  scope  of  their 
operations applied to the whole Empire, except Scotland.  North of  the 
Tweed  there  were  similar  ventures  on  a  joint-stock  basis,  such  as  a 
powder  company,  a  bank  (the  Bank  of  Scotland,  1695), glass-works, 
a white-paper undertaking, mining and draining companies12.  Moreover, 
l  Vide infra, 111.  pp. 4, 5.  "bid.,  111.  pp. 32, 33. 
Ibid., 111.  pp.  13, 14, 25-7.  Ibid., 111.  p. 418. 
Ibid., 111.  p.  11.  G  Ibid., 111.  p.  33. 
Ibid., 11. p. 467.  Ibid., 111.  p.  108. 
Ibid., 111.  p. 108.  10  Vide infra, Irr.  p. 119. 
l1 Ibid.,  11.  p.  483;  Houghton,  Collections for  Improvement  of  Husban,dry  and 
Trade, Londoil,  1691-1703,  No.  156,  July 26, 1694; Pozt-boy,  July  16,  Sept.  3, 
1695. 
l2  Vide inf~a,  111.  pp. 183, 186, 187, 189, 193, 253. Scottish Companies 1692-5  [CHAP.  xm. 
owing to the want of industrial development, it had been found possible to 
obtain privileges for certain manufactures which were  new  there, though 
long established in England, such as four broad-cloth companies, one for 
wool-cards, another sail-cloth and two more for ropes and cordage'.  The 
combination  of  sugar refining  and the distillation  of  rum  was  highly 
successful, and three of these works had been starteda.  In England soap- 
boiling and whaling were distinct industries;  but in Scotland these were 
both carried  on  by the same company; and, after it had abandoned the 
Greenland trade, another company was established to prosecute the latter 
enterprize3. 
In order to obtain a quantitative expression of  the importance of the 
joint-stock  movement during the six years succeeding the Revolution, it 
would be desirable to frame a statement of  the total capital of  the 150 
bodies of  this kind, which were  in existence up to the end of  1695.  It 
is almost inevitable that sufficiently complete materials for such a calcu- 
lation are wanting.  There was  no registration  of  financial details, and 
many of the ventures (especially in Scotland) were semi-private concerns. 
Further, where information relating to the capitalization has survived, it 
is often fragmentary.  Sometimes the number of  shares in a company is 
recorded but not the nominal  value of  each, or again there  may  be  a 
statement of  the total shares into which the capital was divided and their 
amount, but in some cases all these  were  not offered  for  subscription. 
Elsewhere the only particulars obtainable  consist of  an  estimate of  the 
funds required to establish a certain industry, and it may have been that 
the amount actually provided was much less.  Then, there were the cases 
of  the old companies such as the Mines Royal, the Mineral and Battery 
Works  and the New  River.  Though the original capital of  the two 
Elizabethan  societies is  known, it is obvious that such figures are of  110 
value for an estimate  of  the worth  of  the assets from  1690 to 16944. 
Therefore, since information  on this head is wanting  at the later date, 
for  the  purposes  of  the present  enquiry,  these  undertakings  must  be 
classed  as  those  of  which  the  capital  is  unknown.  The New  River 
company is in a different category.  During three-quarters of  a century 
it had been using income for developing and extending its property6,  and 
therefore the most reliable estimate of  the whole value, representing the 
capitalizatioil of  its earning power, would be  that based on the price at 
which  a whole  share changed  hands. 
Taking then 137 joint-stock  companies for home and colonial under- 
takings, in  the shares of  which  at the end of  1695 there  is  known  to 
have  been  dealings, the capital  at that date, subject to the limitations 
l  Vide infra, 111. pp.  159, 174-9.  Ibid., 111. p.  136. 
Ibid., 111.  pp.  131, 132.  Ibid. II., pp.  387, 416-8. 
Ibid., 1x1.  pp.  25, 28. 
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mentioned above, is recorded or can be recovered in the case of seventeen 
in England and of  seven in Scotland.  It is certain that these twenty- 
four undktakings include all those with a very large capital; and, except 
in a  very few  cases, those with  a  very  small  capital are excluded.  It 
remains  to obtain  some  average  for  the latter  undertakings,  some  of 
which  must  have  had  a  very  modest  outlay for  starting. the business, 
while  that  of  others  was  considerable.  Amongst  the  latter  may  be 
mentioned one of  the salt-petre companies which had five factories1, and 
the City Conduits, the capital of which (after its amalgamation with the 
London  Bridge  undertaking  in  1703) was  &150,0002.  On  the other 
hand, the average original expenditure of the treasure-recovery companies 
would  be  under 22,000 each, and it is difficult to see how the London 
to Norwich  Stage-coach  company  or that for  making whalebone whips 
could require a capital of more than a few hundreds.  For these reasons, 
the average cost of establishing 73 companies in England is estimated at 
&5,000 each up to 1695 and in  Scotland at 23,000 each to the same 
date.  The following statement gives a detailed estimate of  the capital 
of all the companies known to have been in existence in 1695: 
Estimate  of the  Capital  of Joint-Stock  Companies  1695. 
(1)  Companies-England  and  Wales, Ireland and Colonies 
(exclusive of those engaged in foreign trade) 
The  New  River  Company-72  shares  at  $4,000  per 
dare  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .. .  .  .  .  22813,000 
,,  White  Paper  Makers  of  England  (estimate  of 
capital  required)5  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  100,000 
,,  Hampstead Aqueducts-capital  paid up6 .  .  .  .  .  .  12,000 
,,  Convex Lights Company  7  .  .  .  .  ..  .  .  .  .  .  .  25,600 
,,  King's and Queen's Corporation for the Linen Manu- 
facture  in  England-nominal  capital  210,000, 
amount issued and paid  up in 1695, exclusive of 
premium  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  3,400 
,,  King's andQueen'sCorporation for the Linen Manu- 
facture  in  Ireland-nominal  capital  $5,000- 
issued  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ..  .  .  .  2,000 
,,  Royal Lustring Company, exclusive of premium10  60,000 
,,  Glass-Makers of  London l1  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ..  .  ..  25$00 
,,  York Buildings Water-Works l2  ...  .  ,  .  .  .  .  4,800 
Newcastle Water Company '3  .  .  .  .  ..  .  ..  .  .  .  3,500 
$524,300 
l  Vide infra, 11.  pp.  473, 474.  Ibid., 111.  p.  15. 
For particulars of these vide wpra, p.  325. 
Ibid.,  111.  pp.  25, 26, 31.  G Ibid., 111.  p.  64. 
Ibid., 111.  pp. 6, 9.  Ibid., 111.  p.  59. 
Ibid., 111. p.  91.  g  Ibid.,  111.  p.  100. 
'O  Ibid., 111.  p.  75.  l1 Ibid.,  111.  p.  111. 
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Forward 
Company formed  to  develope the lead  mines  of  Sir 
Carberry Price1-4,800  shares from 1691-3 at 17 
Company  of  Copper-Miners  in  England-700  shares 
..................  sold at 572 
Company for making iron with Pit-coal-paid  up3  ... 
......  Royal Fishery Company-paid  up about4 
Company of  Merchants  trading into Greenland-paid 
.....................  up6 
Bank of England-60°/,  called up 011 521,200,0006  ... 
Bank  of  Tickets  of  the  Million  Adventure-amount 
paid up7  .................. 
Total capital, paid up or taken as paid up of 17 companies 
Estimated capital of 73 companies at $25,000 each  ... 
(2) Scottish Companies  E 
Capital  of  the  Scottish  Royal  Fishery  company,  the 
Glasgow  Soa.perie,  Glasgow  Sugarie,  the  Paper 
Manufacture,  Bank  of  Scotland,  Glasgow  Rope 
company and Scots Linen  Manufacture  (all  taken 
as paid up)  ..................  74,033 
Estimated  capital of  40 other manufactures  at $23,000 
each  .....................  120,000 
194,033 
Total  paid  up capital  of  137  English,  Scottish,  Irish 
and colonial companies (exclusive of  those engaged 
in foreign trade)  ...............  2,105,333 
Nominal capital of three foreign-trading companiesg ...  2,144,750 
Total 140 companies (1695)  ............  $24,250,083 
It is not a little noteworthy  that, out of  a total capitaliiation  of 
84,250,083 amongst  140 companies, no less than 23,932,000  is  to be 
assigned to six undertakings-the  East India, African and Hudson's Bay 
enterprizes  for foreign trade and the New  River, the Bank of  England 
and the Million Bank.  The proportion  of  Scotland in the total is also 
worthy  of  attention. 
If the foregoing estimate is  well-founded, it is  of  value, not  as  an 
isolated statement, but in relation to the whole wealth employed in trade 
at the time.  According  to King the stock  in  shipping,  forts, stores, 
goods, instruments  and  materials  of  England and Wales  amounted  to 
Pride infra,  11. pp. 440, 443,  444.  Ibid.,  11.  pp.  432,  435. 
Ibid., 11.  p.  467.  Ibid.,  11.  p.  375. 
Ibid.,  11.  p.  379.  Ibid., 111.  pp. 206,  207. 
Ibid.,  111.  p.  277 (note). 
E  Ibid.,  11.  pp.  377,  378,  111.  pp.  131,  134,  166,  174,  183, 256; Records  of  a 
Scottish Cloth Manufactory  at New  Mills Haddingtonshire 1681-1703, ed. W.  R. Scott 
(Scot. Hist. Soc. 1905), pp..  xlvi., xlvii.  The capital of the Darien  company is not 
included in this estimate since (though a charter was signed in 169.5) the capital was 
not paid in. 
9  Vide supra, p.  325. 
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33 millions in 1688.  The value of  forts,  save as  built  by  a  foreign- 
trading company, was not a mercantile asset, and on the other hand this 
total  omits  buildings  used  as  factories  or stores1.  Moreover,  between 
1688 and 1695, there had been  a considerable reduction in this portion 
of  the national  wealth, occasioned by losses  of  ships and goods during 
the war and by the ensuing high taxation.  Taking these various elements 
into account, the industrial wealth (exclusive of  agriculture) of  England 
and Wales  in  1695 would  ~robabl~  be  somewhat  under  33  millions. 
Now  the estimated nominal  or  issued  capital  of  English  and  Welsh 
companies was  over 4 millions or about l2  per cent. of  the commercial 
investments  of  the country.  The fact that the nominal capital of  the 
foreign-trading  companies was  subject  to a  considerable  depreciation 
must  be  allowed  for;  and,  while  some of  the other  companies'  shares 
were  above par, those of  the rest  showed a decline, so that on the basis 
of  the market-prices  of  1694-5  it seems  possible  that the investments 
in  the 140 companies dealt in were considered to amount to about one- 
tenth of  the wealth  which  was  estimated to be  employed in the home  -  - 
and foreign  trade. 
When the joint-stock  system was the medium for directing so much 
of  the commercial capital  of  England, it is worth  enquiring with  some 
detail  how  these  companies  were  formed  and  organized.  There  can 
be  little doubt that the pre-occupation  of  the government  by the war 
tended to favour the establishing of  companies, many  of  which acted as 
a corporation without  seeking a  charter-a  course which,  under  other 
circumstances, would have attracted the attention of  the law-officers of 
the Crown.  As it was,  no obstacle was  placed in the way  of  those who 
wished to start any enterprize by means of  a joint-stock, and it was  left 
to the founders of each venture to prescribe the constitution under which 
it was  to work.  Houghton  describes the manner  in which  a company 
was  established for exploiting a new  industry in the following terms- 
"  When sonieone has thought of  an art or invention or discovered some 
mine  or knows  or thinks of  some new (or new  manner of) way of  trade, 
whereby he thinks a considerable gain may be gotten, and yet this cannot 
well, or not so well  as otherwise, be  carried  on by a private purse, or if 
it could the hazard would be too great; he then imparts it  to some friend 
or friends, who  co~nmonly  consider or enquire of  the learned whether it 
will  stand good  in law, and, if  so, they contrive some articles for a con- 
stitution, whereof to give the first inventor a sum,  of money for his charge 
or some certain number of  the shares or both is certainly and with good 
reason  one of  the principal articles.  This done, the parties concerned 
'  The rent of  business  premises  in London  at this period  was  very  low-The 
First  Nine  Years  of  the  Bank  of  England,  hy  J. E.  T.  Rogers,  Oxford,  1887, 
pp.  15,  16. 
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let it be known and each brings in his friend, till all the shares be bought 
at such a  price as stated, either presently or to pay down all the money 
(which  is generally found to be  the best  and easiest way) or only some 
part which  is often troublesome, one or other being backward of  paying 
his  quota'."  In  some  of  the mining  companies, the constitution  had 
been  settled  before much  development work was  accomplished, and the 
right  to mine  in  a  certain  area was  divided  in  certain  cases  into 400 
shares  which  were  issued  at prices  varying  from  10s. to 2l~.~  Sub- 
sequently  calls were  made  as required. 
In a few cases a charter was  sought, either in the case of an important 
body, such as the Bank  of  England, in order to regularize its corporate 
character or, as in that of  the White Paper Makers, to induce the sub- 
scription of  capital3.  Companies of  medium size endeavoured to obtain 
incorporation for a variety of reasons.  Sometimes special privileges, over 
and above  those generally  conferred  by  a  patent for a  new  invention, 
were  granted, as for  instance  in  the  case  of  the  King's  and  Queen's 
Corporation for the Linen Manufacture, where the monopoly of  certain 
processes was  conveyed for ever4.  As a rule existing interests were safe- 
guarded  in the charters.  Thus the company  for digging and working 
Mines by a Joint-Stock in England was obliged to make agreements with 
the society of  Mines Royal"  and the Lustring company was  subject to 
the inspection  of  the Weavers  of  London6.  It often happened  that a 
charter  was  required  to free a  joint-stock  company  from  liability for 
debts, incurred  by  the promoters  prior  to its formation.  This reason 
was  urged  openly by the shareholders in the company for Smelting Iron 
with Pit-coal',  and also in the application to the Scottish Parliament by 
the Linen Manufactures. 
In view of  the controversy in Parliament  concerning the East India 
and African companies, the facility with which acts granting or confirming 
monopolies were  passed  in  England  is  remarkable.  Not  only  was  a 
Greenland  company  re-established,  but the White Paper  Makers,  the 
Royal Lustring company, two water-works and the Droitwich rock-salt 
undertaking were  invested with  extensive privileges under act of  Parlia- 
mentg.  Owing to the tendency of  Scottish commercial policy, the Estates 
were  always ready to extend the benefits of  the act of  1681 to new  or 
revived  industries1". 
Collections, ut supra, No. 98, June 15, 1694. 
Anglia Tutamen, p. 18. 
Vide infru, 111.  p. 64.  4  Ibid., 111. p. 91. 
Ibid., 11.  p. 441.  6  Ibid., III.  pp.  74, 75. 
Ibid., 11.  p.  466.  8  Ibid., III.  pp. 165, 166. 
Ibid., rr.  pp. 379, 470; 111.  pp. 32, 65, 66, 77, 419. 
l0 Ibid., III.  pp.  128, 129. 
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The constitution  formulated by the charters or deeds of  settlement 
in England mainly followed the established model of  a governor, deputy- 
governor and assistants.  The number of the latter varied, but, as a rule, 
it  was a multiple or sub-multiple of 12.  It  was 15 in the English Linen 
Corporation1, 24  in the Saltpetre company and  in the Shadwell water- 
works2, l8 in the Guernsey Linen  and Paper company%nd  12 in the 
Royal  Lustring  and Sword  Blade  companies4.  There were  a  few  ex- 
ceptions.  Both the company for the working and digging of Mines and 
the Glass-Makers had 20 assistants5,  the Merchants trading into Greenland 
166,  the  company  for  smelting Iron with  Pit-coal 14?, and the York 
Buildings  company only 78.  In the Blillion  Bank  and the Hampstead 
Aqueducts (both of which were established by deed) there was a conimittee 
of  management,  consisting  of  24  members  in  the former  and of  from 
9 to 15  in the latter!'.  The use of  the term, managers, shows a trace of 
Scottish influencelo, and conversely many of  the companies, working in 
Scotland,  were  organized on the English model.  Finally, for the first 
time (after the exceptional  use  of  the term  by the Guinea company in 
1618) the name of  director displaces that of  assistant-the  former being 
used  by  the banks  of  England  and  of  Scotland  and  by  the  Darien 
company, while the Royal  Fishery society, when  reconstituted  in  1692, 
divided  its 12 committees  into 4  directors and 8 masters1'. 
The qualification  for  the office of  assistant,  director  or  cotnmittee 
varied according to the size of  the undertaking.  In the Royal Lustring 
company it  was 10  shares (&250)12,  in the Hampstead Aqueducts 10  shares 
(2200)13, in the Million  Bank  2500 stockI4, in  the Bank  of  England 
22,000 stock15, in the Bank of  Scotland 23,000 Scots16.  Those eligible 
as governors of  the Bank of  England must hold 24,000, in the Bank of 
Scotland &8,000 Scots. 
The quorum at meetings of  the governing body was frequently seven, 
often  subject to the proviso that the governor or deputy-governor must 
be  included.  Companies which  fixed on this number were  constituted 
with  courts  of  varying  membership-those  of  the Saltpetre company 
and the Bank  of  Scotland totalled  twenty-six17, that of  the Guernsey 
Paper  company twenty18, that of  the company for  smelting  Iron  with 
Vide infra, 111.  p. 91.  "bid.,  11.  p.  473; 111.  p.  $2. 
"bid.,  III. p.  71.  Ibid., 111. pp. 76, 435. 
Ibid., 11.  p.  441; 111.  p.  111.  Ibid., 11.  p. 379. 
7  Ibid., 11.  p. 467.  "bid.,  111.  p.  420. 
9  Ibid., rrr.  pp. 6, 275. 
IQ  Both Paterson and  Holland were interested in the Hampstead Aqueducts. 
Vide infra, 11.  pp. 212, 374; III.  pp. 205, 254.  '"bid.,  111. p. 76. 
l3 Ibid.,  111.  p. 6.  " Ibid., 111.  p. 275. 
'6  Ibid., 111.  p.  205.  '"bid.,  Irr.  p. 254. 
17 Ibid., Ir.  p. 473; 111.  p. 264.  l8 Ibid., nr. p.  71. 
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Pit-coal 16l and that of  the Copper-Miners 1a2.  On the other hand, it 
required 13 out of  the court of  26 in the Bank of  England to form a 
quorum3; 5 out of 14  in the Sword Blade company4, while the Hampstead 
Aqueducts was  unique  in providing  that a  majority of  the committee 
of  management,  present  at any meeting,  should  suffice5. 
The controversy on the subject of  voting rights in the East  India 
company affected  the constitution  of  other bodies in  this respect.  On 
the one side, there were  a number of  companies in which  there was  no 
limitation,  for  instance  in  the  White  Paper  Makers,  the  Saltpetre 
company, that for digging Mines and the I-lampsteacl Aqueducts each 
share entitled the holder to one vote6.  On the other hand, while there 
was  no undertaking which followed what is said to have been the method 
of  a regulated company, namely the decision of controverted questions by 
a poll  of  persons, the Bank  of  England  approached near  to this rule, 
since it was  decreed that no  member should have more than one vote7. 
The difference  lay in  the fact that those,  who  owned  less  than  £500 
stock,  had  no  voting-power.  Similarly  in  the Million  Bank  £300  of 
stock  entitled the holder  to one vote and no one might have more than 
ones.  In  the Royal  Lustring company  10 shares (2250) conferred 
single vote,  which  in this case also  was  the maximum allowed to each 
member"  There  was  a  third  group  which  aimed  at  a  compron~ise 
between  the extreme  tendencies.  Like  the  Bank  of  England,  £500 
stock  in the Greenland company gave a right to one vote, £1,000  stock 
to two, the latter being the maximum  for any personlO.  According to 
the constitution  of  Barbon's  land  bank,  2300 stock  qualified for  two 
votes, 8500 stock for three votes, 21,000 stock for five votes-the  latter 
being the maximurnl1.  In the company for smelting Iron with Pit-coal 
the maximum was four voteslz, in the Scots Linen manufacture five votesIs. 
In some cases, where no express maximum  is mentioned, there was  still 
a limit to the votes  of  any  shareholder,  arising  out  of  the restriction 
which  limited the amount of  stock  or shares that might be subscribed 
for or owned by a member.  Thus in the Bank of  Scotland each £1,000 
Scots carried one vote, subject to the proviso that no one might take up 
more than 220,000  Scots14; and in  the society of  White writing and 
printing Paper, while each five shares gave a vote, the maximum holding  , 
l  Vide infra, 11.  p.  467.  Ibid., 11.  p.  431. 
Ibid., 111.  p.  205.  Ibid., 111.  p.  435. 
Ibid., III. p. 6. 
Ibid., rr.  pp. 441, 473; 111.  pp.  6, 64. 
7  Ibid., rrr.  p.  206.  8 Ibid., 1x1.  p.  435. 
Ibid., rrr. p.  76.  l0  Ibid., 11.  p.  379. 
11  Ibid., 111.  p.  250.  lZ Ibid., 11.  p. 467. 
l3 Ibid., 111.  p.  167.  Ibid., 111.  p.  254. 
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was  20 shares1.  The final step in  this  tendency,  as it existed  in  the 
seventeenth  century,  was  made  by  the charter  of  the Old  East  India 
company (1698), which  introduced a  sliding scale, but not a  uniformly 
progressive one2. 
As a rule, the capital was  divided into shares, and in this respect an 
advance was  made on the cumbersome methods of  the Mines Royal and 
the New  River,  with  their units of  large nominal  value  divided  into 
fractions.  In  the Convex  Lights  company  there  were  originally  32 
shares on each of which 2800 was  called  up  3;  but, as a rule, almost all 
the shares,  created  after  1688,  were  of  small  amount  and necessarily 
the  whole  number  was  increased.  Those  in  the  Lustring company 
were  225 nominal4, in  the English  Linen  corporation  210 nominal5, 
and in the Scottish6  and Irish7 undertakings of £5  in each case.  French 
promoters especially departed from the previous practice of  making  the 
whole  number  of  shares consist  of  dozens.  In the ventures  pronioted 
by Nicholas Dupin, such  as  the Linen  companies, in  those formed for 
England  and Ireland  there were 1,000 shares and in the former  under- 
taking 340 were first  sold about par, and soon afterwards another issue 
was  made at a  premium  of  400 per  cent.8  The whole  capital  of  the 
Lustring company was  placed at a premium of 20 per cent.g 
The methods of the promoters (or as they were called the "projectors") 
of  the  period  varied.  Some  of  them,  like  Thomas Neale,  who  was 
responsible for  a  number  of  lotteries  and  treasure-seeking  ventures, 
seem  to have foisted doubtful schemes  on  the investing  public  during 
a  time of  excitementlO.  Others like Nicholas Dupinll, who founded the 
Linen  and  White Paper  companies,  Wjlliam  Paterson'"  (the Bank  of 
England,  Darien  company,  Hampstead  Aqueducts),  John  Holland13 
(the  Bank  of  Scotland,  Manufacture  of  Colchester Baizes  &C.) were 
quite  honest  and above  board.  They agreed  that they  were  to have 
a  certain sum  in  payment for  their preliminary expenses and the idea 
on  which  the  enterprize  was  based.  This  arrangement  was  either 
embodied  in  the articles of  the company  or  each  share  was  charged 
l  Vide infra, 111.  p.  183. 
Charters granted  to  the  East  India  Company from  1601,  also  the  Treaties and 
Grants made, or obtained jkom,  the Princes and Powers  in India fiom the year  1756 to 
1772, I.  p.  185. 
Vide infra, III.  pp.  53, 59.  Ibid., 1x1.  p.  75. 
Ibid., 111.  p.  91.  Ibid.,  1x1.  p.  167. 
Ibid., 111.  p.  99.  8  Ibid., 111.  p.  93. 
Ibid., 1x1.  p.  75. 
'O  Ibid., 11.  pp.  441, 488.  Cf.  Defoe's  description  of  the Bloutegondegours  iri 
The  Consolidator:  or  Sundry  Transactions  from  the  WorM  in  the  Moon,  1705, 
pp.  257-65. 
l1  Vide infra, 111.  pp.  64, 71, 91, 92. 
l2 Zbid.,  11.  pp. 207-12;  rrr.  pp. 5, 204, 205.  l3 Zbid.,  rrr. pp. 173, 252. Promoters'  Projts  1690-5  [CHAP. xv11. 
with a certain amount which was  known  to be  the recompense  of  the 
promoter.  The largest  payment  to  be  made  of  this  kind  was  that 
to William  Paterson  by the Darien  company, which  however 
he afterwards surrendered.  This was fixed at  R per cent. on the original 
capital,  which  would  have  brought  him  81R,000,  and 3 per 
cent.  on  the profits  for  twenty-one years.  The latter was  redeemable 
by  the company for a further 21R,0001.  In the Hampstead Aqueducts, 
Paterson and two others bargained to receive 100  shares, equal to &2,000 
nominal  between  them, without  any payment.  These  were  known  as 
bb maiden  shares."  They were also to have the option of  subscribing in 
cash  for  a  like  number, and  a  sum  of  2200 they  had  disbursed  on 
account  of  the undertaking was  to be deducted  from  the calls due on 
the "chargeable  shares."  It follows that the vendors' shares in this case 
came to 18 per cent. of  the whole nominal capital2. 
Uupin received 100  shares of 25  each in the Irish Linen company, but 
he was unable to retain any of  them for himself, some being distributed 
to possible rivals  in  Ireland while  the balance  was  transferred to the 
English  corporation3.  Warned  by  this  experience  he  arranged  that 
those who applied for shares in the Scottish Linen and Paper companies 
should  pay  him  personally 8s.  in the case  of  the former,  and 18s. in 
that of  the latter, on  each share  they  took  up4.  Again,  in  the land 
bank, the promoters, Asgill  and Barbon, were to receive 83,000 stock 
and &R,000 stock, respectively  B.  In view  of  the special circumstances 
none  of  these  payments  were  excessive,  and  it is  clear  that the more 
important companies were not mulcted by the promoters. 
When  a  company was formed  a  difficulty arose in  the payment  of 
calls.  Owing to the scarcity of  capital it was  found that the advice of 
Houghton6, to exact  the full  payment  at once, was  a  counsel  of  per- 
fection; and, if  adopted, it would have reduced applications for  shares. 
On the other hand, when  it was  arranged that calls were  to be  met  at 
fixed dates, shareholders were  dilatory in  discharging their obligations 
in this respect.  From the beginning of  the joint-stock  system in every 
case, where  there are details  of  the proceedings of  any company, there 
are repeated complaints on this head.  In the Mines Royal, the Mineral 
and  Battery  Works,  the  company  of  Kathai,  the  early  East  India 
voyages, the Virginia and Fishery companies, there were shareholders  in 
arrear who  only paid  under  pressure7.  The Guinea  company  of  1631 
is said to have been ruined in this way"  Royalty was  no exception, for 
l  Vids infra, 11. pp.  211, 212.  2  Ibid., 111. p. 5. 
Ibid., 111.  pp. 92, 93.  Ibid., 111.  pp.  167, 183. 
Ibid., 111.  p. 250.  6  Vide supra, p. 338. 
7  Vide infra, 11.  pp.  79, 81, 94, 95, 100, 107, 251, 365, 387, 416. 
8  Ibid., 11. pp. 14, 15. 
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Charles 11.  was  one  of  the defaulting adventurers  in a later African 
undertaking'.  Merchants  also were  offenders in  this  respect, and  the 
managers of  the Newmills con~pany  found it necessary to institute legal 
proceedings against  members who were  far behind  in  their payments2. 
This characteristic  of  the severiteeilth  century  shareholder  explains  a 
clause  which appears in the charters  of  the Sword Blade company and 
of the Copper Miners that failure to meet calls when  due rendered  the 
sums, already subscribed on the shares, liable to forfeiture  3. 
The relation  of  the governing body  to the shareholders  varied in 
different  companies.  Mention has already been made of  the great split 
in the East India company but it is worthy of  note that, a  few  years 
later,  when  this body  was  assailed from  outside,  Cook,  the governor, 
was  loyal  to the shareholders  in refusing, as long as it was possible, to 
disclose the destination  of  the secret  service  fund4.  The  connection 
between  Paterson  and  the  Darien  company  reveals  a  spirit of  self- 
sacrifice that  could  scarcely be  anticipated in a  commercial  concer~i~. 
There was  a striking solidarity amongst the stockholders of  the Bank of 
England during its early history; and, in this case, the directors had no 
fixed  fees,  but  "submitted  themselves  wholly  to what  the generality 
allowed them6."  In other companies it was usual  to grant each of  the 
assistants a sum varying from 81 down to 2s. 6d. for every meeting they 
attended'.  Sometimes a  moderate  honorarium  was  provided,  which 
was  divisible  amongst  those  present  at the  court;  while,  when  the 
Newmills company began to succeed, each manager received 212  sterling 
a  year8.  Elaborate rules were framed for a  system of  fines to punish 
unpunctuality,  which  in  some cases embodied a graduated scaleg,  and in 
others particularized  the clock by which  the degree  of  lateness should 
be  decidedlo. 
Unfortunately there were instances where members of  the governing 
body and individual shareholders knowingly betrayed the general interest. 
A  member  of  the Newmills  company was  discovered to be  one of  the 
chief smugglers of English clothn, and an assistant of the Royal Lustring 
l  State Papers,  Domestic, Charles II., CXLII.  1. 
Minutes in lkcords of a Scottish Cloth Manufactory, ut 8UprU, p.  19. 
Vide infra, 11. p. 431 ;  111. p. 435.  Ibid.. 11. D.  160.  ,  A 
A  History  of  ~illiam  paterson  and  the  Darien  Company,  by J. S.  Barbour, 
Edinburgh,  1907,  p.  187. 
A Short ~ccoukt  of the Bank of England, p.  1. 
7  Houghton, Collections, ut supra, No. 98, June 15, 1604. 
Minutes in &cords  ofa  Scottish Cloth Jfanufactorb, ut supra, p.  261. 
Ibid., PP. 17. 311. 
l0 ~arli  &story  ofthe Scots Darien  Company by H. Bingham in Scottish Historical 
Review, 111. p.  325; vide infra, XI.  p. 192. 
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company was proved to have acted in concert with  a  French firm whose 
object was to overthrow the English undertaking'.  It was  asserted also 
that large shareholders used the knowledge  they obtained  of  the affairs 
of  a  certain company to make profits by  speculation  in the shares, but 
there is not sufficient evidence available to confirm this statement. 
A few peculiarities in organization are deserving of  mention.  It was 
announced  that some  of  the  shareholders  in  the London  to Norwich 
stage coach  company  would  give  all  the  dividends  they  received  to 
charity, and the remaining members promised to distribute in the same 
way all profit accruing to them  in excess  of  10 per cent.2  In the con- 
stitution of  the Royal Fishery company it was agreed that the committees 
might  use  10 per  cent. of  the capital, without  giving  the shareholders 
any account of how  such moneys had been disposed of3.  The prospectus 
or "preamble"  for subscriptions of  the Million Bank  promised limited 
liability,  in so far  as no  subscriber should  be  further  answerable  than 
for  the amount of  his stock4.  Local considerations introduced several 
varieties of  type in the Scottish companies.  The Hoyal Burghs were to 
subscribe  one-half  of  the capital of  the Linen  manufacture,  and the 
Leather-stamping undertaking  might  not  enter any town to transact  - 
business  without  an invitation from the magistratess.  Since  so  much 
of the capital for the development of  Scottish industries had been raised 
in  England, it is not surprising that duplicate books of  the Newmills, 
Linen, Baize and Paper companies were kept in London6. 
The financial methods of the period reveal, not only the real scarcity 
of capital, but the strange glamour exercised by what was  called "a fund  , 
of  credit."  The Fire  Insurance  company,  the Bank  of  England and 
the Rilillion  Bank  all carried  on  business without  any working capital 
provided by the members.  In the Insurance undertaking, the partners 
in  1680 paid  the  debt,  incurred by  Barbon,  and pledged  a  rental  of 
B2,160 a  year  as  a  security against  claims7.  Supposing  each  share- 
holder  "subscribed"  the same  amount  of  rental,  the whole  uncalled 
capital would (at 18 years' purchase) be worth 238,880, on which basis 
the uncalled liability would be  close  on  32'3,240 for  each  of  the twelve 
shares.  Those  who  joined  the Million  Bank  simply deposited  certain 
government securities, for which they received a specified amount of  the 
nominal  capital  of  the undertaking,  and the funds for  banking  were 
provided by the depositorss.  The original state of the Bank of  England 
was  even  more hazardous.  The company lent B1,200,000 for a term 
1  Vide inj+a, 111.  pp. 81-3. 
"oughton,  Collections, No. 156, July 26, 1695. 
3  Vide infra, 11.  p. 375.  Ibid., 111.  p. 275. 
"bid.,  111.  pp. 167, 194.  6  Ibid., 111.  pp 150, 166, 173, 183. 
7  Ibid., 111.  p. 375.  Ibid., nr. pp.  275-7. 
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of years to the State, but only &720,000 was called up at first from the 
stockholders, and  the balance  of  2480,000  was  supplied  from  other 
sources, chiefly  out  of  the deposits'.  The Bank  of  Scotland  was  the 
sole  exception, since  it had a working capital of  32'10,000, paid  by the 
members2.  The same magnitied expectation of  the value of  "a fund of 
credit" was  at the root of the land bank schemes of  1695-Ci3. 
The activity of  the period  from  1689 to 1695 is  reflected by  the 
transactions  in  the  shares  of  the  chief  industrial  companies.  The 
mechanism  of  stock  exchange  dealings  had  been  developed.  Time- 
bargains  were  well  understood,  and  "put  and  call  options"  were  not 
unknown.  The business  of  a  stockbroker was  specialized, and a  tariff 
of  charges  had  been  established, varying  from  10s. to 5s.  per  share, 
while  the transfer fee of  the companies was  2s.  6d.' 
The commencemeilt  of  the excitement  arose  from  the  remarkable 
success of  the syndicate for the recovery of  bullion  from the wreck  of 
the Spanish plate-ship at  Hispaniola in 16885.  Until 1693  speculation 
in  similar  ventures  was  exceedingly  active;  and,  according  to Defoe, 
some of  the shares (probably of  32'5  or 210  nominal) changed hands at 
as  much  as 21006.  Then from  1690 there  were  exaggerated  expec- 
tations of  the profits  that would  result  from the production  of  goods 
previously  imported  from  abroad.  Since the  middle  of  the  reign  of 
Charles II., there had been much jealousy of the pre-eminence of France 
in the finer textile and paper  industries.  Duriiig the war, such impor- 
tation was  prohibited;  and, with an adequate supply of  technical  skill, 
it seemed  a  necessary  conclusion  that  the gains  to be  made  by  the 
companies, with  a  monopoly  of  some  process  in  one  of  these  trades, 
would be immense.  The trend of quotations in the shares of  the White 
Paper  Makers  company  shows  the  magnitude  of  these  expectations. 
The  first price  recorded  was  60  at the end  of  March  1692.  Until 
May 9th there was  a  reaction, and at that date the quotation was 41. 
For the next two years  the market  advanced.  In September 1693, 70 
was reached, and thereafter the rise was rapid.  By February 1694, 100 
was quoted, and in May 150-an  increase of 200 per cent. on the average 
recorded price of  1692'. 
The fluctuations ill the shares of the English Linen corporation were 
somewhat sensational.  In 1690 the issue-price was  10, and the following 
l  Vide infra, 111.  p. 207.  Ibid., 111.  p.  256. 
Ibid., 111.  pp. 247-9. 
Houghton,  Collections, Nos. 99, 101, June 24, July 5, 1694; The  Story  of the 
Stock Exchange, by Charles Uuguid, London, 1901, p. 5. 
Vide infra, 11.  pp. 485, 486. 
Essay upon Projects, London, 1697, pp. 12, 13. 
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year an allotment was made to shareholders at 50.  In 1692 the quota- 
tion  varied from 42 to 29.  The year 1693 began with the price at 45, 
by May the shares  were  below  40, at the end  of  July below 30, while 
in December they were no better than 18.  In  1694 the fall was  con- 
tinued until 8 was quoted, and in the following year the variations were 
narrow,  being only  between  7  and 8l.  The absence of  uniformity  in 
the movements of  the securities of  these two companies is  deserving of 
attention.  During the two years 1693 apd 1694 the shares of  the Paper 
company rose from 59 to 150, while those of  the Linen  corporation fell 
from  45 to 8, while in the same period  the variation  in the actions of 
the Lustring company was very small2. 
These  diverse  fluctuations  in  the valuation  of  shares,  subject  to 
the same general  conditions, suggest  the presence  of  some  exceptional 
influence.  This is to be found, in the case of  the Linen corporation, in 
the way that its assets were  dealt with.  Through the agreement with 
Dupin this undertaking received, without payment, a number of  shares 
in  the Irish  company,  which  were  divided  to the shareholders  in  the 
parent concern.  But these shares were saleable at upwards of ten times 
their face value, and therefore such a  scrip dividend  constituted  a  most 
substantial bonus.  It  follows that the high  price  of  the shares from 
1691  to  1693 included  this  bonus,  and  the  subsequent  fall  is  more 
apparent  than  real  and represents  the  adjustment  of  the price,  after 
scrip  in  the  Irish  corporation  ceased  to  be  divided3.  Information 
relating to the cause of  the advance in the shares of  the Paper company 
is wanting, and also as to the fate of  the market after 150 was reached. 
Making  allowance for  the bonus  paid  by  the  Linen  corporation,  the 
course of  the market in its actions is uniform with that in the securities 
of  the  Lustring company,  the average  discount  on  the shares  of  the 
former  in  1695 being  about 25 per  cent.  and  of  the latter  close  on 
20  per  cent.  In other  manufacturing  companies the  course  of  the 
market  yields  similar  results.  Thus in  the case  of  the two glass com- 
panies, either through speculation or extrinsic circumstances, the average 
quotation of  1695 was less than half that recorded in 16924. 
The tendency of  quotations in mining and smelting shares presents 
a  wonderfully  close parallel  to that of  transactions  in  the actions of 
the Linen,  Lustring  and  Paper  companies.  Here  too  there  is  the 
phenomenon  of  a  rapid  depreciation in the prices of  some, co-existing 
with absence of  movement in others.  For instance, shares in the Welsh 
Copper company (the nominal value of  which  is said to have been 4i5) 
were  32 in  1694 and only 10 in  16955.  Similarly, in the three years 
l  Vide infra, 111.  pp. 93-5. 
3  Ibid., 111.  pp.  92, 93, 100. 
6  Ibid., 11.  p.  439. 
a  Ibid., 111.  p.  78. 
Ibid., In. pp.  111, 114. 
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1692 to  1694, there  was  a  depreciation  of  close on  one-half  in  the 
securities of the Derby copper mining company and of  the undertaking 
for  copper  smelting1.  On  the  other  hand  during  the  same  period 
there was  scarcely  any change in  the quotation  of  the actions of  the 
syndicates formed by William Docwra or of  that working the lead mines 
on the property of Sir Carberry Price2. 
The effect  of  the war must also  be  allowed for.  At first it would 
tend towards  immense profits  being  made by companies (such  as  those 
producing powder  or ordnance) which  supplied  the forces.  Under  the 
influence of  the very  large dividends,  which  were  no doubt paid,  the 
shares of  such undertakings would stand at considerable premiums.  In 
other industries  again  there  was  a  large field for the entrepreneur, and 
respectable gains  accrued from such pioneering.  This element accounts 
for some  of  the advances  in  certain  cases,  such  as  that of  the Linen 
corporation.  These phenomena  explain  the premiums  reached  by the 
shares of  a  number  of  companies.  That there  was  a  period  of  wild 
speculation  (as  is  suggested  by  the  Report  of  the Commissioners  of 
Trade3) is disproved by the fact that, up to the beginning of  the crisis in 
1695, there were several undertakings which attained at least a moderate 
success, the shares of  which did not appreciate. 
Any  inflation,  that  there  may  have  been  in  1694,  was  gradually 
reduced  by the growing  stringency of  the money-market;  and, by  the 
summer of  1695, there were the premonitory  symptoms of the beginning 
of  a  crisis.  This was  indicated by the straits to which the government 
was  reduced in its efforts to raise nioney, and by the state of the foreign 
exchanges.  Before the war, exchange on  Amsterdam was at 35s. Flemish 
per  g,  or at a  discount  of  5.8 per cent.*  On August  16th, 1695, the 
discount  was  as  high  as  36.9  per  cent.5  This adverse  state  of  the 
exchanges was  occasioned, partly by  the exceedingly bad  state of  the 
coinage,  partly  by  financial  difficulties  of  the  government.  For  a 
considerable period the nun~ber  of  defective coins had occasioned much 
inconvenience  in  the transaction  of  business.  For  instance,  in  1684, 
Philip Madox complained that the goldsmiths would  receive, at its face 
value,  none but "choice  money,"  and that  in a  payment  of  2195 in 
guineas  25 of  those he tendered had been rejected6.  As time went on, 
the better  coins  were  exported,  and  those  that remained  were  much 
below the legal weight.  The evils  that resulted  have been graphically 
pictured  by  Macaulay-"  When  the  great  instrument  of  exchange 
l  Vide infra,  11.  pp. 435, 439.  Ibid., 11.  pp. 439, 440. 
Journals of the House of Conzmons, xr.  p. 595. 
*  Add.  MS. (Brit. Mus.) 28,078, f. 356. 
"ogers,  First Nine  Years of'the  Bank of England,  pp. 41, 164. 
6  Diary-MS.  Eg. (Brit. Mus.) 1,627, f. 64. Suspension  of  the  Bank  1696  [CHAP. XVII. 
became  thoroughly  deranged,  all trade,  all  industry  were  smitten  as 
with  a  palsy.  The evil was  felt daily and hourly in almost every place 
and by almost every class, in the dairy and on the threshing floor, by the 
anvil and by the loom, on the billows of  the ocean and in the depths of 
the mine.  Nothing could be purchased without  a dispute.  Over every 
counter  there  was  wrangling  from  morning to  night.  The workman 
and  his  employer  had  a  quarrel  as  regularly  as  the  Saturday  came 
round.  On  a  fair day  or a market  day the clamours, the reproaches, 
the taunts, the curses were  incessant;  and it was  well  if  no booth was 
overturned and no head broken.  No merchant would contract to deliver 
goods without making some stipulation about the quality of  the coin in 
which he was to be paid.  Even  men  of  business were  often bewildered 
by the confusion  into which  all pecuniary  transactions  were  thrown1." 
Though some of  the details in  this picture are certainly exaggerated, 
the  urgency  of  a  reform  of  the currency  was  sufficiently pressing  to 
induce  the administration  to undertake  a  re-coinage  in  the midst  of 
a costly war, and at a time when the strain  on  the finances had become 
almost  intolerable.  This step had been  resolved  upon  at the end of 
1695, and the re-coinage was  actually begun early in the following yeaa 
The carrying  out of  this policy revealed the dangers  surrounding  the 
Bank of England, which was  without an adequate reserve for the critical 
times  in which  it had to work.  It was  moreover  forced to strain  its 
credit  to the uttermost  in  the service of  the State; and, at the same 
time, it was  subject to attacks on the one side from  the Tories and on 
the other  from  the private  bankers.  The  combination  of  all  these 
circumstallces produced  the run  of  May 4th, 1696, and the consequent 
suspension of  cash payments of  the notes of  the Bank2. 
Had the crisis been  mainly  a  monetary  one, it would have  passed 
away when the new  coins were  in circulation, but  it lasted  until about 
March  in  the following year  (1697).  All  the evidence  points  to the 
conclusion that the "want  of  money,"  in  this as in previous periods of 
acute  depression, was  a  symptom, not  the cause  of  the malady.  The 
chief influence tending towards a dislocation of  credit continued to make 
itself  felt.  This was  the cumulative  weight  of  the cost  of  the war, 
acting at a time when the volume of trade was becoming more and more 
restricted. 
The revenue (exclusive of  loans) in  the last years  of  the reign  of 
Charles  11.  had been  about l+  millions.  At the  Revolution  it  was 
2 millions;  and, after paying this sum, it was  calculated that the nation 
was  saving  at the rate of  82,400,000  a  year.  One result of  the war 
1 Histoy (1865), rv.  pp. 626, 627; cf. Rogers, First  Nine  Years of  the  Bank  of 
England,  pp. 30-6. 
Vide infra, 1x1. pp. 208, 209. 
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was  at least to wipe out this surplus by losses of shipping and restriction 
of  trade.  According to Davenant  the national  income in  1698 (after 
the peace) was  a million less than it had been ten years before1; so that 
while  hostilities were  in progress, in  view  of  the recorded  captures of 
ships  and the decline in foreign  trade, it is probable that, without any 
additional  burden,  the  national  dividend  would  have  just  met  the 
expenses of  the people.  But the cost of  the war compelled the govern- 
ment to augment the revenue;  and in the three financial years 1691-2, 
1692-3,  1693-4,  in  addition  to the settled  revenue,  there  was  raised 
annually, by special  parliamentary grants for  the war,  2$ millions, this 
being considerably in excess of  the average from this source during the 
whole reign2.  It follows  that inroads were being made on the national 
capital  at the  rate  of  over  two  millions annually.  The cumulative 
effect of  such  a burden  was  great, and there is to be added the weight 
of  debt, which  involved  an  addition  to the expenditure  of  close  on  a 
quarter  of  a  million in 1692 and 16933.  Moreover, the extraordinary 
expenses  became  heavier  as  the struggle progressed.  Thus the esti- 
mates, which  had  been  4 millions for  the navy and army in 1692, had 
grown  to 55 millions in  16964,  with  the result that by 1697 there was 
a debt outstanding  of  17;  millionss, of which 6;  millions was funded at 
the end of  the year6. 
The unfunded  debt  was  the measure  of  the embarrassment  of  the 
administration.  It represented so-called securities, many of  which were 
hovering  on  the verge  of  default.  Tallies were  issued when there was 
no  more than a  pious hope that they would be redeemed;  and, in view 
of  the state of national credit, it is not surprising that these obligations 
were  at an  immense  discount.  Even  the recently  created Exchequer 
Bills were  14 to 15 per  cent. below par in the middle of  1696'.  The 
l  Works, ut supra, I.  p.  250. 
Vide infraj 1x1.  p.  539; An Abstract  of  the  Receipts  and  Issues  of  the  Publick 
Revenue,  Taxes and Loans during  the Reign of His late Majesty  King  William; that is 
to say from the  5th of  November 1688 ...  to  the  25th of March  1702, in Sorners'  Tracts 
(1751), XII.  p.  72*. 
Interest  paid  at the Exchequer  from September  29th to the same  day in the 
following  year- 
1689-1690  ...  ...  ...  %48,715  11  74 
1690-1691  ...  ...  ...  121,584  15  12 
1691-1692  ...  ...  ...  202,374  5  39 
1692-1693  ...  ...  .  220,321  4  llQ 
-Lansd.  MS. 1215, f.  52. 
Journab ofthe House of Commons, X.  pp.  437, 547, 711 ;  XI.  pp.  345, 347. 
Davenant,  Works, I. p.  250. 
"History  ofthe Earlier  E'enrs  of the Funded Debt,  1694-1786  [C.  90101, p. 15. 
Vide infia, 1x1.  pp.  909-11;  Evelyn, Diary, ut  supra,  11.  p.  358; History  and 
hoceedings of  the House of  C'ommons, ut supra, 111. pp.  60-1. 330  Fall  in Stocks 1692-7  [CHAP.  XVII. 
land bank  had  been  expected  to provide two  millions, but it utterly 
failed  to make good  its offer, besides adding to the want of  credit by 
increasing the suspicions of bank-notes l. 
Under pressure from the government, the Bank of Englandwas induced 
to adopt a device i11  January 1697, which  at once tended to steady the 
market in  tallies and other  unfunded debts, but which was temporarily 
most  depressing  in  its effects  011  the quotation  of  Bank  stock.  This 
scheme consisted in the distribution of  the reserved profits to make the 
stock fully paid, and then the taking of  a subscription for a temporary 
addition to the capital, known  as  the engrafted stock, which  might be 
paid  as  to four-fifths  in tallies.  The eFect of  this method  of  support- 
ing the credit  of  the State was to transfer the discount at which tallies 
stood to Bank stock.  Early in  1696 the latter (then partly paid) had 
been at  48 premium.  Under the combined effects of the passing of  the 
land bank act and the suspension, it  had fallen to 7 discount at  the end of 
the year.  The engraftment of  the tallies produced a more serious effect 
than all the other adverse tendencies;  and, in February 1697, the fully 
paid stock was at 514, or a discount of  nearly 50 per cent.2 
The severity of  the culmination of  the crisis in the first half  of  tKe 
year 1697 may best be shown by a comparison of  the highest prices of a 
number of  representative securities, beginning in  1692, with  the lowest 
point touched up to the end of  1697: 
Compari.son of the  Highest  and  Lowest  Prices  of certain 
stocks  and  shares,  1692-7. 
East  India  Royal  African  Hudson's Bay 
Company  Company  Company 
Highest  Price 
1692-1  200 (1692)  52 (1692)  260  (1692) 
Lowest  Price 
I 692-7 
King's and  Queen's Cor- 
Royal  Lustring  poration for the Linen 
Company £25 shs.  manufacture  in England 
Bank  of  England  issued at $5  Prem.  £10 shs. 
Highest  Price 
1692-7  48  Prem.  (169G)  32 (1692)  4.5  (1693) 
Lowest  Price 
1692-7  489 Disc.  (1697)  l8 (1697)  5  (1697j 
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CHAPTER  XVIII. 
JOINT-STOCK  COMPANIES  FROM  THE  CRISIS  OF 1697 
TO  THAT  OF 1708. 
THE  crisis of  1696-7 began to pass away when it was  recognized that 
the negotiations in progress were likely to  result in a cessation of hostilities, 
and the restoration  of  confidence   receded  the actual signature of  the 
peace at Ryswick by some months.  Both the Bank of  England and the 
Hudson's  Bay company had suffered greatly by the war-the  latter by 
the capture of  its forts by the l;'l.enchl and the former through being forced 
to engraft into its stock the depreciated  tallies2.  It was  not surprising 
therefore  that the securities of  both should rise apart from the general 
recovery, but the magnitude of the rebound from the lowest point during 
the depression is  only to be  explained by the co-operation of both series 
of  causes.  Hudson's  Bay stock advanced from 80 to 130 in 1697, or a 
rise  of  no less  than 624 per  cent.3  The extreme  quotations of  Bank 
stock  during the same period  are 51 and  98,  but the former  price  is 
that of  this security with 280 paid, while the latter is the quotation of 
it as fully paid.  Therefore dealings  in the stock, with 280 paid, at 51 
are equivalent  to a price  of  632 for the same security with 2100 paid, 
and  hence  the real  rise  was  about  53 per  cent.'  The quotations  of 
East India stock are of  no value  in  testing the extent of  the return  of 
confidence, since this undertaking  was  affected by all  the uiicertaintics, 
surrounding the expected  settlement  of  the disputes  which  had  been 
hanging over the market  since  16935. 
It is  only to be anticipated that many of  the companies, which had 
been formed during the activity from  1690 to 1695, should have come 
to grief  during a crisis of  exceptional severity, indeed it was the custom 
of  writers of  a generation  later to represent the promotions of  1690 to 
1695 as "bubbles"  or schemes which were chimerical, nheil not dishonest. 
l  Vide infru, 11. p. 231.  "bid.,  111. p. 210. 
Ibid., 11. pp.  233, 237.  Ibid., 111. pp.  211, 244. 
Ibid., 11. pp.  163-7,  181. 
While, as almost invariably happens during a period  of  excitement, the 
production  arranged  for,  in  some  directions,  was  in  excess  of  the 
demand,  there  were  very  few  schemes  which  could  not be justified  as 
speculative investments.  Even the syndicates for the recovery of treasure, 
if  regarded  as a whole, left  a  large balance of  profit1.  Supposing that 
there were in all twenty schemes with an average capital of  &1,000 each 
and that all the imitators of  the original expedition involved themselves 
in loss, the success  of  the first venture still left a balance, after making 
good  such  loss  equal to nine times the resources estimated to have been 
employed in this class of  venture. 
In some  cases (e.g.  the Linen  corporationa) errors  in  finance were 
committed, but these were incidental to the knowledge  of  the time and 
were  shared,  by companies that have succeeded as well as by those that 
failed.  Thus, in this respect, the Bank  of  England, under  pressure of 
the administration3, was one of the chief  offenders.  Such mistakes were 
inevitable  in  critical  times, when  many  of  the industries started were 
experiments,  and when  the particular  mode  of  organization  was  new 
and had  not been  generally  adopted  hitherto,  outside foreign  trades. 
That the activity  of  1690 to 1695 was  justified  is  shown  by  the con- 
siderable proportion of  undertakings which were then started and which 
survived into the nineteenth century.  In this connection the names of 
the Banks of  England and of  Scotland  immediately suggest  thenlselves 
and to these are to  be added the Million Bank, the Hampstead Aqueducts 
and the London Bridge Water-works, the latter includi~lg  two companies 
of the 1690 to 1695 period which were amalgamated in 1703'.  Needless 
to say, such a  long history  is  the exception  amongst commercial con- 
cerns, but there were many companies which survived the crisis, some of 
which  recovered  afterwards and attained  to a respectable success, while 
others continued  to exist, but in an enfeebled  condition.  The causes, 
which resulted in the failure of  some and the relative success of  others, 
differ in various groups of  undertakings;  and, since several are of  con- 
siderable intcrest, it is worth enquiring which  of  the ventures  survived. 
It may be  premised, however, that, owing to the disrepute  into which 
transactions  in  stocks and shares  had fallens, information  relating  to 
companies  is  comparatively  rare  after  1697  and  many  undertakings 
may  have enjoyed  great prosperity  without  such  success having  been 
recorded.  Accordingly the surviving  companies mentioned below must 
be  taken  as  the minimum,  and it is probable  that the list  could  be 
Vide infra, 11. pp.  485-8.  2  Ibid.,  III. pp. 95, 96. 
Arldr6adhs, Hiutory of the Bank of England, p. 109. 
Vide infra, 111. p. 15. 
Cf.  The Villany of Stock-Job6er.r detected, [by  D. Defoe] 1701, in A True Cbllection 
of  the  Writings of the Author  of the True-Born Englishman,  1703, pp.  225-71. 
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considerably extended, if  the data for the ten  years after 1697 were  as 
complete  as  those  for  the period  from  1690 to 1695.  Moreover  the 
crisis was  primarily an  English  one.  As far as  can  be ascertained,  it 
only affected Scotland in  so far as the inflow of  English capital thither 
was  checked.  For this reason  it will  be  advisable to deal  first  of  all 
with the state of  companies in England after the summer of  1697, and 
later with that of the undertakings in Scotland at the same period. 
First of  all,  as  already  indicated,  the syndicates  for the recovery 
of  treasure had  disappeared  by this date.  Then,  while  the return  of 
peace was an immense advantage to industry generally, this event  was 
pre.judicia1 to certain companies whose position was exceptional.  Of  the 
armament undertakings, nothing more is heard of the powder companies1 
or of  those for making ordnance2.  The only enterprize of  this descrip- 
tion, which  is known  to have  been  able to carry on business after the 
crisis, was the Sword Blade company which was in the position of  being 
able to pay  dividendss.  Another  group was  similarly  affected.  The 
companies formed  to produce  commodities, of  which  the importation 
was  difficult during the war,  experienced  a  double  misfortune.  Even 
before  the  peace,  the prosperity  to which  they  might  otherwise hwe 
attained, was  checked by the strain on the finances which induced the 
administration  to impose heavy excise  duties  on a number  of  the new 
manufactures  such  as white  paper  and glassd.  It follows that under- 
takings  in this group were deprived  of  the full measure of  protection 
which the circumstances of  the time would  otherwise have given them, 
and  the  continuance  of  these  excises  after  the  peace,  when  foreign 
competition  had  to be faced, further weakened  such  companies as had 
weathered the period  of  stress.  The White Paper makers continued to 
exist  in  169S5,  and the Linen  corporation also survived the crisis6, but 
in each case, after a short interval, both businesses appear to have been 
wound  up.  The same tendency  is  shown  in  the history  of  the other 
companies  formed  to carry  on  these  industries, all  of  which seem  to 
have disappeared by 1699, with the exception  of  the wall-paper  under- 
taking which was prosecuting its trade actively at a later date7.  One of 
the glass companies too was sufficiently successful to  distribute dividendss, 
and the English Tapestry makers continued, though it was found  neces- 
sary to wind up this concern about 1703"  The effect of the peace on this 
1  Vide infra, 11.  p.  474.  2  Ibid., 111. p.  109 
3 Ibid., 111. p.  456. 
A  Historu  of Taxation and  Taxes, by S. Dowell,  London,  IV.  pp.  290,  304;  "  -  .  - 
vide Llfra,  III.  pp.  69,  111,  112. 
6  Vide infra, 111. p.  68.  G  Ibid., 111. p.  97. 
Ibid., III. p.  72.  8  Ibid., 111. p. 113. 
9  Zbid.,  III. p.  119. 
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class of undertakings is clearly shown in the quotation of the shares of the 
Lustring company.  During the crisis  the price was  rarely  below  par 
(k25) and was  often  higher.  As other securities rose on the prospects 
of peace, Lustring shares fcll,  from 38 in 1696 to 18 in the latter half of 
1697.  This movement is to be attributed, not only to the general fear 
of foreign competition, but also, in this special case, to the revelations as 
to the extent to which the company had suffered through stnugglingl. 
Of the banking and finance companies, besides the Bank of England, 
the Orphans' and  the Million  Banks  remained,  but the latter felt the 
shock  of  the crisis in being  driven  from  banking  proper  and existed 
thereafter  exclusively  as  a  trust  or  investment  company2. 
In the mining group the old  society  of  the Mineral  and Battery 
Works still existed, but the Mines Royal Act of  1693 had deprived the 
companion  undertaking  of  any  scope  for  its  operations.  However, 
owing to the practical  amalgamation of  the two societies, the charters 
of  both were claimed to be operative ;  and, from the practice of holding 
meetings, as those of  the Mines Royal and Mineral and Battery Works, 
an intricate legal point arose in the year 17205.  Amongst other mining 
companies, that formed to work the mines of  Sir Carberry Price and the 
undertaking  established by Docwra were  doing well;  while  the Copper 
Miners, both of England and of  Wales, continued to exist4. 
There was  one group, namely the water-supply companies, numbering 
about eight  separate  undertakings  for the London  area,  all  of  which 
survived the crisis.  At the same  time  the period  of  activity had  had 
the effect of  inducing excessive competition with the consequence of  an 
undue inconvenience to the public in the breaking up  of  the streets for 
the laying  of  mains;  and,  through  much  of  the  outlay  proving  un- 
remunerative, the shares of  the weaker  companies became depreciated, 
several of  them  finding it difficult to raise capital at a later date when 
it was  required.  Thus  in  l700 the  shares  of  220 nominal  of  the 
Hampstead Aqueducts  were  sold at 2159 
Finally of  the miscellaneous  companies there is  information  of  the 
fate of  only two after 1697.  These were the insurance office, originally 
founded by Barbon  and the Convex Lights company.  The former was 
in an unsatisfactory condition;  and the company, formed in  1680, was 
either wound up or reorganized in 17036.  The Convex Lights company, 
though its success led to the starting of  competitive schemes, continued 
to do well, and it  was able to hold the contract it had obtained from the 
Vidc infra, 111. p. 89.  Ihid,, 1x1. p. 277. 
Ibid., 11.  pp. 404, 40.5, 428, irr. p. 398. 
Ibid., 11. pp. 433, 437, 438, 4-14. 
Ibid., 111.  pp. 6,  7,  13, 11, 26, 32, 33. 
"bid.,  111. pp. 376, 377. 
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Corporation  for  street-lighting1.  One  of  the land-companies  is  to be 
added  to the list of  those that are known to have out-lasted the crisis2, 
so that altogether, adding the three joint-stock organizations for foreign 
trade, of 93 English companies that were carrying on business from 1690 
to 1695, 28 can be ascertained  to have been  in existence in 1698, or at 
least  29 per  cent.,  and it is  probable  that this  number  ol~ght  to be 
increased,  since  there  are  no  particulars  as  to  when  many  of  the 
manufacturing  and mining  companies were  wound  up. 
I11  Scotland  the crisis from  1695 to 1697 produced comparatively 
small  effects.  Its  influence  was  indirect  rather  than  direct.  The 
scarcity of  capital in London  precluded  the making of  further invest- 
ments of English resources in Scotland, and it is probable that, owing to 
the indignation which had been  aroused  amongst the mercantile classes 
of  both  countries  concerning  the inception  and development  of  the 
Darien  scheme, even had there been no financial crisis, such investment 
would have ceased for a considerable ~eriod. It  follows, then, that there 
was not the same abrupt check to prosperity in Scotland that there had 
been  in England, and it is  significant  that, while  there was  an almost 
complete  cessation  of  new enterprize  south  of  the Tweed  in  1696 and 
part  of  1697; in Scotland, during these  years, capital was  being found 
for  nlanufactures  and for calls on  the stock  of  the Darien  company3. 
The only change  in the situation was  that after 1695 such capital was 
raised locally and not supplied in part from England. 
When Scotland was  fortunate in escaping the full effects of the crisis 
of 1695-7, it might be concluded that more of  the companies established 
there wo~lld  have  been  in existence in 1698 than remained in England 
at the same date.  As far as can be ascertained, out of  47 undertakings, 
which had been  at work between 1690 and 1695, only l2  are known  to 
have been  able to carry on business in the last years of  the seventeenth 
century.  The most  prominent  of  these were the Darien company, the 
Bank  of  Scotland,  the Soaperie, two  Sugaries, a  Koperie,  three  cloth 
companies,  one  for  paper  and the  wool-card  manufactory'.  On  the 
whole  then,  taking  England  and Scotland  together,  out of  the  140 
companies particularised  in the previous chapters, there is information 
to show that at least  40 (or  about 28 per  cent.)  were  in a  condition 
which  enabled  them  to continue to carry  on  business  in  1698. 
During the continuance of the crisis in England, the phenomenon of 
the recent  formation  of  many  new  companies, accompanied by  active 
dealings in their shares, followed by the collapse of  the majority of  these 
1  Vide injka, 111. p. 60.  "bid.,  111. p. 417. 
"Ibid.,  11. p. 218. 
Ibid., 11. pp. 217-9,111. pp. 132, 136, 153, 159, 160, 174, 179, 258. 
Via% supa, pp. 335, 336. 
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undertakings, naturally  excited  attention, and the tendency of  opinion 
was  to attribute the series of  failures  to "the pernicious art of  stock- 
jobbing."  As  in  most  other  periods  of  acute depression, the popular 
remedy for the disorder of  credit was based on a superficial examination 
of  the facts.  To many  observers  it was  sufficient  evidence  that  the 
crisis  had followed a great increase  in  the dealings in shares and other 
securities, whence it was inferred that the latter event was  the cause  of 
the former.  Moreover, there were reasons of a semi-political nature, which 
made the administration prone to offer the "stock-jobber"  as a scape-goat 
to bear the burden of the great decline in the national credit.  In addition 
to the shares of  companies, tallies and other obligations of  the govern- 
ment were actively dealt in, and such transactions advertized the immense 
discount at which some of  these securities stood from 1695 to 1697. 
The condemnation  of  the stockbroker was  expressed  in a report of 
the Commissioners appointed to look after the Trade of England, which 
was  dated  November  24th,  1696.  In this document  it is  stated  that 
"the  pernicious art of  stock-jobbing hath of  late so perverted the end 
and design of  companies and corporations erected for the introducing or 
carrying on of  manufactures to the private profit  of  the first projectors, 
that the privileges granted to them have commonly been  made no other 
use  of  by  the first  procurers  and  subscribers  but  to sell  them  with 
advantage to ignorant  men, drawn in by the reputation, falsely raised 
and artfully spread, concerning the thriving state of  their stock.  Thus 
the first undertakers getting quit of  the company by  selling their shares 
for much more than they are really worth to men allured by the noise of 
great profit, the management of  that trade and stock comes to fall into 
unskilful hands, whereby the manufactures intended to be  promoted  by 
such grants and put into the management  of  companies for  their better 
improvement come, from very promisir~g  beginnings, to dwindle away to 
nothing and be in a worse condition than if  they were perfectly left free 
and unassisted by such laws and patents;  an instance whereof we  humbly 
conceive is to be found in  the paper and linen  manufactures, which, we 
fear, feel the effects of  this stock-jobbing management and are not in so 
thriving a condition as they might have been  had  they not fallen under 
this  kind  of  misfortune'."  This  report is directed chiefly against the 
alleged arts of  the promoter, who was able to carry out the designs with 
which he was  charged, by means of  the mechanism of  the stock-market. 
It was said of the brokers that "they  confederated themselves together," 
either to raise or depress prices as suited their interests2. 
l  Journals of the  House  of  Commons,  XI. p. 595; cf. Essay  upon Projects,  1697, 
pp.  12,  13; A  Letter  written to a Member  of  Parliament  relating to  Trade, by John 
Bgleton, 1702, in Somers'  Tracts (1748)  111. p. 550. 
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Thus  the  censures,  made  on  transactions  in  stocks,  are  directed 
upon  two  different  interests, on the one side against the promoter and 
on the other against the dealer.  As regards  the latter, there  is  ample 
evidence that facilities were  granted for the purchasing of  securities  on 
margins.  Options were  understood, and "bear"  sales were made.  Still 
the chief operators were  not brokers by profession, but members of  the 
rising  class  of  "monied  men,"  who  employed  agents  to execute  their 
commissions1.  Such men organized an elaborate system of  intelligence 
for conveyance of  the earliest possible news of  events that affected their 
interests.  Thus Sir Josia  Child, and subsequently his  son, Sir Francis 
Child, established a  private  express service from  the south  of  Ireland, 
which  gave  early information  of  the arrival  of  East India ships, while 
several directors of  the Bank of  England were  in possession  of  news  of 
events  on  the continent  in  advance of  the government  offices.  These 
astute operators  naturally took  steps to reap  the full  benefit  of  their 
enterprize, by instructing brokers, who were known to  act for them, to sell 
when they had just received favourable information, while, on a reaction 
being established, other agents purchased quickly2.  On the whole, how-? 
ever, the effect of  such speculative manipulation of  the stock market, as 
existed  in  the  seventeenth  century,  was  less  than  might  have  been 
expected.  It is  to be  remembered  that the investment of  capital was 
subject  to immense  risks.  So much depended  on the issue of  the war 
that the future of Bank stock and of  the obligations of  the government 
was  exceedingly uncertain.  East India stock again was not only subject 
to special risks  during  hostilities,  but,  in  addition,  according  as  the 
expected settlement of  the trade was  unfavourable or favourable  to the 
company, its securities in  fire years  from 1697 might  be  worthless, or 
selling at ROO  to 3003.  In ~urely  domestic  undertakings, all  the dis- 
appointments  that are encountered  in starting a  large number of  new 
industries simultaneously,  were  to be  anticipated.  In  view  of  these 
factors, all of  which tended  to produce  great instability  of  prices, it is 
remarkable  that quotations display  so  little of  the see-saw  movement 
due to market  manipulation, but on  the contrary  follow  well  defined 
The  Consolidator:  or  Memoirs  of  Smdry Transactions from  the  World in the 
Moon,  1705,  pp.  256,  257. 
Chronicles and  Characters  of  the  Stock  Exchange,  by John  Francis,  London, 
1849,  pp.  23,  365. 
This aspect of the situatio~l  was overlooked by Defoe when he wrote that East 
India stock, "withill  ten years  or thereabouts, without any material  difference iri 
intrinsick  value, has  been sold  from $300  per  cent. to $37  per  cent. from whence 
with fluxes and  refluxes, as  frequent as the tides, it has been up to £150 per  cent. 
againn-ViTillany  of' Stock-Jobbers Detected  in  True  Collection of  the  Writings of  the 
Author  of the Tvue-Born Englishman,  1703, p. 257. 
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lines  of  movement,  the causes  of  which  can  generally be  traced,  even 
after the lapse of  a long interval of  time1. 
The attack of  the Comlnissioners of  Trade on promoters, as a class, 
comprises  two  main charges.  First that they circulated  false  or  mis- 
leading statements, relating to the prospects of  the companies they had 
formed,  and  then,  when  as  a  consequence the shares  advanced,  they 
sold  on  a  rising  market.  In  several cases,  indeed  in  whole  groups of 
companies,  the  shares  advanced  to  a  great  premium.  This was  so 
especially in mining undertakings and the syndicates for the recovery of 
treasure2.  In each  of  these instances  there was  the inducement offered 
by great gains, already made, and there is no record of  misrepresentation 
by  the promoters  of  these  companies formed from  1690 to 1695.  In 
the manufacturing group of  undertakings, information is wanting  as to 
the cause  of  the advance  in  the shares of  the White Paper company3, 
while  that of  the English  Linen  corporation  is to be assigned to the 
manner in which  the "community of  interest"  between this concern and 
the Irish undertaking affected prices4.  In the remaining companies for 
new  manufactures  there is no  record of  large premiums being obtained 
on  the shares.  It  follows, therefore, that the available evidence does 
not support the charge of  a fraudulent engineering of  a large rise in the 
prices of  shares in these undertakings, in order to enable the promoters 
to dispose of  their holdings.  On the contrary, the fact that the sums, 
reserved to the founders of a company at  its inception were comparatively 
moderate,  points  to the opposite  conclusion, while  the allegation that 
the reputation of  such  stocks  was  "falsely  raised and artfully spread" 
is not established by anything published in the newspapers of  the time. 
The press, with the exception of  Houghton's  ColZectio?ts, contented itself 
with the insertion  of  advertisements without  comment, while the latter 
explains the nature of the different schemes, but as a rule without adding 
any strong recommendation. 
If  then  there  was  no  general  inflation  of  prices  by  means of  the 
circulation  of  misleading  information,  the explanation  of  the collapse 
contained  in  the Report-namely  that the only  persons, possessed  of 
technical  knowledge, having sold their shares, the management fell into 
unskilful hands-breaks  down.  Indeed, in the two conlpanies instanced 
in  the Report those  who  were  prominent  in  the direction  about  1690 
l  These causes, as  far as they affect  the chief stocks, are dealt  with uncler the 
heads of  the respective co~npanies-vide infra, 11. pp. 28, 29, 159,160,163,16G,  168, 
173, 183, 186, 233, 432, 433, 437, 438, 450, 111.  pp.  25, 26, 56, 50, 67, 78, 95, 96, 
97, 210-12,  244, 274,  280-1,  287.  Cf.  also Rogers, First  Nine  Years of  the  Bank 
of England,  pp.  25-7,  62, 70, 92, 93, 98, 100, 101, 132, 133, 153, 154, 158-60. 
Anglia Tutnmen, p.  18 ;  An Essay upon Projects,  pp.  12, 13; The  Consolidator, 
1705, p.  260. 
3  Vide irzfrn, III.  p.  67.  4  Ibid., III.  pp. 93-6. 360  Stockbrokers'  Badges  169'7  [CHAP. XVII~. 
continued to hold  their shares  in 1697.  Amongst  such inventors and 
promoters  may  be  mentioned  Nicholas  Dupin  and John Tyzack,  who 
between them were connected with about ten separate companies1. 
For these  reasons, it appears that the blame, laid on stock-,jobbing, 
was  to a  large extent undeserved.  Still the imputation was  so widely 
accepted  that various legislative  and other devices were adopted  with 
a view to restrict transactions in stocks and shares.  It was  enacted  in 
the act of 1697, which authorized the increase in the capital of  the Bank 
of England, that no contract for the sale of  the stock should be valid in 
law, unless it was registered at the office within  seven days and actually 
transferred inside a fortnight2.  The object of  this clause was to prevent 
dealings on margin.  Then a  measure was  passed  in  1697 "to  restrain 
the number  and ill-practices  of  brokers and stock-jobbers."  In future 
the  number  was  limited  to 100, and candidates  were  required  to be 
licensed  by  the Court  of  Aldermen  of  the City.  After enrolment, the 
authorized  broker  had  to  show  a  badge  on  the completion  of  each 
transaction.  He was  bound  to keep  books  and  was  prohibited  from 
dealing  on  his  own  account  under a penalty of  2200 for each oflence. 
Anyone  who  acted  as a  stockbroker, without  the statutory authoriza- 
tion,  was  subject  to a  penalty  of  2500, and  to be  thrice  pilloried3. 
Further  evidence  of  the  drift  of  opinion  against  the stock-jobbers  is 
shown  by  their expulsion  from  the Royal  Exchange in  1698, whence 
they  migrated  to Exchange Alley4-a  locality  destined  to become  as 
notorious  at a later date as the Rue Quincampoix in Paris.  They were 
violently  attacked  in  a  pamphlet  entitled  the Villany of  Stock-Jobbers 
Detected"  and the joint  effect of  the crisis  and the obloquy to which 
the brokers  were  subjected,  caused  newspapers  which  had  begun  to 
quote changes of  prices  in the stock market to discontinue the practice. 
Even Houghton, who in 1694 had printed the names of  fifty companies 
in his list, in 1698 reduced it till quotations of  only seven securities were 
included.  At the same time he introduced a very ingenious departure 
by placing a small figure at the side of  the quotation, e.g. Bank stock- 
92 r p, 91 24, 96 3 p,  103  oq.  No  explanation  is given of  this notation, 
but it seems  highly probable  that these  small figures are intended  to 
record  the number  of  quotations at a given  price  on the day  named. 
Thus 103  oq would  mean  that this price  was  offered, or that stock was 
for sale at this limit, but that no business resulted6. 
l  Vide infra, 11. pp.  441, 487, Irr.  pp.  64, 71, 90, 109, 119, 163, 182, 187. 
Statutes, ~II.  p.  227. 
3  Ibid.,  VII.  p. 285 ;  Reports Hist. MSS. Com. xrrr.,  Pt. VI.,  p.  304. 
Anderson,  Annals  of  Commerce, 111. p.  195; The Story  of the  Stock  Exchange, 
by C. Duguid,  London,  1901, p.  17. 
6  Printed  in 1701.  It was written by  Defoe.  B  Vide supra, p. 361. 
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The disrepute of  stock  dealing explains  the apparent anomaly that 
during three and  a  half  years of  very great prosperity from the middle 
of  1697 to the end of  1700, very few new companies were established in 
England.  In  Scotland, on  the other hand, between  1696 and 1702 no 
less than twelve undertakings were started.  The cloth  trade there had 
shown  signs  of  revival, and it appears  that  about  l700 the  Newniills 
company paid  a  dividend  of  18 per  cent.'  This success induced com- 
petition,  or at least  imitation,  and  woollen  manufacturing  companies 
were  established  at Glasgow (two), at Aberdeen  and in  Berwickshire2. 
Two new  sugaries " were  founded, also  four glass companies and two 
factories  for  hardware3.  The check  to the activity in  Scotland began 
to make itself felt about 1700; when, after a series of  bad harvests, it was 
discovered that the country had  been  investing too freely in  new  enter- 
prizes for  the home  trade and, especially, when  it was  found  that the 
Darien scheme had miscarried4. 
The wave  of  prosperity  in  England  continued  till  the end  of  the 
year 1700.  With the return of  peace, trade everywhere expanded, and 
the recovery was aided by a series of favourable seasons.  From 1701 to 
1703 wheat and other agricultural products  were  sold  at low  prices5, 
and there was  much  activity in farming.  This tendency is  shown  by 
the number  of  petitions and grants at this period for the establishing of 
new  markets and fairs6.  Shipping revived  after it was  known  that the 
depredations of  privateers were  no  longer  to be feared, and steps were 
taken  to add to the safety of  navigation  by erecting new  beacons  and 
lighthouses7.  Internal communication and transport were  improved by 
an extension of water-carriage through the making of a number of  rivers 
navigables.  The total foreign trade, which had fallen to only 7 millions 
in  1696-7,  advanced  to 133  millions  i11  1699-1700  and  to close  on 
136  millions in  1700-1,  an  increase  in  the four years  of  over  90 per 
cent.g  The expansion  of  commerce, coupled with the improvement  in 
the state of  the.  national finances, produced  a  marked  reduction  in  the 
1 Becords of a Scottish Cloth Manufactory, ut supra,  pp.  336, 337  (note). 
Vide infra, 111.  pp.  160, 161. 
Ibid., 111. pp.  136, 188, 180-92. 
*  The Fiscal  Policy  of Scotland before  the  Union-Scot.  Hist.  Review,  r.  pp.  181, 
182; On  the  Price  of  Wheat at  Haddington,  by  R.  C. Mossman,  Edinburgh,  1900, 
p.  29. 
Rogers, Agriculture and Prices, ut supra, v. p.  278. 
State  Papers,  Domestic,  Petition  Entry  Books  and  Home  Office  Warrant 
Books,  1701-1703. 
The  Growth  of  English  Industry  and  Conamerce  in  Modern  Times,  by  W. 
Cunningham,  1903,  p.  488. 
Journals ofthe House  of Commons, XI. pp.  368, 372, 673. 
g  State  oJ  the  Trade  of  Great  Britain,  by Sir  C.  Whitworth, London,  1776 
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rate of  interest.  Instead  of  the government  being forced to borrow at 
8 per cent. or even  at greater  cost, by l700 proposals were  made for  a 
loan at 5 per cent.' 
One of  the first  consequences of  the return  of  prosperity  was  the 
effort  to  effect  a  settlement  of  the  African  and East  India  trades. 
In either  case  the  administration  would  have  been  disposed  to have 
granted  a  monopoly  to  any  group  of  capitalists  who  provided  a 
considerable loan, since money was  still required to reduce the floating 
debt.  With African  stock  selling at an  average price of  only  15 for 
2100 nominal2,  neither  the company nor  its opponents were  prepared 
to undergo  extensive risks, and in 1697 a  comprornise was  effected by 
which  the chartered undertaking was  compelled to license independent 
traders,  on  condition that they paid  a  royalty which  was  intended  to 
provide for the upkeep of the forts"  The underlying principle, adopted 
in dealing with the East India trade, was the same, though the working 
out  of  it in  practice  differed  in  the details.  It  was  clear  that the 
dispute  between  the two opposing  interests had become so embittered 
that there  was  no  prospect  of  both  factions working together  in  one 
organization.  In  1697  the stock  of  the Old  Company was  so  much 
depreciated  that  it would  have  been  easy  for  its opponents to have 
acquired a considerable interest under par.  By this time they aimed at 
the complete extinction of  the existing body;  and it was fortunate that,. 
while the House of Commons was still greatly influenced by both interests, 
sufficient  time  had  elapsed  to  moderate  the extreme  views  that had 
been  current  before the crisis  of  1695-7. 
The date of  the attempted settlement was  conditioned by the state 
of  the money-market,  since the organization, which  was  to be  indued 
by Parliament with the control of the trade in future, would be expected 
to provide a large loan.  Thus it was  not until 1698 that the tender of 
two  millions  at 8 per  cent.  was  accepted.  The act, authorizing this 
loan, was obviously intended to be  a  compromise between a number  of 
divergent principles and between persons who were hostile to each other. 
It resembles  the settlement  made  in  the African  trade,  in  so  far  as 
Parliament granted a footing to the independent merchant, the regulated 
and the joint-stock  company.  All that the act effected was to confine 
the India trade to those who subscribed capital for this particular loan, 
and the owners of  this stock were  entitled  to send goods to the East 
proportionate  in value to the amount of  their holding.  At the same 
time,  provision  was  made  that  any  of  the  subscribers  who  wished 
could unite and  become  incorporated as a joint-stock  company.  Prior 
to the passing of  the act, the opponents  of  the old  undertaking  had 
1 Rogers, First Nine  Yearx oj'the Bunk  of h'ngland, p. 101. 
Vide infra, 11.  p. 34.  Ibid., 11. p. 23. 
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expressed  themselves  in  favour  of  an unrestricted  trade in  most  un- 
exceptionable terms.  They urged that though patents might be granted 
to joint-stock  companies for  infant  industries, "yet,  afterwards,  when 
such  trades  have  grown  considerable, the wisdo~n  of  the  nation  has 
always  or generally judged  it fitting to open  a  way  for  the kingdom 
to receive a  general benefit  therefrom."  But, though  the promises  of 
the promoters of  the act pointed  either to a  regulated  company or to 
a  body  of  independent  traders  without  any  regulation  beyond  that 
required to maintain the general monopoly, it is a significant commentary 
on  these  professions that only  about  one  per  cent.  of  the  trade was 
carried  on  in  this  way.  It  was  found  that  the  Old  Company  had 
subscribed  enough  of  the loan  to entitle it to between  one-sixth  and 
one-seventh of  the trade1.  All  the remaining subscribers, who  owned 
over four-fifths of the debt, were incorporated into one joint-stock body2. 
Therefore the situation entered into a new  phase, with keen competition 
between two joint-stock organizations, which were denominated "the Old" 
and "the New"  Companies.  The most important element in the begin- 
ning of  this struggle was  the comparative financial weakness of  the rival 
undertakings.  Both had nominal capitals of  over a million and a half, 
but the resources  of  the Old  Cornpany were  depleted by  losses during 
the war, by  payments  for  secret  services and by  reduction  of  trade in 
the interval while the settlement  was  under  the consideration  of  the 
House of  Commons.  On  the other hand, the New  Company had sunk 
its subscribed capital in  the loan, made to the State, and therefore, at 
the date of its incorporation, it had no resources available for prosecuting 
its trade,  except  in  so  far as it could  borrow  on  the security of  the 
government debt due to it.  To provide working capital a new security 
was  created, known as "the  additional stock" or "the  Shares."  There 
was  no  fresh  allotment,  since  calls  were  made on  the existing stock- 
holders until by l702 over half a million had been raised.  It is doubtful 
if  much  of  this sum was  available for trading, since the company had 
promised a considerable amount in bribes before the act was  passed, and 
from  1698 to 1701 further payments were  made on account of  "secret 
serviced." 
Besides the new  East  India  company,  there  were  few  companies 
established in England from 1698 to 1700.  The chief direction in which 
the activity showed itself was in provident schemes.  In 1696 the mutual 
l For the details uide infra, 11. pp. 166, 180, 181. 
Stock in the two millioll loan was held as follows- 
Persons who did not belong to either company ...  .  .  .  223,000 
The Old Company  ...  ...  ...  ...  .  .  315,000 
The New Company  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  .  1,662,000 
Vide infra, 11. pp. 183-5. Classes of  Share-Capital 1698  [CHAP.  XVIII. 
fire-insurance undertaking, known as "the Hand-in-Hand,"  was started', 
and in 1698 a Society of Assurance  for  IVidows and Orphalzs was founded2. 
In the following year  the  Ch~ritable  Corporation for  the  Relief  of the 
Idu.~trious  Poor began a career, which subsequently became remarkable. 
The earliest  proposals for the founding of  banks had contemplated the 
lending  of  money on  pledges,  and in 1678 "divers  poor artificers and 
handcraftsmen" had presented  a  petition  praying that loans  should be 
made to them  at the rate of  $d. in the &? per week3.  The Charitable 
Corporation was  established  to meet this  need  by a number of  philan- 
thropic persons,  who  provided  the  necessary  capital,  subject  to the 
condition that only the legal  rate of  interest  should be  paid  to them. 
The most  striking  promotion  of  this period  was  that  which  was 
subsequently  incorporated  as  the  Mine-Adventurers  Company.  The 
undertaking formed to develope the mines of  Sir Carberry  Price4 had 
been  doing  well,  and  its  shares  remained  steady  during the crisis at 
about  17.  In  1698  Sir  Humphrey  Mackworth  formed  a  syndicate, 
which proposed to buy out the existing shareholders on behalf  of  a new 
company.  They might either sell their shares for cash at 220  per share 
or convert  them  into so-called bonds  of  the new  undertaking.  These 
bonds were  then drawn, not for repayment, but as tickets  in  a lottery 
where  the prizes  were  shares  in the new  company.  The bonds  were 
entitled to a  fixed dividend  of  6  per  cent.  and to repayment  of  the 
principal, while the shares were entitled to the remaining profits.  The 
effect  of  this arrangement was  to increase a capital, valued at 396,000 
in  the market during 1697, to one of  2205,160 nominal, and this was 
augmented both by a further issue of  shares and by the price of  these 
counters being raised very greatly above the so-called par value5. 
What is important in the whole transaction, from the point  of  view 
of  historical  development, is  the gradual emergence in  the joint-stock 
company of  a  division  of  the whole  capital into different  classes with 
special rights.  For over a century, borrowing on the bonds of  a company 
had  been  in  existence.  In some  respects  such  obligations  resembled 
debentures, in so far as they constituted a first  charge on the earnings. 
They  differed,  however, in that there was  nothing corresponding to a 
trust deed, no properties were specifically charged, the total amount was 
not fixed, and they were  repayable  either on  demand or at short dates. 
In the case of the new East India company, the stock as such was divided 
into two separate classes each of  which had distinct rights-the  original 
1 Amalgamated with the Commercial Union Assurance Comparly Ltd. in 1006. 
Vide infra, 111.  p. 389. 
State Papers, Domestic, Petition Entry Book, XLVI.  p. 241. 
4  Vide SU~T~,  pp.  336, 347, irgra, 11.  p. 440. 
Vide in/ra,  11.  pp.  444-7. 
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stock being  entitled  to 8 per  cent.,  paid  by  the government,  and to 
certain contingent advantages, while the additional stock was to receive 
the  profits,  made  in  trading'.  Similarly,  in  the  Mine  Adventurers' 
company  the bonds  were,  in  effect, preference  shares,  with priority as 
to a  moderate  fixed dividend  and to capital,  but  subject to cancella- 
tion on repayment at the will of the company.  It is interesting to note 
that this principle in joint-stock  finance appeared in the one case where 
the additional stock  came  to an end  through  the interference  of  the 
State, and in the other in  a  company which  anticipated later develop- 
ments,  not  only  in  this respect,  but  in  some of  the most  undesirable 
characteristics  of  fraudulent promotions. 
Some measure of the  improvement of credit and the  general prosperity 
of  the three years ending in l700 may be obtained from the position of 
the Bank  of  England at this period.  In  1698 a  beginning was  made 
towards the paying ofT  of  the engrafted stock.  These payments, which 
continued  until  1707,  make  the dividends  appear somewhat  complex; 
since, while the total distribution for the half-year or year was calculated 
at an even rate per  cent. (including the usual  fractions), the allocation 
of  the whole  sum, as between what  was  divided  from profits  and what 
represented  a  return  of  capital  on  account  of  the  engrafted  stock, 
involves minute subdivisions which are sometimes so small as to involve 
farthings per  cent.  Taking the three and a half years from July 169'7 to 
December 1700, there was divided from profits very nearly 29:  per cent. 
or an  average  of  nearly  89 per  cent.  annually.  The highevt  dividend 
in this period was  in 1700, when  it was  10 per cent.  The advance in 
the price  of  the stock  was remarkable.  In February 1697 the equiva- 
lent  of  2100 of  fully  paid  stock could have been  purchased at about 
363. 15s.  In March 1'700 the quotation touched 148a, or a rise  of  no 
less  than  1323 per  cent.  in three  years2.  For  1698 the yield at the 
average  price  of  the year  was  63 per  cent., for 1699 88  per cent.  and, 
for 1700, 7&  per cent., giving an average from  1698 to 1700 of  74 per 
cent.  It shows  the  difference  in the state of  credit  in  England and 
in  Scotland  that about this time the yield  on the stocks of  the New- 
mills company and  of  the Bank  of  Scotland was,  in  each case,  about 
13 per  cent.3 
In the year from March  1700 to March 1701 there came a startling 
change from abounding prosperity to the depths of  depression and even 
panic.  Two  diverse  series  of  events  led  to the crisis of  February and 
March  1701, on  the  one  side  the  doubtful  aspect  of  internatio~lal 
politics and on the other the embittered  strife between the Old and the 
Xew  East India companies.  In the spring of  1700 there were grave fears 
Vide inj'ra, 11.  p.  186.  Ibid.,  111.  pp. 214-16,  244. 
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as  to what  would  happen  on  the  death  of  the king  of  Spain,  whose 
health was reported to be precarious.  In certain contingencies it became 
apparent that a  renewal  of  war with  France would  be  inevitable, and 
the recollection of  the losses from 1692 to 1697, of  financial difficulties 
and of  the late crisis  was  too recent  for  the prospect  to be  regarded 
without  serious apprehensions.  The  news  of  the nomination  of  the 
Duke of Anjou for the crown of  Spain, which came in November, showed 
that these gloomy anticipations had been well-founded, while the absence 
of  preparations  for  war  in  England  occasioned  great alarm  in  the 
southern  counties,  which  were  greatly disturbed  by  the danger  of  a 
French  invasion1.  At a  time  when  trade  was  active,  the  uncertain 
political  outlook might  occasion a crisis, but, when the mercantile com- 
munity was  case-hardened in scares, it is probable that no panic would 
have resulted had there not been  other elements of  danger.  These  are 
to be found in the condition of  the East India trade from 1698 to 1700. 
The  act  of  1698 had  produced  an inlpossible  situation.  The New 
Company was entitled to more than four-fifths of  the trade, but its rival 
was firmly established in India with the consent of  the native rulers, who 
had small respect for the votes of  an English Parliament at  Westminster. 
It  follows  then  that the Old  Company, having an established position 
where  its mercantile  operations  were  carried  on,  could  hold  a  larger 
share  of  the trade than it was  allowed by the act.  On the other side, 
the New  Company was  strong at home, where  the other organization 
was weak.  Though the latter was  able to make the greater profits in 
the East, its methods were  subject to the interference of  the House of  . 
Commons,  exerted  in  the  interests  of  the  younger  body.  The only 
logical  escape  from  the  impasse  was  by  an  amalgamation,  but  the 
Old  Con~pany  was  determined to obtain better terms than would have 
followed from a union on the basis of  the allocation  of  trade under  the 
act.  Therefore,  its  efforts were  directed  towards  improving its con- 
dition at  home.  I11  following out this policy, there were several different 
steps which  must  be  co-ordinated in their proper places in the general 
scheme.  No  efforts were spared  to make  interest  in Parliament, and 
both  organizations  became  brisk  bidders  for  the  small  and  corrupt 
boroughs2.  Then the credit of the New  Company at first was not good, 
and a vigorous campaign was begun to bring it into discredit, especially 
by the depreciation of  its stock  in Exchange Alley.  On the whole, the 
1  Hist. and Proceedings of the House of Commons, III. p. 143. 
2  The  Freeholder's  Plea  against  Stock-jobbing  Elections  of  Parliament  nien  [by 
Daniel Defoe],  1701, in A  True Collection of  the  Writings of  the  Author  of  the True- 
Born  Englishman,  1703, pp.  166-83;  The Consolidator, 1705, p. 261 ; The Anatomy 
of  Eschange Alley,  1710, in Chronicles and Characters of the Stock-Exchange,  by John 
Francis,  1849, p. 380. 
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Old Company was  the victor  at almost every point.  Its stock  during 
the year  before  and  after  the attempted  settlement  had  sold  at an 
average  rice of  about 50, and in l700 the middle quotation was as 
as 1004.  Against this advance of  over 250  or 100 per cent., the stock 
of  the New  Company had only risen 41 per cent., and, in the following 
year,  the  older  undertaking  maintained  most  of  this  increase,  while 
the premium  on  the  stock  of  the  other  undertaking  was  reduced  to 
20 per  cent. 
It  was  the further development  of  the attack on  the credit  of  the 
New  Company which  produced  the crisis of  1701.  It had many obli- 
gations  outstanding,  and  the  accommodation,  given  it by  the Bank 
of England, had strained the resources of the latter.  The Old Company, 
taking advantage of the shock which the credit of  the bankers had already 
sustained, organized a run on the Bank in the hope that, if it were forced 
to suspend payment,  the operations of  the new  East  India company 
would be further restricted.  The Bank narrowly escaped; and, in saving 
itself, it was  forced  to call  in  its advances, with  the result  of  the run 
becoming general and the failure of  several bankers (amongst whom  the 
financial  agent  of  the  Old  Company  is  said  to have been  included). 
This crisis came in February 1701, and it lasted well into the following 
month'.  The  depreciation  of  the chief  securities  from  the  highest 
point of  the previous year varied  between 34 per  cent. and as much as 
53  per  cent. 
Cornparison  of  the  highest  recorded price  of  certain  stocks  with 
the  lowest  during the  Crkk 1701. 
Old East India  New East India 
Co.  Co.  Bank of England  Million Bank 
Highest  Price 
1700 
142  154  l482  97 
Lowest  Price 
1701  759 
100 
--  97  57  - 
Depreciation 
The fall in  stocks  and failures  of  bankers  show that the crisis of 
February and  March  l701 was  severe.  Contemporary observers spoke 
of  "the  great declension of  trade"  with  an  increase  of  poverty  and 
unemployment.  In some  districts,  the poor-rate  had  been  increased 
tenfold in the last  25 years, rising  in Shoreditch from  4s. 6d. to 36s. 
in the  on the same valuationz.  Fortuilately the duration of  the crisis 
was brief, and by the summer the commercial situation was  approaching 
the normal.  It  was  recognized,  moreover, that  the  contest  between 
Vide infra, 11.  pp.  184, 185, 111.  p. 217. 
A Brief  History of  Trade in England,  1702 [Brit. Mus. 1138 .  b .3], pp. 25,154, 
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the two India companies had become little short of  a national  danger, 
and steps were taken to effect a further settlement, which  it was  hoped 
would be  final.  Even  adherents  of  the New  Company admitted that 
this organization was unable to hold the proportion of  the trade granted 
to it by  the act of  1698, therefore  in  the amalgamation  it was  seen 
that the old undertaking must be  treated as if  it had subscribed more 
stock  in the loan, on  which  the monopoly  depended,  than it actually 
owned.  Once  this point  was  reached, it was  not difficult to advance 
a stage farther and to make it a basis of  the union that the share of 
each company in the trade should  be exactly  equal.  This was  carried 
out by the shareholders of the New Company selling to the Old Company 
enough  stock  to make the holdings  of  both  in the loan of  the same 
amount.  The Old  Company  gained an important advantage  when  it 
was agreed that such sales were to be made at par1.  The equalization 
of  the holdings of  the two bodies in the loan was  only one side of  the 
arrangement.  It was  also  agreed that the whole  management  of  the 
trade was to be committed to a body elected equally from the courts of 
the two companies, and that this body should have full powers to raise 
further  capital  as required.  Meanwhile each undertaking was to exist 
as a corporation for seven years in  order  to pay off  its debts, incurred 
on  the security  of  its  common  seal;  and,  at the expiration  of  that 
period, the amalgamation should  be  consummated by the stockholders 
of  the Old Company receiving the scrip issued against the loan of  1698. 
Then this  corporation  was  to be dissolved, and the remaining organi- 
zation, founded'on capital subscribed as to one half by members of  the 
Old Company and as to the other half by members of  the New Company, 
was  to be  known by  the title of  the United Company of Merchants  of 
England trading to the East Indies2. 
This agreement,  which  was  signed in instruments described as  the 
Indentures Tripartite and Quinque  Partite  on  July 243nd,  17043,  con- 
stitutes one of  the developments which  mark  the period  of  prosperity 
beginning in 1701 and continuing until 1704.  Of  new  schemes  there 
was the purchase of  the undertaking owned by the Sword Blade company, 
and the formation of  an offshoot of  this enterprize for the purchase and 
development of estates which had been forfeited by Jacobites in Ireland. 
By 17043 the capital invested  in  this separate  venture  was  &200,0003. 
This is the first instance of  the use  of  a charter for the carrying on  of 
some enterprize of  a totally different character from that for which it 
1  The so-called stock of  the New Company was  quoted  at rather over 135, but 
135 per  cent. had been  called up,  so that it was  only a little over par-vide  infra, 
11.  pp.  168,  169, 185. 
2  For the details,  vide infra, 11. pp.  169-76, 187,  188, 189-90, 206. 
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was  granted  in the first  instance*.  Such  a  method  was  quicker  and 
probably  cheaper  than  the  obtaining  of  a  new  grant;  while,  after 
the repressive  legislation  against stock-jobbing,  it may  not have  been 
easy  to obtain  charters  for  companies  which  were  capitalized  with 
shares.  In  1703 the  London  Bridge  and  City  Conduits  companies 
were  amalgamated with  a  capital of  8150,000, originally divided into 
shares of  85002. 
Of  the miscellaneous  companies  in  England  most  of  those  which 
had survived  the  crisis  of  1695-7  still  continued  to exist.  Two  of 
these  were  removed  from  the list  in  1703,  these  being  the Tapestry 
Makers and the company formed to carry on  the Fire-Insurance office 
founded by  Barbon.  The latter may  have been  transferred  to a  new 
undertaking known as "the  Phoenix3."  The chief remaining companies 
in  this  group  include  the  water  supply  organizations,  the  Copper 
Miners, probably  Dockwra's  copper company, the Royal Lustring,  the 
Blue Paper undertakings and the society for the Assurance of  Widows 
and Orphans4. 
The- return  of  prosperity  gave  opportunity  for  certain  fraudulent 
practices connected with companies.  The Mine Adventurers had started 
with  an inflated  capital,  constituted  in a  manner calculated  to appeal 
directly to the gambling disposition.  Ever.y  artifice was  adopted  that 
would  aid  in  the  inflation  of  the  price  of  the  shares;  and,  by  an 
arrangement  made  between  the  deputy-governor  and  the  manager, 
false  information  was  insidiously  circulated~. From  the  year  l702 
the management  of  the Royal African company had adopted  financial 
methods, which  were  all but fraudulent.  Debts had been incurred, and 
more  capital  was  needed.  Ostensibly  calls  were  made  on  the stock- 
holders for which bonds were given, but, at the same time, the payment 
of  dividends  was  resumed.  The  effect  of  this  practice  was  that  the 
proprietors  received back  a part of  the sums, recently subscribed, while 
they ranked as creditors for the whole amount6. 
From the summer of  1701 to 1704 there  were  three years of  pros- 
perity.  Though war  had  been  declared against France  in  May  1702, 
it was  discovered that the effect of  hostilities  on  trade had  been,  at 
first, less than had been anticipated.  While it was  necessary to increase 
taxation,  the national  credit  was  in  a  better  condition  than  it had 
l The company known  as Captain Poyntz and Company  for planting the Island of 
Tobago (vide  infra, 111.  pp.  416,  417)  also carried  on several distinct enterprizes and 
that at an early date.  This company however was authorized  by  a foreign grant, 
not by an English charter. 
Ibid., 11;.  p.  15.  Ibid., 111.  pp.  119,  377. 
Ibid.,  11.  pp. 433,  437,  111:  pp.  7,  16,  26,  32, 33,  60,  72,  84,  85,  390. 
Ibid.,  11.  pp. 447,  448,  450,  451.  Ibid., 11.  pp.  28,  29. 
3  Ibid.,  111.  pp. 436,  437. Capital iwuested  in Companies  1703 
been  since  the  Revolution1.  At this  time,  the  repayment  of  the 
engrafted  stock  of  the Bank  of  England  was  the bsrometer  by  which 
the position  was  judged;  and,  from  1702 to 1'704, large amoullts of 
this  stock  were  extinguished.  Another  favourable  factor  was  the 
tentative amalgamation of  the East India  companies which  removed a 
long-standing  source of  irritation.  Trade  at home  was  active,  while 
that abroad was  much above the low level, touched  during the previous 
war.  As compared with a total foreign trade of  131 millions in 1700-1, 
the  figures  for  1702-3  were  114 millions  and  fur  1703-4  close  on 
12  millions2. 
Though  the number  of  companies in  existence  in  1703 was  much 
less than ten years before, the stock or share capital had almost doubled. 
In making  this estimate, it is  necessary to take  several  difTerent  con- 
siderations into account.  Many of  the companies had borrowed large 
amounts on bond, but there is no  informatioll  sufficiently  complete to 
enable  this class  of  obligation  to be  included.  At least  two  under- 
takings  were  wound  up in 1703, and this fact  renders  it advisable  to 
make  the  calculation  at the end  of  that  year.  But,  owing  to the 
involved history  of  the settlement between the East India companies, 
by  this date the amount  of  share-capital  of  the  New  Conlpany  was 
apparently  reduced,  through  a  large  block  being  held  by  the  Old 
Company in  its corporate  capacity'.  Therefore, the situation  can, be 
presented  more clearly and. on the whole, not less accurately, by adopt- 
ing the capital of  these  two bodies as  it stood in 1'702 just before the 
signature  of  the  Indenture  Tripartite.  Fortunately,  the number  of 
companies, where  information as to the finances is wanting, is compara- 
tively small.  Regarding  these  there is a  change which must be noted. 
The smaller concerns had disappeared ; and therefore, in averaging the 
capital to be assigned to those which remained, it is advisable to increase 
the sum estimated for each in 1695.  Finally, since details  of  nominal 
capital  are liable to be misleading  (owing to some  of  the stocks being 
quoted at  considerable discounts or ~remiums)  the average market price 
for l703 is added in certain cases : 
An Estimate ofthe  Cbmparative St~ength  of  Great Britain during the present  and 
four preceding Reigns and of  the losses of  her Trade from every War since the Kevolution; 
by George Chalmers, London,  1794, pp.  85-7. 
Whitworth, State of  the Trade qf' Great Britain, ut supra. 
Vide infra,  11.  pp.  171, 188. 
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Share capital, paid up  or  taken  as paid up,  of  the  undermentioned 
companies  (exclusive  of  loans) in  1703. 
England : 
Foreign Trading Companies 
Goverr~or  and Company of  Merchants trading to the East 
Indies (the Old Company l) [120#]  ...  ...  ...  1,574,608 
The English  Company  trading  to  the East  Indies  (the 
New  Company)-1702 
Original stock [l8681  ...  ...  ...  ...  1,662,000 
Additional  stock  .  .  ..  .  ..  .  .  ..  ...  581,700 
-- 2,243,700 
The Royal African Company  [l71  ...  ...  ...  ...  1,101,050 
The Hudson's Bay Company  .  ..  ...  ...  ...  31,500 
Banks The Bank of England 
Original stock [l3281  ...  ...  ...  ...  1,200,000 
Engrafted stock outstanding5  ...  ...  ...  592,039 
1,792,039 
The Million Bank6  [83+]  ...  ...  ...  ...  320,000 
Water Supply Undertakings 
The New River, York Buildings,  London Bridge and five 
others7  ...  ...  .  ..  .  ..  ...  .  ..  ..  .  500,000 
Miscellaneous 
The Convex Lights Companys  ...  ...  ...  ...  25,600 
The Royal Lustring Company g  ...  ...  ...  ...  60,000 
The Sword Blade Company-undertakillg  for the develop- 
ment of land in Irelandlo  ...  ...  ...  ...  200,000 
The Mine Adventurers"  [about 201 ...  ...  ...  ...  245,240 
The Charitable Corporation12  ...  ...  .  ..  .  .  .  20,000 
Six other companies,  estimated at 227,500 each  .  .  .  .  .  .  45,000 
Total capital of English companies  .  ..  ...  ...  ...  8,158,737 
Scotland : 
The Company of  Scotland trading to Africa and the Indies 
(the Darien company)-424  "lo  called up on g400,000 
(actually paid)  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  153,631 
The Soaperie, Sugarie, Bank of Scotland and Roperie  ...  35,083  Twenty other companies at 25,000 each  ...  ...  ... 
100,000 
Total paid up capital England and Scotland  .  .  .  .  .  .  8,447,401 
Taking into account  the loans of  the chief  companies and allowing 
for  the existence  of  others,  not  included  in  the  foregoing  list,  it is 
highly probable that the whole  capital  (nominal) of  the undertakings 
in  existence  at the end  of  1703 in  Great  Britain,  was  in  excess  of 
Vide infra,  11.  p.  177.  Ibid., 11.  p.  171.  '  Ibid.,  11.  p.  33. 
Ibid.,  11.  p. 237.  Ibid.,  111.  p. 219.  "bid.,  1x1.  p. 279. 
Ibid.,  111:pp.  9,  15, 25,  26,  32,  33.  Ibid., 111.  p.  59. 
Ibid.,  111.  pp. 75, 89.  It is possible  (as meutioned  below,  111.  p.  85) that the 
value of a part of the assets may have been returned to the shareholders. 
lQ Ibid.,  111.  p.  437.  'l  Ibid., 11. p.  466.  l2 fbid., 111.  p.  380. 
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10 millions sterling.  It is to be  remembered, too, that the great in- 
crease between 1695 and 1703 took place in spite of  legislation, intended 
to restrict  dealings  in stocks and shares.  As  far  as  it is  possible  to 
ascertain  the effect  of  such  measures,  it appears  that they  tended  to 
reduce  the number  of  small  companies  and  to concentrate  attention 
upon the securities of  the great undertakings.  This view  is confirmed 
by the action of  the South Sea company in 1730, which  resulted  in the 
issue of  the writs  of  scire facia8  and which  was  expressly intended  to 
encourage speculation  in the stock  of  that  venture  by  suppressing  it 
in  other  shares1. 
In the last  months  of  the year  1704 there  were  the premonitory 
symptoms of  another crisis.  It became  clear  that the war  would  be 
protracted,  and  merchants  began  to complain  of  losses  of  shipping. 
At  home  the  tension  between  England  and  Scotland  had  become 
serious.  There  were  rumours  that,  after  the passing  of  the  act  of 
Security  by  the  Scottish  Parliament,  an  army  was  being  raised  for 
service  against  England.  Commerce  between  the  two  countries  was 
interrupted, partly by  the fears of  the merchants,  partly by restrictive 
legislation2.  In Scotland,  more  particularly,  the shock  to confidence 
was  soon  felt.  The collapse  of  the Darien  company  had  occasioned 
widespread  losses  which  the  stockholders  could  not  affords.  From 
1695 to 1699 the harvests had been bad, provisions were dear and there 
was  much  distress4.  The highly protective policy, judged  necessary to 
encourage  the  new  manufactures,  produced  retaliation : and,  when 
Scotland  was  largely excluded from  foreign  markets, the failure of  the 
colonizing schenie showed  that  no  outlet  for  her  products  was  to be 
found  in  plantations5.  These  circumstances  reacted  on  the-recently 
established nianufactories, many of  which could no longer find a market. 
for their goodse.  There was a general want of ready money, and failures 
were  numerous7.  The scarcity of  cash  was  so great that the Newniills 
company adopted  the extraordinary  course of  making  advances  to its 
shareholders on account  of  the future  dividends,  which  were  expected 
to be  due to them, but which  were  not yet declareds.  The unrest  in 
l  Vide infra, 111.  pp. 324, 325. 
Hist. and Proceedings of the House of  Commons, 111. p.  436 ;  An Acconzpt Cu~rertt 
between Scotland and England,  by J[ohn]  S[pruel] 1705, p.  1. 
Vide infra, 11.  p. 221. 
Oh  the  Price  qf  Wheat at  Huddington from  l627 to  1897,  by R. C. Mossman, 
Edinburgh,  1900, p.  28. 
G  Scotland's  Interest:  Or th great  BeneJit  and  Necessity  of  a  Communication  of 
Trade with England, 1704, pp.  5, 6. 
6  Scottish Historical Review,  I. pp.  184-6. 
7  Records of a Scottish Cloth Mamfmtory, pp.  222-366. 
8  Ibid., pp.  246, 248. 
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the last months of  the year  1704 made those,  who  had money at call 
in  the Bank  of  Scotland, anxious  to have  the actual cash, and  with- 
drawals were in excess of  lodgments.  In December there was  a report 
that the current coins would  be  recalled, and the Bank  was  forced  to 
suspend  paynient  on  December  18th.  The  same  events  produced 
demands  oil  the Bank  of  England,  and  there was  a  considerable fall 
in  the stock.  The crisis  was  avoided  for  the time  by  the  issue  of 
interest-bearing  bills,  but the uncertainty  continued during the  years 
l705 4  1706.  Besides the unrest in Scotland, there was  the pressure 
of  the war  and the consequent  losses  to merchants,  while  there  were 
fears of  a French expedition which might effect a landing in one of  the 
disaffected districts.  Alarm was general amongst the owners of  capital, 
and the position of  the Bank  of  England  was  endangered.  In  both 
these years it was  only able to pay  7 per  cent. annually out of  profits, 
or 1 per  cent.  less  than  the interest  received  from  the State.  This 
reduced  distribution  suggested  the  inference  that  either  great  losses 
had been  made or  that the situation  was  so  grave  that profits  must 
be  withheld  to maintain the credit  of  the institution.  The effect  of 
these  adverse  influences  on  the  price  of  the  chief  stocks  was  very 
marked.  That of the Rank  of  England, which  had  touched  1389  in 
1703-a  relatively  high  quotatioii  during  a  great  war-fell  steadily 
from the winter of  1704, and all through  1706 it was  below  par.  The 
crisis seemed  to be over  in  1707, although  the depression continued; 
but,  even  after  the Union  had been  completed,  there  was  great  dis- 
satisfaction  in Scotland1, and in February 1708 there  came  an  actual 
descent by  the French,  the news  of  which  produced  another crisis  in 
London, accompanied by a  run  on  the Bank  of  England  and  a  great 
fall in the price  of  stocks.  Owing to the incompleteness of  the record 
of quotations in 1'708, it is impossible to determine whether lower prices 
were  touched  at this time  or  in  1706, indeed  the  whole  period  from 
October  1704 to March  1'708 must  be  regarded  as  one  of  very great 
depression, during which  there were frequent crises, the most serious of 
which  were  those from September to November l706 and in February 
and March  1708.  The following table shows the extent of  the depre- 
ciation between l702 and 1708 : 
A  Brief View of the late Scots Ministry; and of the Reasons the  Scots  had  to wish 
for  a  Delitrerance from  them  by  the  Union,  1709,  in  Somers'  Tracts  (1751),  xv. 
p.  230. 374  Fall  in Stocks  1702-8  [CHAP.  XV~. 
Comparison  of  th  Highest  Prices  of the  ~~ndcrmntwned  Stocks from 
1702 to 1704 with the  lowest from  1705 to  170B1. 
Old East India,  New East India 
Bank of  England  company  company 
Highest Price  1382  139$  260 
1702-04 
Lowest Price  76k  W2  234  -  -  1705-08  - 
624  52  26 
45 "I,  37 "1,  ~O"I, 
Though the East India companies, owing  to special  circumstances 
in their position, were  to a large degree exempt from the full effect of 
the crisis, other undertakings were not so fortunate.  The Sword Blade 
company had  issued  bills  on  the security of  its purchases  of  land  in 
Ireland, and it had thus realized the proposals of  1696 for a land-bank. 
Its competition had affected the Rank  of  England, and in 1708 it was 
in  difficulties2.  The  position  of  the  Mine  Adventurers  was  much 
worse.  This company had  started banking  in  Wales,  and on  March 
17th. 1708, it  was either forced to suspend payment or else it fraudulently 
refused to meet its obligations3.  This suspension was  one of  the causes 
of  the act passed in this year in favour of  the Bank of  England, which 
conferred on  it a  monopoly  as  against  corporations,  but  not  against 
individuals or partnerships, not exceeding six persons in number4. 
' 
Another instance of  default has to be added, also arising out of  the 
crisis of  1708, namely that of  the Royal African company.  Until 1707 
meagre dividends were  paid,  but these were  made  out of  capital.  In 
' 
the following year  it was  no longer  possible  to find money to pay the 
interest on the bonds, and these obligations fell from 80 to 30; while 
the stock, which had sold at the average price  of  about 17  from 1701 
to 1706, relapsed to 41 in. 1708 and to a  fraction  over  2  during the 
next four years5. 
1 The Million Bank is omitted in this table, since, though its stock also declined, 
the fall was  partly due to causes other than the crises. 
2  Some  Reasons  against  the  clause for Restraining all Corporations but the Bank of 
England from  keeping cash or  borrowing money payable  on demand, p.  1 
;  Vide infra, Irr. p. 438. 
Vide infra, 11. pp. 452, 463. 
4  Ibid.,  111.  p.  438. 
Ibid.,  11. pp. 29, 35. 
CHAPTER  XIX. 
THE  long period  of  depression which  had begun  in 1704, began to 
pass away in the middle  of  April  1708.  Bank  of  England  stock  was 
1114  on  March 24th, and by  the 12th of  April it had  risen  to 128. 
During the same period the improvement in the securities of  the India 
companies was  comparatively  small, owing  to circumstances connected 
with  the final an~algamation  which  was  due to take place a year later. 
The transition  from  a  time  of  crises  to  one  of  moderate  confidence, 
culminating in great speculative activity in  certain  directions  towards 
the end  of  1710, is to be assigned to the belief  that there were fewer 
indications pointing to a success of  the Jacobite activity.  Important 
political  advantages  were  expected  to  accrue  from  the  Union  with 
Scotland, and shipping was  less  subject to capture by the privateers  of 
the enemy.  At the same time the continuance of  the war was  a factor 
tending to restrict  the  prosperity  which  might  otherwise  have  been 
experienced.  The  problem  of  providing  money  was  becoming  in- 
creasingly  difficult, since  the  crisis  had  restricted  borrowing  by  the 
State,  in  fact  the  total  funded  debt  at the  end  of  1708 was  only 
slightly in excess of  what it had been in 1701.  This result was reached 
through new  loans  being  made,  when  a  portion  of  the borrowings on 
account of  the former war had been paid OF. 
It is only to be expected that the long continued depression wotlld 
have affected most  of  the companies already established.  The Union 
with  Scotland  had  most  important  consequences  in  relation  to the 
l  Funded debt l701  £4,726,017  17  G  ............... 
1705  4,087,498  4  10  ............... 
1708  ...............  4,777;243  0  0 
-History  of the Earlier  Year8  of  the  Funded  Debt,  from  1694 to  1786 [C.  9010], 
pp 15-17. Companies after  the  Crisis 1708  [CUP.  XIX. 
industries  there.  These  had  all  been  founded  on  the  basis  of  an 
exclusively Scottish cominercial policy ;  and, after 1707, the competition 
of  English  products had to be  faced.  In cases  where  Scotland  was 
deficient in natural or acquired advantages it was  found impossible to 
resist  this competition; and, in particular,  the companies, founded  to 
manufacture fine  cloth, were unable  to hold  their ground, and within 
a few years most of  these were wound  up, the property of  the Newmills 
undertaking being sold in 1713l.  There were however some exceptions, 
the chief  of  which  were  the Sugaries and the Soaperie, the former in- 
deed continued to do very well2.  The Bank of Scotland was flourishing. 
It paid  a dividend  of  20 per  cent.  early in  17096; and, at that date, 
shares were  sold at a premium  of  close on 100 per  cent., representing 
an advance of  over 20 per  cent.  since  1706.  Finally,  the repayment 
of  the whole capital of  the unfortunate Darien company, together with 
interest, was  a  most  valuable  aid  towards lessening the great scarcity 
of  capital, which had depressed Scottish industry since 17004. 
In England  about twenty  companies are known  to have  survived 
the  crisis.  There  were  the four  foreign  trading  organizations6, two 
banks6 and  eight  water-supplying  undertakings7.  Of  miscellaneous 
ventures  there  remained  the  Convex  Lights,  which  still  obtained 
contracts  for street-lightings, and the Royal Lustring company.  The 
latter probably  gained to some extent from the war  though  its trade 
was  injured partly by a falling of  in demand  for alarnudes and partly 
by smuggling.  Its shares however were very steady at the reduced level 
reached  in  1698, being  about half the issue-price in 17069.  Amongst 
mining  ventures  there were  the society of  Mineral and Battery Works, 
which  had continued by this date for upwards of a century and a half 1°, 
the company of  Copper  Miners"  and the Mine Adventurers12, though 
the latter could  only  continue  its operations by  undergoing a  recon- 
struction.  Then there were  also the land-development  undertaking of 
the Sword Blade company13  and the Charitable Corporation14. 
Erroneous financial methods were responsible for the difficulties of 
at  least three undertakings, namely the Royal African, the Sword Blade 
l  Vide ilzfru,  111.  pp. 157, 158, 160. 
Ibid., 1x1.  pp.  132, 137. 
3  Ibid., 111.  pp. 268, 274.  This dividend was earned mainly in 1708. 
4  Ibid.,  rr.  p.  225.  For the general  effect  of  the Union on Scottish  industrp 
tide Wealth of niations, I. chapter XI.  Pt. 111.  (ed. Cannan), pp.  221, 222. 
6  Vide injku, 11.  pp.  29, 174, 187, 191, 234. 
B Ibid., 111.  pp.  224-6,  282.  7  Ibid., 1x1.  pp. 7,  16, 26, 32, 33. 
Ibid., 111.  p.  60.  Ibid., 111.  p.  80. 
'0  Ibid., 11.  p.  427.  Ibid., 11.  p. 433. 
l2 Ibid., 11.  pp.  453, 454.  13 Ibid., 111.  p.  437. 
l4  Ibid., 111.  p.  380. 
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companies, and the Mine Adventurers;  and, from l711 to 1713, there 
were in two cases reconstructions and in the third a winding up. 
The effect of the improvement in credit is shown in the development 
of  the  Bank  of  England  and  the amalgamation  of  the  East  India 
companies.  These events  are of  very  great interest and  importance, 
partly  in  aiding the financing  of  the war, partly, too, as  showing the 
cumbersome  methods  by  which  rearrangements  of  capital were  made. 
The repayment  of  the engrafted  stock  of  the Bank  of  England  had 
been  completed  in  1707, and thus it nlay be remarked  that this stock 
both began and was extinguished during a time of crisis. 
The original capital of the Bank was 21,200,000, the  amount engrafted 
was an odd sum of over a million and the total in 1697 was 22,201,171.10s. 
It might be thought that the directors would  have taken  advantage of 
the reps-yment  of  the engrafted  stock  in l707 to have eliminated from 
their  capital account the odd  pounds  and shillings.  However at this 
time  more  resources  were  required  to enable  the  Bank  to  circulate 
Exchequer  Bills, and it was  decided  to bring in  fresh  capital and to 
fix the amount of  stock in 1708 at the same sum at which  it had stood 
from  1697 to 1707.  This was effected by making a call of  50 per cent. 
on the total of  the original and engrafted  stock.  By  this means the 
funds received brought the capital above the amount that was  looked 
upon  as fixed, and the difference  was  returned  to the  stockholders1. 
The improvement  in  credit  enabled  the Bank  to call  up money from 
the  proprietors  as  required.  On  February  Rand,  1709,  lists  were 
opened for  a  new  subscription  at 115 equal  to the  existing  capital, 
and  the whole  amount was  applied  for  inside  four  hours.  In 1710 
a  further call  was  made,  bringing the total  stock  at that date up to 
25,559,995.  14s. 8d.2 
The capital arrangements  in  the  East  India  trade  from  1703 to 
1708 were  much  more complex.  At the later date, there were no less 
than  seven  distinct  stocks  in  existence.  First  of  all  there  was  the 
capital of  the Old  Company and also its bonds.  Then there was  the 
stock  of  the  two  mi!lion  loan  to which  the monopoly  of  the trade 
was  attached.  Under the arrangement  of  1702, one half  of  the total, 
divided between  the two companies, was  now  the stock of  the English 
company which might  be  sold  in the market, while the other half  was 
held by the committees of  the Old Company in trust for that company 
in its corporate capacity.  Further,  there  were  the bonds  of  the New 
Company and its old additional stock, which was in process of repayment 
under  the terms  of  the Indenture Tripartite.  Lastly came the "new 
additional stock of  the committee of  management,"  which  constituted 
1 Vide infra,  111.  p. 224.  Ibid., 111.  pp.  227, 243. The Fund  of  Credit  FalZacy  1  708  [CHAP. XIX. 
the actual trading capital, and which  again was  held  in  trust by  that 
committee,  in  equal  moieties  on  behalf  of  the two  companies, to be 
transferred  to  them  when  the  amalgamation  was  completed.  This 
stock, it may be recalled, was  begun, by handing over to the managing 
committee the assets in  India,  consisting  of  the dead  stock,  of  each 
company, and it was  increased by equal calls from either body1. 
The position  in 1708 will be  comprehended most easily in relation 
to the widespread  over-valuation of  a  "fund  of  credit,"  which  became 
common after the Revolution and which  produced disastrous results in 
1720.  The old  East India company had worked on a stock, subscribed 
by  the  members,  which  constituted  the  bulk  of  its trading  capital. 
The  subscription  of  the two  million  loan  by  the  new  organization 
provided  no  working  capital,  and a  further  issue  of  stock  was  made 
for this purpose.  But, under the Indenture Tripartite of  1702, this old 
additional  stock  was  to be  extinguished  before  the final  union  of  the 
companies.  Therefore  the  co~n~nittee  of  management,  while  it  was 
freed from the debts of  the two undertakings, was  left  without  floating 
capital to carry on  the trade, except  in so far as the dead stock, vested 
in it in trust, constituted  a  nucleus, and to this the funds  called  up 
from  the  companies  were  added.  To obtain  resources  for  meeting 
these calls neither  body had powers  to add to the stock, sanctioned bg 
the act of  1698, and therefore each had to borrow by its bonds on the 
security  of  the debt due  to it by  the  State.  It follows  then  that, 
although  the  funds  raised  by  the  committee  of  management  were 
described as "the new  additional stock,"  these were  ultimately  of  the 
nature  of  bonds  and  that  the  companies  were  the  intermediaries 
between that committee  and the investing  public.  As  a  preliminary 
to the dissolution,  both  of  the Old  company and of  the comnlittee of 
management, there came the act of  6 Anne c.  17 (which  authorized the 
creation of  21,200,000 stock, to be added to that already existing) and 
the award  of  Lord  Godolphin  (September 29th,  1708).  Under  these 
instruments, the additional stock  was  converted  into 6 per  cent. bonds 
of  the United  company,  and  these  bonds  were  divisible  to the  Old 
and the New  companies in equal parts.  Each undertaking  was  entitled 
to distribute such  bonds  to its creditors  or its stockholders.  In this 
way,  the bonds  of  both the Old and the New  companies disappeared, 
and there remained  only bonds and stock  of  the United  company and 
the stock of  the Old company.  At this point  a difficulty arose.  The 
share of  the bonds of  the United  company, receivable by the Old com- 
pany together with its remaining assets, did not suffice to pay its debts, 
and a call  of  254 per  cent.  was  necessary.  Then, when  the debts had 
1 Vide irzfva,  11.  pp. 169-71, 177,  181,  182,  188,  191,  206. 
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been  discharged,  the stock  of  this body was  exchanged for that of  the 
United company, and the charter of  the former was surrendered.  The 
proportion of United stock to be  received  was  a little larger  than that 
surrendered,  so  that  the members  of  the  Old  compaily had  a  small 
nominal  addition  made  to their  holdings1. 
The broad  effect  of  these financial  methods had  been  to make the 
India trade supply the exigencies of  the State to such an extent that 
for seven years there had been a great want of  free capital to carry on 
the  ordinary  commercial  operations,  for  which  the  undertaking  was 
supposed to exist.  Thus, while  it appears that the capital eniployed 
in the India trade was much more than it had been twenty years before, 
as  a  matter  of  fact  it was  very  much  less,  owing  to almost  all  the 
subscribed stock  and much  of  that borrowed on bond having been lent 
to the government. 
The formation of  the United  East India company in 1709 suggests 
the enquiry as to how  its predecessors  had fared as investments.  The 
New  company  had  existed  altogether, prior  to  the  union,  for  eleven 
years, and it had traded independently from 1698 to 1702.  Its financial 
methods  were  comparatively  prudent,  and up  to l702 only  moderate 
dividends were paid on  the old additional stock  which was  entitled to 
the profits.  Under the Indenture Tripartite, this stock was  to receive 
the  proceeds  of  the  assets  which  had  been  employed in  trade;  and, 
though  the record  of  divisions is  not  complete,  those  that have  been 
recorded show  that the proprietors received more than they had origin- 
ally  invested2.  After  1702 the  position  of  the  original  stock  was 
changed.  Up to the  date  of  the  Indenture  Tripartite  it had  bee11 
analogous to a  fixed  charge on  the  total  income,  whereas  afterwards 
it became an ordinary stock, ranking both for the interest paid by the 
government and for its share of  the profit made by trade.  Under these 
circumstances it is not surprising to find that the quotation appreciated. 
Up to the date of  the agreement of July 22nd, 1702, the highest price 
touched  was  154, while from  that date to 1708 the maxirnurn  was  as 
high as 272 and the lowest  was  1513, while  from  1704 to 1708 it was 
never less than 200.  The cause of  this high Ievel is to be  found partly 
in  the  over-estimation  of  the  advantages  of  the  amalgamation  and 
gartly  (to  which  extent  it  was  justified)  in  the addition  of  about 
two-thirds  to their holdings  in the United undertaking which members 
of this company were to receive in  17093. 
Naturally  the  chief  interest  rests  with  the  outcolne  of  the  Old 
company  as  an  investment;  and,  in  an  undertaking  with  a  history 
extending  over  fifty  years,  much  will  depend  on  the  date  at which 
1  For the details of this arrangement oide infra, 11.  p.  176. 
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stock  was  acquired.  It  will  be  necessary,  therefore,  to select for  this 
enquiry certain typical transactions,  neglecting porchases  of  stock both 
at extremely high and low  prices.  First of  all there is the position of 
an  adventurer  or  his  representatives.  Supposing him  to have 
paid  in  2100 from  1658 to 1660, he  would  have had this doubled  in 
1682; and, on  his  holding  of  8200 nominal  in  1708, he  would  have 
paid  the  call  of  254  per  cent.,  so  that his  total  investment  would 
have cost from first to last £151'.  The holding of  2200 in the Old 
company  was  coi~verted  in 1709 into 2200. 17s. 9d.  of  United  Stock, 
which,  at the  mean  price  of  that  year,  could  have  been  sold  for 
2248. los., to which  is to be  added 2972. 10s. of  dividends from 16612 
to 1708, making  a  total return  of  81,221 as  against a  cost  of  2151 
or a gross profit  of  81,070.  Since the dividends paid on the stock are 
included, allowance illust be  made for  interest on  the capital to obtain 
the nett profit.  Neglecting compound  interest and taking only average 
rates roughly, namely 6 per cent. from 1660 to 1690, 8 per  cent. from 
1690 to 1700, 5 per cent. from 1700 to 1705 and 6 per cent. from  1705 
to 1709, this allowance would amount to 2309; yielding a  nett incre- 
ment of the capital of  27612. 
Next  an investor,  who  bought 2100 stock  at 2300 in  1690, by  a 
similar  calculation,  would  have  sustained  a  nett  loss  of  capital  of 
2472. 5s.  or  over  150 per  cent.  in  the  nineteen  years.  Again  the 
person, who  subscribed  to the new  issue  in  1693, would  have  made a 
1  ' 
Gross profit  ...  1,070  0 
1,221  0 
1  Vide infra,  11.  pp. 176-9. 
2  &lculation  showing  the position @'an original Adventurer (or his representatives) 
in the Old Eust India company (1658-1709) : 
1658-60  ;E100 Stock ...  .  ..  100  0  Dividends to l682 440%/,on  E100  440  10 
1681  100  ,,  bonus  ...  -  -  1  ,,  ,, 1691 200°/0 ,, E200  400  0 
- 
200  ,, 
1708-9  Call of  25*  "1,  .  ..  51  0 
1709  2200  Stock converted 
into  $2200. 17s.  9d. 
stock of United com- 
uanv 
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,,  ,,l708  66"/, ,,  ,,  132  0 
Value  of  S200.  17s.  9d.  stock 
in the United company at the 
middle price of 1709 (123a)  248  10 
Allowance for interest (simple) 
30 years at 6 "1, on 2100  ...  180  0 
10  ,,  ,, 8 ,,  ,,  ...  80  0 
5  ,,  ,, 5 ,,  9,  ...  25  0 
4  ,,  ,, 6  9,  9,  ...  24  0 
Nett Profit  ...  ...  ...  761  0 
-p 
1,070  0 
nett loss,  on  this basis,  of  240. 5s. in  sixteen  years, while  a  purchase 
at 50 in 1699 would  have resulted  in a  nett profit of  286. 5s. in the 
ten years or an average increment per annum of over l7  per cent. 
It will  thus be  seen  that an investment, made in East India stock 
up to 1680, would have  yielded  a  nett  increment  of  capital  on  the 
basis  of  the middle  price  of  1709 for  the equivalent  security of  the 
United company.  At any of the recorded quotations from 1682 to 1693 
there would  have been  a  nett loss.  To have  made a nett profit  from 
1695 to 1699 the investor must have bought at  50 or below this figure; 
while no  one, who  acquired  stock  at the quotations of  1703 to 1707, 
could hare gained a nett increment  of  his capital.  As compared with 
the position of  a purchaser  of  Old East India stock from 1697 to 1707, 
the members  of  the Bank  of  England,  who  subscribed the engrafted 
stock,  were  more  fortunate.  They  received  their  capital  back  again 
inside ten years  with an addition  of  at least  35 per  cent., while some, 
who  like  Sir Gilbert  Heathcote  took  advantage of  the great advance 
in  quotations and sold at a  premium,  easily doubled  the original  in- 
vestment,  besides receiving a  respectable  return  in  either case  as  long 
as  they  held  the stock1. 
From another point of view further light is obtained on the methods 
of  dealing  with  share  capital from  the reorganizations  of  the Royal 
African  company and the Mine  Adventurers.  Both operations belong 
to this period,  though,  owing  to the  delay  in  obtaining  the acts of 
Parliament  that were  necessary,  the  latter was  not  completed  until 
1711 and the former  till 1713.  In neither case was there any prospect 
of  the company being able to pay  its debts in its existing condition; 
and, by the act  14 Charles 11. c. 24, creditors  had  no  recourse against 
the stockholders  of  the African  company.  Parliament  took  the view 
that the so-called bonds  of  the Mine  Adventurers  were  essentially  of 
the nature  of  share-capital,  though  possessed  of  a  certain  priority  as 
compared  with  the remainder.  Making  allowance for this fact,  both 
reorganizations  proceed  on  similar  principles  up  to a  certain  point, 
namely in so far as persons in the position of  bonafide creditors (that is, 
those  to whom  the  Mine  Adventurers  were  indebted  and  the  bond- 
holders of  the African  company) received  new  share-capital in full for 
the amounts of  their claims.  Then the owners of  bonds, issued  in  the 
lottery by which  the Mine  Adventurers  company  was  floated  in 1698, 
had their holding reduced by one-fifth and new shares were given for the 
remainder.  The other securities of each (namely the stock of the African 
company and the shares of  the Mine Adventurers) were  dealt with on 
different principles.  The latter were  written down by one-third only 2; 
Gross profit  ...  ...  ...  1,070  0 
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while African stock was cancelled to the extent of 90 per cent., and, before 
the balance could be  converted into new  stock, the holders were  forced 
to pay an assessment of  50 per cent. thereon.  So far from this disparity 
of  treatment being inequitable, there is in it a rough measure of  justice. 
From l702 the shareholders of  the African company had been  receiving 
dividends, while  calls were  being  made on  them for which  bonds  were 
given.  Such devious finance had two consequences, first that this series 
of  dividends  was  made  out of  capital and secondly, as  affecting the 
reorganization,  if  these  bonds as well  as others were  to be  accepted at 
their  par  value  for  exchange  into new  stock,  the shareholders  should 
be compelled to make restitution of  what they had received in dividends 
since  1702.  This adjustment  was  effected  by  the  assessment  of  the 
reorganization;  which,  though  50 per  cent.  on  the  new  capital,  was 
only 5 per  cent.  on  the old.  Now  the dividends  paid  from  1702 to 
l707 came to 48 per cent., so that the effect of  this part of  the settle- 
ment was  to force the members to refund  the distributions which had 
been  wrongfully  made]. 
This reorganization  would  have brought the holding of  an original 
adventurer  in the company  formed  in  1662 close to vanishing  point. 
Supposing &'l00  to have  been  invested  in  1662,  the  arrangement  of 
1671-2  would have left it at only £10,  which  was  written  up to £40 
in 1691 and was  now  reduced  to £4.  It may be noted that while the 
1-eorganization was  in progress  the highest price of  the stock was about 
4  for  &l00 nominal  and  that for  a  year  afterwards  it averaged  52, 
so that at the latter quotation  the market  value of  what remained of  . 
the 2100 invested in  1662 was  only about  22.  The position  of  the 
adventurer, who  subscribed at the formation of  this company in 1672, 
was  for  practical  purposes  as bad,  though  his  percentage  of  loss  was 
much less.  This £100  would  be  converted  into g400 in  1691 which 
was  written  down  to g40 in  1713 and  was  then  worth  about  &2O. 
The loss  is so clear that it would  be  useless to add how  much it was 
increased by  the cessation of  dividends.  Since the assessment  of  1713 
may  be  off-set against  the  distributions,  wrongfully  made  from  1702 
to 1707, the position  was  in eflect that no  profits  had  been  divided 
since 1692, and further allowance has to be  made  for the depreciation 
of  such payments as had  to be met in response to the calls from l702 
to 1708 which were now converted into stock2. 
The increases of  capital by new subscriptions of  the chief companies 
between the middle of  1708 and before the end of  l710 are indications 
that this period  was  one of  modified prosperity.  Prices of  stocks rose, 
and there  was  an  advance in the dividends distributed.  For  instance 
Vide infru, 11.  pp.  81,  35.  "bid.,  11.  pp. .19,  28, 29, 31-5. 
the United  East India  company  increased its rate to 9 per  cent.  for 
the year  1709-10;  and,  during the  period  from  September  1708 to 
March  1710, the Bank of  England  divided  as  much  as 28a per  cent.' 
While these events show that there was  a considerable activity in trade 
at this time,  it is  probable  that the  improvement  in  confidence  was 
largely based  on the expectation  of  an  early peace, and that therefore 
to that extent  it discounted  the future.  This  estimate  of  the inner 
meaning of  the situation  is  confirmed by  the state of  British  foreign 
trade.  The total  imports and exports (including  those  of  Scotland) 
in  l709 and l710 averaged  less  than 11  millions as against over 104 
~nillions  annually  for England alone between  l705 and  1707.  There- 
fore it appears that the improvement consisted chiefly in the restoration 
of  confidence and a renewal of  hope.  Such a revival, finding compara- 
tively  small  scope  in  the legitimate  extension  of  existing  industries, 
tended  to  branch  out  in  an  altogether  new  direction.  Already  for 
several years past  attention had been paid to insurance schemes.  Thus 
in  1706,  the  Amicable  Society for  life-insurance  was  establisheda, and 
before  1708 Charles  Povey  had  founded  two  undertakings  known  as 
the Exchange House Offices  which  were  purchased  by the company of 
London Insurers, whose business was  better known as the St6n Fire O@e, 
which  still exists.  The original  capital paid  up in 1710 was,  as far as 
can be ascertained, under £1,0003.  In 1709 a company known as that 
of  the  London  Insz~rers  upon  Live8  was  started"  These  enterprizes 
appealed  mainly  to the impulse  towards  thrift;  but insurance, as yet 
being  in its infancy,  had  mother side which  met  and  became  inter- 
mingled with  one of  the main tendencies  of  the time.  Wagering was 
not only  a  fashionable  amusement,  it was  also an important  interest 
amongst all classes, and it entered to a considerable extent into many 
business  transactions.  Since the outbreak of  the wars with France, the 
course of  trade had been  vitally affected by the progress of  hostilities. 
Therefore,  there  arose  the  anomaly  that  it  was  often  the  prudent 
business man who apparently made wild bets  upon  the Exchange.  For 
instance, suppose an operator in  the stock-market had an account open 
for  the rise,  and  he expected  an advance  in  quotations would  follow 
the success of  the arms of  the allies in  a battle that was  anticipated. 
To protect  himself  he  would  wager,  apparently  unpatriotically,  that 
they  would  not  achieve a  victory  before  a  certain  date.  By covering 
his  risk  in this manner, he reduced the maximum  gain he  might have 
made,  but  at the same time  he  minimized  his  loss.  If  British  arms 
succeeded  within  a  given  date,  and  his  other  calculations  were  well 
founded, he had the profit  on his  operation  in  stocks; if  on the other 
Vide infru, rr. pp. 200, 206,  111.  pp. 226-8,  24.5.  "Ibid.,  111.  p.  390. 
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hand  there was  no battle or  if  the enemy  had  the advantage, he  was 
able to recover  on his  bet.  Alnlost  all  important financial and com- 
mercial transactions  were  influenced by  the progress  of  the campaigns 
and  similar  wagers  were  frequent.  Moreover,  when  the  mercantile 
public  had  become  inured  to  risks,  there  arose  a  disposition  to risk 
money  on  what  were  purely  matters  of  chance.  Instances  of  this 
tendency  are  to be  found  in  the Lottery  Loans  of  1694 and  l710 
and the floatation of the Mine Adventurers company by similar methods 
in 16981.  It was  the uniting  of  these two tendencies-on  the one side 
the insurance idea on the other the willingness to risk money on a pure 
chance-during  a period  of  moderate credit when the usual channels of 
investment  in trade  were  not  specially promising,  that  produced  the 
insurance boom  of  1710.  During a  period  of  about a year  there was 
great activity in  what  was  virtually  a  gambling  in  life-contingencies. 
Professedly  provident  schemes,  these  insurance  offices  (of  which  over 
two hundred  were  opened in  London) would  never  have  attracted the 
public had it llot  been  for the speculative element  involved.  In most 
cases  these were  organized, on the tontine principle, as what are known 
as "  dividend societies," that is they bound  themselves  to divide  all the 
premiums  received,  less  a  certain  moderate  charge  for  management, 
amongst those members who  had qualified according  to the conditions 
laid  down.  Most  of  the  offices  were  at coffee-houses,  and probably, 
the  proprietors  considered  themselves  reimbursed  for  the  moderate 
charge  for  management  by  the  amount  of  additional  custom  they 
obtained.  The most  important  contingencies  provided  for  (each  by 
separate  groups  of  undertakings)  were  the  payment  of  a  sum  on 
marriage, on the birth of  a child, on the completion of  apprenticeship 
and to domestic  servants  who  had  remained  for  a  specified  period  in 
one place.  The speculative  element  arose  from  the  variation  in  the 
number  of  claimants  at a  given  date,  and  it  sometimes  happened, 
especially at the beginning,  that they received sums very many times in 
excess of the premium  paid.  Such cases were advertized  in the papers 
and  new  offices  were  formed  with  reckless profusion,  while  "policies 
and premiums were in the mouths of  all.  It was  the El-dorado of  the 
London craftsman, the alchymy of the needy tradesman2."  Such schemes, 
hurriedly formed and without adequate supervision, were subject to the 
risk  of  fraud  on two different sides, either by the managers  or  by the 
claimants.  Within  a  few  months  many  offices  failed,  and  there  is 
evidence that marriages  were  effected  solely  to. qualify  for  the  distri- 
bution to be made at a certain date3.  There was  a  special objection 
l  Vide infra, 11.  pp. 445-7;  111.  pp.  275, 290. 
2 Annals,  Anecdotes  and  Legends  of  fiye  Insurance,  by John  Francis,  London, 
1863,  p.  66.  Vide infra, 111.  pp. 369-72,  391-4. 
CHAP. XIX.]  The  Crisis  of  1710  385 
to such undertakings from the point of  view  of  the administration.  It 
was  thought that this easy method  of  gambling  diverted subscriptions 
from the Lottery Loan  of  17101, while the numerous  failures of  these 
societies came  at an  unfortunate  time  when  credit  had  been  again 
severely  shaken. 
The causes of  the crisis, which  began  in  the closing months of  the 
year  1710, that can  be  most  easily discerned  were  the defeat  of  the 
Whigs  at the general  election  of  that  year  and  the  collapse  of  the 
insurance  boom.  The new  ministry did not command  the confidence 
of  the classes who  had capital to invest,  and it is  recorded  that such 
persons, not only themselves sold large quantities of  stock, but recom- 
mended  their  foreign  correspondents  to dispose  of  their  holdings  of 
British  securitiesz.  Another cause of  uneasiness was the suspicion that 
had  begun  to become  rife  as  to the  management  of  the  Exchequer, 
indeed it was stated in 1712 that the moneys, not accounted for,  were 
as  much  as 36 millions, while it was  well known that bribery continued 
in  the  House  of  Commons3.  It  is  obvious,  however,  that  for  such 
action  to result  in  a grave disturbance  of  credit there must have been 
an element  of  weakness  in the financial situation.  This is to be found 
in the cumulative effect  of  the strain  on  the resources  of  the country 
involved by the continuance of  the war.  During the first six or seven 
years of  the struggle the pressure on the finances of  Great Britain  had 
not been  sufficient to produce  any greater effect  than  the curtailment 
of  trade.  That this  was  so  is  established  by  the fact that, as far as 
can be  ascertained, the series of  crises from  1704 to the beginning  of 
1708 were occasioned by friction between England and Scotland, indeed 
up to l710 the cost of  the war  had not imposed any great  strain  on 
the national  credit.  By  the terms  made  with  the  Bank  of  England 
and  the  United  East  India  company  in  1708-9,  these  institutions 
between them  lent over 14 millions without  interest"  and, up to 1710, 
the Bank  undertook  to circulate more than  3 millions  of  Exchequer 
1 The Petition  of Dorothy  Petty, a director  of the Union Society,  printed  in 
The Insurance  Cyclopmdia, by Cornelius Walford,  I. p.  322. 
Truth v  you  can jind  it: Or a Cha,racter of the present M-y,  1712, p.  5 ;  An 
Essay  towards the  History  of  the  last  Ministry  and  Parliament,  containing seasmahb 
Reflections on Favourites, Ministers  of  State, Parties, Parliaments  and  Publick  Credit, 
1710, in Somers'  Tracts (1748), 11.  p.  269 ; The History  of  Great Britain  during the 
Reign of Queen Anne, by Thomas Somerville,  London,  1798, p.  423. 
Truth v  you  can Jind it, 1712, p.  11 ;  A Representation of the  Loyal  Subjects of 
AZbinia, 1712, p.  6 ;  No Punishment no  Government and ATo Danger eaen in the  Worst 
Designs, 1712, p.  5;  An Inquiry into the ,Wiscarriages  of  the Four  Last  Years Reign, 
1714, p.  26; The Management of the Last Four  Years Vindicated, 1714, p.  19. 
4  This loan reduced  the rate of interest on the whole debt due to the Bank  of 
England to 6 per  cent. and  to 5 per  cent. in the case  of  the East  India  company- 
tide infra, 11.  p.  191, 111. p.  227. 
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Bills'.  By these temporary expedients the annual deficits were financed, 
and the hope  of  an early peace had enabled  the government to meet 
the outstanding liabilities by contracting a  large  floating  debt.  The 
administration found itself unable to bear the protracted financial strain 
which involved an outlay of  over 65%  millions by March l714=. Already 
in 1710 many signs of  embarrassment  were  observed, taxes granted by 
Parliament  did  not  realize the estimated  amounts,  trade  was  heavily 
burdened,  many  branches  of  the  revenue  were  anticipated  and  the 
salaries in the Royal Household were eighteen months in arrears3.  The 
obligations comprised in  the floating debt began  to fall in value early 
in 1710.  For instance "Army Debentures,"  which  had been  91 in the 
bad  years  l706  and  1707,  fell  below  80 in  January  17104.  Other 
unfunded  debts were  sold  at greater discounts which tended to increase 
during  the  year.  Under  such  circumstances  the  Bank  of  England 
hesitated  to endanger its own position by comn~itting  its credit further, 
and  the  proprietors  became  alarmed  when  it  was  reported  that  the 
Whig ministry was  in danger of  dismissal.  The governor and directors 
waited on the Queen and urged that this course would have a disastrous 
effect  on  credit  generally5.  Between  June  and  September  successive 
ministers  were  dismissed, and, as  the insurance  offices  began  to fail, a 
crisis was  reached  in November  and  December,  when  all  the leading 
securities touched  the lowest  prices  since  1707.  The following table 
shows the extent of  the fall as compared  with  the highest  quotations 
in  l709 and  1710: 
Comparison  of  the  highest  price  of the  undermentioned  securities from 
1707 with the  lowest  in 1710. 
f  Bank of  England  Army Debentures 
Highest quotation in 1709 (except in 
the case of Army Debentures where 
the quotation used was recorded in 
1707)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  135  91 
Lowest quotation in 1710  ...  ...  952  72 
During the crisis some of  the unfunded securities fell to low prices, 
and the average discount  appears to have been  close  on  40 per  cent.6 
History qf'the Earlier  Years ofthe Funded Debt,  ut wpra, p. 69. 
A &port  from  the Commissioners appointed ...  to  take the Publick  Accounts,  1714, 
in Somers' Tracts (1748),  11.  p. 113. 
An Esspy towards the History ofthe Zmt  Ministry, 1710, in Somers' Tracts (1748), 
11.  p. 268. 
Vide infra, III.  p. 439.  Ibid., 111.  p. 229. 
Ibid., 111.  pp. 293, 297. 
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Even  Exchequer  Bills  were  at one  time  below  par  to the  extent  of 
3 per  cent.';  and  a  contemporary  writer,  after describing  credit  as 
"having  been  for  some years the nation's  happy  guest,"  recorded the 
current  opinions  that the nation  was  exhausted, there "was  a  famine 
of  funds  and  we  are at a  full  stop2."  Another  writer  speaks of  the 
"remarkable  coldness " show11 by investors towards all public securities3. 
The situation was  considered so  alarming that  early in January  l711 
an arrangement was  made with  the Bank  of  England, under which, in 
consideration  of  receiving 245,000 from the State, the company under- 
took  to cash  all Exchequer  Bills of  a  certain issue at face value.  The 
effect of  this agreement was that the discount was  transferred  from the 
holders  of  the Bills to the national finances, and it was clear that such 
a  measure  could  be  no  more  than  a  temporary  expedient.  In  the 
meantime it sufficed  to re-establish  some degree of  confidence in these 
obligations,  and all the Exchequer  Bills  current  began  to appreciate. 
The discount, which had been as much as &l. 128. per cent. on January 
19th, 1711, was  below 1  per  cent.  from the 26th to the 31st.  Up to 
February 12th it rose again till 14 per cent.  was  quoted, and thereafter 
it fell rapidly, being under 4 per cent. in the beginning of  March, only 
+ per cent. on the 9th and $per  cent. on the loth4. 
Owing  to the circumstances under  which  the  elimination  of  the 
discount  on  Exchequer  Bills  was  manipulated,  this  event  cannot  be 
taken  as  representative  of  a  general  improvement  in  credit.  Other 
securities gained ground to some extent, but the crisis may be  said to 
have lasted until the beginning of  March 1711, when an act was  passed 
dissolving the societies, recently  established  for the insuring of  certain 
life-contingencies.  Apart from Exchequer Bills, other stocks recovered 
only slowly from the low level of  the previous December.  For instance 
the six per cent. bonds of  the East India company, which were quoted 
at  97a on January 19th, 1711, were 96$ to 96;  until the end of  February 
and repeated 974 on March 9th, rising to 97:  on the R3rd but relapsing 
again to 971 at the end  of  May.  By  March  lath Bank  of  England 
stock had advanced from  95f  (quoted  in  November) to 1064, but the 
whole of  this gain was not maintained.  The prices of  stocks remained 
comparatively  low  until the end  of  August, after which  date an im- 
provement  began  that inaugurated a  long period  of  prosperity. 
H~A-tory  of the Last Four  Years, p.  177. 
An Essay upan Publick  Credit, being an Enquiry  how  the Publick  Credit  comes to 
Gepend upon the change of the Ministry or the Dis.~olution  of Parliament, London, 1710, 
pp. 9, 15, 17. 
A Letter to a Friend in which is shewn the Inviolable Nature of Publick  Securitieo, 
London, 1717, p. 32. 
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IN  September 1711 there came two events, which  were  instrumental 
in  the restoration  of  credit.  These  were  the  signature  of  the  first 
preliminary  articles for peace  negotiations  and the arrangement  made 
for dealing  with  the unfunded  debt.  No  doubt, ultimately,  a  return 
of  peace  was  a  most  important element  towards  industrial  progress, 
but, in the actual circumstances, the funding of  the floating  debt was 
even more satisfactory, and the fact that such an important operation 
could be carried through  was  in  itself  testimony to the return of  con- 
fidence.  The method by which  this transaction  was  accomplished was 
precisely the same as  that adopted  in  the floatation  of  the engrafted 
stock  of  the Bank  of  England1, and  it closely  resembled the type of 
capitalization  adopted  in  the  land-development  undertaking  of  the 
Sword-Blade  company  (which  was  wound  up  just  about  this  time2). 
The parallel  to the engrafted  stock  is especially close.  Both in 1697 
and in 1711 unfunded obligations were at a great discount, being worth 
only from  60 per cent. to 70 per  cent. of  the par value.  In each base 
it was decided that these should be  accepted  at their nominal amounts, 
as capital subscribed for the stock  of  a trading company-in  1697 for 
the Bank  of  England and in 1711 for a new undertaking incorporated 
as the Governor and  Company of the merchants of Great Britain, trading 
to the South Sem and other parts  of  America andfbr Encouragement of 
the Jishing3.  The only  differences  between  the  two  operations  were 
that in 1711 a  new  company was  formed and that the sum dealt with 
was  much larger.  In this case, moreover, the capital of  the South Sea 
company  was  permanent,  but  subject  to  redemption;  whereas  the 
engrafted  stock of  the Bank  of  England  was  intended  to be cancelled 
within  a  few  years. 
The foundation  of  the  South  Sea  company  was  not  an  isolated 
event;  on  the contrary,  it represents  the  culmination  of  a  financial 
1  infra, III. pp. 210, 211.  2  Ibid., 111.  p. 437.  3  Ibid., 111.  p.  295. 
policy  (which  was  common  to both  political  parties)  and which  had 
been  in vogue since  the Revolution.  On  the one  side  there  was  the 
idea  of  the  utilization  of  capital  lent  to the  State as  "a  fund  of 
credit"  on  which  loans  could  be  raised  by  an incorporated  body  for 
its trading operations.  This principle was at the root of the foundation 
of  the Bank  of  England1 as well  as of  the New  and the.United East 
India companiesa. 
Apparently  by  this  method  both  the  State  and  its  incorporated 
creditors  gained.  The unfunded  debts  were  due  for  repayment,  and 
no resources  were  available  for  meeting  these  obligations.  Therefore 
it was  inevitable that such securities should be sold at a great discount, 
and that the national credit  should  be  bad.  If, however, such obliga- 
tions were  funded as redeemable debts, it was  believed that interest at 
6 per  cent. could  be  paid  thereon,  and  there was  the prospect  of  dis- 
charging the liability in the future.  The effect of  the operation was  to 
add  over  9 millions  to  the  funded  debt,  which  was  increased  from 
4 millions in  1706 to 25fr millions  in  171R3. 
The attractiveness of  the proposal to the holders of  floating debts is 
shown  by  the appreciation  of  these  obligatioils  on  the scheme being 
mooted, and by the unanimity with which it was accepted.  Undoubtedly 
the prospect of gain to the individual investor was great.  He had before 
his  mind  the outcome of the subscription of  tallies into the stock of  the 
Ban]< of  England, where a depreciated security, which was  not receiving 
interest,  had  been  transformed  into  an  appreciated  one,  returning  a 
satisfactory yieldd.  At the worst  he had the advantage of  exchanging 
an  unprovided-for-debt for  one  which  ranked  for  interest  on  a  fund 
that was  moderately secured, and, in addition, there  was  the hope that 
the income, receivable  from  the State, would  be  augmented by  profits 
made  in  trading.  Therefore  there  appeared  to be  a  reasonable  pro- 
bability that, by  the conversion of  the unfunded  debts into South Sea 
stock, there would  be  a  considerable addition  to the capital  value  of 
the former,  which  may  be  estimated to have  been  only about  68 per 
cent. on the average of  the nominal amount early in 17116. 
The relief  of  the money-market  from  the pressure  of  the floating 
debt tended to produce  a  more  sanguine spirit, and as it began  to be 
recognized  that peace  was  assured,  enterprize  broadened  out, and an 
era  of  prosperity  began  which  continued  until  1720.  Foreign  trade 
expanded  to  a  remarkable  extent.  The  total  British  imports  and 
exports, which had been under  11 millions in l710 increased by about 
I  Vide injru, 111.  pp. 204-7.  2  Ibid., 11. pp.  165, 180, 191. 
Ifislory of  the Earlier  Years of the  Funded  Debt from  1694 to 1786 [C-9010], 
1898, pp.  16, 17. 
Vide mpra, p.  381.  Vide infra, 111.  p.  297. 390  Expanding  Trade  17  11-14  [CHAP. XX. 
a million in each  of  the three following  years, reaching  144 millions 
in  1714, a  figure  approximately  double  that of  1697.  Profits  were 
relatively  high.  The Bank  of  England had been  forced to reduce  its 
dividend after the crisis of  l710 to 7 per  cent.;  and, up to the end of 
1714, the distribution was  raised to 8 per  cent.  This rate was  more 
satisfactory than would appear at first sight, since the interest receivable 
from the State was  now  6 per  cent.  instead of  the original 8 per cent.' 
The Bank of  Scotland for the three years 1712-13,1713-14  and 1714- 
15 divided no  less  than 30 per  cent.  annually, and  its stock  realized 
R2732.  The old-established insurance companies gained some assistance 
from  the compulsory  closing of  the ultra-speculative  offices  in  1711. 
The Sun Fire o6ce was  able to pay  a  dividend  in  17133,  and  in the 
following year  a new  undertaking in  the same department was started, 
which  was called the Union or Double Hand-in-Hand Fire Ofice4.  An- 
other new  company, organized on the basis  that had  been  so common 
twenty  years  before,  was  established  in  1713 as  the  Governor  and 
company  for making and vending Beech Oil.  In this venture the capital 
was  divided  into classes, one part, the owners of  which  were  known as 
"the  annuitants,"  being entitled  to a fixed and preferential charge on 
the profits, while the balance was divisible amongst the remainder which 
was  described as  "the  shares,"  the owners  of  which  were  called "the 
sharers  5." 
The  tide  of  prosperity  was  checked  in  its  flow  from  the  end  of 
January  l714 to the beginning  of  April.  Probably  the  activity of 
trade had made considerable demands on the supply of  capital available, 
and any untoward  incident  would  produce  a greater effect  than when 
business was dull.  The shock came from a baseless announcement of the 
death of  Anne; and for a short time  there was great uneasiness, which 
culminated in a run on the Bank of  England.  It is to be remembered 
that the dissemination of  misleading information had been practised  for 
more than twenty years by unscrupulous operators in stocks"  and what 
made the report of  l714 remembered was partly the spectacular means 
by which it was circulated7, and partly the fact that it brought  to light 
the prevalent anxiety concerning the succession.  Owing to the frequent 
mention  of  the episode by contemporary writers,  some recent  students 
of  convulsions in  credit  have  treated  this  disturbance  as  the  most 
serious one between  1708 and 17208.  As compared  with the crisis of 
1710 the short period  of  excitement in  l714 was  less  intense,  the M1 
I Vide infra,  111.  pp. 330-3,  245.  L?  Ibid.,  111.  pp.  269,  274. 
Ibid.,  1x1.  p.  384.  * Ibid.,  III.  p.  379. 
Ibid.,  111. p.  116.  Vide supa, p.  358. 
7  Vide infra,  111.  p.  232. 
8  Des C'risea Commerciabs, par Clement Juglar,  Paris,  1889, p.  294. 
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in stocks was  only half as great, and the recovery afterwards was  very 
rapid.  For these  reasons, the disturbance  in credit early in 1714 can 
at  the worst be described only as a minor crisis, and it may be doubted 
whether  it was  sufficiently  grave  to be  named  a  crisis  at all.  The 
following comparison of  the prices of  stocks at the lowest  during  the 
depression  of  1710, at the highest  in  1713 and again  at the  lowest 
from January to April l714 will  show  the extent of  the rise in  1713 
and of  the fall at the beginning  of  the following year: 
Comparison oj  the lowest prices  of Stock8 in 1710 with the highest in 
1713 and with the lowest in  1714. 
East  South 
Bank of  Differ-  India  Differ-  Sea  Differ- 
England  ence  Co.  ence  CO.  ence 
Lowest price in 1710  ...  953 
Amount of  fall from highest 
price, 1709-10  ...  ...  -  39a 
Highest price in 1713  ...  1303  l282  973 
Amount of  rise from lowest 
price, 1710  ...  ...  +  344  +  192. 
A  - 
Lowest price,  1714 (Jan. to 
April)  ...  ...  ...  1162  1162  838 
Amount of  fall from highest 
price,  1713  ...  ...  -  134  -  12  -  149 
* From estimated par value 1711. 
Not  only  was  the fall  comparatively  small, but  the rebound  was 
rapid.  By  August  of  the same year,  most  of  the securities had  ad- 
vanced  in  price  beyond  the  highest  quotation  of  the previous  year; 
and, before  the end of  September, all  of  them (save the Royal African 
company)  showed  a  substantial  improvement  on  the  best  figures  of 
1713. 
For just  a year-from  August 1714 to the same month in 1715- 
business was good and the stock  market  was  strong.  The accession  of 
George I. and the return  of  the Whigs  were  accepted  in  the  City 
as highly  satisfactory events.  There  remained  however  at least  one 
element of  uncertainty, namely the possibility of action by the Jacobites. 
The danger of  an insurrection tended towards caution, and in foreign 
trade there was  a considerable decline, from the total reached in 1714, 
during  the  following  year1.  Judging  from  the  state  of  the  stock- 
market,  the position  at home was  one  of  marking  time.  Thus  Bank 
of  England stock  for the first eight months of  1715 fluctuated about 
130, which had been a common high level during periods of  prosperity 
since 170%.  This attitude of  expectancy and of  financial  preparation 
l This decline was attributed by many writers to the clauses relating to commerce 
in the Treaty of  Utrecht-Truth,  Truth,  Truth,  1715, pp.  10-20. 392  The Stock-Market and  the Rebellion 1715  [CHAP. XX. 
was  effedtive  in  minimizing  the consequences  of  the  Rebellion,  news 
of  which  was  received  in  London  before  the  end  of  October.  The 
enterprize  of  John  Freke,  a  stock-broker,  has  provided  a  complete 
record  of  the change  of  prices,  not  only  in  the  securities  of  public 
companies, but also of  such funds as were  dealt  in at  the time1.  The 
total fall from the highest quotations of  1714-15  to the lowest recorded 
from  October to November  1715 was  between  l2  per  cent. and 14  per 
cent. in the stocks of  the Bank  of  England, the East India and South 
Sea companies and the Million  Bank.  During  the  same  period  the 
decline in the annuities, guaranteed by the State, was  from 8 per cent. 
to 10 per  cent.=  By  far the heaviest  sufferer  amongst  the companies 
through  the Rebellion  was  the Bank  of  Scotland, which  was  forced to 
suspend  payment  and  was  unable  to pay  any dividend  for  the year 
1715-163. 
Comparison of the  highest prices  of  stocks  of the  undermentioned 
companies ji-om  1714 to 1715 with  the  lowest  in  1715. 
Bank of  East India  South Sea  Million 
England  Company  Company  Bank 
Highest price in 1714, 1715 ...  1349  l019  100 
Lowest  price  from October to 
December  1715  ...  ...  115  126  88  88  - 
Fall  ...  ...  19i  18$  13B  12 
14 "1,  12  "1,  13  "1,  12  O/, 
The main  effect of  the minor crises at the beginning of  l714 and at 
the end of  1715 had been to prevent the development of  the prosperity, 
which had begun in 1711.  During the whole five years, there had been 
a  series  of  oscillations  between  certain  narrow  limits,  which  is  very 
clearly  marked  in the fluctuations of  Bank  of  England  stock:  - 
Fluctuations  of Bank  of England  Stock  1711-15. 
1711-13  1714-15  To  end  of  Feb. 1716 
Maxima-  130&  1343  130& 
1714 (April)  1715 (Nov.) 
Minima-  116%  115 
From the middle of  1716 the progress, which  had been  arrested  by 
the uncertainties  of  the two  previous  years,  was  resumed; and,  apart 
1 The Prices of  the Several Stocks, Annuities and  other Publick  Securities  4c. with 
the  Course of Exchange,  by John Freke,  Broker.  A specimen sheet  of this list is 
reproduced in vol. 111.  pp.  xiv, xv. 
2  For instance the Annuity of  1708, secured  on the old  tonnage, was  quoted  at 
1.58 years'  purchase  in  the earlier period  and  at 1.5  years'  purchase  in the later one. 
3  It was stated  the cause  of the suspension  was  political,  rather than financial, 
wide infra, 111.  p.  269. 
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from some alarm occasioned amongst holders of  public debts by Walpole's 
proposals for a re-arrangement of  the loans1, the outlook was  promising 
until  the end  of  1717.  Trade was  very  active, the total imports and 
exports amounted to close on 15+  millions, as compared with 144 millions 
in  1714,  the  highest  point  hitherto  reached.  The great  volume  of 
business gave full employment  for the recent  accumulations  of  capital, 
and the rate of  interest was  comparatively  high.  Some. of  the Long 
Annuities, which had been  issued in  l707 and 1708 during a period  of 
depression and when the pressure of the war was severely felt, and which 
gave a return at the issue price of 64 per cent., yielded at the quotations 
of the summer of 1716 close on 6:  per  cent., but, owing to the advance 
of  the market in these securities at the end of  the year, the return was 
reduced  to 54 per cent.2  The income per  cent. given by  the stocks of 
the Bank of England, the Million Bank, the East India and South Sea 
companies varied from 26.5s. per cent. to 58 per cent., while the average 
return  of  the five securities was just  over 6 per cent.3  Bank stock was 
as high as 1574.' (the maximum as yet recorded), while East India stock 
touched 210 at the end of  17175.  In view of  the fact that interest was 
greater in  1716 than it had  been  during  a  considerable  part  of  the 
period  of  the war,  the advance in quotations is a strong testimony  to 
the general  feeling of  confidence.  The years 1716 and 1717 represent 
the culmination  of  the era of  prosperity which had begun in 1711, and 
as such afford a convenient opportunity for forming  an estimate of  the 
share-capital  of  the  companies,  which  are  known  to  have  been  in 
existence at this time.  The following statement is confined to English 
undertakings, since there are not sufficient data to justify  the inclusion 
of  the Scottish organizations.  Amongst the latter the Bank of  Scotland 
still had a paid up capital of  .&?10,000  sterling, and there remained the 
sugar-refining partnerships, the soaperie, and probably the roperie alsoS. 
The Union had had the effect of  destroying such of  the woollen  manu- 
factories as had not changed their product  from  fine  to "  coarse" cloth ; 
but the admission of  Scotsmen to the plantation  trade had opened  up 
a  highly  prosperous commerce  between  the West  of  Scotland  and the 
colonies, most of the capital for which was provided by small companies. 
Thus of  67 ships, owned in the Clyde in 1735, no less than 63 belonged 
to  companies,  some  of  which  are  returned  as  the  owners  of  five 
l  Vide infra, 111.  pp.  298, 299. 
For  particulars  of  these loans wide  infra, III.  p.  292,  and  for  the prices,  The 
Prices ofthe Several Stocks, Annuities and other Publick Seculities &C.,  by  John Freke, 
1715, 1716. 
Vide infra, 11.  p.  206 ;  111.  pp.  244, 245, 280, 287, 360. 
Ibid.,  111.  p.  244. 
Ibid.,  11.  p.  206. 
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vessels1.  Unfortunately there are no details available  as to the capital 
or organization of these firms. 
The Share-Capital  of  English  companies  existence  in 1717 
Hudson's  Bay company2  ... 
Royal African company3  .  .  . 
The Bank of England  4.. .  .  .  . 
The Million Bank6  ...  ... 
Water-supply undertakings6  .. . 
Mine Adventurers7  .  ..  .  .. 
The Sun Fire Offices  ...  .  .. 
The Charitable Corporation9  .  .. 
The Convex Lights company 10 
The United East India company11 
The South Sea company l2  .  .  . 
The Beech Oil company '3  .  .  . 
a..  ... 
(about) 
...  ... 
(about) 
...  ... 
The increase of over 150 per cent. in the share-capital of  companies 
in England since 1703 must be viewed in relation to the peculiar  form 
of  the joint-stock  type of  organization at this period.  It must always 
be remembered that, owing to the financial policy of  successive govern- 
ments, the share-capital did not mean  resources that were available  for 
trade.  As  yet  the  South  Sea  company  had  found  no  outlet for  its 
resources ;  and, in the main, its stock, which amounted to close on one- 
half of  the total of more than WO&  millions, was  simply the equivalent of 
an  equal  amount of  government  debt.  Similarly,  the actual trading 
resources of  the East India company were less than the sum, which had 
been  lent  to  the  State and  which  was  treated  as  the  stock  of  the 
undertaking since 1709.  From the point  of view of  trade at any given 
time, the importance of  the companies, which  had lent capital  to the 
government, could be best  estimated by the amount of  loans that they 
1 E.g.  "John  Lyon and company" owned 5 ships, also "  Buchanan and company," 
"  Somervilles and company"-The  History of  Glasgow,  by James Gibson, Glasgow, 
1777, p. 210. 
Vide  in.a, 11.  pp.  232, 237.  Ibid., 11.  p.  31. 
"bid.,  111.  p. 243.  Ibid., 111.  p.  279. 
6  It might at first sight appear that the valuation  of  the water  companies should 
be advanced  since 1703; but,  owing to competition amongst them, profits had not 
expanded to ally considerable extent since 1700.  Between  that year  and 1720, the 
dividend of  the New River  company increased  by less than l* per  cent.  (ibid.,  111. 
pp.  26, 31) while some of the other undertakings had lost ground. 
7  Ibid., 11.  p.  456.  Ibid., 111.  p.  385.  "bid.,  111.  p.  380. 
10 Ibid., 111.  p.  59.  There is no information as to whether there had been any 
change in the amount of the capital of this company. 
11  Ibid.,  11.  p.  206.  '"bid.,  111.  p.  360.  l3 Ibid.,  111.  pp.  116, 117. 
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themselves had borrowed, since such loans would  represent  their actual 
trading capital at that period, and this method  could be  applied, with 
certain modifications, to the case of the Bank of  England.  At the same 
time,  the limitation  of  the enquiry to the ascertaining of  the trading 
capital  only would  present  but one side of  the financial position, since 
the massed  holdings of  government  debt by  an incorporated company 
enabled it to increase its borrowings to a considerable extent at need, 
and in addition it was able to obtain credit to a large amount, without 
actually executing bonds in favour of  the creditor. 
While to all appearance the period  of  prosperity  still continued in 
1718 and 1719, there were underlying causes which point to a slackening 
in  the  great  activity  of  trade.  The state of  tension  between  Great 
Britain  and  Spain  caused  ~rudent  men  of  business  to  curtail  their 
operations,  and  the  wisdom  of  this  course was  shown  by  the actual 
outbreak of  hostilities later in 1718.  Capital was comparatively plentiful 
and  the rate  of  interest  on  the  five  representative  securities  already 
referred  to1  was  about  5  per  cent.  as  compared  with  G  per  cent. 
approxin~ately  in 1716.  The ~ield  on the Long Annuities of  1708 and 
on East India stock at  the middle prices of  1718 was under 5 per cent.2, 
while the bankers  of  the South Sea company  fixed the rate of  interest 
on an overdraft up to &'100,000  at 4 per cent.3  With capital relatively 
plentiful and the rate of  interest ruling comparatively low, the prices of 
Bank of  England, East India and Million Bank stocks were higher than 
in 1717, and all these securities touched the highest  quotations, as yet 
recorded,  in  the first quarter of  171B4.  The rumour  of  an invasion, 
arising out of the war with Spain, affected ~ublic  securities from October 
8th to loth, 1718, and a fall from the highest records of  the year in the 
stocks of  the chief companies is  recorded  varying  from 7 per  cent.  to 
14  per cent., while the quotations of the Long Annuities receded during 
the same period, on the average, about  10 per  cent. and those of  some 
of  the Short Annuities by as much as 15  per cent. 
There  is a  certain  symmetry in  the progress  of  British  commerce 
from l711 to 1719.  The maximum of  activity was reached about 1716 
and on  each  side of  this point  there were  two  minor  crises-those  of 
1714 and 1715, before the culmination was reached, and again two more 
in  l717  and  1718,  when  the  activity  had  begun  to  slacken.  The 
circumstances, already indicated, explain the phenomenon of  a declining 
volume of  trade in 1718 and 1719, accompanied by an advance in the 
l Vide supra, p.  393. 
Freke,  Prices of  the Several Stocks, 1718; wide  infra,  11.  p. 206. 
Court Book of  the South Sea Company, Dec.  12, 1718, British Museum-Add. 
MS. 2.5,498,  f. 77. 
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prices  of stocks.  The following statement shows  in a  condensed  form 
the check  to the upward  movement by  the alarms of  March 1717 and 
October  1718, together  with  the rise  on  balance: 
Comparisons of the  Quotations  of various stocks  between  October  1716 
and  November  1718. 
Bank of  East India,  South Sea  Million 
England  company  company  1  Bank 
Highest price, 1716 (Oct.) 
Lowest price, 1717 (Jan. to 
March) ..................... 
............  Difference 
Highest price,  1718 (Jan. 
to March) .................. 
............  Difference 
Lowest price, 1718 (Oct.) 
............  Difference 
.........  Highest price,  1719 
Difference ............ 
In the year 1719 there were  several  conditions, which were likely to 
result in considerable speculative activity in the stock-markets.  Owing 
to the  checking  of  the enterprize  in  1718,  capital  appeared  to  be 
relatively plentiful, and the rate of  interest  was  low.  Moreover, there 
were some pre-conceptions, which had entered almost unconsciorisly into 
the methods  of  business-organization  and which, when  carried to their 
logical issues  in an environment favourable  to them, would  inevitably 
lead to wild speculation.  The chief of  these was the series of  conclusions, 
drawn from the potency of  "  a fund of  credit."  In order to grasp, the 
full  import  of  the  situation,  it is  necessary  to  remember  that  the 
extensive utilization of  credit was new, and that contemporary observers 
noticed that, by this agency, business had been immensely extended, and 
the results achieved were viewed with amazement.  Thus a writer of the 
period speaks of "  the mysteries, or indeed miracles wrought.. .things as 
incredible as the greatest impossibility in nature coirld be thought to be, 
things that now  they  are done they are as a dream  to those that see 
them'."  It is little wonder, then, that the idea of  a fund of  credit was 
described as "a mine  of  gold,"  or as "realized  alchemy2."  Such ideas 
were not confined to Great Britain, but were shared by  the chief trading 
nations.  Everywhere, when  men  considered how  enterprizes  had  been 
started and had been  carried  on  successfully by the using twice over of 
the same wealth, it came to be thought that the process was  capable of 
1 The  Chimera.,  London, 1720, p. 60. 
2  Quoted by Bastable, Public Finance, p. 662. 
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infinite extension.  But,  while  these  ideas  had  been  growing,  various 
causes prevented  any very great effort being made to realize the gains 
that were popularly expected to flow from the organization of  a fund of 
credit on a vast scale until 1719.  Still, it must always be  remembered 
that the dramatic events of 1719 and l720 represent  only the inexorable 
conclusion from a  series of  premisses almost universally accepted; and, 
since these  ideas were not confined to a  single  country, their practical 
realization became an incident of  considerable importance  in European 
history.  Thus the crisis of  1719-30  constitutes  simply the attempt to 
realize an unconscious  ideal of  the indefinite expansibility of  a  fund of 
credit. 
In Great Britain, since the Revolution, this ideal had been gathering 
importance.  In  addition  to  the  land-bank  schemes  of  1695l,  the 
finances of  every important company had been  determined by it.  Not 
only  was  all  the  capital  subscribed  by  the members  of  the Bank  of 
England  lent  to the State, but, in addition, a  further sum was  taken 
from  the deposits  of  customers.  Thus none  of  the share-capital  was 
available for the business  of  banking, and the loan, made by the Bank 
to the State, became in fact a fund of  credit  to support the operations 
of  the institution2.  Similarly, in 1695 and as long as the Million Bank 
carried on banking operations, it had to depend, not on its share-capital, 
but on the fund of  credit,  constituted  by  the original  subscription  of 
scrip of the Million loan3.  Moreover, once the system had been started, 
it was found capable of  extension.  The engrafted stock  of  the Bank of 
England was  formed  by the valuing of  government obligations, which 
were  selling  at the time at a discount of  about 35 per  cent.,  at their 
nominal  value.  Apparently the operation  was  justified, for  those  who 
converted their tallies into engrafted stock secured a large profit  by the 
transaction4.  Similarly the whole  influence of  Parliament, as affecting 
the East India trade,  tended  again and again  to force this branch  of 
foreign  commerce  to depend  solely  on  capital  lent to the State.  In 
1698 the right  of  trading to India was  confined to subscribers to the 
two  million  loan.  When  the New  East India company  had  raised  a 
trading capital by its additional stock, it was forced under the Indenture 
Tripartite to cancel it, and therefore the joint committee of  management 
was  compelled  at the  beginning  of  its  career  to rely  solely  on  the 
resources  it could  borrow  on  the security  of  the loan  to the  State. 
Finally, when the union  of  the two companies was  completed  in 1709, 
the trading capital, raised  by  the committee of  management, was  once 
more merged in a State-loan.  Thus on three different occasions, within 
the space of  eleven years, the East India trade was  compelled by the 
l  Vide infra,  111.  pp. 246-52. 
Ibid., 111.  pp.  276, 277. 
Ibid., 111.  p. 207. 
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State to rely on a fund of  credit1.  At the root  of  the various schemes 
for an increase of  the circulating medium, propounded in Scotland from 
1699 to 1705, there is the same idea of  a fund of  credit.  Though none 
of the proposals were adopted, this agitation  is  of  special interest, since 
one of  the plans  emanated  from  John Law and was  in  many respects 
similar to that carried out by him  in France.  Then again in England, 
one  aspect  of  the land-bank  scheme was  adopted by  the Sword  Blade 
company, which issued notes on the security of  lands it had  purchased 
in Ireland2.  It was  in l711 that the most  ambitious development  of 
the idea of  the fund of credit was realized, when the South Sea company 
was  incorporated, with  a nominal capital of  over 9 millions.  Like the 
engrafted  stock  of  the Bank  of  England,  the South Sea  capital was 
formed  by  the conversion  of  various depreciated government securities 
into the stock of  the trading company.  Similarly in France in August 
1717 the compagnie d'occident was formed, under the auspices of  Law ; 
and, exactly as in the case of  the South Sea company, stock was obtained 
by subscribing depreciated obligations of  the State.  The only difference 
between the two floatations was that in France the securities subscribed 
were  at a  much  greater  discount.  This fact  becomes  an interesting 
commentary on the fears, expressed in  England for a number  of  years 
before  the Revolution,  as to French  commercial  supremacy.  At the 
end of  the reign of  Louis XIV., through a variety of causes, the country 
was bankrupt.  Even after a  drastic cancellation  of  debt, it was  found 
impossible to pay  interest regularly  at 4  per  cent.  on  the remainder. 
Moreover, the system of  taxation  and its amount imposed  a  crushing 
. burden  on  the industry of  the country.  Owing to the default  of  the 
government,  its securities  were  immensely  depreciated.  Even  the re- 
organized  debt was  at a discount  of  close on 75 per cent.3  Thus, while 
the original nominal  capital of  the compagnie d'occident was  l00 mil. 
livres in shares of  500 livres each, or approximately 5 millions sterling 
in shares of  225, the securities,  exchanged into that nominal  capital, 
were  worth  no  more than  30 mil.  livres or ~1,500,000. Therefore in 
1717 the relative positions of  the South Sea company and the compagnie 
d'occident  were as follows : 
l  Vide infra, 11.  pp.  165, 170, 171, 185-7,  191. 
Ibid., III. p.  438. 
Recherche.~  et Conside'rations  sur les Finances en France depuis 1595 jusqu'en  1721, 
par F.  V6ro11 de Forbonnais,  1758,  VI. p.  274.  Elsewhere the depreciation in 1717 
is given  at between 68 per cent. and 70  per cent.;  Memoirs ofthe Liye  of John Law, 
by John Wood, Edin. 1824, p.  36. 
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Nominal  and  real par  value  of the  capital of the South Sea Company 
and  the  Compagnie d'occident in 1717. 
Approximate market price of 
securities, exchanged into 
Nominal capital  the nominal capital 
South Sea company .  .  .  .  ..  ;E10,000,000  S6,800,000 
Compagnie d'occident ...  100,000,000 livres  30,000,000 livres =  ;E1,500,000 
As yet, although South Sea stock had never  fallen  below what may 
be described as its real par value, it had never for long been  maintained 
above the nominal par value'.  It follows that the process of  reducing 
the "  watering"  of  the stock of the compagnie d'occideilt  was one which 
was likely to be  protracted, since the discount on the French obligations, 
converted into the stock  of  the trading company,  was  more than twice 
as large as that on those similarly exchanged in England  in 1711.  In 
other words, the situation may be conveniently remembered by fixing on 
the figure 68 which represents the estimated actual market value of  the 
securities exchanged for South Sea stock and also the minimum discount 
on  those  converted  into shares  of  the compagnie  d'occident.  Under 
these  circumstances it is  not  surprising  that, while  the shares  of  the 
latter undertaking were  worth more than the billets #&tat which  had 
been  exchanged for  them, they still remained  much  under  the nominal 
par.  For about a year the price did not exceed 300 livres for the share 
of  500  livresz.  While  such  a  quotation  constituted  it  satisfactory 
advance for the person, who  had purchased  500 livres of  billets  #&tat 
to subscribe at 150 to 160 livres, the financial position  of  the company 
cannot be  described as flourishing, when  its stock  sold at only 60 per 
cent. of  its nominal amount.  Still, towards the end of  the year 1718, 
the company  had  strengthened its position.  Like  all  other  ventures 
founded on a fund of  credit, arising out of  obligations of  the State, this 
undertaking  was  a  creditor  of  the  government  to the extent  of  the 
billets #&tat, exchanged as against its shares; and, through the influence 
of  Law with the regent, the Duke of  Orleans, interest was paid regularly 
to the company, whereas the previous irregularity continued in the case 
of  similar  securities  which  had  not  been  exchanged.  Further,  on 
September l4th, the tobacco farm was  acquired, and on December 15th 
the assets of  the compagnie du S&n&gal  were added.  The same process 
of  consolidation was  continued.  In May 1719 these  undertakings  were 
amalgamated  with  the compagnie  $Orient  and the  compagnie  de  la 
Chine and the title of  the series of consolidations became the compagnie 
des Xndes.  Then further in June $719 the compagnie  d'Afriqoe  was 
l Vide infra, 111.  pp. 297, 360. 
2  Law, son SystZme et son l$poqw, par P. A. Cochut, Paris, 1853, p. 60; Recherche8 
Hiiistoriqws sur le SystZme de Law,  par E. Levasseur,  Paris,  1854, pp.  91, 92. 400  The South Sea  Company 1719  [CHAP.  XX. 
acquired1.  Thus it may be said that, in the period  extending from the 
summer  of  1718 to that  of  1719,  the  energies  of  Law  were  mainly 
directed towards the organization  of  the whole foreign trade of  France 
with America  and the East by means of  a  single joint-stock  company. 
While these efforts were sufficiently striking, there was another mode of 
extending the sphere of operations of  a great joint-stock company, which 
was  adopted in England by the South Sea company; and which, while 
less remarkable at  the moment, contained the germ of the great financial 
transactions during the latter part of  1719 and in  the following year. 
This was the offer  of  the South Sea company  to convert into its stock 
the Lottery Loan of 1710 ;  and, though a bonus was  given both to the 
annuitants and to the State, the company succeeded in making a profit 
of  ;C72,800 on  the  transaction2.  The importance  of  this  operation, 
which  extended from February till July 1719, consists in its appearing 
to prove that, when a fund of  credit had been established by a company, 
further  assistance  could  be  rendered  to  the  State,  through  such  a 
company undertaking extensive conversions of  the public loans  into its 
own stock to the mutual profit of all the interests concerned. 
In  the  month  of  May  and  the  early  part  of  June,  there  was  a 
remarkable  coincidence  in  the prices  of  South Sea and French  Indies 
stock.  At that time both stood  at a trifle  over 10  per cent. premium 
on  the nominal  par  value.  At this  date  the  capital  of  the  latter 
undertaking was  in process of  being increased by  one half,  in order to 
provide funds for  the expropriation  of  the shareholders  in the various 
foreign  trading companies recently  bought  up ;  and, for this purpose, 
an issue of  50,000 shares was made, at 550 livres per share, or a premium 
of  10 per cent.  It is to be noted  that the issue price  was  payable  in 
cash  in  instalments;  and that  therefore,  expressed in  terms  of  cash, 
these  shares cost  more  than  three and a  half  times  the sum required 
to obtain the billets  d'ktat  which were  accepted at face value in 1717. 
The following figures summarize the positions  of  the two companies at 
this date : 
Relative positions  of the South Sea Compan?j and the Compagnie des 
Indes at the date of theJirst isslre of capital by the latter. 
Nominal capital  Market price 
South Sea Company  ...  ...  ...  ...  11%  mil. Ss  110 
Compagnie des Indes 126 mil. livres (partly paid)=6& mil. Ss  110 
While  South  Sea  stock  was  never  quoted  above  117 during  the 
summer of  1719, there was  a rapid advance in the price of  the shares 
1 Mkmoire  sur  la  Situation actuelle  de  la  Compagnie  des  Indes,  par  M,  1'Abbe' 
Morellet, Paris, 1769, pp. 21,  22. 
"or  the details vide infra,  1x1.  pp. 301-3. 
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of  the French Indies company.  In the first instance this undoubtedly 
arose  from  the relations  of  the shares, just  created,  to the old  ones. 
The payment  on  the former  was  divided  into twenty  equal  monthly 
parts of  the capital value,  with  the addition  of  the premium  to the 
instalment  first  due.  Thus  the original  outlay for  a  share  was  only 
75 livresl.  Moreover  already  the  securities  of  Law's  company  were 
selling at three and a half  times the value of  the obligations subscribed, 
and  it was  believed  that  further  developments  were  to be  expected. 
Therefore  any  one,  who  had  600 livres  in  cash,  might  either buy  one 
original share or he might take the risk of  purchasing eight of  the new 
issue, trusting that there would  be  a  rise  in price  which  would enable 
him,  by  selling  part,  to pay  the  calls,  as  they  became  due,  on  the 
remainder.  Thus, in the former case, an advance of  15  per cent. would 
yield him  a profit  of  that amount,  whereas, if  he adopted the second 
course  he  might,  under  the  same  conditions,  more  than  double  his 
capital.  For this reason, purchases of  the new  issues became frequent ; 
and, as the price advanced, the demand  increased, until before the end 
of  June the new  shares were  sold  at a price  equivalent to 1,000 livres 
for the old share, while the latter was sold at 630 livres.  Obviously the 
situation was an artificial  one, and in time, had events been  allowed to 
take their course, the premium on  the new  shares would  have gradually 
been reduced.  But Law had committed himself  to a course of inflation, 
and he decided to force the old shares up to the level of  the new  issue. 
This was  effected by an arr6t of  June 30th, which  made it a condition 
for  the  valid  ownership  of  one  new  share that the purchaser  should 
possess  four original  shares.  Since the latter were  regarded  as giving 
birth to the scrip of the second issue, they were described as "  les mkres" 
and the others as  "les  filles";  and,  in a  short time,  the former  were 
quoted at 1,000 livres, that is twice  their face value,  and no less than 
seven times the cash equivalent of  the billets $&tat, subscribed two years 
before.  Had the series of  new  developments ceased at this point, it is 
probable that the inflation in the market-price of  the shares would have 
been  gradually  reduced, but in  July  there came the edict  transferring 
the Mint to the company, with the issue of  a further 50,000 shares, to 
pay  the sum  agreed  upon  to the Regent.  This  brought  the  total 
nominal capital to 150 mil. livres (or approximately 74 millions sterling). 
These shares were issued at 1,000 livres and were offered for subscription 
for  cash,  subject  to the condition  that, to obtain the allotment of  a 
single share of  the third issue, it was  necessary to produce titles to the 
ownership of  four "  m&resV  and one "  fille."  Hence  the last emission 
was  described as "les  petites  filles."  At the same time a dividend  of 
I.e. the premium of 10°/,=50 livres and the monthly instalment of  25 livres. 
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12  per cent. was promised  for  the year  1720, which  would  give a yield 
of 6 per cent. at  the market price, or 50 per cent. more than the interest 
paid by  the State.  If  this dividend  could be justified,  it is  clear that 
there was room for a further advance in quotations, but the revenue of 
the company from known sources would have been insufficient to pay it. 
Therefore,  either  Law  was  deliberately  misleading  investors,  or  else 
there  was  a  new  scheme  in  the background,  which  would  add  to the 
power  and  resources  of  this all-embracing company.  That there  was 
such  a  prqject  is  shown  by  the events  of  September.  The crown  of 
Law's  operations consisted of  a double scheme,  the execution of  which 
extended from the last days of August into October.  On the one side, 
the company was  authorized to become the sole agent of the government 
for the collection of  revenue, thereby displacing the wasteful sub-division 
of farms of the taxes.  Thus Law, having consolidated the foreign trade 
with tropical countries, now  proceeded to a further consolidation  of  the 
fiscal system ;  and, by the sweeping away of vast  intermediate  profits, it 
was  calculated  that the taxpayer, the administration  and the company 
would  gain1.  But the increase of  revenue on a  scale of  reduced taxes 
was  not the only benefit reserved to the government.  It  was a condition 
of  the transfer of  the farms to the company that it should lend to the 
administration, at 3 per cent., a sufficient sum to repay the creditors of 
the State.  Since the interest, previously fixed for these loans was 4 per 
cent.,  there  was  thus  a  saving  of  25 per  cent.  The  result  of  this 
arrangement  was  that  the  company  incurred  an  obligation  to  find 
l50 mil. livres or about 74 millions sterling, a sum  equal to its whole 
nominal capital.  Further that amount was payable  to the creditors in 
cash or in drafts on the State-bank, which were to he accepted in lieu of 
cash, and  the company was  bound  to provide  funds  in  a similar  form. 
As  matters  stood,  there  was  just  one  method  by  which  the operation 
could  be  accomplished,  narnely  by  a  creation  of  new  shares  of  the 
company,  and  also,  as  a  temporary  measure,  of  a  great  quantity  of 
bank-paper.  If the shares of the company were sufficiently popular, the 
creditors, when paid in bank  money, would exchange such notes against 
the new  shares, and the paper would  return  to the company and would 
pass again from the company to the bank in payment of  its loan to the 
latter.  Thus the final  effect  of  the scheme  would  be,  supposing  the 
whole  plan  worked  without  a  hitch, the conversiorl of  the loans into 
stock  of  the company, while  the State would  in  future have  only one 
creditor instead  of  many and would  save in the interest required for the 
service  of  the debt.  Law  himself  summarized  the whole  method  of 
1 The benefit to the people, by the withdrawal of  oppressive taxes, is dealt with 
by Prof. J. S. Nicholso~l  in his "  Essay on John Law of  Lauriston" in A  Treatise on 
Money, London,  1901, p.  187. 
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conversion in the following terms :-"  L'intention  de la  compagnie @tait 
que  ceux qui seraient remboursgs fissent acquisition  des actions quTe1Ie 
exposait en vente  au-dessous de leur juste  valeur  et qu'en  s'assurant 
elle-m6rne une rente fixe contre toute e've'nement, l'l?tat  ffit libe'rd et les 
rentiers enrichis'."  In the effecting of  the conversion, much  depended 
on the price  at which  shares in  the company were  offered.  Under  the 
stimulus  of  the spirit  of  speculation,  which  had  been  by  now  aroused 
and the prospects opened up by the grant of  the farms of  the taxes, the 
shares had advanced to 5,000  livres or ten times  their nominal  value. 
It was  therefore  decided  that the capital of  150 mil. livres should  be 
doubled,  and that the new  issue  should  be  offered at 5,000 livres per 
share, payable in instalments, without any restriction as to the previous 
possession  of  shares of  the earlier  series.  The first payment being 500 
livres, this issue was  distinguished from  the others by the name of  the 
"cinq  cents."  Further,  since  the 150 mil.  livres  of  new  capital was 
offered at ten times its nominal  value, the amount receivable for it in 
bank-money was  exactly  equal to the sum  of  the debts to be  paid  off 
and also to that to be  lent by  the company to the State.  Finally, if 
the whole amount of "cinq  cents"  was  taken  up at the price  of  5,000, 
the  conversion  would  be  complete,  and those  who  had  formerly  been 
creditors of the State (or their assip)  would now  be shareholders in the 
company, whose total capital was  300 mil. livres (or 15  millions sterling2). 
This operatio~l  was a brilliant success.  As had happened in the case 
of the "filles,"  the "  cinq cents" very soon acquired an additional premium 
of  110 less than 3,000 livres, while the earlier issues  relapsed from  5,000 
to 4,000,  thus the former were  quoted at twice  as much  as the latter. 
As  before,  instead  of  the "cinq  cents"  relapsing  to the price  of  the 
"mitres,"  that of  the latter advanced  to the new  high level.  On this 
occasion there were no fresh important developments, and the inflation 
was  due  in  the  main  to an apparent,  and to some  extent to a  real, 
plentifulness of  money.  In September, Paris became the Mecca  of  the 
speculators of  Europe, and these  men  brought  funds  with them, so  far 
there would be a real increase in money ;  but, on the other side, much of 
the inconvertible  money, created  by the bank,  remained in circulation, 
and  therefore  the  appreciation  in  the  shares  of  the  company  was 
accompanied by and, to a large degree, was  the result of  the deprecia- 
tion  of  the paper-money.  Therefore, as the inconvertible paper-money 
sank in  value, the shares rose;  and, at the beginning of  December, the 
quotation was almost double that at which  the "cinq  cents"  had been 
Quoted by E. Levasseur, Recherche8 Historiques,  p. 126. 
There  was  a  further,  but  unauthorized,  issue  of  12 mil.  livres  which was 
afterwards recalled. 
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issued1.  At the dividend announced for the year 1720, this would yield 
the investor only 4  per cent. or one-sixth of the reduced rate paid by the 
State.  It follows that, expressed in  terms  of  the earning power of  the 
investment, the price was much too high ; but in justice  to Law, it is to 
be  remembered  that  this  dividend  had  been  fixed  before  the recent 
extension of  the company's  operations.  Additional revenue was expected 
to accrue  from  these,  and  the  dividend  for  l720 was  augmented  to 
40 per cent., and thus at 12,000 livres per  share the return was  under 
12 per  cent.  But  it is  one  of  the  symptoms  of  an  acute  fever  of 
speculation that prospects  are over-discounted, and it is not surprising 
that  the  increased  dividend  was  regarded,  not  as  a  support  towards 
maintaining the already  too inflated  price, but as  an influence to raise 
it still higher.  After the announcement,  the quotation rose to 15,180 
livres,  and  on  January  5th,  1720 to  18,000  livres.  The  last  price 
represents  the  culmination  of  the  boom  in  Paris,  and  constitutes  a 
remarkable  inflation.  The market  price  was  no  less  than  thirty-six 
times the nominal amount of  the share, and that nominal amount again 
was  fictitious, in so far as it constituted  merely the paper equivalent of 
billets  d'ktat,  purchasable  in  1717 at about  150.  Thus  the  original 
shareholder, who sold at the highest price, might have made a profit  of 
some one-hundred-and-twenty times his capital.  Such a profit, however, 
was  to some  extent one  on  paper.  The original  outlay was  made in 
coin, whereas, after the edicts limiting the use of  metallic money to very 
small transactions, he would be bound to take payment in paper-money 
which had already begun  to depreciate.  Regarded  from another point 
of  view,  the valuation  of  the whole  capital, taken  as fully paid,  would 
have worked out at between 500 and 600 millions sterling expressed in 
French paper-money.  To  obtain the real equivalent i11 British currency, 
it would  be  necessary  to deduct from  this estimate a sufficient sum to 
cover the depreciation of  the French paper. 
The immense speculation in Paris, during the closing months of  the 
year  1719,  was  sufficiently  striking  to attract  the  attention  of  the 
mercantile  classes  in  other  countries.  Speculators  from  Holland  and 
from Great Britain arrived at an early stage of  the boom, and many of 
these made large profits, while some had the prudence  to return  home 
with their gains.  It was  estimated that in a  short period  no less than 
500 mil.  livres  in  bullion  had  been  carried  to other  countries  in  this 
way.  There are particulars  of  several Englishmen and Scotsmen, who 
were  amongst the earliest speculators,  and there seems reason to infer 
that the Prince  of  Waleb sent a financial agent to Paris2.  HOW  far the 
l  I.e. expressed in terms of  the  equivalent price of a fully paid  share, the price 
was from 10,000 to 12,000 livres. 
2  Woocl, Life  of  Law, ut supru, pp. 73-102. 
growth of  speculation  in London  is to be  assigned to the influence of 
that at Paris, how far it was  an independent growth, fostered by similar 
conditions, is a  question  of  considerable difficulty.  At first sight  the 
whole weight of  evidence appears to be in favour of  the former alterna- 
tive.  The boom in Paris reached its height in the closing days of  1719 
and in the first week  of  1720, while that in  London was  not similarly 
advanced  until  six  months later.  It is  known,  too,  that Englishmen 
had speculated in Paris and returned to London before there seemed to 
be much speculative activity in England.  Thus it appears that a direct 
personal transference of  the mania  can  be traced.  Further, the careful 
and exact  work  of  French  scholars on  "the system" of  Law  and  the 
absence of  similar investigations of  the parallel phenomena in England 
' 
tend in  the same direction.  It is not unnatural that French historians 
of  this epoch  in  finance should  regard  the system of  Law as daringly 
original and should describe the speculation in Britain as "an  imitation1." 
The incomplete  state of  our  knowledge  of  the financial situation  in 
London in 1719 and 1720 undoubtedly fosters this belief.  Hitherto it 
has been necessary to depend on the account of this time given by Adam 
Anderson, which is imperfect in so far as the phenomena he records are 
not  co-ordinated,  and moreover he  fails  to give  the date or  any  full 
description of  the many new promotions which  he classifies2.  The first 
consideration  that  suggests  some  doubt as  to whether  the cominonly 
accepted opinion  should  be  received  without  further enquiry is that it 
contains an error in holding Law to have been completely original.  He 
was no more than the spokesn~an  of the exaggeration of the fund of credit. 
Operations, such as the conversion  of  the French debt in 1719, were, as 
already pointed out, quite common in England.  It may indeed be said 
that Law's  transactions were  on  a  scale of  unexampled  magnitude, but 
it is to  be  remembered  that  the  nominal  capital  of  the  South  Sea 
company was  but  little less  than  that of  the French  company of  the 
Indies,  comparing  both at the end  of  1719.  Another claim  may  be 
advanced, namely that Law was at  least original in his method of inflating 
the price of his shares, but in so far as his method involved the deprecia- 
tion of  paper-money, there is no parallel in actual practice at this time 
in England, though in the  idea he was  anticipated by  Hugh Chamber- 
lain?  The doubts, which  these  various considerations suggest, become 
strengthened when it is discovered  that there was a strong undercurrent 
of  speculative activity in  London  as early  as September  1719, that is 
Cf.  Levasseur, Rechwches Historiques, ut supra, p. 400.  "  chronological  list of these  promotions will be  four~d  infra,  111.  pp. 445-68. 
This table  colitains  fewer entries than  Anderson's,  owing  to the adoption of the 
principle in its compilation of including only such cornpallies as could be dated. 
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before the rise in the price of  French  Indies shares had become remark- 
able.  A  colour-mill  company  had  already been  successfully  floated1, 
and on September 19th it is recorded that a subscription of  capital was 
being taken by the Royal Fishery company, a revival of  the undertaking 
incorporated  after  the  Restoration,  and  which  had  endeavoured  to 
obtain more capital  during the boom from 1692 to 16942.  In October 
there  were  a  number  of  new  promotions.  Another  fishery  company, 
known  as "the  Grand,"  invited  applications  on  the  14th and,  since 
Scottish investors were dissatisfied with the 2200,000 allotted them, the 
capital was  increased from  21,000,000 te 21,500,0003.  Then came a 
fortnight later the undertaking of  the York Buildings company for the 
purchase  and development  of  forfeited  estates,  the nominal  capital of 
which was  21,%O0,0004.  The promotion of  marine insurance companies 
was  remarkable.  About this time two companies were floated for this 
class of business, the one by Ram, a banker, with a capital of 21,!200,000 
and the other by another banker,  Colebrook, with  d?l,000,0005.  It is 
not  clear whether  these were amalgamated into a later venture with  a 
capital of  dt32,000,000,  which became the basis of  the undertaking after- 
wards  incorporated  into the London  Assz~rance  company.  There were 
numerous other joint-stock enterprizes connected with marine insurance. 
Already the company, afterwards incorporated as the Royal Exchange, 
had allotted shares between August 14th, 1717, and January 16th, 1718, 
and  it was  now  carrying  on  business  under  the charters  of  the old 
Elizabethan  societies of  the Mines Royal and the Mineral and Battery 
Works.  It too had a capital of  over a  million6.  In addition to these, 
there were two other promotions, one of  which was formed by Shale and 
another for lending money on bottomry, each with a capital of a million, 
floated before the end of  December7.  From October to December there 
were  many  financial  companies  formed  to grant annuities  (Nov.  Rlst 
and Dec. 29th) or for  insuring lottery tickets (De~ember)~.  It is note- 
worthy that, following the divergency of practice to which attention has 
already been  frequently directeds, the unit of  capitalization was  some- 
times the number 10, sometimes 12.  But what  is  most  striking is the 
vast n~ultiples  used.  The great majority of  capitals, offered for subscrip- 
tion, were either 21,000,000 or 21,200,000.  Only in two cases of which 
particulars  have been  preserved, was the capital less than a million, the 
one  being "  a  company to encourage British  manufactures " (Oct. 6th) 
with  2100,000  and  the  other  the  lottery-ticket  assurance,  already 
l  Vide infra, 111.  p. 445. 
"bid.,  11.  p.  376, 111.  p.  445. 
4  Ibid., 111. p. 423. 
6  Ibid., 11.  p.  405, 111. p.  398. 
8 Ibid., 111. p.  445. 
3  Ibid., 111.  p. 446. 
6  Ibid., 111.  pp.  399, 400. 
7  Ihid., III. pp.  401, 445. 
9  Vide supra, pp.  151, 341. 
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mentioned,  with  2120,0001.  I11  the large companies  the  shares were 
frequently of  21,000 each, but only a very small fraction was  called up 
varying from + per cent. to 1 per cent.  Therefore an almost infinitesi- 
mal  cash  paynient  coiltrolled  a very  large amount of  nominal  capital, 
and a  brisk  trade was  carried  on  in  the selling of  allotment-rights at 
very substantial  premiums on the amounts actually called up, indeed it 
was not long before a merchant  in London stated that no business "  was 
minded  since  the several subscriptions  had  been  set  on  foot2."  The 
number of  proinotions  and their inflated nominal capital, as well as the 
active dealings  in  the shares, even  before allotment,  shows that before 
the end of  1719 there was  a  very  considerable amount  of  speculation. 
It might be said that the fever  manifested  itself  differently in Paris and 
in  London.  In France  the whole  movement  centred  round  a  single 
organization,  whereas,  at the  beginning  in  England,  it  took  many 
different  forms,  though  showing  in  almost  every  case  evidences  of 
inflation.  It  is perhaps for the former reason that thoughtful observers 
declared emphatically that there was  no  danger of  London  witnessing 
anything comparable to the meteoric rise of the French Indies company. 
"Where  is the man,"  it was  asked at the end  of  1719, "who  having 
lent his  money to the ~ublick  on  the credit  of  Parliamentary security, 
will  upon  a whim, discharge that fund and take a precarious  conlpany 
of  private men for the money."  Elsewhere Law is described as a person, 
who "  being first acquainted with the solid immovable state of  credit in 
England and seeing the fluctuating manner  of  things in  France plainly 
saw also how easy it was to push those things there, which he would not 
so much as think  of  in  England without  apprehensions of  being pulled 
in pieces by  the rabble"."  It is a curious commentary on  these expres- 
sions that in  all probability  before  they  were  written-certainly  long 
before the end of  1719-there  were active negotiations for the conversion 
of  the British debt.  The important fact must not be overlooked that 
operations of this kind, as already explained, were well known in London 
and that in the early part of  1719 the South Sea company had made a 
handsome profit  by converting a  part of  the Lottery loan  into its own 
stock.  Naturally it was desirous of  repeating and extending this class 
of business.  But there were many difficulties to be overcome in England 
that did not exist in France.  In the first place, the French loans had 
been  to  a  very  great  extent  consolidated,  whereas  the  British  loans 
remained in the original forms in which  they had been  issued.  More 
Vide infra, 111. p.  445. 
Journak of the House of Commons, xrx. p.  347. 
3  The  Chimera, or the  French  way of  Paying  National  Debts  laid  open,  being  an 
Impartial Account  of the proceedings  in France for  raising a Paper Credit and Settling 
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especially there was the difficulty that some of  those obligations were in 
the form of  irredeemable annuities.  Besides, in that portion of  the loan 
which  was  redeemable, there was included  the debt of  the State to the 
three great companies.  It follows that any one of these, which could secure 
the right of  making the conversion, would be  in a position  to capture 
the business of  the other two, and the first step made was the admission 
of  the principle that the portion  of  the debt, lent by  the cornpallies to 
the  State,  should  be  exempt  from  the  proposed  conversion.  This 
condition was  accepted as early as  November 1719, and it yet remained 
to be decided, if  a conversion were  to be effected, what body should be 
authorized to make it.  An enterprize of  this nature  might  have been 
undertaken either by the Bank of  England or by the South Sea company. 
The latter, by means  of  lavish  bribery,  had  secured  the support  of  a 
number  of  the  most  influential  members  of  the ministry  as early  as 
December 1719 ;  and, although tenders were made, both by the Bank and 
the South  Sea company  in  January and February 1720, there is good 
reason  to believe that the ministry was  committed  to the latter body. 
The scheme, eventually  accepted  by  Parliament, differed from  that of 
Law and was in fact a repetition of  that which had already been carried 
to a s~iccessful  issue by the South Sea company in 171g1.  The conver- 
sion was  to be at the option of  the creditors of the State.  The company 
was  left free  as  to the terms  it would  offer  to those  who  were  to be 
invited  to exchange their  government-debt  for  South Sea stock.  On 
the other hand, the respective positions  of  the State and the company 
were  strictly  defined.  The  nation  admitted  itself  indebted  to  the 
company for  the par value of  all the redeemable debts converted, while 
"the  long annuities" were to be  capitalized  at twenty years'  purchase 
and "  the short annuities " at fourteen years'  purchase.  Supposing all 
the loans were  converted,  an  addition  of  nearly  31  millions would  be 
made to the debt, due*to the company.  Further, it was  agreed  that 
the company might increase its nominal capital proportionately  to the 
debt converted,  that is,  if  the whole  loans  were  exchanged, the stock 
would  be  augmented  by  upwards  of  31  millions, making  it, with  the 
amount  already  issued,  about  422  millions, or  nearly  three  times  as 
much  as  that  of  the  French  Indies  company.  With  regard  to the 
interest  on  the converted  debt, after  1727, the nation  would  effect  a 
saving of  2420,000 a year, and in addition the company undertook to 
pay a bonus, dependent on the amount of  debt converted,  which, had 
all  the  loans  been  exchanged,  would  have  been  nearly  79  millions2. 
The possibility  of  profit  for  the  company  is  not  apparent  without 
further  consideration.  It arose from the fact that, while the nolninal 
capital was  increased pari passu  with  the debt exchanged, there was no 
1  Vids infra,  111.  p.  302.  Ibid., 111.  pp. 304,  305. 
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stipulation as to the price at which the company's stock should be rated 
for the purposes of  that exchange.  Obviously, if, as in 1719, the stock 
were at a premium, the quantity of  South Sea stock, required  to satisfy 
the holders  of  government loans,  would  be  less  than  that which  the 
company was authorized to create.  Therefore such surplus stock would 
constitute the gross profit on  the transaction  for  the company.  The 
proceeds of  the sale  of  that surplus stock at the premium would be the 
gross cash profit, from  which was  to be  deducted the bonus payable to 
the State, and any  balance  remaining would  constitute the nett gain. 
Expressed  in this form, it is clear that only a very great premium on 
South Sea stock  would  give any very considerable profit,  and for  this 
reason the market  during January, while active, was undecided.  More- 
over it was not as yet known whether Parliament would accept either of 
the  rival  conversion  schemes.  This  uncertainty  is  reflected  by  the 
quotations.  South Sea stock was  128a on January lst, 1720, it rose to 
1374 on the 12th and closed  on  Saturday the 30th at 1282 to 130i. 
Bank  stock  on  January  1st was  1504, rising  to 153% on  the  13th, 
relapsing  to 1492 on  the 20th and closing at 153.  Judging solely by 
these figures (and the movements of East India and Million Bank stocks 
were within similar  narrow limits), there was  little speculative activity. 
But, outside the long-established  companies, there was  a great increase 
in new  promotions  and in the attention paid to these.  In fact, during 
January and part of  February, the new  ventures,  with  their  moderate 
sums called up and great prospects, absorbed the interest of  speculators. 
The increasing ~opularity  of  these companies is attested by the growth 
of  new  enterprizes, all issued with only very small sums called up.  Thus 
at this stage, there was  (to borrow an expressive American phrase) "a 
poor  man's  boom'  in  progress.  In  January  companies, that  can  be 
dated, were floated with  a  nominal  capital of  over  G  millions.  Two of 
these were fishery enterprizes, two financing companies and another was 
intended "  to encourage the growth of  raw silk " in England1.  Large as 
was  the proposed  capital for the time, it becomes  quite inconsiderable, 
compared  to that  of  the  pronlotions  of  February.  In  that  month, 
taking account  only of  schemes that can be  assigned to a definite date, 
there was  offered for subscription a  total nominal capital  considerably 
more than the whole national  debt of  upwards of  31  millions, which it 
was  proposed  to convert  into South Sea stock.  Most of  these promo- 
tions had capitals of  at least a  million, several of  two millions and one 
of  no less  than three millions.  About two-thirds of the number might 
be described as insurance and financial companies.  The most interesting 
of  this group is perhaps the Sadlers' Hall Insurance, which had a capital 
of  Y2,000,000 and the partly-paid shares of  which sold at a premium of 
'  vide infra, 111.  p.  446. 410  Conzpanies promote&-Jaw,  Feb.  1720  [CHAP.  XX. 
300 per  cent.'  The subscription  list was  opened  on  February  16th, 
and,  later  in  the  year,  the  business  was  transferred  to  the  Royal 
Exchange companya.  Of  the remaining ventures, there was an attempt 
to utilize  the charters  of  the  Mines  Royal  and  of  the  Mineral  and 
Battery Works for mining operations.  It is to be remembered that one 
of  the marine insurance companies was working under these grants, and 
therefore  this  undertaking is  described  as  "the  Grand  Lessees  of  the 
governors assistants and societies of  the City of  London of  and for the 
Mines  Royal  and  the Mineral  and Battery  Works"  (February 
Then there was a company for building or buying ships to let for freight 
(February  Ilth), and another for  the Newcastle  coal trade (February 
23rd)  which was  intended,  by  preventing  "prejudicial  combinations," 
to save consumers 6 per  cent. to 8 per  cent. and to pay 8 per  cent. on 
the capital.  Three new  foreign  trading companies were  projected, two 
to trade to Germany  and the other to Spain.  This month  is  distin- 
guished from the previous December and January by the slight attention 
paid  to fishing societies.  There was  only one which  was  intended for 
whaling (February 22nd).  There were  three other promotions  one  of 
which-a  salt company-was  floated  on  February 26th, on the ground 
that an increased production  of  salt would  be required by the develop- 
ment  of  the fishing trade.  To these  may be  added two rather bizarre 
schemes, the one "  for furnishing funerals to any part of  Great Britain " 
(February 19th) with  a  capital of  &1,200,000 and the other (February 
20th) with &2,000,000 was  partly  a sanitary, partly a  saltpetre under- 
taking4. 
The whole financial situation in London during February was highly 
important in determining future events.  The South Sea company was 
likely to obtain  the privilege  of  converting the debt, but the necessary 
act had not yet been  passed.  It was  calculated  that, with  South Sea 
stock at 130, the company could convert the debt, pay the bonus to the 
State and  retain  a  considerable  profit5.  If,  therefore,  the stock  was 
I.e. the share, with 58,  paid,  at 21-Journals  of  the  House  of  Commons, XIX. 
p.  347. 
Vide infra, 111.  p.  408. 
The full titles under the charters of  James I. ;  ibid., III.  p.  440. 
Ibid., 1x1. pp.  446, 447. 
According to Archibald  Hutcheson, with South Sea stock at 125, the nett cash 
profit  would  have  been  %480,000,  with  the  stock  at  150  it would  have  been 
23,707,600-Some  Calculations  relating  to  thr  Proposals  made  by  the  South  Sea 
Company  and  the  Bank  of  England  (March l72O),  reprinted  in  A  ColZection  ~ 
Calculations and  &marks  relating  to  the  South Sea  scheme  and Stock, London, 1720, 
p.  10.  In  Some  Paragraphs  of  Mr.  Hutcheson's  Treatises on  the South Sea  Subject, 
London, 1723, p. 4, the profit on a conversio~l  with South Sea stock  at  150 is given 
as Z,1,400,000 ;  cf.  Journals @'the Hmlse  qf Commons, XIX.  p.  433. 
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worth  l20 to 130 before the scheme had  been  developed, it was  value 
for a higher price, according  as the coilversion became  more  probable. 
Thus it is not surprising that the day (February 1st) after the bill had 
passed  the  House  of  Commons,  the quotation  advanced  from  128 to 
1374, closing at 1362.  On  the 4th the  improvement  was  continued, 
and it lasted until the 15th, when  187 was  touched, an increase of 59 ia 
less than three weeks.  At this point the directors were confronted with 
a serious difficulty.  Owing to the recent great increase of  the premium 
on their stock, they  could count  on  a  large  surplus for sale.  But, to 
realize the profit, it was  necessary the market should be in  a position to 
purchase and pay for such surplus stock.  If, however, the new promo- 
tions  were  permitted  to proceed to business  and to call  up capital, it 
was  in  the  highest  degree  improbable  that  there  would  be  enough 
floating wealth  to enable sufficient sales of  South Sea stock to be made 
at a high price.  Therefore it was to the interest of  this company that 
the promotions  of  new  ventures  should  be  checked,  and there  can  be 
little doubt that it was  through  the influence of  the directors with the 
administration that a committee of  the House of  Commons was appointed 
on February 22nd, to enquire into the several subscriptions for fisheries, 
insurances etc., "whereby  great  mischiefs may  accrue to the publickl." 
It was two months before this committee reported, and its appointment 
may  have  tended  to  prevent  a  further  increase  in  projects,  besides 
precluding those that had issued  shares from making further calls, while 
the investigation  was  in progress.  The immediate effect  on South Sea 
stock  was  to reduce  the price, and it was  almost a  month  before  the 
quotation  of  February  16th was  repeated2.  With the competition  of 
other  speculative  ventures  temporarily  suppressed,  the price  of  South 
Sea  stock  advanced  with  great  rapidity,  since  every point  above  125 
meant  that there would  be  more  surplus stock, and that, when  sold, it 
would realize a higher price per cent.  On March 18th, 200 was  touched 
for the first time, that is double  the sum at which purchases could have 
been  made in  September  1716, and a  premium of  almost 200 per cent. 
on  the estimated  cash  price  of  the  securities  converted  in  1711.  It 
required three and a half years for the stock to advance 100; but, inside 
four market days, a further increase of a like amount was recorded, when 
300 was touched on March 23rd.  Until April 14th the price fluctuated 
about  300,  being  more  frequently  above  than  below  that  figure.  It 
was  on this day that the first step in the actual conversion was  under- 
taken, when a sale of  stock was  made to the public at 300, followed by 
a further issue at 400 on the 30th3.  On  May 19th the terms on which 
1 Jou~nals  of the House  of  common.^, XIX.  p.  274. 
Web.  16, 17, 180-187;  March  16, 185-1866 
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the irredeemable debt  might  be  converted  were  announced,  and their 
chief characteristics consisted in  the company offering a greater number 
of  years' purchase to the annuitants than it received from the State on 
these loans.  The price, arrived  at in  this way, was  payable partly  in 
cash,  but the larger portion  consisted of  South Sea stock  at 375, that 
being slightly below the average price of the day on which the announce- 
ment was  dated'.  On the announcement  of  the ternls  (May 20th) the 
quotation rose  to 400,  an  addition  of  another  100 in two  months-a 
rise  which  is  the more  remarkable  since  it took  place  in  spite of  an 
attempt by  Law to "  bear" the stock upon a very large scale2. 
The result of  the conversion was that the con~pany  had succeeded in 
converting  debt  valued  at 94  millions by  issuing  only  34  illillions of 
stock.  This left a gross profit  in stock, issuable by the company, of  63 
millions.  Of  this, 32 millions had actually been issued for cash, payable 
in  instalments, and  would  realize  1R$  millions,  leaving  a  balance  of 
issuable stock of  24  millions which,  at 400, would  produce another 10 
millions.  Thus in May there was  a gross profit of  222 millions.  From 
this considerable deductions  nlust  be  made to arrive at the nett profit. 
Part of  the price of  the converted  annuities was  payable  in cash,  and 
allowance must also be  made for the sum due to the State.  These two 
aniounts may be  placed at 94  millions.  Deducting this from the cash 
receivable  from  stock, already  issued  (namely the 122 millions), there 
remains a  balance of  3+ millions.  To this is to be  added  the surplus 
issuable stock  still available of  24 millions, or (taking the latter at 400) 
there would  be  a  nett  profit  on  the transaction  of  139 millions cash. 
Further the issuable capital was now  increased to 214 millions, of  which 
in May l720 there was  issued 184 millions. 
The wave  of  speculation, which had now set in, was  far from being 
equally distributed.  The stocks of  the Bank  of  England and the East 
India company showed a  comparatively small gain, the increase varying 
from 34 per  cent. to 36 per  cent.  On  the other hand, the advance in 
the quotation of  South Sea stock, since the beginning of  the year, was 
225 per cent.3, and even this imniense increase is surpassed by the Royal 
African company where the rise was  300 per cent.4 
was  not sold in the market at 400  until  May  20th.  The reason that  subscribers 
were willing to contract to pay more than the market price was that the instalments 
were distributed over a long period. 
l  May 19, 370-384. 
W. Michael, Der Siidseeschwindel worn  Jahre 1720 in Vierteljahrschrzj?  fur SociaG 
und  Wirtschnftsgeschichte, vr. pp. 568, 569. 
3  The maximum daily fluctuations in the stocks of these three cornpallies from 
May to September are represented in a chart in vol.  111. 
Vide infra, 11.  pp.  32, 3.5. 
corn par is or^  of Prices  of  Stocks on  Jarb.  lst, 1720, u?ld  on 
May  ROth,  1720. 
Bank of  India  South Sea  Million  Royal African 
England  company  company  Bank  company 
Jan. 1, 1720  1506  2OOg  128f  128  25 
May 20, ,,  204  268  415  - 
100 
534  672  225  2868  75 
36 "1,  34 "1,  300°/, 
The fact that there was  so  great a disproportion  in the amount of 
the iniprovement  in some shares, as compared  with  others,  shows that, 
as yet, the influence of  the speculative activity was  partial in its effects. 
The reason that Hoyal  African  stock had risen more in proportion tha~ 
that of  the South Sea company is to be found in the revival of  interest 
in  the floatation  of  new  companies.  From  the middle of  April there 
was  a fresh  outburst  of  further promotions.  From  November  to Feb- 
ruary the favourite  ventures  had been  fishery, insurance  and  financing 
undertakings.  In  April  and  May  the  most  popular  enterprizes  were 
those for foreign and colonial  commerce.  Out of  about 50 which  can 
be  assigned  to this  period,  close  on  one  half  would  fall  under  that 
category  and of  these,  no  less  than  five  were  formed  for  the African 
trade, indeed  it was  announced,  evidently  with  no little glee,  that the 
charter of  the existing conlpany "  not being  exclusive,"  there were great 
opportunities  for  "  the more  effectual carrying  on " of  this branch  of 
commerce1.  In addition, an  undertaking was  floated  for the Barbary 
trade,  and  the promoters  mentioned  as  one  of  the inducements  that 
thereby "our  country-men would  be  preserved from  being  carried  into 
slavery2."  There  were  also at least  four  enterprizes  started  to  trade 
with America, as well as one for each of  the following countries, Norway, 
Russia,  Portugal arid  another for the importation  of  rough  diamonds. 
There  were  in  addition  some  half-dozen  fishing  companies, and  here 
again  the  same general  tendency  manifests  itself,  which  differentiates 
this group from the previous floatations for  this business.  Though the 
Committee  of  the House of  Comnions had  reported  on  the whole  in 
favour of  that trade, it was  recognized  that,  when  the Royal  Fishery 
company had increased its nominal capital to 10  millions and there were 
llumerous competitive  organizations,  the home  fishing  had  been  fully 
provided for, therefore the proinotiolls of  April and May tended towards 
the exploitation  of  colonial waters, such  as Newfoundland and the East 
coast  of  America.  I'inancial  undertaltii~gs were  fewer  than  in  the 
previous three  months,  and became  more  original  in  their nature.  A 
l  Post-bog, April 14-16,  1720; aide infra, 111.  pp. 449, 450. 
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"Lombard  office"  was  established  on  the  model  of  the  Charitable 
corporation,  also  a  foreign  exchange  company  for  "the  remitting  of 
money  to and from the principal  trading places  in  Great  Britain  and 
foreign parts1," as well as two new  insurance ventures, one  for fire (the 
Globe) and the other for  marine  risks.  There remains  a  considerable 
number of  miscellaneous schemes, several of  which were  concerned with 
the textile trades.  The Royal Lustring company, after having apparently 
endeavoured  to  transfer  its  charter  to  an  insurance  'companya, was 
revived  for  the resumption  of  the  manufacture  of  a-la-modes3.  Two 
woollen  enterprizes  were  proposed,  one  for  linen  and another for  sail 
cloth.  It is difficult to decide whether  a  scheme for a calico company 
was  intended  to be  taken  seriously.  This was  to be  established  by 
women  who  were  to find  the capital and "they  were  resolved,  as  one 
man,  to admit no man,"  confining applications to those  who  appeared 
at a certain china-shop dressed in calico-a  costume, one would imagine, 
somewhat  light for  April  19th4.  A  venture  for  the tinning  of  iron 
plates,  which  was  started  on  April  13th  may  be  described  as  the 
foundation  of  this industry in  Great Britain.  Then comes the revival 
of  a kind  of  enterprize that was  very  popular  for some years after the 
Revolution,  namely  the  working  of  an  improved  water  engine,  also 
another not dissimilar in character for draining fens6.  A glass company 
appeared  on  May 12th and another which  seems  to have aimed  at an 
improvement in the production of  pottery,  i.e.  "for  glazing and painting 
stone [ware] to endure the fire6."  Finally there was an undertaking for 
the sale of  the goods of  bankrupts or persons deceased7. 
During the five weeks  from May 20th to June 24th, the speculation 
became  most  intense.  In that period  South Sea  stock  advanced  over 
600,  while  those  of  the new  promotions  considered  most  promising 
commanded  immense  premiums,  and  the  fresh  floatations  grew  still 
more  numerous  with  yet  larger  nominal  capitals.  All  these  pheno- 
mena  co-operated  in  increasing  the  fever  of  the time.  Profits  made 
in  one  stock  were  used  in  purchases  of  another, and what  was  most 
serious  for  the future  was  that speculators  mortgaged  their  credit  in 
order  to participate  in  the gains shown  on  paper  by  the general  rise 
in the prices of  the various speculative counters.  It is shown elsewhere 
that the access  of  speculation  must  be  attributed to the directors  of 
l  Post-bog, April  14-16,  1720. 
As to the negotiations  with the Sun  Fire  Office  vide  infra,  111.  pp.  386, 387. 
It  appears from the report of  the Committee of  the House of Commons that early in 
the year there had  beer1 ~legotiatiolls  bet\rreerl  the comparly and  Overal's Insurance, 
Journals of the House  of  Commons, XIX.  p.  3-17. 
3  Vide infra, 111. p.  88.  4  Dai(y Post, April  19, 1720. 
6  Cf.  infra, 11. pp. 481, 482.  6  Daily Post, April  16, 1720. 
7  ~bid.,-~ay  6,-1720; 'uide infra, 111. pp.  450, 1.51. 
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the  South  Sea  company1.  It  is  true  that  the  success  of  the con- 
version  operations of  April and May  left  the  company  with  a  profit 
unexpectedly large.  Even granting that the surplus stock would sell at 
400  or  over,  it would  be  clear  to a  dispassionate  observer  that  any 
further rise in price was  over-discounting the future.  But the argument 
of the speculator was  that, as yet, the whole debt had not been converted 
and  that  future  operations  would  ~ield  a  still  larger  proportion  of 
surplus stock, and it was  gravely maintained that "the higher the price 
is that is given for the stock, the greater benefit will the purchaser have 
thereby=."  What it was difficult, if  not almost impossible, to recognize 
at the time was that the additional rise at the end of  May and during 
June was  almost wholly  artiticial.  Instead of  using  the funds realized 
by  the instalments  on  the stock  issued  in  April in providing  for  the 
bbnus  due  to the  State, the directors  had  embarked  on  a  policy  of 
making loans on the security of the stock of the company, and the effect 
of  each  of  these  loans  can  be  clearly  seen  in  forcing  the  quotation 
upwards.  Between  May  20th and June  4th  South  Sea  stock  gained 
4003, and it was  inevitable that an advance so  great, superimposed on 
one already  large, should  give an overwhelming stimulus to the forma- 
tion of  new  con~panies.  At the end  of  May and early in June issues of 
capital  were  made  with  a profusion  quite bewildering.  Not  only were 
the issues  more  numerous,  but the nominal capital asked was  growing 
larger.  A  subscription  of  A?1,000,000  had  ceased  to  be  common. 
With a  few  exceptions,  the joint-stock  was  to be  at least &2,000,000, 
often  &?4,000,000 or  &?5,000,000.  Thus it is  not  surprising  to learn 
that the total nominal  capital of  the companies, which  published  pre- 
ambles for  subscriptions during the single week  ending  on  June llth, 
was  calculated  to amount  to 224  millions4.  Once  again  the general 
character  of  the new  enterprizes  had  changed  and the textile  trades, 
other manufactures  and land-development ventures became most promi- 
nent.  In the former group, calico was  most  popular,  and upwards  of 
ten undertakings were  formed from  May 2lst to June llth (inclusive) 
for developing this industry.  Wool too was not overlooked, there were 
several promotions to sell or produce  woollen goods, besides  others  to 
develope the accessory  industries,  such  as  the growing  or  grinding of 
materials  used  in  dyeing-for  instance  woad,  madder-while  certain 
soaps  were  to  be  made  specially  for  the  cloth  trade.  Then  other 
l'ide  inji-a, 111. pp.  317, 318. 
Flying Po.~t,  April 9, 1720, cf.  A. Hutcllesorl, C'ollection of  calculation.^,  ut supra, 
p.  25. 
3  May 20, 381-415  ;  June 4, 820-770. 
Mist's  Weekly Journal, June 11, l720 (reprinted in Daniel  Dfloe:  his Lijh  and 
recently discovered  Writings, by Willism Lee, 1869, Ir.  p.  249). 416  Companies promoted--June  1720  [CHAP. XX. 
companies  were  floated  to make  Colchester  Bays,  Manchester  stufs, 
crape, sail cloth, and two to import lace.  Besides all these, there was a 
resuscitation of  the Framework-Knitters.  As showing the wide-reaching 
methods  of  organization  of  some of  the undertakings in this group, it 
may  be  noted  that it was  proposed  to grow  a  certain  plant,  such as 
cotton or hemp, on the estates of the company and to manufacture it in 
factories under the same management.  Land-development schemes were 
also numerous and covered a large variety of  objects.  One, for instance, 
aimed at improving estates by  a "particular  method"  which  increased 
the value by between  &R0  and A230  an acre1, another at reclaiming bog 
lands in  Ireland, others at building houses.  In the same group may be 
included  a  venture for  the buying  of  titles  to properties,  which  were 
disputed, and carrying on proceedings to make good the claims.  Under 
the same general heading may perhaps be  added enterprizes relating to 
agriculture, such as companies proposed for the corn-trade, for seed-corn, 
for improving the breed  of  horses.  A third group, that was  considered 
to possess considerable speculative  attractions, consisted of  home manu- 
factures, and undertakings (one  or  more) were  formed for  each of  the 
following  trades,  sugar,  paper,  paste-board,  white-lead,  plate-glass, 
watches, starch and brushes.  The class of undertaking that had been so 
popular in April, namely that for foreign or colonial trade, was now less 
common, these being now confined to the importation of  naval requisites 
like masts, wood, pitch and tar.  Insurance and financial ventures, also, 
were  comparatively  rare.  Of  the former,  two  may  be  mentioned,  the 
one  to provide  against  the  thefts  of  servants  and  the  other  against 
burglary2.  More  peculiarly  financial  were  two  companies founded  at 
this time,  the first  for loan offices and the second for the purchase  of 
South  Sea  and  other  stocks.  The  iron  and  steel  trade,  too,  had  a 
number of  floatations.  The milled-lead undertaking was re-started  and 
once more an effort was  made to smelt  iron with pit-coal.  Companies 
were  formed  to work  lead  and  other  mines,  to  manufacture  and  to 
import steel, also to work engines for draining mines or clearing harbours. 
There remains a considerable number of  miscellaneous enterprizes, as for 
instance  the production  of  alum,  of  rock-salt,  another  company  for 
carrying coal from Newcastle, schemes for improved methods of  brewing 
(such as the drying of  malt by hot air), for victualling ships, for the sale 
of  medicines (" the Grand Dispensary "),  for supplying Liverpool  with 
water,  for  trading in  hair  for  wig-making,  for  dealing  in  advowsons, 
importing diamonds, even for the rearing of  bastard children. 
The succession of  companies had for a long time excited considerable 
alarm ;  and, immediately after the Con~mittee  of  the House of Conlmons 
1  Daily C'ourant, June  8, 1720. 
2  Vide infra, rrr.  pp.  374, 451-6.  Ibid., 111.  pp.  105-8,  453. 
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had reported  in April, steps were  taken to limit the new  pron~otions. 
In  5 18 of  6 George I.  c.  18 it was  enacted that, where  any  project 
ofered  shares for public subscription after June 24th, 1718, and acted as 
a company  without a charter, or  under  a charter granted in the  first 
instance for some other purpose, or which had fallen into abeyance, such 
undertakings should  be  held  to be  void, and,  after June  24th,  1720, 
became  in law public  nuisances and would  incur praemunire.  Though 
attention was  drawn to this act by a proclamation, issued on June llthl, 
dealings in the shares of  the threatened  schemes continued  active, and, 
what is more remarkable, a few completely new  promotions appeared at 
intervals after the proclamation, even  after the date at which  the act 
was due to come into force.  The chief effects of  the action of  the State 
were on the one side to influence the market in South Sea stock, on the 
other to enhance the quotations of shares in the ventures already formed. 
In fact, instead  of  the flowing tide of  speculation  being  dissipated  in 
every direction, it was diverted into two main channels, namely towards 
the South Sea market  and to that for  the new  shares.  On  June 4th 
all stocks had  reached a  new  high  level,  South Sea  stock for  instance 
being for the first time  over 800.  After the proclamation  of  the llth, 
at first the price was  considerably weaker;  but, when  the third money 
subscription  was  announced  on  the 15th at 1000,  together  with  the 
promise of  10 per  cent. dividend in stock2, quotations rose and on June 
24th and 25th the boom  reached its culminating point.  At this time 
Bank  stock  was  265,  East  India  stock  440,  South  Sea  stock  1,0503. 
Thus the latter was  ten  and a half  times  its nominal value and  over 
fifteen times the cash  payment  of  1711.  Striking as was  that advance 
in  the  time,  it becomes  insignificant when  compared  with  the rapid 
proportionate  increases  in  the  shares  of  some  of  the  lately  founded 
companies.  "  The Bubble-Act,"  sc far from damping speculative enter- 
prize, merely served to concentrate it on some of the favourite companies. 
It is true that in  a few  cases the highest  price recorded shows only a 
small gain.  For instance  there is  no evidence that shares in the Liver- 
pool  Water-supply  company,  or an ordnance undertaking  ever sold at 
more than thrice the suin paid in.  Owing to the immense capital of  the 
Royal Fishery, the maximum was  but two and a half times that called 
up.  Out of  forty of  these recent pronlotions, the greatest price of  two 
'  London Gazette, June 11-13,  1720. 
V.8. worth in cash about 100 per cent. 
In A History  of  Agriculture  and  Prices,  by  J.  E. T. Rogers,  ~II.  Pt  11.  p.  706, 
a  quotatio~~  of  1060  is noted  June 25.  The only verification  I  have been able to 
obtain of this price is the mention of it in the Culedonian Mercury  which  quotes the 
Evening Post of June 25.  The maximum  quotation noted by Freke and the Daily 
Courant is 1050. 
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was three times that paid up, in three cases four times, in two six times, in 
two again seven times, in four eight times and in two ten times.  That is, 
in forty instances analyzed, the advance in eighteen cases was less than that 
of  South Sea stock, but in the remaining twenty-two it was greater, that 
is  more than ten and a half  ti~nes  the sum called up in cash.  In the 
following companies the highest  price varied  from twenty to thirty-five 
times the sums paid  by shareholders-Royal  Lustring, English Copper, 
Welsh Copper, British  Insurance, Welby's  Gold  Mines, London Assur- 
ance, York Buildings and Royal Exchange Assurance.  But these were not 
the greatest premiums.  The  shares of the General Insurance were sold at 
no less than sixty-four times the sum called up, while, most remarkable of 
all, in a company promoted by Steele, the essayist (the object of  which was 
to convey fish alive in tanks from the fishing ground to the market, and 
generally  described as "  the Fish-Pool1 ")  g160 was  paid  as a premium 
before any call had been  made.  It may be  noted  that in the majority 
of  cases, where the rise was greatest proportionately, the companies had 
a charter or a patent; and doubtless it was  thought that the Rose, the 
General  Insurance  and the Fish  Pool would succeed in obtaining such 
authorization.  At the same time, in spite of  the act, the other under- 
takings were  far from  being immediately reduced in value, since it was 
believed that a legal status could still be  secured.  Few had described 
themselves  as  companies,  the  general  tenour  of  their  advertisements 
being  a joint-stock  of  a  certain  sum  for the carrying on  of  a  certain 
trade.  After  June  11th  it was  thought  that  by  calling  themselves 
CO-partnerships  the proclamation  could  be  evaded2, and therefore the 
chief  efFect  of  the legislation  up to the end of  June was  to confer an 
advantage on  a company with "  a good" charter or on  one which was 
likely to secure incorporation. 
It will  be  clear  that the rage  of  speculation  in the shares of  new 
companies is a phenomenon  to which  due weight  must  be given in any 
study of  the financial conditions in 1720.  Though at first  only  per 
share or  per cent. was  called up, as time went on other calls were made, 
and  ill  the Orkney  Fishing  conlpany  the share  was  &R5  paid,  in  an 
undertaking  to  trade  with  Hamburg  215 paid.  Even  though  the 
actual  payments  on  each  share  were  comparatively  small,  when  the 
market  price  was  very  many  times  that  sum  and when  the nominal 
capital was  very  large, it is  clear that the demand, made  on credit  by 
the speculation in these shares, was  immense.  It was  estimated that at 
this  period  the  market-value  of  all  the  stocks  and  shares  dealt  in 
l  This  enterprize  is described by  Defoe  ir1  Mist's  Journul,  September 6,  1718 
(reprinted in  Daniel Defoe:  his Lijfi. aud  recent4  discovered  Writings,  by  William 
Lee,  1869, Ir.  pp. 68, 69). 
W'aledonian Mercury,  June 14,  1720. 
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amounted to as much  as 500 millions, a larger sum than the aggregate 
value of  French Indies shares at the highest quotation1.  The price  of 
some of the securities too was large, thus one share in either the Temple 
Mills Brass Works, the Orkney Fishery or the Royal Exchange Assurance 
cost  2250, while  York  Buildings  touched  2305.  The effect of  the 
inflation  too  may  be  seen from another point of  view,  by selecting for 
investigation  and comparison two  groups  of  companies in  the first  of 
which only 4 was  paid, while in the other 25  was paid. 
Highest  Price  recorded for the shares  of the following  companies  on 
all  of which  4  waa  paid. 
For Drying Malt with hot air 
,,  Life Insurance  1  ...  ...  1 
,,  Saltpetre 
,  , Flax and Hemp  l- 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
,,  Land Improvement 
l+ 
,,  General Insurance  ...  ...  ...  8 
Highest  Price  recorded  in l720  for  the  shares  oJ' the following 
companies  on all of which  25  was paid. 
Holy Island Salt  ...  ...  ...  ...  15 
Land Improvement (Lambert)  .  .  .  .. .  20 
lbfelioration of Oil (Long)  ...  ...  ...  60 
Navigation, River Douglas  ...  ...  ...  70 
English Copper Company  ...  ...  ...  105 
London Assurance  ...  ...  ...  .  ..  175 
Finally  the following table shows  the nominal  value of  fully-paid 
stocks (or in  the case  of  partly-paid  shares the amount paid) and the 
highest recorded price.  In some cases the advance was so great that the 
statement of  the premium  can  no longer  be  conveniently expressed  in 
the percentage  of  the nominal  value,  and therefore  the figure,  added 
below the maximum price, represents the number of  times the sum paid 
up is contained in the maximum quotation. 
Table showing the amount paid  up (or held  as paid  up) on each of the 
undermentioned  stocks  and  shares  and  the  highest  price  recorded 
in 17202. 
Name ......  South Sea Company  Bank  of England-  East India Company- 
-vide  infra, III.  p. 360  vide infra, III.  p. 244  vide infra,  11. p. 206 
Nominal value ...  100  100  100 
Highest price  ...  1,050  265  449 
L  Anderson, Annals of  Commerce, 111. p.  330. 
Based on the Bubbler's Mirror-Print  Room, British  Museum, No. 1621, also 
Nos. 1610, 1611, 1620,  1622, 1642.  Anderson, Annals of  Commerce,  III.  pp. 33943. 
The figures in brackets after the name of some of the cornparlies refer to the list of 
these promotions, infra,  111. pp. 445-58. 
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Million Bank-vide  infra,  Royal African Company1 
Name ......  III. p. 287  --wide inf~a.,  11.  p. 35 
Nominal value ...  100  100 
Highest price  ...  440  200 
Liverpool  Puckle's  Machine  Sun Fire Office  Royal 
Name and Ref. No.. ..  Water-  Gun-vide  infra,  -vide  infra,  Fishery 
Supply [l421  III. p. 109  III. p. 387  L21 
Paid per share .........  10  4  ? 10  10 
Highest price  .........  20  8  20  25  -  -- 
(Highest price) +  (par)  2  2  2  2; 
Marine Insuranoe  Holy Island  Supplying coals from  Name and Ref. No. ...  [? 361  Salt [l621  Newcastle 1401 
Paid per share .........  1  5  3 
Highest price  .........  3  15  1 
(Highest price) +(par)  3  3  4 
Irish Sail  Improvement of  Westleg's  Furnishing 
...  Name and Ref. No.  Cloth  Land (Lambert)  Actions  of  Funerals 
[?  87 or 711  [l791  [? 1251  t301 
Par ........................  i  5  2  23 
Highest price  .........  1  20  12  15 
(Highest price) +  (Par)  4  4  6  6 
Pennsylvania  Whaling Co.  Drying Malt  Rose Insur-  ...  Name and Ref. No.  [ss]  L341  by Air [l291  ance [as] 
Par ........................  5t  3  B 
1 
8 
.........  Highest price  40  3b  4 
(Highest price)+(Par)  7  7  8  8 
Life In-  Trading with  Grand Fishery  Orkney 
Name and Ref. No'...  surancea  Hamburgh [? 1661  L41  Fishery3 
Par ........................  8  15  fr  25 
Highest price  .........  4  120  5  250  - 
(Highest price)+ (Par)  8  8  10  10 
Flax and Hemp  Rock-  Hemp and  Melioration 
Name and Ref. No.. ..  growlng  Salt  Flax  of  Oil (Long) 
Pennsylvania [79]  [l131  [? 71 or 871  [l811 
........................  Par  ?l  1  t  A  5 
Highest price  .........  28  15  19  .  60 
(Highest price) +  (Par)  11  12  12  12 
Salt-  ''  Stockings" ?Frame-  Manuring  Water- 
Name and Ref. No. ...  petre  work-Knitters Co.  of  Land  Engine 
[321  11591  [? 1261 
Par ........................  4 
~761 
23  B  4  .........  Highest price  l3  30  l3  50  - 
(Highest price)+(Par)  12  12  12  128 
Navigation  Building or  Royal Lustring 
Name and Ref. No. ...  Bahama  of the River  buying ships  Co.-vide  infra, 
Islands l  Douglas2  to freight [22]  111. p.  88  - 
Par ........................  3  5  1  64 
Highest price  .........  40  70  15  106 or 120 
p- 
(Highest price)+ (Par)  13  14  15  208 or 233 
English Copper  Welsh Copper  British  Temple Brass Mills 
Name and Ref. No. ...  Co.-vide  infra,  Co.-vide  infra,  Insurance  -vide  infra, 
11.  p.  435  11.  p.  439  [25]  11.  pp. 428,  429 
Par ........................  5  46  Q  ? 10 
Highest price  .........  105  90 or 95  - 
3  250  --  p 
(Highest price)+(Par)  21  22 or 23  24  25 
Royal Exchange As-  York Buildings  Gold Mining Co. 
Name and Ref. No. ...  surance-vide  infra,  Co.-vide  infra,  (Capt. Welbe's) 
111.  pp. 404,  410  III. p.  425 
10  ........................ 
[l741 
Par  10 
Highest price  .........  250  305  3 
16 
(Highest price) +  (Par)  25  306  32 
Name and Ref. No., ,  .  London Assurance-vide  General In-  "  Fish Pool " 
infra,  1x1.  pp. 404, 411  surance F241  (Sir R.  Stee1e)s  -- . 
Par ........................  5  B  nil 
Highest price  .........  175  8  160 Prem. 
(Highest price) +(Par)  35  64 
The capital  was  $8,000  (Anderson,  Annals of  Commerce,  111.  p.  342).  The 
second instalment was to be paid on July 20,  1720 (Daily Courant,  July  14). 
Qnderson,  Annals of  Commerce, 111.  p. 345 ;  Rogers, Agriculture and Prices, VII. 
Part II.,  p. 608. 
On September 13,  1720, it was advertised that ships were almost completed, 
and share certificates were then ready (Duily Post,  Sept. 13, 1720). 
The quotation of the Bubbler's Mirror is 200,  that of the newspapers 180. 
?" Symond's Assurance  on Lives,"  An Exact List of  all the  Bubbles,  1721, in 
Somers' Tracts (1751)) xvr. p.  419;  The History of  Banking, by W. J. Lawson,  1850, 
p.  489. 
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CHAPTER  XXI. 
THE  boom  of  1720 was  at its height  in  the last  week  of  June. 
South Sea stock was quoted at 1,000 on each of  the six week-days from 
the 23rd to the 29th'.  But already there were signs portending serious 
trouble in the future.  The inflation of  credit had been  carried  to such 
lengths  that  later  on  it became  customary  to speak  of  the financial 
operations of  this period as "  bubbles2."  Towards the end of  April, the 
rate of  interest  on  stock exchange  loans  was  as much  as  10 per  cent. 
a  month,  indeed  in  some cases 1 per  cent.  a day was  paid3.  Foreign 
exchange was  becoming adverse to London, though  the change  was  to 
some extent disguised by the influence of  a similar  speculative  fever at 
Paris and Amsterdam"  Though the diminution  of  further floatations 
l Vide infra,  chart in vol. III. 
2  The use of  the term "bubble,"  in this connection, is often supposed to have 
been the creation of the South Sea period, and it is sometimes derived  from "bob." 
Shakespeare has "  bubble reputation,"  and Wycherley describes one of his characters 
as "bubbled  of his mistress."  The plates in Het Broote Tafereel  der Dwaasheid, 1720, 
show that the word was  understood literally,  and was  closely connected  with  air- 
bubbles or soapbubbles-as  something unsubstantial,  which was  capable of "  being 
blown up"  rapidly and was liable to burst. 
3  A. Hutcheson,  Collection of  Calculations, ut supra, p.  25. 
*  Freke's Prices, ut supra.  The Paris rate which had  been  34.8 on January 13, 
1719, went to a greater and greater discount in 1720, being 10,79, G, 0 on August 2, 
16,  September 9,  13; cf.  MS.,  "Second  and Last  Advice  to  ye  Freeholders  of 
England,"  1721, where the beginning of this phenomenon is traced to the exportation 
of  bullion and bills on behalf  of  the foreign favourites of  George I.-"  The locusts 
which  the East  wind  brought  into  Egypt did  great  mischief,  but  they  carried 
nothing away but their  carcasses and those ye  Egyptians had ye pleasure to see 
drowned by a strong West  Wind.  But our locusts are grievous not only at their 
visits but at their departure, they come empty and go away loaded ....  But all this, 
as great and as intolerable as it was,  is nothing to ye plunder of  ye nation  in 1720, 
when ye K-  himself sold out a vast deal of South Sea stock  and subscriptions  at 
800 and 900 per cent.  and when yt prodigious deal of  fictitious  stock was pretended 
to be sold we all know ye greater, much ye greater, part of those sums were paid to 
ye K-  and ye  Duchess  of  Kendal ...  and it was  all spirited away to Hanover of 
which ye proofs are plain.  For besides what was  carried away in specie  SO  much 
was  remitted  by  bills  yt  insta~ltly  upon  the K-'S  departure,  the exchange to 
Holland fell very much against us and could never afterwards be got up before the 
total catastrophe and crack of ye South Sea." 
of new  companies strengthened the prices of  South Sea stock and of  the 
shares of  undertakings  already established,  the element  of  doubt as to 
the legal  status of  the latter was  prejudicial  to the continuance of  a 
state  of  credit  already  subject  to a  strain  that must  increase  with 
cumulative  force  as  time  went  on.  It is  shown  elsewhere  that  the 
finances of  the South Sea company were  strained to the uttermost by 
the malpractices of  some of the directors and by the system of  making 
loans  on  the  stock'.  Everything  points  to the conclusion  that  the 
condition  of  the stock-market  in June was  exceedingly unstable,  sup- 
posing there had been no further demands on the credit  of  the country. 
But the situation  was  such  that,  if  financial  enterprize stood  still,  a 
collapse must  have followed.  Only  the future  could justify  the high 
level of  the quotations of  stocks.  For instance the whole profit of  the 
South Sea company was still to be realized, and the same remark applies, 
with  even  greater force, to the host  of  new  companies.  Therefore to 
stand still was to court disaster, but it can be shown that to go forward 
was  only  to  meet  vast  misfortunes.  The  South  Sea  company  had 
immense sums due to it in the future, as instalments  on  the three cash 
subscriptions.  But such of the new companies as could make good their 
footing would also  require very  large sums.  Now,  when  credit  was  so 
strained  already  in June, it is  clear that it was  absolutely  impossible 
that the necessary funds should  be  forthcoming.  Therefgre either way 
a terrible  collapse was  inevitable.  If speculation  had been  checked  in 
June it would have come quickly, if, on the other hand, the directors of 
the South Sea and other companies went  forward, it would arrive more 
slowly but no less surely, and the panic would be thagreater the longer 
the delay. 
It  is  shown  with  some  detail  in  the  account  of  the  South  Sea 
company  that its policy had been all along to inflate  the price  of  its 
scripS.  Every possible device was adopted to support the market.  Not 
only were loans made on the stock, but there was  a  sustained effort to 
corner  it.  Necessarily  those,  who  borrowed  on  their holding,  had  to 
pawn their stock, and there was great delay in issuing new  scrip against 
the annuities converted  in  May.  Thus the market  was  kept  bare of 
stock, but here again the management of  the company was involved in a 
dilemma.  The price  of  the stock,  being  artificially  enhanced through 
the loans on it, to support the market  it was  necessary to continue the 
policy.  But, to obtain funds for such financing, further issues  of  stock 
must be made.  Moreover the company was approaching the end of  its 
issuable stock, and to create more, would involve the opening of  lists for 
a  second  conversion  of  debts.  It follows then that the operation  of 
l  For the details vide infra,  111.  pp.  317-19,  323, 324. 
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cornering the stock had failed.  In spite of  the widespread  speculative 
fever, there  was  a  steady  undercurrent  of  real  selling from holders of 
stock, who  refrained  for political reasons from condemning the scheme. 
This  attitude of  mind  is  expressed by  William  King,  Archbishop  of 
Dublin,  in  a letter to Molesworth  written  in May-"I  send  you  the 
queries  about  the South Sea, but  would  not  on  any  account  have  it 
known that I am concerned in it, for I think, if the debts of  the nation 
may  be  paid  by  the folly of  particulars ...  it will  be  very  well  for  the 
publick, and I know  no obligation  on  me  to hinder  it.  Perhaps what 
would be  spent this way would  be  spent  on  gaming  or on luxury, and 
I am of  opinion that most that go into the matter are well aware it will 
not [succeed], but hope to sell before the price fall1." 
For these various reasons the stock was  steady during July, in fact, 
allowing  for  the deduction  of  the dividend,  it rose  slightly, owing to 
further  loans  to stockholders  at the end  of  the  month.  Since  the 
second step in  the conversion-scheme was  now inevitable,  the time was 
judged  favourable, and the stock was rated at 800 for both irredeemable 
and redeemable debts.  This operation was  carried  through during the 
first twelve days in  August, and on the 12th a final issue of  stock for 
cash was made at 1,000.  The eRect  on the market soon  showed itself. 
The quotation, instead of advancing as it had done after the conversion 
in May, very slowly receded, and, when  the operation was  completed, it 
fell below 900. 
Meanwhile, in spite of  the act and proclamation of  June2,  the new 
or revived companies continued to gain popular support.  There was no 
legislative machinery provided for taking action against them ;  and, in 
any case,  those  that stood  highest  could  only be  touched by  showing 
either non-user or misuse of  their charters.  The directors of  the South 
Sea company believed  that, if  they  could put the law  in force against 
such  undertakings as were  most  favoured, the way  would be  clearer for 
the payment  of  calls on  the cash-subscriptions and also for the main- 
taining of  the price of  South Sea stock.  But two of  the undertakings, 
which  were  most  successful  in  the  market  were  legally  unassailable. 
These were the marine insurance companies, which had been established 
by  act  of  Parliament.  There  was  a  stipulation,  however,  that these 
companies should  each  make  a  loan  to the State,  and the South Sea 
company endeavoured to force them into such a position that they could 
not fulfil the conditions, and as a  consequence would  be  subject to the 
forfeiture of  their charters3.  Either as a result  of  these  nlariceuvres or 
1 MS. Letters of Archbishop King, Library, Trinity  College, Dublin, h'.  3.  '6.  f. 87. 
2  Vide supra, p.  417. 
3  A New  Year's GijZ for  the  Divectors  with some  account of their plot  against  the 
two Insurances,  London, 1721, p. 24. 
CIIAP. XXI.]  The  Writ  of  Scire facias-August  1720  425 
through  ill-advised  speculation,  the insurance  companies were  in  diffi- 
culties  later in  the year,  but  they  managed  to maintain  their  credit, 
longer than their aggressor1.  It follows that out of  ten  undertakings, 
the shares  in which  are known  to have sold  at over twenty  times the 
amount  paid  up2, two,  the  Royal  Exchange  and  London  Assurance 
companies,  were  beyond  the reach  of  the directors  of  the South Sea 
company.  Of  the remaining  eight, four  (namely  the British  and  the 
General  Insurances,  the Temple  Brass  Mills  and  the  Gold  Mining 
company promoted by Welbe) had no charters and could be  dealt with 
under the act of  June.  This left four undertakings-the  Royal Lustring 
company, the English and Welsh copper mines and the yoEk Buildings 
-all  of  which had charters, while the first and the last were strengthened 
by  acts  of  Parliament.  It  follows  that,  if  the  South  Sea  company 
decided  to  attack  their  legal  status,  it could  only  do  so  by  proving 
non-user or misuse  of  the respective charters.  Accordingly on  August 
18th, the directors  made application  for a  writ  of  scire facia8  against 
these  undertakings.  There  were  considerable  differences  in  the legal 
position  of  the four  companies.  No  evidence  is  discoverable  which 
shows  that  the  Welsh  copper  company  had  continued  to  exist. 
Originally  founded  in  1694 it does  not  appear  to have  survived the 
boom  that gave  it birth3, and  therefore,  so far as is  known,  this was 
a  clear case  of  a  charter  becoming  void  through non-user.  The cases 
of  the Royal Lustring company and of  the English Copper Mines were 
more doubtful.  The former  had  been  founded  in 1688; and in  l706 
-a  year  of  great depression-its  shares  were  still quoted at half  the 
issue price, that is at 60 per  cent.  of  their  nominal  value.  The joint- 
effect  of  peace with France in 1713 and the approaching determination 
of  the monopoly of  the undertaking led to the announcement  that its 
assets were to be  realized  in  1713, though  there  is  evidence  that the 
shareholders  continued  to meet  as  a  corporate  body  in  17164.  The 
cessation of  manufacturing, as well  as the attempts to sell the charter 
to insurance companies, afford evidence that the status of  the company 
under  the  act  was  bad.  When  it  had  ceased  to  manufacture,  the 
charter  was  forfeited  under  the  non-user  clause.  The  company  of 
English Copper Mines was  less unfavourably situated in law.  Founded 
in  1691, this organization  was  still at work  in  1711, and in  l720 an 
amalgamation  had  been  effected  with  two  other smelting and copper- 
rnining undertakings.  The united capital was only &105,0005.  In this 
case  there  was  no  question  of  a  misuse  of  the charter, since all  the 
business,  carried  on  under  it, was  exactly  of  the character  originally 
Vide infra, 111.  pp. 405, 406. 
a  Vide infra, 11.  pp.  438, 439. 
5  Ibid., 11.  pp. 434, 435. 
Vide 8upra, p. 421. 
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authorized.  Moreover, it seems that a  fair case  could be made out to 
show that the company continued to exist  between 1711 and 1720.  In 
l710 a further call on the shareholders had been  made, and this points 
to the conclusion  that,  at that date,  the assistants contemplated the 
carrying  on  of  the undertaking.  Further,  once  the amalgamation  of 
1720 had been completed, it would  have been  equitable to consider the 
charter  as  applying  to the  united  mines,  smelting-works  arid  copper 
mills, and  there  is  good  reason  to believe  that one  at least  of  these 
enterprizes had been  established  some years before 1712 and had been 
at work from that date until 1720'.  Thus there seems to have been  no 
ground for  the voiding  of  the charter  on  account  of  non-user.  The 
case of  the York Buildings company was  peculiar.  Founded originally 
as a water-supply  company, it had continued as such until the end of 
1719, when a group of  speculators  bought  up  the water-works and the 
charter and floated the land-development  undertaking.  Therefore this 
company could not fail by reason of  non-user, but it might  be reached 
on  account  of  misuse  of  its charter.  That grant  had  been  made on 
behalf  of  what  had  been,  at the date  it was  signed,  a  new  type  of 
water-supply  undertaking2, and  the  whole  question  was  whether  the 
purchase of  estates in  Northumberland  and Scotland  could  be  covered 
by that instrument or by the act in favour of  the company.  There was 
one technical point urged on  its behalf, namely that, whereas as a rule 
other charters limited the value of  lands purchasable by the undertaking 
incorporated, there was  no such limitation in this special case.  Apart 
from the question of  construction of  the charter, it appears that, while 
there was no express restraint on the purchase of land, whatever amount 
was acquired should be in relation to the main  object of  the company ; 
and, if  so, it follows that the recent  operations of  the company, while 
not contrary to the letter of  the charter,  were  not authorized by  that 
instrument and might further be held contrary to its intention.  How- 
ever, in view  of  the influence which  the South Sea company was able to 
command, the decision of  the Courts was  adverse to three of  the four 
companies?  The consequences of  this verdict  were  very  far-reaching; 
and, were it not for the tragic nature of  the causes now  set in motion, 
they would have been highly hunlorous.  It has been shown above4  that, 
with  the exception  of  the Welsh copper  company, something at least 
was to be said for  each  of  the other undertakings.  When this was  so, 
what was  the position  of  the bankers  of  the South Sea company, who 
1 State Papers, Domestic, Petition Entry Book,  XI. p. 521. 
Vide injka, 111.  pp. 419, 424. 
3  The  charter  of  the  English  Copper  company  was  found  not  to have  been 
invalidated. 
Vide supra, p. 425. 
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carried  on  business  under  a  charter originally  granted  for  the manu- 
facture of  hollow sword-blades in the north of  England, and after this 
industry  was  abandoned,  the grant  was  used  to purchase  estates  in 
Ireland  and,  after  being  for  some  years  in  abeyance, was  revived  to 
authorize banking and  financing  on a  vast  scale1?  In this case there 
was  certainly  both non-user  and misuse. 
The direct result of  the issue of  the writs of  scire facias was a rapid 
fall in the shares affected, some of which became  unsaleable.  Within a 
month York Buildings had relapsed from 305 to 30, London  Assurance 
from  175 to 30,  Royal  Exchange  Assurance  from  250  to 60.  When 
these were the shares that fared best, it may be gathered that those that 
were most  affected  became worthless.  Considering the undue strain of 
the credit of  the country at the time, losses of this magnitude could not 
be  confined  within  a  given  area.  As  these  shares  had  risen  in  the 
market,  loans  had  been  made  on  them  by  bankers,  and the price  fell 
too  quickly  for  the margin  to protect  the lenders.  Not  only so,  but 
the same persons, who  speculated in  these new  companies, were  holders 
of  South Sea stock; and, through  their losses  in the former, they were 
compelled to sell part of  what  they owned in  the latter.  Thus, just  as 
all stocks tended  to rise  together  during the height  of  the boom,  so 
conversely, the state of  credit  being  what  it was,  a  great  fall  in  one 
direction  would  spread  until the relapse  became  universal. 
Possibly  it may  have  been  some  consolation  to  the  companies 
attacked by  the South Sea directors to know  that the stroke directed 
against  them  had  recoiled  with  crushing  force  upon  the  aggressors. 
Before the issue of  the writ South Sea stock had stood at 850, a month 
later it was  as low as 390.  Thus in the month from May  24th to June 
23rd there had been a rise of  520 while in the same period from August 
20th to September 19th there was a fall  of  about 450.  Comparing the 
state of  the market  in the stock  with  the position of  York  Buildings 
shares; the latter, in spite of  the attack made on  them, commanded as 
high a premium on the sum paid up as could now  be obtained on South 
Sea stock2. 
The great fall in stocks, during the last ten days of  August and the 
month of  September, is to be  attributed in part to the shock to credit 
by  the issue of  the writs; but,  where the inflation was  greatest,  there 
were other causes.  The beginning of  the decline came  from the losses 
in the new  companies.  But, since  the later  part of  the advance had 
been  artificial, any disturbance of  confidence would  inevitably produce 
Vide infra, 111. pp. 440-2. 
Credited as paid up  Price 
South Sea stock, Sept. 19  ...  ...  100  450-380 
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wide-reaching effects.  In  a  time  of  wild  speculation  a  moderate  fall 
would become the prelude to further relapses ;  and, once the downward 
movement had  acquired  a  certain  momentum, it would  continue irre- 
sistibly  until the inflation  was  reduced.  Just as  in the period  when 
prices were advancing, the fact that certain stages were  reached tended 
towards  further  gains,  so  in  the reverse  direction  other  limits  being 
touched  gave  an  added  force  to  the  panic.  For  instance,  up  to 
September  5th,  South  Sea  stock,  though  faIling, remained  over  700, 
but  600  was  the figure  at which  enormous  loans had  been  made by 
bankers ;  and, at the former price, in a falling market  it was  clear that 
the margin was  rapidly shrinking.  To protect themselves, the lenders 
began  to sell  the pawned  stock,  with  the result  of  a  further relapse. 
Then the directors of  the company themselves began to make bear-sales1, 
and such action added to the panic, until on September 19th the stock 
fell  below  400.  At this price,  the whole influence of  the annuitants, 
who  had  converted, became adverse to the company.  Those, who  had 
come in in August, saw the stock selling in the market at half the price 
at which  it had been  rated for them,  while  the position  of  those who 
had  subscribed at 1,000 was  necessarily still worse.  Instead of  being 
able to sell their allotments at a profit, as they had hoped, they would 
now be forced to pay calls, all of  which  represented  a dead loss at the 
prices  then  ruling.  It was  little  to be  wondered  at that the stock- 
holders  began  to clamour  for  a  revision of  the terms  of  subscription. 
But, if there were such a revision, the amount of  surplus stock would be 
reduced, and thus the great argument in favour of  advanced quotations 
would be weakened.  The fortnight from September 19th to the end  of 
that month  was  a most  critical period  in the stock-market, gathering 
up within a short space the nemesis of  bad  finance.  On  Monday the 
19th South  Sea  stock  opened  at 450,  and an  angry  meeting  of  the 
company on  the following day tended  against any recovery.  As con- 
fidence became more and more  impaired, doubts arose as to the ability 
of  the company to make good  its vast  financial commitments.  In the 
past as fast as cash had been  received from  the subscribers, it had been 
lent out; and the payments, to be  made on  the conversion-operations, 
were  satisfied by  bonds.  When almost  all  paper-securities  had  fallen 
under suspicion, the position  of  these  bonds  was  doubted.  It is true 
that the market was temporarily strengthened by the announcement on 
Friday the 23rd that the Bank of  England would support the South Sea 
and Sword Blade companies, and the price  closed at 375, but the next 
day (before the agreement could be completed) the Sword Blade company 
was  forced  to suspend  payment,  and  within  a  few  days  many  other 
1 Vide infra, 111.  pp. 326, 328, 329. 
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bankers  failed.  On  Monday,  Tuesday  and  Wednesday  (26th-28th) 
the panic was at its worst, South Sea stock touched  180 (a fall of  600 
in a month), the bonds were sold at 75, East India stock  fell  from 210 
to 150, York Buildings from 30 to 17, Royal Exchange Assurance from 
65 to 40, London Assurance from 35 to 20.  The breakdown  of  credit 
was  felt universally1.  Loans,  even  on  good  security,  were  almost  un- 
obtainable;  and those who had funds to lend  considered that they had 
"acted  a  charitable part in taking no  more  than  five  per  cent. for  a 
month."  Most  credit-instruments were  not negotiable-as  it has been 
graphically  described "  every  note and bill,  except those  of  the Bank, 
and some few others, is now become as mere piece of  waste paper as if  a 
prayer or a creed was  writ on it instead of money2.  It was "  unfashion- 
able  not  to be  a  bankrupt,"  the consequences to trade were described 
"as  most  miserable  and  ruinous"  and  merchants  were  said  "to  be 
reduced  to such misery  as  they  had never  felt before3."  Though  the 
prices  of  stocks were  considerably lower  in  December, the most  acute 
stage  of  the panic had  passed  on Thursday, September 29th,  when  it 
was  definitely agreed that the price, at which South Sea stock  had been 
rated  for  the conversions of  the summer,  should  be  reduced  to 4004. 
Great efl'orts  were now made to maintain  the stock  at about 200.  All 
the devices that had been used from May to August were revived  as far 
as  they  could  be  applied  in  the  altered  circumstances.  Handsome 
dividends were promised in the shape of  "divisions"  out of  the surplus 
stock.  The company  intimated  that  it would  pay  30  per  cent.  at 
Christmas,  in cash, and 50 per  cent.  thereafter  for  a  term  of  years; 
while treatises were issued endeavouring to prove that these distributions 
could  be  made  good,  even  after the readjustment  of  terms  with  the 
annuitants, whereby the quantity of  surplus stock was  greatly reduced5. 
In this way  the price  was  maintained  at about 200 till the middle  of 
November.  It then  began  to be  seen  that  an  enquiry,  during  the 
approaching session of  Parliament, into the conduct of the directors was 
possible.  Besides, some of  the ulterior  consequences of  the panic were 
still producing a great depression in  trade, so  that towards the end of 
December  prices  of  stocks  were  lower  than  they  had  been  when  the 
Vide infra, 11. p.  204. 
Considerations on the Present State of the Nation  us to Puhlick Credit, Stocks, the 
Landed and  Trading Interests,  London, 1720, pp.  17, 21. 
HiStoricab  Register  (1720), v.  p.  380; Some  Paragraphs  of  Mr.  Hutche8on's 
Treatises,  ut  supm, p.  14. 
*  It will  be  seeuthat, owing to payments  made in cash and  to the subsequent 
bonus, this was not the price  at which the annuitants held the stock-vide  infra, 111. 
pp.  311, 322, 400. 
5  An Argument proving  that  the  South Sea  company are able to make a dividend of 
38 per  cent. for  12 yeala,,ritted  to the meanest capacities, London, 1720. 430  Finance Companies after the Panic 1720  [CHAP. XXI. 
panic was at its worst.  The following table will show the decline from 
the highest point during the boom ;  and, for the purposes of comparison, 
the quotations of  January lst, 1720 (or in  the case  of  new  companies 
the amount called up) are added : 
Comparison of the Prices  of  stocks  and  shares from  June  to August 
and  in December  1720. 
Bank of  East India  South Sea  Royal African 
England  Company  Company  Company 
1720.  June  to August.. .  265  449  1,050  200 
December 13-14  132  145  121  45 
January 1st  ......  (1501)  (2003  (12%)  (25)' 
Royal Exchange  London  York 
Assurance  Assurance  Buildings 
Jurie to August ...  250  175  305 
December 13-14  9  11  15 
Paid in  ............  10  5 
The great  fall  in  the  price  of  stocks reflects  one aspect  of  "the 
clearing away of  the wreckage,"  after the collapse of the period of  over- 
speculation.  Both the boom  and the consequent panic had  originated 
in financial operations, and it is natural to seek  for the most  important 
results amongst those companies which undertook this class of  business. 
Amongst  finance,  banking  and  insurance  undertakings  there  are two 
groups,  the  one,  which  through  circumstances  or  choice,  was  closely 
related to the South Sea scheme, and the other which  was  less affected 
by  it.  I11  the  first  class  may  be  mentioned  the South Sea company 
itself, as the prime  mover  in the inflation, the Million Bank, as a very 
large holder of  the securities converted and the York Buildings company, 
which though attacked by the South Sea directors, yet imitated some of 
the most objectionable of  their methods, which involved it in difficulties 
during a lengthened, but not a reputable existence2.  The Million Bank 
appears to have speculated in annuities during the boom, and it emerged 
in  a  somewhat crippled condition  which  involved  a  reduction  of  the 
dividend.  In time  its credit  became  re-established  and it endured  as 
long as terminable annuities, of  the kind common after the Revolution, 
were  a  favourite investment3.  The dominating figure in  this group is 
the  South  Sea  company,  whose  directors  had  been  as  kings  in  the 
summer and were execrated  as 'L  the scum  of  the people" in  the winter. 
Strenuous efforts were made to leave the position, established at  the end 
of  September,  exactly  as  it was.  This course  would  have  involved a 
menace  to credit  and  a  slur  on  the  national  honesty.  There  still 
CHAP.  XXI.]  Finance Companies after the Panic 1720  431 
remained a considerable amount of  surplus stock ;  and, had no further 
action  been  taken,  the company  would  have been  in  a  position,  when 
trade  again  became  active,  to  sell  this  stock.  Further,  when  the 
investigations  of  the Committee  of  the House of  Commons had  made 
some  progress,  it was  seen  that  the  creditors  had  good  ground  of 
complaint  against  the  State,  which  had  appointed  the  South  Sea 
company  as  its  agent  for  making  the  conversion.  In  so  far  as  the 
n~inistry  had  betrayed  its  trust,  the creditors  were  forced  into  wild 
speculation, where the dice were loaded against them.  Clearly therefore 
the State was under an equitable obligation to affbrd some relief  to the 
subscribers  of  debts.  Two  methods  were  open  to it.  The company 
had not as yet paid the bonus it had undertaken  to provide  out of  the 
surplus stock, and besides  there were the fines levied on the directors. 
Further,  to remove  the  temptatidn  of  surplus  issuable  stock,  it was 
decided  that,  on  the State foregoing  its claim  to the bonus,  all  the 
issuable stock should be divided, together with the fines on the directors, 
amongst  the annuitants,  who  had  converted.  The effect  of  this re- 
adjustment was that the long annuitants now held  South Sea stock on 
an average of  from 105 to 110 and those who exchanged redeemables at 
about 160'.  These prices  were  below  the average of  December  1720, 
but the position  had another side, which was  less favourable, in so far 
as,  even  after the re-adjustment,  there was  a  material loss  of  income. 
The settlement of the affairs of  this company introduced certain changes 
in  the capital  account  which  affected  the Bank  of  England  and had 
been  intended  to  influence  the  East  India  undertaking  also.  The 
concession to the annuitants, who  had converted,  removed  the possible 
danger from the existence of  a  surplus issuable stock.  There remained 
the  risk  of  the  operations  that  might  be  undertaken  in  the  future, 
through funds raised on the credit of  the debt due by  the government 
to the company.  It was  therefore  intended that the capital, which was 
372 millions at the end  of  1720, should be  reduced  by  20 millions- 
2 millions were  cancelled and the Bank  and East India company were 
offered  the privilege  of  purchasing  9 millions each.  It shows how  the 
estimation of  a fund of  credit had fallen after the severe lessons of  l720 
that,'before  the  panic,  the South Sea  company  had  bribed  ministers 
most lavishly to obtain the right of  increasing its capital ;  whereas the 
East India company in 1721-2  refused  this offer, even  as giftZ  and the 
Bank only took 4 millions instead of 9 millions"  After this adjustment 
was  made the capital  of  the South Sea company was 313 millions, that 
of  the Bank almost 9 millions.  Apart from  the increase of  its capital, 
the latter institution did not bear any lasting marks of  the troubleso~ne 
February 5th. 
Ibid.,  111.  p. 286. 
2  Vide infra,  1x1.  pp.  426-34. 
1  Vide infia,  1x1. pp.  347-9.  Ibid.,  11.  p.  205.  Ibid.,  111.  p.  242. 432  Finance Companies after the Panic 1720  [CHAP. XXI. 
times through which it had passed.  Indeed the fact that its credit had 
stood  during  the  panic  strengthened  its position,  besides  giving the 
directors  a  salutary  lesson  on  the  evils  of  speculative  finance.  The 
Bank was fortunate in  escaping the evils that beset its great rival, for 
it must not be forgotten that it accepted  the principles that had ended 
so  disastrously.  The directors, like their contemporaries,  exaggerated 
the advantages of  a  fund of  credit,  but the state of  home-politics and 
the dishonest methods of the South Sea company resulted in the offer of 
the  latter  being  accepted.  The proposal  of  the Bank,  had  it been 
realized, would in all probability have been carried out more equitably ; 
but, if so,  there would have been no little danger to the stability of  the 
company.  Leaving  aside  the  dishonesty  of  the  South  Sea  directors 
(which added to the inflation and suhsequent collapse in 17RO), the real 
cause of  the panic was the erroneous views held as to the extent of  the 
fund of  credit.  The Bank of England had first worked out the idea on 
a large scale in England ;  and, had a different government been in office, 
it is possible that it would  have  secured the privilege  of  making  the 
conversion.  Thus  the  success  of  the  South  Sea  company  in  being 
selected was  in truth a  predestined  failure; for,  as opinion was  at the 
time, men  exaggerated the powers of  a fund of  credit to such an extent 
that it was  inevitable that too high a price  should be asked from the 
body  selected to carry out the scheme, with the result that eventually 
the operation would involve that body in difficulties. 
While those financing companies which were brought into immediate 
contact with  the South  Sea company felt the effects  of  the year  1720, 
the other members of  this group came through the crisis bearing marks 
of  the period  of  stress.  The two new  marine insurance companies were 
unable to pay the sum  they had promised to lend  to the government1, 
partly through losses in speculation, partly through the impossibility of 
inducing shareholders to pay calls ;  and they were compelled to come  to 
Parliament and obtain remission of  a part of  the amount they had each 
undertaken  to  provide.  The  management  of  the  Royal  Exchange 
company  had  been  particularly  enterprizing,  if  not speculative.  Not 
content with the marine  business, secured it by  the charter and act of 
Parliament, it endeavoured to undertake  fire  risks,  by  buying  up the 
Sadlers' Hall company, besides  forming  a  community of  interest with 
the Sun by  an extensive purchase  of  the shares of  the latter2.  It is 
a  curious  commentary  on  the  over-capitalization  of  the  insurance 
companies promoted  in l720 that the Sun Fire Office, which  was  now 
beginning to succeed, could  have  been bought up for about 250,000. 
This company, too, was  arected by the prevailing excitement, not only 
1 Vide infra,  111. pp.  405-7.  Ibid., 111. pp. 388, 408, 409. 
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in  its relations  with  the Royal  Exchange  but in  its legal  status and 
capitalization.  Having  no  charter,  it appears  at one  time  to  have 
endeavoured to purchase that of  the Royal Lustring company.  Moreover, 
like other  undertakings,  which had  been  founded  before the boom,  it 
found  that  the R4 original  shares soon  rose  to a  price  that was  un- 
manageable and accordingly  each  was  subdivided  into  100 new  ones'. 
The same method  was  adopted by  the English  Copper Miners and by 
a company (formed in 1716) for  lending money on real security2.  The 
Royal  Lustring  company  on  the  other  hand  retained  the  original 
number  of  shares, but created  in addition a large amount of  new  ones 
on which  calls were  made3.  The case of  the Bank  of  Scotland shows 
how widespread the fund of  credit fallacy was.  The South Sea company 
had  sought the making  of  a  conversion of  debt, but strenuous efforts 
were made to force such an operation on the Scottish institution against 
its  will,  through  exchanging  its  shares  for  the  securities  known  as 
Equivalent  Debentures  which  were  created  in  17074.  The owners of 
these debentures, being  repulsed  by the Bank,  used  them  to establish 
a  fire  insurance  company and again  attempted to compel an amalga- 
mation5.  The success of  the Bank  of  Scotland not  only aroused  envy 
at home  but  a  desire  of  imitation  in  Ireland.  When  a  Bank  was 
proposed in Dublin  in March, 1719, one of  the inducements held forth 
to prospective shareholders, was that the shares of  the Bank of  Scotland 
were  selling  at 150 per  cent.  premium;  and  the proposed  capital of 
&100,000 was  taken up, before the date at  which the books were opened 
for  public subscription.  As has often  happened  since in  Ireland, new 
industrial developments were made weapons in keen party strife, and the 
opponents of  the scheme represented it as "a society of  men incorporated 
to seize the money  of  the kingdom  and turn it to their private benefit, 
whilst the people circulated their papers and paid them interest for the 
use of  them 
After the purely  financial companies, those  which  suffered most in 
1720 were the undertakings expressly named  in the writ of  scire facias. 
The Royal  Lustring  company  disappeared  altogether7, and the York 
Buildings continued as a highly  speculative venture8.  The two mining 
enterprizes-the  English  and Welsh  copper  undertakings-suffered  in 
the market, but neither admitted defeat.  Both  continued to transact 
Vide infru,  111.  p.  387.  "bid.,  11. p. 434, III.  p. 456. 
Ibid., 111. p. 88.  Ibid., III. pp. 269-72. 
"ese  Equivalent Debenture holders finally became incorporated in 1727 as the 
Royal Bank of Scotland. 
6  MS. Letters of  Archbishop King,  Library,  Trinity  College,  Dublin, N.  3.7, 
ff. 11, 12, 10, 31, 49,  50. 
7  ride infla, 111. p. 80.  S Ibid., 111.  pp. 426, 427. 
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of  its influence as far as was possible1.  The African and Hudson's Bay 
companies were  to some extent  touched by  the prevailing fever.  The 
former  had long  been  in  want  of  capital and immediately  the boom 
began,  it issued  a large quantity  of  stock  in  April,  1720a.  Had this 
emission been delayed for a few months, double or treble the price could 
have  been  obtained,  though  it is  doubtful  if  the  stockholders  would 
have  been  able  to pay  the calls  when  due.  In  any  case,  the funds 
received would have been  of  no benefit to the company ;  since, like the 
South Sea company, it made loans on the security of  its own stock3.  If 
this undertaking was  unfortunate in creating new  stock  too  early,  the 
Hudson's  Bay  company  fell  into the opposite  error  of  being  too late. 
Its scheme of  capital  re-organization  was  only  ready  on  August  29th 
(that is after the writs had been  issued).  It was  proposed to treble the 
nominal amount of  the existing capital, by way  of a bonus, and then to 
offer  thrice  as  much  more for public  subscription.  The effect  of  this 
arrangement  would  have  been  to make  the  whole  capital  nine  times 
what  it had  been  at the beginning  of  the year.  However  the  panic  ' 
came  before  many  of  the  new  subscribers  had  paid  their  first  call, 
and  it was  found  necessary  to cancel  almost  the whole  of  the recent 
issue4. 
The events of  the year  l720 sum up to a certain extent the history 
of  the joint-stock  movement  since  the  Revolution,  and  at the same 
time they determined  the course of  the future for over a hundred years. 
The exaggerated ideas as to the extensibility of  credit had been  floating 
through  men's  minds for the past twenty-five years, and the speculation 
of  1719 and  l720 exhibited  the  inevitable  outcome  of  an economic  . 
fallacy,  developed in  an  atmosphere  of  political  corruption.  In  this 
respect  the South Sea panic  constitutes a  distinctive epoch in financial 
history.  From a different point of  view, too, this eventful period marks, 
more even  than most  times of  crisis, the end of  an old order, and there 
is certain completeness in  it, since it brings  to light all the joint-stock 
companies that possessed  any degree of  vitality.  Those that were able 
to survive the panic were shown to be endowed with a remarkable degree 
of recuperative force, and almost all of them had a lengthened existence, 
while  the  majority  have  continued  to flourish  during  the nineteenth 
century. 
The true  significance  of  the  panic,  however,  is  not  so  much  in 
terminating one  epoch, but in beginning and dominating another.  To 
the statesmen of  the first quarter of  the eighteenth century, it seemed 
l  Vide infra, 11.  pp. 204, 205. 
2  Treasury Records, Royal African Co. (Court Book of  the Assistants), No. 743, 
ff.  2, 5, 7. 
3  Ibid., f. 45.  Vide infra, 11.  pp. 235-7,  III.  p.  457. 
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demonstrable that the joint-stock system-"  the pernicious art of  stock- 
jobbing "-was  the sole and sufficient explanation of  the miseries of  the 
country.  No words were too strong to condemn what was  then considered 
to be a malign perversion of  industry, destructive of  commercial probity, 
of  a well-ordered social life, even  of  religion  and virtue.  In  fact  the 
joint-stock  type  of  organization received  only  a  little less  abuse than 
the directors of the South Sea company.  What it proved convenient to 
forget was that the real proximate cause of  the evil had been the veniality 
of  the ministry and of  the House  of  Commons.  Had the legislature 
done its duty, it is    rob able  there would still have been a conversion of 
the debt;  and, through  the  influence  of  the fund  of  credit  fallacy, 
consequent inflation: but, with an honest administration, the possibilities 
of  speculation would  have been  less, and the subsequent disturbance of 
trade  would  have  been  smaller.  As  the  scheme  was  actually  carried 
through, it stands as  a  permanent  warning  to the nation both against 
corruption  in  finance  and  also  against  attempted  reductions  of  the 
national  debt by juggling  obligations  of  the State from  one  fund  to 
another. 
Politicians  sometimes  find  a  remedy  for  their  mistakes,  but  they 
rarely have the candour  to make a  public recantation of  the principles 
that caused those  mistakes to be made.  Everyone at the end of  1720 
blamed the mechanism  which  had shown the disorder of  credit, no one 
seized  upon  the fallacy that had  been the true cause of  the distemper. 
Even those, who were held to be  the financial experts of  the time, such 
as Walpole and  Archibald  Hutcheson,  maintained  stoutly that credit 
was  good, but that it had  been  somewhat impaired  by  the canker of 
stock-jobbing1.  In short the result  of  opinion  in  1720 and l721 was 
that the rise of  the joint-stock system had been  the cause of  the panic, 
and therefore  it was  decided  that the Bubble  Act  should  be  strictly 
enforced.  As a consequence, no company was  safe in beginning business 
without  first obtaining a  charter,  and such  instruments were  now  only 
granted after a more  searching enquiry than had been usual in the past. 
Under the existing circumstances, it  was fortunate that no more restrictive 
measures were passed.  At one time legislation was contemplated to niake 
all the bargains in stocks during the year l720 null  and void, and also 
to prohibit for the future every species of  time-bargain  in the stock of 
companies.  It is an instance of  the common sense of  Parliament, even 
in a time of exceptional  stress and excitement, that these proposals were 
not persisted in ;  since a government, which  endeavoured to suppress all 
l  E.g.  Hutcheson,  Collection of  Calculutions,  ut  supra,  p. 118 ;  Some  Paragraphs 
of  Mr  Hutcheron's  Treatises,  ut  supra,  pp.  11,  17 ; C'ato's Letters;  or,  Essays  on 
Liberty,  Civil  and  Religious,  and  other  important  Subjects,  London,  1733,  I.  pp.  6, 
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speculation and at the same time continued itself  to issue lottery-loans, 
would  have  been  as inconsistent  as the South Sea company proceeding 
against  other  undertakings  for  non-user  or  misuse  of  their  charters, 
while it employed the Sword Blade house as its own  banker.  In truth 
the evils  of  speculation,  though  brought  to light  by  the joint-stock 
system, arose, as already shown, from the almost universal misconception 
of  the limits of  credit, and it might possibly be  maintained  that it was 
owing to that system that the inevitable crash came perhaps sooner, but 
that the losses were  more widely diffused and were less than they might 
have  been  had  the fund  of  credit  fallacy  been  translated  into actual 
practice  through  the medium  of  State-owned  land-banks  or  through 
excessive  issues  of  inconvertible paper  by  the government, which  pro- 
posals and others of a like nature all originated from  the one error. 
The legislation  and consequent  procedure  in 1720 and l721 might 
perhaps  be  described as the purely local treatment of  a sore, instead of 
the  healing  of  the  malady  that gave  rise  to it.  The decision now 
reached  arrested the development  of  the joint-stock  system  as long as 
the Bubble  Act was  rigorously  enforced.  It became both difficult and 
costly  to obtain the necessary  legal  authorization  for the  starting of 
a new  enterprize needing a large capital.  In one that might have been 
established with a moderate outlay, which for any reason it was desirable 
to collect from  a  large  number of  persons, the trouble and cost proved 
prohibitive.  Therefore, for upwards of  a century, industry was deprived 
of the advantages of  a certain amount of  capital, which would otherwise 
have been  available ;  till early in  the nineteenth  century when, in spite 
of  the law, unchartered  companies began  to be  formed.  By that time 
it was  recognized  that the fears  of  Parliament  in  1720 and  1721 had 
been  exaggerated, and  the act was  repealed  in  1825 by  4  George IV. 
c.  94. 
CHAPTER  XXII. 
REVIEW  OF  THE  JOINT-STOCK SYSTEM  FROM  1653 TO  17'20 : 
WITH  A  NOTE  ON  THE  CRISES  DURING  THAT  PERIOD. 
FEW  industrial developments during the latter half  of  the sixteenth, 
the whole  of  the seventeenth  and the first  quarter of  the eighteenth 
centuries are more striking than the progress of  the joint-stock system. 
Regarded from the point of view  of  the wealth it controlled, the progress 
had  been  remarkable.  The capital of  the only  undertakings of  this 
character-the  Russia  company  and the Adventurers  to Africa-that 
are known  to have  been  in existence from  1553 to 1560 was  under 
&?lO,OOO1, representing  only  about  .013 per cent. of  what the national 
wealth may be guessed to have been at that time2.  By 1695 the nominal 
capital of  companies had increased to 1.3 per cent. of the estimated total 
wealth at that times.  Only eight years later it had doubled4,  while in 
1717 it was again doubled, being by that date no less than 20 millions5. 
At the end  of  1720, adding the augmented  capital  of  the South Sea 
company after the conversion and the sums then called up by the recently 
established  undertakings, the whole  amount was  about  50 millions  or 
13 per cent. of  the estimated national  wealth at that datee.  When it 
is remembered that of  this total of  370 millions only about one-tenth 
consisted  of  instruments  of  trade-the  remainder  being lands,  cattle, 
houses and household  goods-the  full  significance of  the  proportion 
will  be  apparent.  Indeed  it  seems  that  the  result  is  a  paradox, 
namely  that  the  joint-stock  undertakings  used  between  them  con- 
siderably more capital than the whole  sum which  it was  calculated  was 
Vide infra, 11.  pp.  6, 37. 
There is no estimate known for this early period; but, calculating backwards 
from the figures given for 1600, it may be guessed roughly that from 1563 to 1660 
the national wealth might have been about 76 millions. 
Vide supra, pp.  335-7.  *  Ibid., p. 394.  6  Ibid., p.  431. 
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employed in every  kind  of  commerce  (inclusive  of  agriculture).  The 
explanation, however,  is  very  simple  and  depends  upon  the  peculiar 
relations of  the larger  companies to the State.  Several of  them had 
lent the money, received from theii members, to the government ;  and 
conversely, as  already  shown,  others  had  been  created  in  order  that 
existing  loans  might  be  consolidated  into their respective  stocks'.  If 
then allowance be made for these facts, the apparent paradox is resolved; 
since, in the case of  the South Sea company in particular, only a fraction 
of  the great nominal  capital  was  employed in  trade.  Thus,  through 
the peculiarities  of  their  origin,  the companies used  very  considerably 
smaller sums in  commerce than their aggregate  nominal capitals.  At 
the same time  it must  be  noted  that an  organization had  come  into 
being,  which,  by  1720,  possessed  the  control  of  funds  at least  as 
great  as  the  whole  estimated  amount  of  the  trading  wealth  of  the 
country. 
From  another  point  of  view  the growth  and development  of  the 
system  gave  rise  to important  results,  some of  which  are  interwoven 
with  the history  of  the  nation.  During  the  first  130  years  of  the 
progress  of  the joint-stock  company  it is  inseparably  connected  with 
British naval and maritime progress.  Froin 1553 to 1568, little as the 
names of  the Fellowship for the discovery of  New  Trades, the societies 
of  the Mines  Royal and  of  the Mineral and Battery mrorks suggest it, 
these  enterprizes  find  their  unity  in  relation  to the equipment of  the 
navy2.  The first imported  masts  and cordage, while  the Mines Royal 
discovered and  worked  the copper  from which the Mineral and Battery 
Works  made  bronze  or  brass,  which  again  in  its  turn  was  cast into 
cannon.  Moreover, the flexibility  of  the system was  such  that from 
1568 to 1588 its dominant manifestation  was  in the financing  of  the 
numerous privateering ventures, most of  which were managed  by  joint- 
stock  companies3.  During  the  next  ten  years  (1589-99)  maritime 
progress gave a fresh direction to this class of  enterprize, and it will be 
found financing the earliest  colonizing expeditions4.  Thus, during the 
first  half  century  of  its existence,  the joint-stock  company  was  the 
organization which, at each  successive  step, provided  the requisites  for 
the obtaining both  sea-power and colonial possessions.  The bravery of 
the  privateersman  and  the  endurance  of  the  explorer  are  gratefully 
remembered;  but,  at the same  time,  the faith of  the gentlemen  and 
merchants, who provided the necessary capital, should not be forgotten, 
nor  the system which  had worked  so  smoothly  on  the whole  and that 
made  the  co-operation  of  the men  of  action  and the men  of  wealth 
possible.  From 1600 to 1635 the main activity of joint-stock enterprize 
1  Vide infra,  III.  pp.  275,  295,  437.  Vide supra,  pp. 30,  31,  39. 
3 Ibid., pp.  75-7.  Vide infra, XI. pp. 241-4. 
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consisted in the following up of  the tentative efforts of  the previous 
decade, in a vigorous planting of colonies, joined  with the prosecutio~l  of 
trade to  tropical countries, such as the East Indies.  It shows how popular 
the system had  become  that even  emigrants, who  were  forced to leave 
England  for religious  reasons,  obtained  the funds required  by  consti- 
tuting  themselves  joint-stock  companies.  To the  companies  of  this 
period  belongs  the honour  of  giving  England  a  foothold  in  India, 
Africa1, Virginia and New England, while a Scottish enterprize attempted 
the planting of  Nova Scotia2.  Closely connected  in  principle  with  the  --  ---- 
colonizing companies were those which, towards the end  of  this period, 
aimed at the reclan~ation  of land at home by means of drainage3.  l'hp~p 
U 
ventures  constitute the first  important  stimulus  of  home-industry  by 
means of joint-stock enterprize, and to the same branch of  the movement 
may be attributed the fishing undertaking which belongs to this epoch4. 
The policy, that induced Charles I. to establish the monopolies6, reacted 
on  the  companies  then  in  existence, and during  the  distraction  and 
depression of  the  Civii Wars,  joint-stock undertakings remained neces- 
sarily depressed.  In the time of  the Protectorate a tendency, which had 
begun  earlier,  attained  to  considerable  dimensions.  This  was  the 
formation  of  an  extended  partnership  or  company,  many  of  which 
possessed  large  capitals,  trading  under  the  style of  "  A.  B.  &  CO.~" 
After the Restoration  until just  before the Revolution, the joint-stock 
system  was  confined  to  foreign  trading  enterprizes  and a  few  other 
undertakings  of  moderate  size.  But  from  about  1687  there  was  a 
remarkable  expansion  of  activity;  and,  by  this  system,  capital  was 
provided for the utilization of  the technical  skill of  the Huguenots and 
other immigrants, while from  1694-what  was  even  more important- 
the joint-stock  company became  the means  of  an  immensely  enlarged 
credit,  which  could  not have  been  carried  on,  even  with  a  moderate 
degree of success, by any other method.  Thus, during the first century 
of  its existence in England, the joint-stock company was the organization 
that provided  funds  for the growth of  maritime enterprize and for the 
beginnings  of  colonization.  Thereafter,  for  about  thirty  years, it was 
instrumental  in  extending  and  consolidating  certain  distant  foreign 
trades, and in the remaining quarter of  a century it laid the foundations 
of an organization of  credit  on a new and augmented basis.  But it has 
Though  there had been  companies trading  to Africa at intervals  during the 
second half of  the sixteenth  century,  it was  only during this period  that  factories 
began  to be  established. 
Vide infra, 11. pp.  11-16, 91-112,  24'7-58,  306-11, 318,  319. 
3 Ibid.,  11.  pp. 363-6.  Ibid., 11. pp. 361-7. 
5  H. Levy,  Monopole,  Kartelle und Trusts, pp. 14,  15. 
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been  shown in the previous  chapter that the joint-stock  company was 
no  more  than the means  for  improving production  by  arranging for 
the  ready  inflow  of  capital,  and  therefore  it could  only  realize  the 
prevalent  econonlic ideals1.  Its great success up to 1720 in developing 
a system of credit became an element of  danger, since so much had been 
accomplished that the impossible was  expected; and, as a  result, came 
the crisis of  1720 which again led to the arresting of  a further develop- 
ment of  the joint-stock company for upwards of  a century. 
The results achieved by this type of  organization during the hundred 
and seventy years ending in 1720 being so important, whether regarded 
in relation  to the capital coiltrolled  by  companies or to the industrial 
and  political  consequences  of  their  activities,  the  further  question 
suggests itself "  what were the causes of  the successes achieved "  ?  The 
answer-as  in  n~any  similar  enquiries  arising  out of  highly  complex 
phenomena-is  not  to be  found  in  any  single  influence,  but  in  the 
concurrence of  a number of  causal relations.  In the first place, despite 
what has been written  by many eminent investigators  in condemnation 
of  the exclusive spirit of  early joint-stock compa~lies,  the general drift of 
the conclusions to be  drawn from the previous chapters, as well as from 
the detailed histories of  the individual undertakings, is that this system 
tended as a whole to break down the quasi-monopoly which had hitherto 
been accorded to the capital owned  by  merchants.  At the middle  of 
the sixteenth century, when there was  the possibility of  the commence- 
ment  of  a  great  increase in  foreign  trade,  the  practice  of  confining 
membership of  the regulated companies to those who had been "bred  to 
the trade of  nierchandize,"  would have limited this new  opening to such 
funds as were  already owned  by persons so qualified.  Therefore, at the 
time when  capital  was  exceedingly scarce, a possible supply would have 
remained untapped, had there not been some means by which the wealth 
of  those, who were  not merchants, could have  been made available.  It 
is true that partnership had long  been  known2; but, with the changed 
conditions,  there  came  a  time  when  it was  desirable  that  a  greater 
capital should be  invested, and hence a kind of  organization came into 
existence with a larger membership, in which those interested necessarily 
had the right of  selling their respective interests without obtaining the 
sanction  of  the  rest.  No  fixed  line  can  be  drawn  between  a  large 
partnership and  a  small  company, except  in this  single  characteristic, 
that the member in the latter could  dispose of  a part or the whole of 
his share in the undertaking  without  receiving the consent  of  others 
concerned.  Thus, from an early period in England, shares were bought 
and  sold  with  a  considerable degree  of  freedom.  It follows that the 
view that the really transferable share first came into existence in  the 
Vide supra, p.  432.  Ibid., pp.  2, 15. 
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eighteenth century1 cannot be  accepted.  Even as early as the sixteenth 
century,  shares  were  sold  outside  ~ersonal  acquaintances  and without 
limiting conditions.  For instance,  a  transaction  is  mentioned  below, 
where  Leicester  had directed a share should  be  sold, just as a modern 
stockholder gives an order to his broker2.  In the next century adventures 
in  the East India company were  sold  by auction at the court of  salesS. 
It is true that purchasers must  become freemen of  the coiilpany, but in 
a joint-stock company there was no test for admission (as in the regulated 
companies), and the fine was  of  moderate  and  decreasing amount.  In 
the second  half  of  the century references to dealings in  shares become 
more numerous, and the transfer books of  the Royal African company- 
some  of  which  are  in  existence-show  many  changes  of  ownership4. 
Finally  transactions  became  so frequent that a stock and share list  was 
printed-a  reproduction of which will be found in this volume"  In fact, 
early in the reign  of  TVilliam  III., put and call options, bear sales, and 
bull accounts were perfectly well known ;  so that, before the end of  the 
seventeenth  century, there was  an open  and highly organized market at 
London in stocks and shares of companies. 
It was  not only by the right of  freedom of sale or purchase of shares 
that the joint-stock company was  distinguished from the regulated type. 
Even  at the inception  of  the former it is  noticeable6 that it possessed 
a very large non-mercantile element.  Apparently  the conclusion which 
suggests itself is that (when two distinctive types of  trading organization 
are to be  compared, the one consisting  wholly  of  merchants, who  were 
skilled in the particular  trade for which  the company was formed or in 
some allied trade, while the membership of  the other comprised, together 
with merchants in the strict sense, persons engaged in other branches of 
commerce, those  who  had  retired  from  some  industry,  gentlemen  and 
others) the former  would  be  the more successful.  Reasoning on purely 
general  principles,  everything  seems  to  point  to  this  conclusion. 
Technical  skill  and experience would  appear to be  wholly in favour of 
the regulated company, but, as a matter of  fact between 1553  and 1720, 
the joint-stock  type had grown enormously, and the other had failed to 
maintain  its position.  While the importance  of  technical  knowledge 
can  scarcely  be  over-rated, due weight  must  be  given  to the peculiar 
nature of  the enterprizes  to which  chief  attention was  paid from 1553 
to 1635.  In foreign trade or colonizing much more than the specialized 
information  of  the merchant  was  required.  In  addition,  there  was 
l  Werner Sombart, Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsbben, Leipzig, 1911, pp. 68,69. 
Vide infra, 11.  p.  416 (note).  Vide supra, p.  161. 
4  Treasury Records-  Royal  African Company.  Vide supra, p.  351. 
6  Cf.  the lists of members of the Russia company, the Mines Royal, the Mineral 
and Battery Works, at the formation of each. Non-mercantile  Capital  iw Comparbies 
needed something of the imagination of the pioneer and of the  diplomacy 
of  the statesman.  The privateering ventures, too, demanded a peculiar 
temperament in the investor, in so far as he must  undergo  very great 
risks in the hope of commensurate gains.  Thus the admission of a strong 
non-mercantile element by the joint-stock company not only was advan- 
tageous in increasing the supply of  capital, but also in strengthening its 
organization.  From  this point  of  view, that strength lay not so much 
perhaps in the mere introduction of  capitalists who were  not actually in 
trade, but in the union of  these in one body with the mercantile classes. 
Either in isolation was  imperfect.  The short-sighted views of  some of 
the regulated con~panies  and the lamentable ignorance displayed in the 
equipment  of  the Darien  company  are cases  in  point.  Whereas  the 
con~bination  of  the specific and detailed knowledge  of  the trader with 
the  broad  outlook  of  the nian  of  affairs  tended  towards  a  greater 
etticiency'.  This happy result is  to be attributed in no small degree to 
the relation  of  classes  in  England  where  members  of  different  social 
grades  could  work  together with  the  minimum  of  friction,  and both 
could bear  adversity with fortitudez.  In another unexpected direction 
the joint-stock  company had an advantage over the regulated type.  The 
supervision  of  agents in distant places was  far from  being  eficient in 
either  case,  but  there  is  no  instance  on  record  where  a  joint-stock 
enterprize was  quite  so  lax  as the Levant company  for a  number  of 
years-after 16603. 
The causes already indicated tend to explain why, during the period  ---- 
under review,  the joint-stock  system aided in the extension of  commerce, 
and why it maintained its position side by side with the regulated bodies. 
They do not however fully account for its great popularity.  This type 
of  organization  might have been exceedingly advantageous in providing 
new  for capital and in  securing not inefficient methods for con- 
trolling  its use, but thew were  mainly gains to the nation; and, unless 
+hp individual  investor tended to benefit  on the whole, it would be idle  "*> - - -.  .-  - 
to expect hi~n  to have  continued  adventuring his resources over a pro- 
tracted period.  It might indeed be urged that on general principles, at 
a  time when  capital was  exceedingly scarce, the fact that such support 
was continuously forthcoming during more than a century and a half  is 
1 This pinciple was  stated by  Child  in the following terms,  as early as  1681, 
I am of  opinion and have found by experience that a mixt assembly of  noblemen, 
gentlemen  and merchants are the best constitution that can be established for the 
making of  rules,  orders and by-laws  for the carrying on any trade for the publick 
utility  of  the kingdom"-Treatise,  wherein  it is demomtrated, that  the  East  India 
Trade is the most national of  all Foreign Trades, in Somers'  Tracts (1748), rv.  p.  35. 
2  The relations of  the mercantile and other classes were not so harmonious  in 
Scotlarld as late as 1670,  vide  infra,  11.  p.  376. 
3  Vide supra, p.  269. 
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sufficient evidence of the relative profitableness of these investments ; but 
it has  been  found, in the comparison  of  the regulated  and joint-stock 
companies, that the legitimate conclusions of  purely abstract reasoning 
are subject to considerable modification when corrected by the peculiar, 
and possibly exceptional  phenomena  to which they have to be applied. 
Fortunately the detailed exan~ination  of the finances of $1  the conlpaiiies 
up to 1720, as far as data are recoverable, affords a basis for a reasonably 
complete induction.  It can be shown precisely what dividends were paid 
by certain companies, and in a few cases there are plain hints indicating 
the amount of  undivided profit either in lieu of, or in addition to, these 
distributions.  On the other side, it can be ascertained that some nnder- 
takings resulted  in a loss, while the fate of  many of  the remainder may 
be  inferred in several ways.  It follows  that con~paratively  accurate in- 
formation may be obtained in the case of almost all the larger and more 
important undertakings ; and, as a consequence, the general profitableness 
or the reverse of  the system  may be determined with some approach to 
accuracy.  Since these details are recorded in the separate histories of the 
several companies, it would  be needless to attempt to recapitulate them, 
were it not that much of the prevalent opillion on the financial results of 
early joint-stock  enterprize depends on the industry of  Adam Anderson 
who  collected  and  summarized  such  references  as  he  could  discover. 
Admirable as this work was, it is misleading in some respects, especially 
as every statement, whatever its source, is recorded without  any critical 
estimation of its value.  Neither Anderson, nor those who have followed 
him, recognized  that the data, instead of  being scientific statements, are 
highly controversial documents, and that, if  any approach is to be made 
to the truth,  they  must be  treated as such.  As in  other cases of  the 
same  kind, the question of  motive arises.  Most of  the more important 
documer~ts  consist  of  petitions  to Parliament  or  to the Privy  Council 
either by the privileged  companies  to obtain further in~inunities  or by 
their opponents to secure an entrahce into the trade without the cost of 
purchasing shares.  In either case, it would have been a fatal mistake in 
tactics to have exhibited a particular industry as being financially success- 
ful-the  company believed  its case to be strengthened if  it could sue in 
forma  paz~peris,  while  its opponents dare not  represent  the branch  of 
commerce they wished  to capture as being prosperous,  else, if  they suc- 
ceeded, a great burden  of  some kind would be imposed on them by the 
State1.  Thus it was the interest of  almost all those, who must be relied 
011  as authorities, to represent trades, that received privileges, in the most 
gloomy light, and cases  could  be  cited  where  most  of  the well-known 
1 E.g. at the enquiry after the Revolution,  the Old  East India company  was 
forced to make a return specifyi~lg  its dividends with  the result that a large loan 
was  imposed on the trade-vide  infra,  11.  pp.  160,  177 (note). 446  Projts on Capital invested in Conzpanies  [CHAP. XXII. 
references  to a  company describe it as being  a  failure, and yet,  even 
granting these represent the facts at the time when they were each written, 
in the intervals between, that undertaking was  highly prosperous.  A 
remarkable instance of this tendency is to be found in the Russia company. 
All the petitions represent it as being on the brink of  failure, yet there 
is the peculiar fact that it continued as a joint-stock compaiiy (or rather 
as a succession  of  separate stocks) for over a  hundred  years, and it is 
incredible that generations of investors should have continued to  keep on 
losing their capital for such a lengthened period.  Two glimpses of  the 
detailed finances of  the undertaking tend  towards  the solution  of  the 
puzzle.  The first  in  1568 to 1573 shows  an  expedition, counted un- 
successful,  yielding  a division of  no less than  106 per  cent.,  while  the 
second covers the  eight years 1608 to 1615  inclusive yielding total divisions 
of  339 per  cent.l, that is an average  of  over  42 per  cent. per  annum, 
while in the two years  1611 and 1612 90 per cent. was divided on each 
occasion2.  Results, so much at variance with the qualitative descriptions 
of  the financial  accounts  of  the trade,  justify  the obtaining and the 
examination of  exact statistical data, when such can be found, and these 
tend  to show,  that, though  joint-stock  companies were  by  no  means 
uniformly successful, successive generations of  investors were justified by 
the profits in their support of  the system. 
In many respects the period  from  1553 to 1568 was  a most critical 
one for the joint-stock company, which was  necessarily on its trial.  The 
African Adventurers had made very large profits, and the Russia under- 
taking may  have been  successful.  In the next twenty  years  (1568 to 
1588)  privateering  ventures  had  proved  most  lucrative  investments. 
While Drake's  expedition round the world yielded the remarkable profit 
of 4,600 per cent. on the capital risked, gains of  30 per cent., 50 per cent. 
and 100 per cent. in similar ventures were not uncommon3.  During the 
first twenty years of  the sixteenth century the foreign trades were doing 
well, as may be  gathered  from the dividends of  the East India and the 
Russia  companiesd.  The colonizing ventures were  succeeding when  the 
former trades declined temporarily  through the aggression of  the Dutch. 
The chief  failure of  the epoch  before  the Civil  War was  the Fishery 
l These distributions were made as profits, i.e. on the supposition that the capital 
remained intact.  The capital however was  subsequerltly lost and the shareholders 
were assessed to the extent of  35fr per cent.  Therefore the nett profits were 2034 
per cent.  or  253 per cent.  per  annum. 
2  Vide infra,  11. p. 53.  As showing the difficulty of dealing with the finances of 
this company, it is only candid to mention  that  the history of it printed below (11. 
pp. 36-69)  has been several times re-written, as new data were discovered, and that 
fresh information in each case made it necessary to take a less unfavourable view of 
the profits of the undertaking. 
Tide supru, pp. 146-7.  4  Vide infra,  11. pp.  63, 101, 123-5. 
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society1.  Even during the period of distraction from 1640  to 1660, some 
undertakings  were  sufficiently  successful  to  obtain  profits  warranting 
dividends of  more than the customary rate of  interest on good security. 
As  instances, the United Stock of  the East India company and some of 
the unincorporated partnerships of this period may be mentioned*.  From 
the Restoration to the Revolution came the great boom  in foreign trade, 
when, besides paying large dividends, the East India company doubled, 
the  Hudson's  Bay  company  trebled,  and the Royal  African  company 
quadrupled, the nominal capital by way of  bonus out of reserved profits3. 
For the next twenty years foreign trade was  depressed, but from  1692 
$0  1695 there was  great activity in  the formation of  companies for the 
development  of  industry  at home.  There is some doubt as to the out- 
come of  these pron~otions  as a whole.  The salving of a Spanish plate-ship 
~ielded  the adventurers the immense profit  of  about  10,000 per  cent.4 
The banks  of  England and of  Scotland were successful and some of  the 
industrial  companies paid  dividends, and may have given a fair return; 
but the remainder suffered from foreign competition when the ports were 
re-opened after the Peace of  Ryswick.  During the first twenty years of 
the eighteenth  century almost all the companies, that maintained  any 
degree of  vitality after the crisis of  1696-7,  continued to be profitable, 
subject to a  few  exceptions,  where  failure was  attributable  either  to 
special circumstances or to downright dishonesty (e.g. the Mine Adven- 
turers and the Royal  African  company6).  Further, not only were  the 
profits of  the successful undertakings very considerable, but the losses of 
those that failed were not great in the aggregate.  In several cases, where 
it was found necessary to wind up a company, a part at  least of the capital 
adventured was  returned to the shareholders.  Where an enterprize was 
a  complete  failure,  there  were  certain  modifying  circunistances which 
limited the loss of the members.  The Royal African and Royal Fishery 
companies were  ~rotected  from  liability for loss  beyond the amount of 
the nominal capital by act of  Parliament, indeed it  was  supposed that all 
chartered  undertakings were  in  a  similar advantageous position6.  This 
view is erroneous, since there are a number of  instances where assessments 
were  made on  the shareholders in  such companies over and above any 
uncalled capital, e.g. the Russia  company,  the company of  Kathai, the 
Fishery company founded in 1630'.  But these were the exceptions, even 
Vide infra,  11. p. 3G7. 
"bid.,  11.  p. 128 ;  the Adventurers in the ship William (a11 interloping company 
in  the India  trade with  a capital of £46,200) made divisions of 50 per cent. in one 
and  a  half  years  1658-9-MSS.  at the India Ofice, Home Miscellaneous, XXVI. 
Wide supra, pp. 303, 318.  Vide infra,  11. p. 486. 
Ibid., 11. pp. 29, 450-2. 
Adam Smith,  Wealth of  Nations, v. ch. I., Pt 111.  l (ed. Cannan, 11. p. 232). 
Cf.  MCCu1loch,  Dictionary of  Commerce-company;  vide infra,  11.  pp.  47,  48, 448  Joint-Stock  Compawies and  the  Nation  [CHAP.  XXII. 
amongst  the more unfortunate ventures.  In many enterprizes, such as 
water-supply and mining, it was  possible so to manage that the loss did 
not exceed the subscribed capital.  It is important to note, further, that 
most companies of  this period were of  gradual growth and that therefore 
any undertaking, that was unsuccessful from the beginning, was  able to 
attract only a relatively small capital.  It  follows then that the gains of 
the larger  and profitable  companies, though  subject to some deduction 
for the losses of the smaller and less fortunate ventures, left a large balance, 
giving  a satisfactory return  on the whole amount invested.  Thus these 
facts explain  the continuous and increasing inflow of  capital into joint- 
stock  enterprizes. 
The advantage  to the individual capitalists, who participated in the 
companies, having been  established,  it remains to enquire how far this 
was  coincident  with  a  gain to the nation.  Mention has already been 
made of  the new branches  of  commerce developed either altogether, or 
in the main, by this type of  organization.  These constituted the clear 
gain of  the system, but may there not at the same time have been a loss, 
only discoverable after searching enquiry, and if there be such loss, it may 
perhaps happen that the apparent national advantage becomes transformed 
into an actual disadvantage?  In order to deal adequately with the enquiry 
suggested, it will be necessary to give a fresh consideration to the question 
of  the monopolistic elements in many  early companies.  Hitherto this 
element, which  has recurred from time to time in the previous chapters, 
has been  dealt with  as far as possible from  the point  of  view  of  con- 
temporary  opinion  during  each  period.  Now,  it will  be  advisable to 
endeavour to approach the whole  position  from  a wider  outlook;  and 
this investigation becomes the more necessary, since opinion on the nature 
and results  of  the early joint-stock  movement  has been  determined by 
certain  expressions in  the work  of  Adam  Smith. 
It may be  that the parts of the  Wealth of  Nations, treating 
of  companies, show  less  of  the  remarkable  economic  investigation  of 
the writer  at first  hand  than  almost  any  other  part  of  the  book. 
Smith depends almost  altogether1 on "  that sober and judicious writer 
Mr Anderson,"  who  can  frequently be shown  to have drawn  erroneous 
inferences from incomplete  data.  Thus, in so far as Smith's enquiry on 
this  subject is historical, it is liable to be imperfect through his reliance 
on Anderson.  Moreover, it may well be questioned whether the meagre 
59,  61, 66, 80, 367.  With regard to the real loss involved in the assessment of  the 
stockholders in the Russia company-ibid.,  11.  pp.  54, 58.  The assessment on the 
stock of  the African company in  1713 is to be regarded as the restoration by  the 
stockholders of  dividend  wrongfully paid--ibid.,  11.  pp.  29,  32. 
1 His only other authority appears to have been Examen de  la riporwe de  M.  N.... 
aa Mimoire de  M. rAbbi Morellet,  sur la Compagnie des lndes (1769). 
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material  is  used  to the best  advantage.  It almost  seems as if  Smith 
selected  from  his  authority  such  data as  would  tell  against  certain 
companies,  and  there  are  a  few  passages  which  suggest-though  one 
hesitates to say  it-almost  an  animw against  the East  India  under- 
taking1.  If it should  turn out that there was  such  a bias in  Smith's 
mind when  he wrote, it may perhaps be  resolved into his acceptance of 
the statements, made in certain periodical articles which began to appear 
in  1720 and which were subsequently reprinted under the title of  Cato'a 
Letters.  Several of  these deal with  monopolies for  foreign  trade, and 
Smith's language is so close to that of  these Letter8 that it  seems possible 
that he had read them and been influenced by them2.  Should this have 
been  so, much  of  the erroneous information, that he gives in relation to 
early companies, can  be  easily explained ;  since it is natural that essays, 
written just  after the South Sea disaster "  with an honest and humane 
intention  to call for publick  justice  upon  the wicked managers of  that 
late fatal scheme,"  cannot  be  expected  to be  unprejudiceds. 
Following the treatment of the Wealth of  Nations, there is first of all 
the position  of  foreign  trading joint-stock  companies, in  relation  to 
monopolies.  It is clear that if  such trades, by  reason of  the privileges 
of  the companies,  involved higher prices, and if  these industries could 
have been  carried  on  by  an open  trade,  then  there  is  an  element  of 
national loss to be set against those of  gain, already mentioned.  Smith 
came to the conclusion  that there was  such  loss,  and that it was  very 
great.  This argument is partly founded on  his view  of  the territorial 
maladministration of  the East India company of  his own day, partly on 
the history  of  joint-stock  foreign  trading companies in England  since 
their  first  appearance.  The former  contention  is  founded  on  events, 
which  only began  after  the period  at which  this work  closes,  but  the 
latter concerns those  undertakings  whose  history  it has  been  its main 
object  to trace.  Perhaps  the  central  thought  in  Smith's  historical 
argument is that the administration of a foreign trading company abroad 
is  inevitably  wasteful,  if  not  corrupt.  Thus  he  speaks  of  "all  the 
extraordinary  waste,  which  the fraud  and abuse, inseparable  from  the 
management  of  the afkirs of  so great a company, must necessarily have 
occasioiled4," and elsewhere "  of  negligence, profusion and malversatiorl 
Allowance must however be  made  for the fine sentences at the end of ch. VII. 
of  Bk.  IV.,  containing the comparison of  the conduct of the councils of  Madras and 
Calcutta "  on several occasions " with  "the senate of Rome in the best days of the 
Republic"  (ed.  Cannan,  11. p.  140). 
Cf.  in particular  Letter No.  50  "Monopolies  and  Exclusive Companies  how 
pernicious to Tradev-Cato's  Letters, or Essays on Liberty,  Civil and Religious, 1733, 
111.  pp.  199-213. 
3  Ibid., I. p. xxi. 
4  Wealth of  ikii~zs  (ed. Cannanj, 11. p. 130. 
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of  its own  servants1."  Again  in  a well-known passage, he writes, "the 
directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people's  money than of  their own, it cannot well be expected, that they 
should  watch  over it  with  the same anxious  vigilance with  which  the 
partners in a private co-partnery frequently watch over their own.  Like 
the stewards of  a rich  man, they are apt to consider attention to small 
matters as not for their master's  honour, and very easily give themselves 
a dispensation from having it.  Negligence and profusion, therefore, must 
always prevail  more or  less, in the management of  the afTairs of  such a 
company2."  These  statements relate to the East India undertaking at 
the time Smith wrote ;  and, in his account of  its early history, he is careful 
to say that the capital "  which never exceeded seven hundred and forty- 
four thousand  pounds,  of  which  fifty  ~ounds  was  a  share,  was  not so 
exorbitant, nor their dealings  so extensive, as to afford either a pretext 
for gross negligence and profusion, or a cover to gross malversation3." 
There is  some difficulty in  determining with  precision  to what  period 
this passage is to be taken to extend.  While it is true that in  1698 the 
capital was  &744,000, at that date, owing to the doubling of  the stock 
in  1682, this amount was  regarded as fully paid4.  Still more is Smith 
in error in supposing that from the end of the reign of Charles 11. to the 
beginning of  that of  Willianl  111.  the company was reduced "to great 
distress5."  Judging  from  the  references  in  Anderson,  which  Smith 
evidently  had  before his  mind,  the period  to which  he  alludes  is  the 
eleven years from  1681 to 1691, and during that time dividends of  no 
less than 570 per cent. were made on the original paid up amount of the 
stock6.  It was  a happy, "distressful"  company that could divide over 
50 per  cent.  per  annum on an average for more than a decade !  Apart 
from these minor inaccuracies, it is clear that the main thought in Smith's 
mind  was  that  the joint-stock  system  tended  towards  profusion  and 
waste ;  and that therefore  he  is  inclined to ignore its financial successes 
and to record  only the other side-even,  as has been  shown above, to 
assume results to support his pre-conceived opinion.  In this connection 
it is most significant that during the first ten years of  the history of  the 
United company, when  its capital had increased to over 3 millions, the 
directors required  itemized accounts from each factory which were most 
minutely scrutinized, and  the burden  of  their letters to India is the cry 
for economy which was  enforced by  the suspension of  servants or agents 
who  failed to comply with  the directions sent  them7.  Further, in  his 
WeaZth of Nations (ed. Cannan), 11.  p.  245. 
Ibid., 11.  p. 233.  Ibid., 11.  p.  238. 
Vide infra, 11.  pp. 145, 153.  Wealth of h7ations, 11.  p. 238. 
Vide infra, 11.  pp. 178, 179.  Ibid., 11.  pp. 197, 198. 
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account  of  the Royal African  company1, he  makes  no  mention  of  the 
period  when  it was  successful and begins his  history of  it just when  it 
had fallen into bad, if  not dishonest, financial methods2.  Finding that 
the Hudson's Bay company had made profits, he treats it "  as approaching 
very  nearly  to the nature of  a private CO-partnery  " on  the ground  of 
"the very small number of proprietors3," though about the time he wrote 
there were 89 distinct holdings or 104 including those on joint account4; 
while,  during  the  period  from  1692 to 1700, it is  probable that the 
number  of  shareholders  was  larger,  since the shares were  then  quoted 
regularly 5. 
Even though Smith has been shown to be in error on points of  detail 
in the history of  early foreign trading companies, his general contention 
of  the inefficiency of  the management merits further investigation.  He 
supposes that unremitting vigilance and attention cannot long be expected 
from  the directors of  a joint-stock  company"  There is  a  remarkable 
contradiction of  this statement on the contemporary evidence of  Sir Josia 
Child, who  describes in vivid language how his own holding in the East 
India company  wakened him  often  in the night and how  he had been 
kept  from  sleeping  by  meditation  on  the  affairs  of  that  company7. 
Moreover, contrary  to the opinion  of  Smith, the foreign  trading com- 
panies had  met  with a  very  considerable  measure  of  success, and this 
is indirect evidence in favour  of  the management.  In fact,  while  the 
methods of  control and of  internal organization were  far from perfect, 
they were  much  better  than  might have been expected, considering the 
times and how undeveloped the joint-stock  system was in the seventeenth 
century.  Despite some instances of  fraud, carelessness and profligacy on 
the part of  agents abroad, numerous instances  can  be  quoted  of  a  re- 
markable  devotion  to duty,  while  amongst  the directors  or  assistants 
there was a large-hearted disinterestedness, united to a careful supervision 
of  the business, which  is  highly  commendable.  It is noteworthy  that 
out of  the great number  of  companies,  whose  affairs have  been  inves- 
tigated  in  this work,  the  allegations  of  fraudulent  management  are 
comparatively rare.  There were  such during one period  of  the history 
of  the Mineral and Battery Workss, also in that of  the Russia companyg, 
while  similar  breaches  of  trust may  be  taken  as  proved  in  the Royal 
l  U'ealth  of Nations, 11.  p.  233.  2  Ibid., 11.  pp. 21, 26. 
Ibid., 11.  p. 236. 
Reports from  Committees of the House of  Commons, Ir.  p. 250. 
Vide in@,  11.  pp.  232, 233, 237. 
6  Wealth of  Nations, 11.  p. 245; cf. p. 233. 
7  Treatise, wherein it is demonstrated that the East India Trade is the most national 
of  all Foreign Trades in Somers'  Tracts (1748), rv. p. 45. 
8 Vide infra, 11. pp. 419-21.  g  Ibid., 11.  pp.  58-63. 
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African1  and  Mine  Adventurers  companiesa, in  addition  to the out- 
standing  abuses of  the South Sea finance3.  It  is significant that Smith 
mentions  no less than three of  the companies that may  be  held  to be 
delinquents, but only a  very  few  of  those that have escaped reproach. 
Apart from  the interpretation  of  the historical evidence, there remains 
the further question,  whether  the interest  of  a director  in a  company, 
derived  from  his  stock,  or  his  fees,  or both together was  sufficient  to 
make him  devote  his  energies to the business.  There is clear evidence, 
in  the early history of  the East India company that this was  so.  The 
committees  attended  at the  offices  daily and refused  the honorarium 
offered  by  the general  court, holding  themselves  to  be  satisfactorily 
recompensed by the profits on their respective stocks4.  Smith, in dealing 
with  the general  principles,  applicable  to this phenomenon,  seems  to 
have been  mistaken  as between  two different ratios.  He regarded  the 
aggregate holding of  the management in relation  to the total capital 
of  the company as the measure of  efficiency, whereas the real standard 
was  the proportion  of  the original  cost of  the stock of  each individual 
committee or assistant  to his  whole  wealth.  If  that proportion  were 
large  there  were  obviously  sufficient  inducements  towards  efficiency. 
Prince  Rupert  had  only  g300  original  stock  in  the  Hudson's  Bay 
company,  but  his  financial  condition  was  such  that this  sum  was  of 
importance to him, and he appears to have taken a very great interest 
in the enterprize6.  In the East India  company  the qualification  of  a 
committee was  &1,000  stock,  of  the  governor  84.000,  in  the Royal 
African company that of  an assistant was  &2,000-sums  which would 
probably be  of  sufficient importance to most  of  the adventurers in the 
seventeenth  century  to make them  attentive to their duties. 
The erroneous  conclusions arrived  at in the  Wealth  of  Nations,  as 
to the inevitable mismanagement of  the affairs of  a joint-stock  foreign 
trading company, lead further to the position  that such  organizations 
"have  seldom  been  able to maintain  the competition  against private 
adventurers6."  This is urged as a further argument against the joint- 
stock bodies, but the reasoning, when  investigated, will be  found to be 
a little specious.  In the foreign trades under discussion concessions had 
to be purchased (giving the right of  entry into the country), while forts 
and  other  defensive appliances  were  judged  necessary.  The  private 
trader obtained the benefit of  this outlay by the company; and therefore 
irrespective  of  the quality  of  the management,  he  could  carry  on his 
Vide infra,  11.  p.  29.  2  Ibid.,  11. pp. 450-2. 
Ibid.,  rrr.  pp. 334-44. 
Court Book, East India Company, 111.  September 1,  1615. 
Vide infra,  11.  pp. 229,  230. 
Wealth oofl\rations, 11.  p. 233. 
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business on  a much lower  capital outlay.  If  a statement, compiled by 
the East India company about  1685 may  be  relied  on,  expenditure of 
this nature amounted to  between one-fifth and one-quarter of the whole1; 
and therefore, in these foreign trades, the private  trader in competition 
with  a  joint-stock  company,  would  certainly  have  had  a  distinct 
advantage,  through  the appropriation  of  the fruits  of  the risk  and 
labour of  others.  In spite of  such advantage it appears that, owing to 
the risk  involved, the individual trader had  been  almost driven  out of 
the interloping  business  towards  the end  of  the seventeenth  century; 
though at that time these voyages were numerous, the great majority of 
which  were  carried  on  by  stock-joint  conlpanies with  a  considerable 
membership2. 
This question of the existence of  fortifications introduces the further 
enquiry  as  to the economic and political  position  of  foreign  trading 
joint-stock bodies in  relation to monopolies.  Adam  Smith admits the 
need  for  forts  in  the East India and African trades, and he  saw that 
these  could  not  be  efficiently  maintained  by  regulated  companies. 
Further, there  may  be  added  the necessary additional  outlay,  in  the 
purchase  of  the right  of  trading from  the native  rulers.  When  such 
large expenditure had to be incurred, it was reasonable that the benefits, 
resulting from it, should be confined to those persons who  had provided 
the capital.  This was  the justification  of  the monopolies  for foreign 
trade  in  equity.  The plea  of  "the  natural  liberty"  of  1604  or  of 
extension of  individual freedom in 168g3  (to mention only two instances) 
represents that reprehensible species of hypocrisy, which aims at a private 
gain, at the expense of  others, under the plea of  public service.  More- 
over when  it is said  that,  by the monopoly  of  such  a  company, "the 
other subjects of  the State [i.e. those who are not members] are taxed.. . 
by their  total exclusion from a branch  of  business, which it might  be 
both  convenient and profitable  for  many  of  them  to carry  on4,"  two 
important facts are overlooked.  In the first place,  through  the joint- 
stock system, it  was possible for anyone, wishing to adventure his capital, 
to do so by purchasing stock, and it has been shown elsewhere that, even 
at an early period,  transfers  of  shares were  much  more  common  than 
might have been supposed5,  in fact, soon after the Revolution it is stated 
that the whole  nominal  capital  of  the East India  company  changed 
l  Vide infra,  11. p. 147.  Ibid.,  11.  p. 162. 
Alluded  to by  Adam  Smith  as "  when  the principles  of  liberty  were  better 
understood," Wealth of  Nations,  11.  p. 238.  It will be remembered that  the inter- 
lopers  from  1682 to 1698,  were  those,  who  after  the split in  the old  East  India 
company, were endeavouring to capture the control of it-wide  -a,  pp. 323, 324 ; 
with reference to the motives behind the declaration of 1604 cride  mpra, p. 121. 
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hands  once  in two years1.  If it be  urged, that, while  this contention 
meets the case of  the would-be East India merchant as far as the ~rofit 
on  his  capital  was  concerned, he  remained  deprived  of  the further 
earnings he might gain from his work  in  controlling his own enterprize. 
In fact, as an independent trader, he would have both wages of manage- 
ment and profit on capital, if  he were permitted to send ships to India: 
whereas, as a  stockholder  in the company he was  confined to the latter 
alone.  But there were  further compensations for the would-be trader. 
The East India  company  was  often  charged  with  reserving  offjces of 
profit  for those who  were  members or relatives  of  members.  Thus, in 
the case specified, if  a purchase of  stock were  made by a man possessed 
of  some experience of foreign trade, he had the opportunity of  receiving 
not  only  a  dividend  but  of  earning  a  salary.  Suppose  further  the 
would-be adventurer were  unwilling  to adopt this course, he might still 
trade independently by purchasing a license for one or more "permission 
ships,"  the cost of  which  license might be taken roughly, in the case  of 
the East India  trade, as  his  contribution  towards the interest of  the 
sums  invested in dead stock  by  the company2.  Finally, if  he believed 
that the  trade  could  be  improved,  he  might  endeavour  to establish 
himself  in spite of  the privileges of  the companies.  This course was  as 
a rule only possible by the formation of  an interloping company, and it 
is a curious  commentary on  Adam  Smith's views  on the superiority of 
the management  of  a  single individual  or  a partnership,  as compared 
with that of  a company, that as far as can be  discovered, few individual 
traders who  broke  into chartered  limits succeeded, but that from time 
to time several small companies in the same class of  business met with 
at least a moderate amount of good fortune.  Further, if such companies 
or individuals  (if  there  were  such  individuals)  were  able to maintain 
their  position,  an  arrangement  was  eventually  arrived  at with  the 
chartered  undertaking,  generally  of  the nature  of  an  amalgamation. 
The earliest agreement of this kind was  that made by the act of 1566 in 
the case of the Russia company3.  Similarly in the reign of Jarnes I. the 
Scottish Whale fishing undertaking was purchased by the joint committee 
of  the Russia and East India companies for this industry4.  Again the 
interloping  India  company  of  the  time  of  Charles  I. was  eventually 
amalgamated with  the chartered  body5.  Finally, during the middle  of 
the seventeenth  century, there were frequent  re-adjustments  of  fishing 
grounds  between the Greenland  company  and the rival  undertakings, 
l  Vide infra,  11.  p.  154. 
2  Ibid., 11.  p.  149.  It may be  noted  that there are grounds for thinking that 
,  . 
this svstem  was  abused  by  the Royal  African  company-ibid.,  11.  p.  22. 
3  Ibid., 11.  pp.  41,  42.  4  Ibid.,  11.  pp.  65,  104. 
6  Ibid.,  11.  p.  121. 
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some of which were organized on a joint-stock basis with a comparatively 
large membership1.  Thus it will be seen that there were many avenues, 
open to a man with  capital and ability, to obtain extensive advalltages 
from any one of the so-called exclusive trades. 
Adam  Smith  charges  the  companies,  holding  a  monopoly,  with 
levying another kind of  tax "by the high price of  goods, which, in the 
case  of  a  free  trade,  could  have  been  bought  much  cheaperz."  The 
allegation, made against  the con~panies,  was  disputed  on  their  behalf, 
and some  interesting  statements  were  made,  which  are noticed  in  the 
Wealth  of  Nations3.  Several of  the difficulties, that Smith had in his 
mind at a later date, were operating with greater force in the seventeenth 
century.  The chief of these was  the necessary outlay on dead stock (the 
purchase of concessions, fortifications etc.)4.  There can be little question 
that at this time such outlay was unavoidable.  It  could not be provided 
satisfactorily  by  a  regulated  company5, and independent  traders  could 
not  be  expected  either  to raise  such  funds  or  to take  the  necessary 
trouble.  Smith's  solution was  that, while  a  company  might  receive a 
monopoly on the first discovery of  a trade for a number of  years (as in 
the case of  an invention  or copyright), on the expiration of  that term 
the dead stock should be  taken over by the State, its value being paid, 
and  the trade  laid  open  to all subjects  of  that Statee.  Up to l720 
there was one great, indeed insuperable objection to the carrying out of 
this  suggestion.  The  State  would  have  incurred  the  obligation  of 
maintaining  the fortifications,  recompensing itself, if  necessary, for the 
outlay and for interest on the price of the "  dead stock " by an additional 
levy on all the goods of the trade.  But the condition of home and foreign 
politics up to 1720 was  such that, while the duty would no doubt have 
been collected, nothing could have been done in return for it.  None of 
the Stuarts could have been  expected to maintain forts in India, indeed 
Vide infra,  11.  pp. 72-4.  The whole course of  the East India trade from 1690 
to 1708, involvi~ig  the foundation of  a second company and the final amalgamation 
of  the two might also be adduced, but there appears to be  good reason for believing 
that the interlopers were endeavouring, after they had sold stock in the Old Company 
at a high price,  to force down quotations and then to regain control. 
Wealth of  Nations, 11.  p.  245.  3  Ibid., 11.  p.  239. 
*  It was often argued, on behalf of  the foreign trading bodies, that all the leading 
European countries agreed in carrying on certain branches of  foreign commerce by 
means  of  joint-stocks.  To this Smith replies  by  instancing  the case  of  Portugal 
which "enjoyed  almost the whole of it [i.e. the trade with the East Indies] for more 
than a century together without any exclusive company " (Wealth  Il'ations,  11. 
p. 132).  Literally the statement is true, but it  must be added that the early connection 
of the Portuguese with India is such as to afford a strong argument in itself for other 
countries adopting some other course for the management of that trade (cf. A History 
of  British India, by Sir W. W. Hunter,  1899, I.  pp.  93-185). 
"ealth  of  Nations, 11.  pp.  228, 229.  B  Ibid., 11.  pp.  133, 245. 456  Suggested Expropriation of Chartered Cos. [CHAP. XXII. 
Charles 11.. instead of  retaining Bombay, rented  it to the company for 
610 a  year.  Cromwell,  possibly,  might  have  been  able to have kept 
up  the  and  to have  given  naval  protection,  He  had  the 
opportunity, since, about 1655, all the forts in India and Africa could 
have  been  for  about  £10,000.  He re-incorporated  the 
company, though it may be doubted whether his action was  due to the 
strength of  its case  or  to other inducementsl.  After  the Revolution, 
the French  Wars were  sufficient to preclude  any  prudent  governn~erlt 
from  adding to its responsibilities.  Moreover  there was  the financial 
difficulty.  Smith speaks of  the value of  the dead  stock being paid  to 
the company.  An inspection of  the finances shows that, up to 1720, it 
would have been  quite impossible to have met  any  fair claim  in cash. 
h 1685 the book-value of  the dead stock of  the East India company 
was  over 6700,000.  By the time of  the amalgamation in 1702, that of 
both the Old  and the New  undertakings  was  rated at 8400,000 only. 
Small as this sum appears, it could  not have been  raised  at the time, 
unless exceedingly tempting terms had been offered.  The only remaining 
method would  have been  to endeavour to make payment in some form 
of  government  security.  In view of  the history of  the Bankers'  debt2, 
no  one would  have  accepted  such,  without  most  stringent  guarantees 
before the Revolution, and afterwards the depreciation would have been 
so great that there would have been a real injustice to  those expropriated. 
Thus, there can  be  little doubt that, in the period  ending with  1720, 
a  transfer  of  the kind,  indicated  by  Adarn  Smith, would  have  been 
exceedingly injudicious.  In a few  years after the forts had been handed 
over, the garrisons would have been reduced or withdrawn.  The Dutch 
comparly would have seized such an opportunity  to harry  and oppress 
the English  traders,  who  in  time  would  have  been  forced  either to 
abandon the trade or else perhaps  to combine in  a new  colnpany  for 
self-protection.  Had the latter course been the one followed, the new 
body  would  soon have obtained a  fresh charter of  monopoly.  On the 
whole, the former alternative is the more probable ;  and it would  have 
involved higher  prices  of  Oriental commodities in England,  since the 
Dutch organization  would  at once have  raised  quotations. 
In view of  all these various  considerations it may be concluded that 
the  special  foreign  trades  under  investigation  could  only  have  been 
1 Vide supra, p.  258. 
The pri~lcipal  and interest by 1698 came to ...  ...  E3,321,313  10 
of which the bankers received only  .  .  .  .  ____  664,263  0 
Deficiency  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  2,657,050  10 
The  IIisfory pl. Banking, by  W.  J.  Lawson, 1850, pp. 202,203 ;  History of the Earlier 
V~?crs  of the  Funded  Debt  from  1694 to  1786 [C-90101,  p. 14 ;  Andrhadhs, I5istory  - .  .. 
of  the  Barvk  of  Enghnd,  pp.  39-41. 
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carried on, if  they were carried on  at all, by joint-stock  companies with 
far-reaching privileges.  The question still remains, whether it was really 
advantageous  that they should  be entered on by England at this time ; 
in  other words was  the country ''  ripe  for the East India trade in the 
early part of the seventeenth century1  ?  According to Smith's argulnent 
"poor  countries" tended  to gain  by  their refusal  to foster  a  distant 
foreign trade, since the capital required must have been withdrawn from 
the use  to which  it would  otherwise  have  been  put at home  or in a 
nearer  foreign  trade.  Data  are  available,  which  though  not  quite 
complete, throw some light on this discussion.  Assuming that the total 
wealth  of  England  at the date of  the foundation  of  the East India 
company was  100 millions2, and that the average capital  employed by 
this undertaking was  not more  than  £200,000  in  any one year up to 
1617',  it follows that the latter amount  was  only one-fifth  of  one  per 
cent.  of  the former;  and  it is  to be  remembered  that, during these 
seventeen years, great additions  were  being made  to the wealth of  the 
country.  In one respect, however, this calculation is scarcely sufficiently 
definite, since in a country so predominantly agricultural as England was 
then, the ratio needed is rather that of  the capital ,  r  equired for commerce 
to distant foreign countries, to the resources used  in trade of  all kinds 
(exclusive  of  the  cultivation  of  the soil).  Towards  the end  of  the 
century,  such  wealth  was  about one-tenth  of  the whole;  and,  if  the 
same proportion  applied  in 1600, it would come to about 10 millions. 
Further, if  the average  sum  employed  in  the Russia,  East India  and 
African  trades be  estimated altogether at a  quarter of  a  million, this 
involved the en~ployment  of  about one-fortieth  of  the whole  trading 
capital in these companies.  Taking into account the increase in wealth 
from  1600 to 1617, the proportion towards the end  of  the period  may 
not have been more than one-fiftieth.  This was  possibly too large a per- 
centage to risk, but the small  success of  the Second Joint-Stock of  the 
East India company tended to curtail this class of investment, and, from 
1658 to 1662, when  new  stocks were  raised  for  both  the  Indian  and 
African  trades,  the total  capital  they  employed  was  very  little more 
than one per cent. of  that which may be estimated  as devoted to trade 
at this  time.  Thus  it might  perhaps  be  contended  that,  from  this 
point  of  view,  England entered  on  distant foreign  trades  before  the 
country was ''  ripe "  for these enterprizes, but there is another side to the 
question.  Adam  Smith, in  his  estimation  of  the position  of  a  "poor 
country " in this respect, takes account of  the different ~ossible  levels of 
prices of  the commodities affected, according as it enters on or refrains 
l  Wealth of  NQ~~O~S,  11. pp.  132, 133. 
Gifferl,  Growth of Capital, p. 83. 
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from these trades.  While he  allows that by  refraining  from what  he 
holds to be  an artificial  fostering of  them, the commodities that would 
otherwise have been imported directly would be "somewhat  dearer1," he 
evidently  considered  that  the  absence  of  the  competition  of  such  a 
country in  the European  market  was  not  a  material  element  in the 
situation.  In this respect  the reasoning does not apply to the position 
of England in relation to distant foreign  trades at  the beginning of  the 
seventeenth  century.  Had there been  no English  East India company 
at that time, the Dutch would have had an almost absolute monopoly 
for certain oriental goods in the markets of  northern Europe.  There is 
evidence that the establishment of  the English  undertaking led to great 
reductions in the price of  the commodities affected.  Thus, while from 
the point  of  view  of  the  symmetrical  apportionment of  the  national 
trading capital, it might  possibly be  urged that by reason of  receiving 
monopolies,  some  of  the joint-stock  foreign  trading  companies  were 
founded  too soon, such loss, if  it existed  at all, was  more than covered 
by the reduction in prices. 
It  has  been  necessary  to  examine  at considerable  length  Adam 
Smith's views on foreign-trading  joint-stock  companies up to 1720, not 
only from  the great weight to be  given  to any of  his views, but also, 
since his opinions on these undertakings  determine in  part his attitude 
to similar  organizations in the home trade.  His rooted convictions as 
to the inefficiency of  joint-stock  management,  added  to the disrepute 
into which the system had fallen after 1720, account for the function he 
assigns to these bodies.  "The  only trades,"'  he writes, "  which it seems 
possible for  a joint-stock  company  to carry  on successfully without an  + 
exclusive privilege, are those of  which all the operations are capable of 
being  reduced  to what  is  called a  routine,  or to such a uniformity of 
method as admits of  little or no variation."  There are four industries, 
and only four, which  are covered  by  this description,  namely  banking, 
fire  and  marine  insurance,  water  supply and canal-navigationa.  This 
Malynes  states that East India commodities could be bought cheaper in Lisbon 
before 1580 and  sold  at lower prices in England  than after the East India company 
was formed--Center  of  the Circle of  Commerce, London, 1623, p.  108.  According to 
Thomas Mun, on the establishment of  the company, prices were reduced by  as much 
as  66  per  cent.-A  Discourse of  Trade from  England  into the East  Indies,  London, 
1621, in Purchas, His Pilgrims (1906), v. p.  267 ; Anderson, Annals of  Commerce, 11. 
pp.  373, 374.  Both statements may be true, since, after the accession of Philip 11. 
of  Spain to  the  throne of  Portugal in 1580, the  Lisbon market was closed to  Englishmen, 
cf. The Naval  Tracts of  Sir  W. Monson  (ed. by M. Oppenheim-Publications  Navy 
Records  Soc.,  xxrr.  p.  150). 
2  Wealth of  Nations,  11.  pp.  246,  247.  It is noteworthy that Smith does  not, 
mention  life-assurance,  which,  owing  to the length of time over  which a policy 
extends, is suitable  for joint-stock  euterprize.  When  Smith wrote, the system of 
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description  is  of  great  interest  as  an estimation  of  what  had  been 
achieved  by  the  joint-stock  system,  written  more  than  two  hundred 
years after its inception in England.  It appears however that it calls 
for modification  in several respects.  It may  well  be  doubted whether 
the element  of  monopoly  is  absent  to the extent supposed.  Though 
there was  competition in banking in Scotland, in London  thk  Bank  of 
England had a monopoly against companies but not against individuals 
or partnerships  not exceeding six persons.  The water-supply of  towns 
or  inland navigation  involved in  fact some  species of  local  monopoly. 
Thus  in  three  of  the four  classes  specified,  there  is  involved at least 
a  trace  of  monopoly. 
Further, in view of  the history of  banking and the other industries, 
it is by no means clear that the success of  the joint-stock  system can be 
assigned in these cases to the nature of  the busiilesses being reducible  to 
a  routine.  Joint-stock banking, at its inception, was  full of  surprises, 
and  each  institution had  different  methods.  In London  about  1695 
there were, besides the Bank  of  England, the Million, the Orphans' and 
a number of  Land banks.  Later there were the Sword Blade and Mine 
Adventurers  companies1.  Now,  if  routine  had been the main  element 
in  success,  it would  be  difficult  to  quote any class of  business  more 
subject  to surprises,  and certainly  there  was  very  little that was  not 
purely  experimental  in the first  quarter of  a  century of  the history of 
the Bank  of  England.  Thus if  "absence  of  variationn was  the true 
criterion  of  success, this institution  should not, indeed  it might almost 
be said could not, have made its footing good.  Methods of  insurance, 
too, were in a  constant state of  flux;  there was  no routine, for (except 
in marine risks) there was no definite knowledge to be taken as a guide2. 
Water-supply undertakings, too, were in a peculiar condition during the 
first ten years  of  the eighteenth century.  As  shown  elsewhere3 there 
was a war between the systems of supply adopted ;  and, during the boom 
from  1692  to  1695,  a  considerable  number  of  companies  had  been 
promoted.  Though each had an area in which there was no competition, 
most of  them were both making and meeting aggressive attacks in their 
life-insurance had not been developed, though the Eqnitable Society (1756))  by con- 
stituting a body of ''  charter-founders,"  was  midway between a mutual society and 
a joint-stock  company-Walford,  Insurance  Cyclopaedia, 11.  p.  570. 
l  That is the second  Sword  Blade company or the  land development undertaking, 
which carried  on banking.  The third  Sword  Blade undertaking was also a bank, 
but it was  certainly a  partnership-vide  infra, 111.  pp.  436-42. 
The methods of  Charles IJovey,  the founder of  the Sun Fire Office,  were always 
changing-An  Account  of  the  Fire  Insurance  Companies, associations,  institutions, 
projects  and  schemes, established and projected  in Great Britain and Ireland during the 
17th and 18th Centuries, by F. B. Relton, London, 1893, pp.  262-315. 
3  Vide infra, 111.  pp.  13, 14. 460 Why  Banking and Insurance Coe. succeeded  [CHAP. xxn. 
respective outlying areas.  Thus, while there was  a possible part of  the 
business where there was  no actual competition  and where  consequently 
a fixed set of rules might be followed, in the remainder original methods  -.  -  - -- - 
of  seeking consumers were required.  It follows then that, though at a 
later date the classes of  enterprize specified  may have been reducible  . .  to 
set rules, up to 1720 they were all (with the exception of water-supplying 
to some extent) in the position  of  new  industries ekch of  which had to 
create its own  orga~ization. The explanation  of  the success  of  joint- 
stock management in banking and insurance is to be found in its peculiar  -  ~  " 
advantages for these and other types of  financial business.  h company, 
which had made a large  loan  to the State (e.g. the Bank  of  England  - 
and the two marine  insurance  corporations1), or which  owned  a  great 
quantity  of  government  securities  (e.g.  the  Million  Banka), or  which 
again had made available as security freehold ground rents (e.g.  the Fire 
Insurance  company,  founded  by  Barbon3) was  in a  strong position  to 
answer any sudden  large demands made  upon  it.  Thus, while failures 
of  private  insurers and of  private bankers were  common, the increased 
credit of  a joint-stock company was conducive to stability.  The ease of 
the  water-supply  undertakings  differed.  There,  the  reason  for  the 
introduction  of  the joint-stock  system  was  often the relatively  large 
fixed  capital  that had to be sunk before any return could be obtained, 
and the same principle would apply to the making of  a canal.  Thus in 
banking, insurance, water-supply and inland navigation, the joint-stock 
system was  introduced primarily through the large capital required  for 
efficiency ;  while, in the former two  industries, there was  the additional 
gain in a great increase in credit, first from the large capital subscribed; 
and in the second  place and in addition through the remaining wealth 
of  the stockholders  as a further security  towards the discharge of  the 
engagements of  such companies.  The great defect, not so much of  the 
joint-stock system in itself, but of  that system as applied in practice at 
the close of  the seventeenth and the beginning of  the eighteenth centuries 
was  that it was  not recognized that, if  the association  of  capital was 
artificially  pushed  beyond  the amount  necessary  for  the  credit  of  a 
certain  industry,  grave  dangers might  arise,  as  was  actually  the  case 
during the South Sea boom..  It is a  marked  want  in  Adam  Smith's 
treatment  of  the whole question that he  fails  to take account  of  the 
gradations between  the true partnership and the overgrown company, 
1  Vide infru,  111.  p. 205.  2  Ibid.,  111. p. 275.  Ibid., XII. p. 375. 
Cf.  Wealth of  Nations,  11.  pp.  235,  236-"  The South  Sea company ...  had an 
immense capital divided among an immense number of proprietors.  Jt was naturally 
to be expected, therefore, that folly, negligence, and profusion should prevail in the 
whole management  of  their affairs.  The knavery and extravagance of their stock- 
jobbing  projects  are sufficiently  known." 
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with a dangerous surplus credit.  The latter was  not a  consequence, but 
an abuse of  the joint-stock  system, and the evils  to which  it gave  rise 
are to be assigned to this abuse and not to the legitimate and necessary 
development  of  the idea of  joint  ownership  of  capital,  extended  from 
time to time according to the needs  of  the industry, carried on by its 
aid.  Between such a dangerous organization, forced into a false position 
by the act of  the State through the conversion of  loans, and the small 
partnership, it was proved by experience that there was  ample room for 
organizations of  capital-some  only a little larger than the partnership, 
others considerably larger and yet others very much  larger.  Moreover, 
during the early history of  the system, its applicability was almost the 
reverse of  that suggested  by  Adam  Smith.  The capital of  companies 
was  used in the main, at  the time at which each undertaking was  started, 
for  ventures  which  were  either  altogether  new  trades,  or  revived  in- 
dustries, or those proposed  to be conducted  by  new  methods, or  again 
in cases where  there was  an exceptional degree of  risk.  The advantage 
of  joint-stock  ownership in such enterprizes was  obvious ;  for, while no 
individual would be prepared to undertake the whole liability, a number 
of  persons, acting together, were willing to provide  the funds required. 
This interpretation  of  the facts includes the phenomena of  the appear- 
ance of  companies in new  foreign  trades,  in privateering, in colonizing 
and in the development of  inventions, as well as in the effort to introduce 
manufactures,  already  established  abroad.  A  remarkable  instance  of 
the latter tendency  is  to be  found  in the analysis  of  the promotions 
during the boom  of  1692.  Some of  these new  or naturalized  trades 
seem to have met with a fair measure of  success, and no doubt the profit 
of  the whole group mould have  been  larger, were  it not that these in- 
dustries were started when several of the competing foreign countries were 
excluded, owing to the war,  Peace brought a return of such competition, 
and  the limitation  of  joint-stock  enterprize after l720 precluded  the 
renewal of this species of investment for a lengthened period.  Reviewing 
the results of  such employments  of  capital by  companies in hazardous 
ventures  as far as they can be ascertained, it appears that, as might be 
expected,  while  there  were  numerous  non-successes, in  some cases  the 
profits  were  very  great.  Thus  on  the  whole,  during  the  first  one 
hundred  and  seventy  years  of  its history,  the joint-stock  system  had 
shown itself  fitted for undertakings requiring a large capital, or a large 
credit, or again where the element of risk was great. 
The success  achieved  was  not  all gain.  It  was  in  fact  only  the 
balance remaining after allowing for the disadvantages inevitable in the 
development of a new type of  organization.  For over a century most of 
the companies were  determined in their  development  by the relation of 
the  system  to the  partnership  on  the one  side and to the regulated 462  Early Companies and terminable Stoch  [CHAP. XXII. 
company on the other.  Such of the undertakings, as were incorporated, 
failed  to realize the full  benefit  of  the clause giving  them  "perpetual 
succession."  It is true that many of  the charters remained in being for 
very  long periods,  but during that time,  as  a  rule,  there  were  many 
separate stocks.  Thus the man, who joined  a company at  its foundation, 
might be interested in many distinct undertakings, all carried on under 
that charter.  It follows that, while from the legal point of  view, there 
was  only  one  company,  from  the financial standpoint, there had been 
many.  This  fixed  idea,  favouring  terminable  stocks,  neutralized  the 
advantage  of  perpetual  succession, by  failing to make  the  joint-stock 
independent of  the decease of  individual members, and so "the clamour 
of widows and orphans" was often heard in the courts of  the East India 
company, when the winding up of  some stock was delayed.  It  has been 
shown above that it is probably owing to the crisis, occasioned by the 
misfortunes  of  the years  1665 to 1667, that a  permanent  capital  for 
foreign trade was accepted as desirable1.  Altogether irrespective of  the 
difficulty  of  making permanent  outlay, as long as  terminable  ventures 
were  the rule,  there  was  the great disadvantage  that  no reserves  of 
undivided  profits  could  be  retained,  and thus  it sometimes happened 
that an undertaking  might  be  flourishing  at one  time and ten years 
later  be  involved in great difficulties. 
Side by side with  the financial improvement  in organization, there 
was a development in the methods of  administration.  The progress  of 
municipal government  as well  as the growth  of  the regulated company 
had afforded models for the conduct of business as far as the control and 
representation  of  individuals  were  concerned.  Therefore,  so  far,  the 
early  joint-stock  companies  were  proceeding  along  a  road  already 
travelled.  If, on the other hand,  their  membership  was  small, it was 
possible to modify the procedure of  the partnership to suit their needs. 
Rut in either case, it became necessary to create machinery by which the 
member was regarded, not as an individual, but as representing so much 
of  the capital  of  the undertaking.  Thus his  voting power  had to be 
determined,  also  the exact  amount  of  weight  to be  assigned  to his 
"voice"  in the management  of  the concern.  As shown  elsewhere, the 
whole  question  of  voting-rights  became  con~plicated  by  personal  and 
political  dissensions in  the  Virginia  and Somers Islands undertakings 
from  2619  to 1624 and later in the East India company towards the 
end of  the reign of  Charles II.=,  which is of  great historical importance 
as introducing  the "  sliding-scale "  and  the "  maximum  vote " ; and 
diversity of  practice on these points continues down to the present day. 
As time went on, though there were changes according to circumstances, 
1 Vide supra, pp.  280, 281. 
a  Ibid., pp.  163, 321. 
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the relation  between  the management  and the other members  became 
settled  on  the  basis  that the  former  decided  points  of  detail,  while 
questions of  principle were  debated, often very earnestly, at the general 
courts1. 
One possible danger was happily avoided, namely the undoubted risk 
of  fraud by the management.  No doubt there were cases of  deliberate 
and iriexcusable deceit, as well as of  falsification of  accounts, but in  the 
joint-stock, that was not overgrown, these  are sufficiently rare-a  result 
that is highly creditable to the commercial probity of  the nation at  this 
period.  The remarkable episode of  the South Sea company arose from 
special circumstances, which were  accretions  to, not direct developments 
of  the joint-stock  system2.  However the fact that it was undoubtedly 
this system, which, though  not the cause, was the instrument by which 
the crisis of  1720 came into being, suggests the enquiry as to how far 
the existence of joint-stock  companies either tended  to produce  or to 
intensify disturbances of credit.  It has already been shown that, though 
the crisis of  1696-7  was  attributed to "  stock-jobbing,"  the real  cause 
lay deepera.  Possibly if  there had been no joint-stock system, this panic 
might  have  been  more  confined.  On  the  other  hand,  it is  not  im- 
probable, on the same supposition, that the crisis, which must have been 
produced  some time by the exaggeration of  the fund of  credit, might 
conceivably have been even more serious4.  On the other side, successive 
crises had  important effects on  the financial  condition of  most  of  the 
companies then  in  existence. 
It is somewhat remarkable,  that in reviewing the crises before 1720, 
a fairly well  marked  periodicity appears to manifest itself, and there is 
a  most  striking  repetition  of  years  of  danger,  in  the  same  relative 
positions,  in the century  from  1550 to 1650 and from  1650 onwards. 
Almost invariably, precisely the same year, in  each decade of  the two 
centuries  compared,  can  be  shown  to have  been  one  of  crisis.  The 
following  table  sets  out the years  of  crises during the whole  period, 
arranged to show  the parallelism : 
The statement of Adam Smith (Wealth of  h'ations,  11. p.  232) that "the greater 
part of those proprietors [i.e. in a joint-stock company] seldom pretend to understand 
any thing of  the business  of  the company"  is not borne out hy the evidence up to 
1720.  The minutes of the East India comparly record very full discussions;  and, in 
the time of  Elizabeth, men like Burghley,  even Elizabeth herself, took a personal 
interest in their investments;  while, at the beginning of  the history of  the United 
East India company, the decisions of  the directors were sometimes reversed at the 
general  courts. 
Vide supra, p.  432. 
Ibid., p. 357. 
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Table, showing Crises from  1550 to  1720. 
This table seems to suggest a series of  decennial periods.  The first 
contains two  members  of  a  chain,  1558-9  and  1569.  Then  comes  a 
break, followed by  a  second pair,  also separated  by  ten years,  namely 
1586-7  and 1596-7.  This is followed by another break, and the series 
changes to 1620, 1630, 1640.  There were again a group of  crises  on 
either side of  1649.  It is exceedingly striking that the first two series 
repeat themselves step by step up to 1696-7,  just in every case a century 
later.  The parallelism  begins in the third series again, but the results 
of  Jevons are too incomplete  to enable the table to be  extended with 
confidence, and the same qualification applies to those of Juglar, relating 
to Great Britain1. 
Looking at this table, one is inclined to say that it is too symmetrical 
to be  true.  Though there were  crises in the various years  mentioned, 
disturbances of  this kind were  so frequent in the sixteenth and seven- 
teenth centuries that it is possible to extend the list very considerably. 
Moreover, a distinction  has to be noticed  in the degree  of  the crises. 
Some  were  of  much  greater  intensity  than  others;  and  obviously an 
approach  to decennial  periodicity  which  depends  on  the inclusion  of 
minor  crises,  if  they  happen  at a  time suitable for  this theory,  while 
major ones are overlooked, is scarcely satisfactory.  Further a difference 
in the nature of  the data has to be noticed.  Before 1692 (when prices 
of stocks are first continuously recorded), the chief sources of information 
are qualitative, rather  than  quantitative.  The  records  show  at the 
earliest period the impossibility of  renewing loans, great increases in the 
number of  failures, sometimes an almost complete suspension of  business, 
with an absence of  credit.  After banking became established, informa- 
tion  as to "runs"  is  also  most  important.  Moreover  the extent  of 
a  "decay  of  trade"  affords some measure of  the force of  a  preceding 
crisis, as measured by the subsequent  depression.  Still, even with  such 
data, it is sometimes not easy to distinguish precisely between the crisis 
itself  and the succeeding depression, nor  between a major and a minor 
crisis.  Fortunately, after 1692, the regular quotations of stocks, together 
with  other statistical data, enable exact statements to be made, both as 
1 Investigations  in  Currency  and  Finance,  by  W.  S.  Jevons,  London,  1884, 
pp.  210,  211;  Des  Crises  Commerciales,  par  Clement Juglar,  Paris,  1889,  p.  294. 
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to the duration and the severity of these disturbances.  Such particulars 
show  that one reputed crisis may  be  dismissed as  imaginary.  This is 
that assigned by Jevons to the year 1700 by a process of  reasoning back 
on a decennial periodicity from  1720'.  Also the only crisis, mentioned 
by Juglar between  1708 and 1720, that of  1714, must  be relegated  to 
a subordinate position2.  Moreover, in addition to a knowledge of  the 
years of crisis, it is necessary to know the periods of  good and bad trade 
respectively, so  as to be  able to gauge the ebb and flow of  prosperity, 
and therefore the following more detailed statelnent has been  prepared : 
Thc  I'r.ars  of  Good  and  Bad  Trade, respectively, from.  1558 to  1720 
(serious crises  being  indicated  by  heavy  type). 
- 
l  I  I  I 
Remarks  Good  Depressed  /  trade  1  trade  1  Crises  I  Remarks 
I  /  1  1558-9  /  Famine 1556-8. 
1559 (end 
of year)  I  1  1561  /  1560  l English bills refused abroad. 
Trade fair to good. 
The eleven good years.  1  1575-85 
Trade fair to good. 
The  fieventeen  bad  l  1 
1562-3 
1565-8 












Seizures of  English goods in Flan- 
ders, January 1569, followed  by 
failures.  Norfolk's insurrection, 
December  1569,  followed  by 
failures.  Bad harvests from 1571 
to 1574.  It is slightly uncertain 
whether the years 1570-4  should 
be classed as a part of  the crisis 
or of the subsequent depression. 
1563(Aug.) 
to 
1564  (Aug.) 
Babington  plot,  failures,  bad  har- 
vest 1587. 
Plague,  1592-deaths  in  London 
11,503. 
Famine,  1595-8. 
Plague (the number of deaths said 
to  be  20,000),  interruption  of 
trade with Flanders, famine. 
Plague,  deaths in London 30,561. 
The seventeen good 
years.  1  116-17  (  Criais in cloth trade. 
'  Intle~ti~ations  in Currency and Finance,  London,  1884, p.  210. 
"es  C~ises Commerciales,  Paris,  1889,  p.  294 ; cf.  supra?  pp.  391,  392. 
Schmoller, Les  Phases Typigues des  Crises ~conomiques  in  Revue  Economique Inter- 
nationale, I. p.  140, mentions the crisis of 1711 as intervening between those of  1696 
and 1721. 
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Remarks  1  Good  Depressed I  Oriaea 
1  trade  trade  Remarks 
Home  trade  active, 
foreign trade ver 
depressed througg 
war. 
.--p-  -  -  -- 
Depressed  Crises 
Remarlts  trade  trade 
--P- 
1620-5 
The  financial  strain  of  the  war, 
exaggerated  ideas of  the nature 
of credit, bad harvests, suspension 
of  cash  payments  by  Bank  of 
England,  failure  of  Land  bank 
Remarks 
Effects of crisis in cloth trade, Dutch 
competition  in foreign trade,  de- 
fault  of  East  India  and  Russia 
companies, bad harvests, plague, 
deaths in Lolldon 35,403. 
Trade fair to good. 
Famine,  tonnage  dispute,  plague, 




Depression through tlie monopolies 
of Charles I.,  plague,  deaths  in 
Lolldon 10,400. 
Great prosperity. 
Tension  between  East India com- 
panies, political situation, run on 
banks and consequent failures.  Seizure  of  bullion  by  Charles  I. 
(July),  of pepper (Aug.),  plague, 




Losses in the war, financial strain, 
tension  between  England  and 
Scotland, fears of a French inva- 
sion, run on Bank of England. 
Trade  very  depressed 
,  and interrupted 
through the Civil 
War.  1710-11 
(winter) 
Financial strain of the war,  change 
of ministry.  Exhaustion of the country through 
the Civil War, great dearth, high 
taxation.  Return of  confidence,  1712-14 
relief of the financial 
strain by  conversion 
of unfunded debt into 
stock  of  South  Sea 
company, 1711.  , 
1650-1  /  1653-4  /  Losses  of  shipping  in the Dutch 
War, possibly  too  effects of  the 
I  (  ~avkation  Act. 
l 
1714 (Jan. I 
to April) 
1715  (Oct.) 
1659-60  Fears as to the succession, reported 
death  of  Anne,  run on Bank  of 
England. 
Losses in Spanish  War, especially 






Dutch IVar, plague (deaths 68,596)) 
Great Fire,  Dutch  Fleet in the 
Thames,  1667.  Run on bankers.  Rebellion. 
Walpole's  conversion scheme.  Stop of  the Exchequer,  failure of 
16"  /  bankers.  1 1717 (Jan.  1 
to March) 
Trade fair to good. 
Trade very active. 
Fears of an invasion.  1718  (Oct.)  1678 
Slackening of trade in 
1719,  followed  by 
very  great  specul* 
tive activity. 
I'rohibition  of  trade with  France, 
expectation of war with Holland, 
run OII  bankers.  1719-20 
(summer) 
Panic,  followi~ig  the  collapse  of  I  /  speculation. 
1682  Run on bankers occasioi~ed  by state 
of  home  politics,  foreign  trade 
little affected. 
This tabular statement is not intended to  supersede the accounts of 
1686 
these various crises  in the previous chapters, but merely to present the 
salient  characteristics  in a  condensed form for easy reference.  These 
particulars are of  considerable importance as a means of testing some of 
Depressio~l  in cloth trade, failure of 
Corporation  bank,  foreign  trade 
still fairly prosperous. 
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the current theories of  crises by new  evidence.  Symmetrical as is the 
parallelism  between  certain  years,  a  century  apart,  it can  be  stated 
confidently that, when  the full list of  crises is examined, the decennial 
periodicity does not apply within  this epoch.  'rhough  there are traces 
of it, each series only begins to break off abruptly.  Therefore still more 
is the sun-spot theory impossible ;  since not only is the periodicity too 
incomplete,  but  where  there  should have  been,  on  this assumption, a 
maxirnum of  prosperity there is instead an intervening crisis.  It might 
appear that the frequency of  the appearance of "  famines1," as associated 
with years of  disturbance, is some evidence in favour of  this or a related 
theory.  But such coincidence is far from universal.  The series of  very 
bad  years which  ended in 1700 had begun  in 1694 at which date until 
early in  1696 the hoine trade was  very active, while again there was  a 
famine in 1709 which year represents the  height of a relatively good period. 
Again  the explanation  that the  crises were  due  to over-speculation2, 
must necessarily be ruled  out for the whole period before banking was 
developed.  Scarcely any trace of this element can be found prior to the 
Revolution, since excessive inflation  of  prices  was  soon  checked, when 
credit-instruments were almost totally wanting.  Nor can over-production 
be assigned as the main cause3, though occasionally there are indications 
of  capital tending too  much into one direction.  Possibly, apart from 
the boom  of  1720, the most  interesting instance of  something akin to 
this tendency, was  the too great fitting out of  privateering expeditions 
from 1580 to 1586.  Fundamentally the miscalculation was  the same as 
that in over-production, namely that too much  capital was  invested  in 
this direction with the result, not merely of  reducing the yield per cent., 
brit also probably the whole aggregate return4. 
The chief objective theories having proved unsatisfactory, it cannot 
be  said  that  the  subjective  explanation,  such  as  the  Psychological 
hypothesise, is more explanatory of  these  early crises.  The importance 
of  bad  harvests,  plague,  interruption  of  commerce  by  war  or  sudden 
shocks to credit through bad government are too marked to be ignored. 
Therefore there is the difficulty that, if  reliance is placed exclusively on 
some objective cause, instances can be quoted where that cause has been 
in operation and there was no crisis ; while, on the other hand, there is 
sufficient evidence that the purely subjective theory can only be accepted 
if  the recurrence  of  certain  objective  conditions  is  taken  for  granted. 
1  Des  Crises  Ge'nPmles  et  Pdriodipes  de  Surproduction,  par  J. Lescure,  Paris, 
1910,  p.  19. 
Geschichte der Handelskrisen, von Max Wirth, Frankfurt, 1890, p. 17. 
Das  Grundqesetz der Wirthschaftskrisen, von E. E. May, Berlin, 1902, p. 6. 
4  Vide supm, pp. 85-88. 
b  Economic Crises, by Edward D. Jones, New York, 1900, pp. 180-217. 
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This reasoning, if  well-founded, points to the joint action of  subjective 
and objective  conditions,  which  in the period  under  review  takes the 
form of  what may be described as the occurrence of  "the ~nforese~~l.~ 
It  is the function of  those, engaged  in  industry, to forecast the future ; 
and the whole normal course of  trade may be  regarded as an epoch  in 
which  such estimations are moderately  correct on  the whole,  the more 
successful man being he who is more frequently right in his discounting 
of  the future, and conversely.  It is when  the forecast  of  the majority 
of  traders is  in  error that a crisis results.  The cause of the n~iscalcula- 
tion  may lie either mainly in the men who judge or in the events to be 
judged.  Things that are unpredictable are liable  to cause crises, if  of 
sufficient importance.  Numerous instances of  these are to be found  in 
the crises  of  the period  from  1563 to 1672.  Chief  in importance  is 
a  sudden  and  unexpected  total  interruption  of  trade  between  two 
important markets.  In this respect  an outbreak  of  plague was  a very 
disastrous  event, and out of  nine  important crises  it will  be  found  to 
have  been  present  in  no  less  than  six  instances.  During  the  same 
period,  too,  there  were  other  kinds  of  sudden  and  unforeseen  inter- 
ruptions, as for instance the concurrence of  seizures of  English goods in 
Flanders and the insurrection of  Norfolk both in 1569.  It was  equally 
impossible to forecast occurrences, such as the seizure of  bullion in 1640 
or the "stop  of  the Exchequer"  in 1672.  It is noticeable,  too,  how 
often a run of  bad  harvests  either was  present  at the beginning of, or 
else aided the continuance of  a  crisis.  Moreover wars were  prolific of 
these disturbances ; but, when  due weight is given to any one of  these 
adverse objective tendencies, or even  to the simultaneous appearance of 
several of  them, allowance has to be made for the human factor.  While 
unexpected adverse events  at one period resulted in a crisis, at another 
similar happenings failed to produce one.  Sometimes the mere rumour 
of  a war  sufficed to cause a disturbance of  credit, on other occasions an 
actual outbreak  of  hostilities found trade moderately good.  Similarly, 
crises happened at the beginning or at the end of  a run of  bad years  in 
agriculture ; and they came, too, when harvests were about the average, 
while  again there were  famines, but not crises.  At later  periods the 
importance  of  man's  judgment  and calculation  becomes marked in  the 
period of  speculative activity which precedes a crisis.  But, prior to the 
development of banking, such intense activity is scarcely to be expected. 
Though the active dealing in industrial shares in  1696-5  preceded  the 
crisis  of  1696-7,  and  may  have  aggravated  it, this  speculation  can 
scarcely  be  assigned as  the sole cause.  Over-activity  in  insurances in 
1710 has been greatly exaggerated.  This cannot justly be  described as 
'G a mania,"  producing a crisis, since from its nature it was confined to 
Roscher, System der Volkswirthschaft, Irr.  p. 783. 470  Persistence  of  good  or  bad  Trade  [CHAP. XXII. 
servants, apprentices and a few of  the wage-earning  classes in London1. 
There was however undoubtedly extreme speculation in 17.20. 
Over-active trade having been shown not to have been an invariable 
precursor  of  these  early crises, as can indeed be  seen  by  such  collapses 
happening  when  trade  was  depressed,  there  is  another  feature to be 
noticed  in  this  ~eriod,  namely  that a  time  of  good  trade tended  to 
persist, once it had set in, with a long interval between crises, while in 
the converse case the interval between them was reduced.  For instance, 
in eleven good  years from 1575 to 1585, there was,  as far as is known, 
no crisis, again  in seventeen prosperous years (1603 to 16.20), there was 
only one, whereas in an equal number of  bad years (1586 to 1603) there 
were  three,  and again from  1696 to 1708, there were  only  four years 
free  from  very  great disturbances of  trade. 
After the stop of  the Exchequer, there comes a succession of  minor 
crises, during a period which  on the whole was  one of  great prosperity, 
terminating in the panic of  1696-7,  which was due to a concurrence of 
circumstances  the effects of  which  had not been foreseen.  The cost  of 
the war  was  much  greater  than had been  expected,  and credit could 
effect less than  had been  supposed.  Good trade had induced people to 
believe that favourable  conditions must  recur,  and circumstances pre- 
cluded the realization  of  these expectations.  During the next ten years, 
several of  the crises were  occasioned, or at least  became acute, through 
the dread  of  events  which  never  happened,  as  for  instance  war  with 
Scotland, a  French invasion, a  disputed  succession with the possibility 
of  the repudiation  of  the national obligations.  The period  of  good 
trade from  171%  to 1719 brought to light some unreasonable  expecta- 
tions,  both  as  to the possibilities  of  credit  and  the efficacy  of  vast 
combinations  of  capital.  No  doubt,  one  cause  of  the high  price  of 
French Indies and South Sea stocks was the great expectation, formed of 
the prospects of  the trades of  which these companies had the monopoly, 
but in the case of  the latter undertaking, it has  been  shown that the 
malpractices of  the management  produced necessarily an over-valuation 
of  the surplus stock.  Indeed, had  the facts been  as they appeared in 
the early summer of  17.20, the quotations, while high, were not excessive. 
Thus, even in this case, contrary to what  might be expected, there was 
a  concealed  factor  in  the  situatiori  which  inevitably  frustrated  all 
calculations  as  to the future. 
This view of  the crises up to l720 is to be  understood as applying 
solely  to these.  I11  giving  prominence  to the  element  of  failing  to 
forecast the future accurately, as the explanation of the chief disturbances 
of trade during this early period, it must be remembered that information 
as to current events was very slow, and that the little that existed was 
Tide infra, 111.  pp.  392-4. 
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diffused  over  a  small  circle.  Commercial intelligence  only came into 
existence after the Revolution.  Prior to that period, news  of  political 
tension  was  wanting,  and  therefore  when  a  rupture  came,  which  the 
modern historian can  see to have been inevitable, it might be a veritable 
bolt from the blue  to the merchants.  The improvement  of  the press 
appears at first to have had the effect of  making crises somewhat more 
frequent, since the increase of  information  came  quickly,  and business 
men  of  the  time  were  inclined  to exaggerate the unfavourable  news 
which  was  supplied to them  copiously1. 
This explanation of  the cause  of  early crises may  be  distinguished 
from that type of  theory  of  the whole subject, which tends to describe 
these disturbances of  credit as being due to accident.  Juglar points out 
that such a description emphasizes the last striking event before a crisis, 
irrespective of  the rest, just as a match put to powder may be spoken of 
as  the cause  of  the explosion or the last drop of  water  falling into a 
full bowl as the reason of  the overflow2.  But a miscalculation is not an 
accident.  It may be due mainly to the training or the state of  mind of 
the persons who fail in their forecast.  On  the other hand, it may also 
arise from the fact that those, who  have to judge, have been suddenly 
confronted  by  phenomena which  appear to them  unconnected with the 
whole series on which  their estimates  of  the future were based.  Thus, 
during a period  of  fairly prosperous trade, English merchants, who had 
calculated  on  the continuance  of  normal conditions  and were  met by a 
sudden outbreak  of  plague, were unable to obtain payment of  accounts 
or  a  market  for  their stock  and  it frequently  happened  that a  crisis 
resulted.  Analysing the crises up to 17.20-while  as has been shown, in 
so far as  the subjective element of  forming a forecast cooperated with 
the objective one of  the nature of  the phenomena  to be judged, there 
was  a concurrence of  both sides of  the relation-it  will  be  seen  that, 
owing to defective intelligence in the form of news or to bad government, 
the objective aspect tends to predominate during this period : while, by 
the improvement of  credit and communication at a later date it may be 
found  that the subjective portion becomes  more important, or again it 
may be that the cause assigned to the crises of  this period will give way 
to another which has come into existence with the altered circumstances. 
'  In the Anatomy  of  Exchange  Alley,  London,  1719, it is  alleged that bogus 
foreign news  was  published-"Sham  reports,  false  news,  foreign  letters &c.  are 
thiugs that have been  often trumped  upon  us ....  It was  written from  Rome,  from 
Leghorn,  from Genoa,  from Turin and from  Paris.  Nay,  it was  even believed at 
Court.  Exquisite fraud ! Who could have believed that this was born in Exchange 
Alley, sent over to Rome, agreed to there and executed in such a manner as to cheat, 
not the town  only,  but all Europe"  (reprinted in C'hronicbs and Characters  of  the 
Stock  Exchange,  by John  Francis,  London,  1849,  pp.  366,  367). 
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Abbotsbury, gild at, 3 
Abbott,  India Sir  Co.. Morris,  229  governor  of  the  East 
,  --V 
Aberdeen,  woollen  manufacture in, 361 
Aberystwyth, mint seized by Parliamentary 
troops,  242 
Addis, Mr,  banker,  failure of, 305 
Advowsons,  company for  trading in, 416 
Africa,  expedition  by  Southampton  mer- 
chants, 18 
African  kdventurers,  217,  227,  241,  248, 
269,  270, 276,  439,  446 
-  company  (1553), 21, 33,  34, 45,  63, 75, 
153, 155 ;  foundation, 17, 18 ;  capitali- 
zation  compared with  Russia  company, 
22 ; service to the State, 30 ;  amount of 
capital,  41,  42  - -  (1618),  151,  152,  166;  attitude of 
the House of  Commons to,  179 ; Dutch  .  . 
competition with,  192, 193 
- -  (1630),  200,  201,  224;  financial 
difficulties, 241 ; enquiry  by  Committee 
of  Trade,  248,  249  --  (1662) forts captured  by  the Dutch, 
280;  difficulties  of,  283  - -  Royal  (1672),  283,  299,  308,  317, 
336,  338,  369,  374,  381,  394, 413,  420, 
430, 436 ;  progress of, 302,303 ; dividends 
and value of  shares, 318, 321, 324, 325; 
capital,  371 ; position  of  stockholders, 
382 ;  sale of  shares, 443 ;  Adam  Smith's 
view of, 451  - -  (~utch),  276 
-  -  (French), 121, 399 
-  expeditions, 60,  62 
-  trade,  33,  34,  41,  42,  130, 269,  293, 
362,  441 ; profits  of, 22,  23,  43,  44 
Agriculture, companies concerned with, 416 
A la modes,  414 ;  manufacture introduced, 
314;  see  also Lustring company 
Aldennanni,  7 
Ale  houses,  patent  for  supervising,  170; 
abuse of  patents concerning,  173 
Alenpon,  payments  to,  82,  83;  large  ex- 
penditure  on,  90 
Aliens,  Committee  of  Trade  deprecate 
restrictions,  267 
Mum, companies for production of, 332,416 
Alva, Duke of, 55; difficulty of  maintaining 
his army, 49, 50; his action against the 
English, 51 ;  plot to capture the Merchants 
Adventurers'  fleet, 52 
Amboyna massacre,  196 
America, 66, 71,  251;  plunder  of  Spanish 
settlements, 72; wealth of  Spain obtained 
from,  73;  bullion  smuggled  from,  81 ; 
mines  in,  85;  the  source  of  Philip's 
strength, 99; Spaniards in, l02 ; coloni- 
zation of, 129,130; outlay on plantations 
in. 184.185;  companies to trade with, 413 
~mieable'  society, 383 
Amsterdam, financial  importance  of,  266; 
trade compared with London, 283 ;  specu- 
lation in, 422 
Amwell, water  supply  from,  151 
Anderson,  Adam, value of  his work,  405, 
445, 448 
Andover, gild  administration  at, 7 
Aniseed,  export  of,  108 
Anjou,  Duke of,  nominated  for the crown 
of  Spain, 366 
Anne,  Queen,  rumour  of  her  death,  390, 
467 
Antigua,  plantation  of,  201 
Antimony,  mining  of,  332 
Antwerp,  26,  27,  54, 55; rate of  exchange 
at,  16;  scarcity  of  money  at, 28,  48; 
closed as a loan market, 50; fall of, 90, 
91 
Apples, invention for extracting  juice,  294 
Apprentices,  privileges of, 11 
Aqua  Archangel,  vitae,  38,  116  101, 164; Russia company's 
ship at, 18; exports from, 253 
Aristotle,  54 
Arlington,  Earl of,  impeachment of, 291 
Army  debentures, 246,  259;  fall in, 386 
-  Estimates, 349 
Asgill, John,  payment as promoter, 342 
Assistants,  Associantes, definition,  7  20,  152 
Aurangzeb,  war  with,  317 
Ayr,  cloth  manufactory,  244 ;  dividend 
paid in commodities,  6 
Babington  conspiracy,  89,  465 
Bacon,  Lord, on monopolies,  108 ;  fall of, 
187 
~ahama  Islands company, 421 
Ballot-box, use forbidden by Charles I., 228 
Ballyca~tle,  mining near,  435 
Baltic  Sea, 8, 18, 69,  164;  trade.  to,  72, 
253 ; decline  in exports  to,  169 ; cloth 
trade  to,  181-3 474  Index 
Baltimore, Lord, owner of  Maryland,  201 
Banking,  influence  of  Italian  bankers,  2; 
development of, 238,  239,  274,  275,  281, 
293,  298, 299;  scheme for  a  State bank, 
246;  runs on banks, 279,  288,  292,  30.5, 
309;  proposed  Corporation  bank,  314; 
early difficulties  of  banking,  459 
Bank  of  England, 339,  340,  344,  353,  355, 
375,  392-5,  397,  398, 408,  412,  413,  428, 
430,  431, 460;  establishment of, 331,  338, 
341;  capital,  336,  371;  votes of  share- 
holders,  340 ;  financial  methods,  344, 
345 ; difficulties  of, 348 ; the  engrafted 
stock, 350, 352 ; increase of  capital, 360 ; 
prices  of  stock  and dividends  declared, 
365,  383,  387,  417,  419 ;  run  on,  367, 
390, 467 ;  repayment  of  engrafted stock, 
370;  in financial  straits, 373,  374;  pro- 
gress  of,  377 ; loan  to  the  crown,  385 ; 
comparison with the South Sea company, 
388;  suspension  of  cash payments,  467. 
- - Scotland,  336,  339,  353,  356; 
foundation,  333,  341 ;  voting  rights, 
340  : financial  methods.  345 : dividend  ---  7  -- 
paid, 365 ;  success of,  376, 433;  progress 
of, 390;  suspension of  payment, 392 
Bankruptcy,  fraudulent  knnkruptcy  de- 
nounced  by  Parliament,  53,  54 
Bankrupts,  company  for  selling  their 
nanrlo  AlA 
Books.  licenses  to  wrint.  110  .  . 
~ordiaux,  98 
Bothwell,  Lord,  marriage  with  Nary  of 
Scotland,  48 
Bottles, stone bottle patent, 117;  colnpany 
for  manufacturing,  331 
Bowzs,  Sir Jerome,  his patent,  174 
Brsbant, merchants of,  9 
-  John, Duke  of, 8 
Brandenburg,  132 
Brass,  manufacture  of,  31,  44,  67,  434; 
company  for  making,  39,  40;  see  also 
Temple brass mills 
Brazil,  85 
Bread  riots,  100 
Brewing,  109,  416 
Bridge-tolls, 175 
Bristol, 132,  213,  214;  losses in shipping, 
260 
British Insurance company, 418,  421,  425 
Broad-cloths, export  of,  307 
Brome, Richard,  140 
Brushes, company  for making,  416 
Bubble  Act,  417,  437,  438 
Buckhurst,  Lord,  112 
Building,  company for building houses, 416 
"Bull  accounts,"  early knowledge of, 443 
Bullion,  export  forbidden,  25 ; efforts  to 
retain it in England,  172,  173;  decline 
of. 179:  seizure by  Charles I.,  224,  230,  b"""O,  AA- 
Barbary,  trade  with,  88,  413;  English  238,  466,  469;  export  of!  261 ; recom- 
traders excluded.  97,  98  mendations  of  the Committee  -.  .  of  Trade, 
~irba&  pirates,  69 
Barbon,  Nicholas,  344;  payment  as pro- 
moter,  342;  his  fire  office,  282,  314, 
355,  369,  460;  his land bank, 340 
Bardi, Italian bankers,  failure of,  2 
Barilla, used  in soap manufacture,  211 
Barnardiston, Thomas,  247 
Baronets.  revenue  from  the  creation  of, 
266;  amount imported,  298 
Bulmer,  Bevis, mining speculations,  112 
Burghley,  Lord,  82,  112,  114;  governor  of 
the Mines Royal, 68;  on  the disposal of 
Drake's treasure, 79;  on England's pros- 
perity,  84;  efforts  to  raise  money,  92; 
his interest  in the starch patent,  115 
Burglar-alarm, invention  by  John Tyzack, 
140  330 
Bastard children,  undertaking  for rearing,  Burglary, insurance against,  416 
416 
Bath, trade crisis in, 167  Cabot,  Sebastian,  a  founder of  the Russia 
"Bear"  sales,  early knowledge of,  358  company, 18;  made governor,  20 
Bedford,  Lady,  payment  to  for  a  patent,  Cadia, operations at, 186 
149  -  voyage,  98  --- 
-  Level drainage, 203,  226,  228 
Beech  Oil company,  390,  394,  435 
Beer, patent  for  brewing,  109 
Bell  Sound,  monopoly  of  by  Greenland 
company,  250 
Berck,  town,  88 
Bermuda company, see  Somers Islands Co. 
Bermudas,  settlement  of,  130,  201 
Berwickshire, woollen manufacture in, 361 
Beverley,  268 
Birmingham,  gild  of  the holy Cross at, 3 
Bludworth, Thomas,  247 
Blue  Paper  company,  331,  369 
Bombay, rented to the East India company, 
456 
Boniface,  Pope, 2 
. Bonnington,  cloth factory  at, 244 
Bookkeeping, Italians the pioneers in, 158, 
159 
Calais,  193 
Calamine, 31, 332;  mines in Someraetshire, 
40;  monopoly of  calamine stone, 108 
Calf-skins, export of, 108 ;  patent for trans- 
portation of, 178 
Calico company,  414,  415 
Calls,  difticulties  with  payment  in  early 
companies,  342,  343 
Camden, Wm., on  the export  of  cloth, 42 
Canada  company,  184,  202 
- -  (French), 121 
Candles,  new  method  of  making, 294 
Cannon,  production  of,  31,  39 
Cape Horn,  78 
Cape of  Good  Hope,  164 
Capital,  attitude  of  the  Church  to,  15; 
definition  and  use  of  the  term,  36,  37, 
59,  60,  61 note,  157-9;  amount  sub- 
scribed  to  early  companies,  41,  42; 
effects of accumulation  of,  44;  scarcity 
in early years of Elizabeth, 110;  various 
forms of capitalization, 406,  407 
Caribbees,  201 
Carlisle,  Mary  Queen of  Scots at,  48 
-  Christopher,  voyage  to America,  71 
-  Earl of,  proposed  plantation company, 
156;  the Caribbees granted  to,  201 
Carolina, plantation of, 201;  company for 
re-settlement  of,  275 
Carr, William,  his  brewing patent,  109 
Carrying trade, diverted to the Dutch,  170; 
restored to England, 306 
Caspian Sea, 68,  164 
Cathay,  company  of,  20,  342,  447 
Catholics,  plots  in the reign  of  Elizabeth, 
52,  55,  65,  89 
Cato's Letters, 449 
Cattle,  importation from Ireland,  170, 172 
Cecil, Sir Robert, afterwards Lord Salisbury, 
40,  46,  95,  114,  132;  on  the  financial 
situation,  27;  sympathy with  industrial 
schemes,  29;  experiments  in  making 
gunpowder,  31 ;  acquires  the  starch 
patent,  115;  on  the  abuse  of  patents, 
118 ;  crown debts during his treasurership, 
13R.  139 
~etfalbnia,  158 
Chadwell,  water  brought  from,  151 
Chamberlain,  Hugh,  405 
Chancellor,  Richard,  commander  in  the 
service of  the Russia  company,  18 
Channel Islands, linen and paper produced 
in.  331 
"charges,"  use  of  the term,  61,  62 
Charitable  Corporation,  376,  394 ; estab- 
lishment of,  364;  capital,  371 
Charles I., 150,  194,  230,  231,  237,  260, 
441;  finance  of,  189-92,  194,  204-24; 
his influence  on  the prosperity  of  Eng- 
land,  204;  soap manufacturers' offer  to, 
211,  212;  influence of  monopolies against 
him,  223;  attitude  to  the  East  India 
company,  225,  242;  discharge  of  his 
debts,  263;  seizure of  bullion  by,  224, 
466,  469 
Charles  II.,  265,  274,  345;  financial  em- 
barrassments  of, 285,  286;  gifts  to  his 
mistresses,  291;  difference  with  the 
Commons,  295,  296;  a  defaulter  in an 
African  company,  343 ; revenue  in  his 
reign,  348;  rents  Bombay  to  the  East 
India  company,  456 
Cllarters of  companies,  10,  338 
Cheapside,  goldsmiths'  shops in,  199 
Chesterfield, gild  of  B. V.  Mary  at, 3 
Chevania  and company,  227 
Child, Sir Francis, his financial enterprise, 
358 
-  Sir  Josia,  his  profitable  investments, 
319;  his  policy  in  the  East  India 
company,  321-3 ; his  enterprise,  358 ; 
interest  in  the  East  India  company, 
451 
Children,  insurance of, 299,  300 
China, north-east passage  to,  18 
Church  Churchyard,  lands,  Thomas,  sale of, on  23 the prosperity of 
England,  84 
"Cinq  cents,"  shares  in  Law's  scheme, 
403 
city  ~ Conduits,  332,  333 ; capital,  335 ; 
united  with  the  London  Bridge  water 
works,  369 
Civil War, 247,  261, 283, 466;  outbreak of, 
231,  232;  its  cost,  233-5;  effect  on 
companies,  241-4 ; trade depression  oc- 
casioned bv.  263 
Clergy subsi8es, 96 
Cleves,  132 
Clonmel,  cloth  company at,  275 
Cloth, amount exported, 42,  69, 142;  trade 
with  Germany,  88;  trade to  the Baltic, 
181-3;  levy  on  exports,  268 
Clothiers,  distress in Reading,  307 
Cloth-trade,  13,  84 ; injured  by  foreign 
exchange  transactions,  26;  effect  of 
Duke  of  Alva's  edict,  51,  52 ; depres- 
sions  and  crises  in,  97,  166,  168-70, 
180,  181,  194,  231,  232,  241,  261,  299, 
465,  466 ;  scheme for dyeing, 143 ;  injury 
to, 144,  145,  148;  revival  in, 186,  192, 
306;  export  of  broad-cloths,  307;  com- 
panies  established  in  Scotland,  6,  244; 
334,  361 ; see  also Newmills company 
Clyde, river,  amount  of  sl~ipping  in 1735, 
393 
Coal,  duties  on,  139,  140,  207;  use  in 
manufactures,  204 ; scarcity in London, 
209, 279 ; monopoly of, 219, 220 ; supply 
of  London,  226;  companies  for mining, 
332;  company  to  carry coal  from  New- 
castle, 416,  420 
Cockayne, William,  his scheme for dyeing 
cloth, 143,  144 ;  anger of  weavers against 
him, 145 
Cod-fishing off Newfoundland,  332 
Coffee-houses, insurance offices established 
at, 384 
Coin,  estimate  of  Sir Wm.  Petty,  264 
Coinage, restoration  of  the Irish  coinage, 
136  --. 
Coke,  Sir  Edw.,  on  monopolies,  106;  on 
the advantages of  privateering,  188 
-  Roger,  on  the African  trade,  271 
Colchester,  Merchant  Adventurers at, 268 
-  Bays,  companies for,  341,  416 
Colebrook's Insurance,  see  Ram,  Stephen 
Cologne, price  of  money  at, 65 
Colonization,  early efforts,  86,  440,  441 
Colour  Mill  company,  406 
Comb Martin,  silver  found  at, 67 
Commenda, 1,  11 
Commendatarius, 11 
Commissioners  of  Trade,  347;  report  on 
stock-jobbing, 357 
Committee  for Trade and Foreign Affairs, 
247-9 
-  of  Trade,  264,  273;  recommendations 
by.  266.  267 
commodity. divisions,  6, 12,  301,  302 
Commons,  House  of,  64,  105,  109,  112, 114, 119,  132,  182,  188, 191,  193,  240, 
302,  308, 321, 362,  363, 411;  enquiry 
into  monopolies,  126, 137, 173 ; pro- 
cedure against monopolies,  178  ; bribery 
in, 385 
Compagnie  de la Chine,  399 
-  d'occident,  398 
-  du  SQnBgal, 399 
Companies,  see  Joint-stock  companies, 
Regulated  companies 
Company,  use  of  the term, 40, 151 
-  promoters,  early methods of  payment, 
341, 342 ; attack on,  359 
-  to trade beyond  the Equinoctial,  85 
Compton,  Sir W.,  his soap monopoly,  211 
CondB, Prince of, given financial assistance 
by Elizabeth, 29;  his privateers,  49,  50 
Constantinople, 158 
Consul, origin and use of  the term, 20,  41, 
151,  152 
Convex  Lights  company,  315, 327, 355, 
394; capital, 335,  341,  371 
Cooke, Sir Thomas, governor of  East India 
company, loyalty of, 343 
-,  John, on the effects of  trade depression, 
241 
Co-option, election  by,  9 
Copper,  104; found  in  Cumberland,  31; 
importance of,  39;  difficulty in selling, 
57,  58;  Sir Thos.  Smith's  company, 63; 
scught  in  Ireland,  68  ;  companies  for 
mining,  332 ;  see  also  Derby  copper 
company, English Copper Miners, Welsh 
copper company 
Copyright,  early instances of,  110 
Coral, French coral  company,  121 
Cordage,  import  of,  19,  69, 126; Russia, 
company's  monopoly,  35 ; manufacture 
in Scotland,  334,  336, 356 
Corn, price  of,  100,  239 
Cornwall,  mining  in, 13, 67,  68,  89 
-  Duchy  of,  112 
Corpus  Christi,  gild  at York,  3,  4 
Cossacks,  interrupt  trade  of  Russia  com- 
pany,  164 
Cotton,  growth  of, 416 
Court Beggar,  The, 140 
Court  of  Sales,  161  - -  Wards,  134 
Courten's  Association,  225,  227,  237,  253; 
circulation  of  base  money  by,  244 
Coventry,  distress  among  cloth  workers, 
309 
Cowell (Thomas) and Company,  247 
Crape, company  for making,  416 
Credit, increase  of,  293,  298 
Crime,  decrease of,  64 
Crises in trade, 465-7 
Crispe,  Sir Nicholas,  201 
Cromwell,  Oliver,  255,  278;  gives  charter 
to  the  East  India  company,  258,  272 ; 
state funeral,  259 
Crown finance, Henry VIII., 16;  Elizabeth, 
23-33,  48,  50,  52, 53-5,  64,  65,  82,  83, 
89-101, 187; James  I., 133-42, 148, 
149,  171, 187, 188; Charles I.,  189-92, 
194,  204-24,  232-5 ; Commonwealth  and 
Protectorate,  245,  246, 254-62 ; Charles 
II.,  263,  274, 277,  278,  285-92, 295-8, 
312, 348, 349 ;  James  II.,  312, 313 ; 
William  III.,  349, 350 ;  Anne,  385 ; 
George I.,  407,  408,  412 
Crown lands,  sale  of,  33,  245,  246,  286 
Cumberland, copper  and  silver  found  in, 
39 ; mining  in,  89 
-  Earl of,  his privateering  syndicate, 98 
Cunningham's  Scottish  company,  165 
Currants.  mouopolv  of,  108.  125. 219: 
duty on, 137,-i9i 
Customs,  revenue  from,  24, 53, 54, 97, 
130,  142,  265; farming  of, 97,  290 
Czar, the,  suspends  the Russia  company's 
privileges,  38 
Damask,  manufacture  in  England  and 
Scotland,  331 
Danby,  Earl  of,  his  finance,  291, 292; 
fall  of,  297 
Danes,  attack English shipping,  101 
Danvers, Lord,  his patent,  131 ; grant of 
fines and  forfeitures  to, 138 
Darcie,  Edmund,  his  playing  card  mono- 
poly,  110,  114; its abuse,  115 
Darien company, 323,  339,  341-3,  356,  361, 
376,  444  ; capital, 371 ;  losses occasioned 
by its collapse, 372 
Darnley,  Lord,  his  marriage,  47 ; murder 
of,  48 
Davenant,  Charles,  on the foreign trade of 
London, 266 ;  estimate of national wealth, 
315;  on the national income, 349 
Debtors, number imprisoned,  238 
Defoe,  D.,  on  the  shares  in  a  treasure 
recovery company,  345 
Denmark,  132;  merchants  trading  to,  9; 
exclusion  of  English traders,  98 
Derby copper  company,  347 
De Reuter,  Admiral,  280 
Devon  men  seize Spanish ships,  49 
Diamonds,  company  for importing,  416 
Dice patent,  114, 207 
Dipping company,  333 
Director,  early use  of  the term, 151,  339; 
payment  of  directors,  343 
Dispensary, The Grand, 416 
Diver,  early form  of  outfit,  327 
Dividends,,payment out  of  capital, 60-2; 
distingulshed from  divisions,  153 
Diving bell,  early form of,  327 
Divisions,  definition, 153, 159,  160; com- 
modity  divisions,  6,  12, 301, 302 
Dockwra, William, companies promoted  by 
him, 330,  347,  355,  369 
Domini,  use  of  the term,  9 
Dort,  307 
Dover,  fear  of  privateers  at, 193;  its con- 
dition  owing  to  trade  depression, 241; 
Treaty  of,  286 
Drainage,  schemes  and  inventions,  103, 
217. 416 
~ra&,  sir Francis,  75,  83-5; hin  great 
capture, 70;  expedition round  the world, 
73,  103,  446;  voyage of 1577 74;  outlay 
and  profits  on  his voyages,'77,  78,  81, 
82*  446;  amount  of  treasure  taken,  78, 
79;  his  share of the treasure, 80;  voy- 
ages  of  1585 and  1587, 86, 87 ; relief 
afiorded  to  the  crown  finances  by  his 
treasure,  90;  his death, 102 
Draperies, New,  sealing  grant to the  Duke 
of  Lennox,  138 
Drawatter  (Thornas) and Company,  247 
Droitwich  ltock  Salt company, 338 
Drugs,  trade in,  69 
Dublin,  proposed  bank,  331,  433 
Duckett,  Lionel,  loan  to  Queen Elizabeth, 
58 
Dudley's  iron  smelting patent,  178 
Dungeness,  lighthouse  at,  175 
Dunkirk  privateera,  l93 ;  terrorize  the 
English coast,  101,  102 
Dupin,  Nicholas,  inventor  and  promoter, 
360;  companies  founded  by,  341,  342; 
association with the Linen Corporations, 
346 
Dutch, enter the Russian trade, 38;  jealousy 
of  their  trade with Spain,  100;  compete 
in the whaling industry and the Indies, 
141; effect  of  competition  on  English 
trade,  166, 168, 171, 192, 466; their 
carrying  trade,  170; success  in  the 
herring  fishery,  203 ; comnlercial  con- 
cessions proposed  by, 951  ; capture ships 
in the African  trade, 269 ; sail  up the 
Thames,  276, 279,  466 ; effect  of  their 
immigration  on  English trade, 314 
-  African  company,  280 
-  East India company, 121,  154,  242,284; 
comparison  with  the  English  company, 
146,  147,  258,  303 
-  War,  252,  253,  260,  263,  276;  cost  of, 
278,  289 
Dyeing,  encouraged  by  James  I.,  133; 
attempt  to  introduce  the  industry  into 
England,  168; patent  for,  137,  142-4 
Dyer, Sir Edward, his tanning patent, 108 
Dyewood,  sale  of,  216 
East India  company,  122-4,  161,  162,  164, 
166,  217,  226,  227-31,  236,237,239,299, 
321,  336,  338,  374,  392-4,  399,  412,  413, 
429-31,435,  446,  447,  466  ;  dividend paid 
in kind, 6;  relation  to  the Levant  com- 
pany,  103; foundation,  129, 150, 151; 
pepper monopoly,  140;  progress of, 141, 
145,200,  270,  302,  303;  comparison with 
the Dutch company, 146,147,  194-8,283, 
284;  regulations for admission, 152,  153  ; 
capitalization, 154-7,  371  ;  divisions, 157, 
159, 160; honorarium  refused  by  com- 
mittees, 163,  452  ; voting and transfer of 
shares,  163, 285, 340, 443; proposed 
union with Dutch company, 164;  decline 
of  bullion  attributed  to,  179; Dutch 
competition with,  192,  193;  loan  to  the 
State, 238, 258,  385; influence  of  Civil 
War  on, 242;  affected  by  Courten's As- 
~ociation,  244;  issue of fresh stock, 245 ; 
compensation from  the Dutch  company, 
253;  the crisis of  1665-7,  280,  281 ; divi- 
dends paid  and value of  stock, 276,  318- 
20, 325, 417, 419; stock  doubled, 304; 
crisis  of  1682, 305; attacked  by  the 
~~~~~tcompany,308;  war withAurangzeb, 
21 7: struggle for control of  the company,  v-. , 
321-3  ;  new company formed, 324 ;  events 
leading  to the  union  of  the  two  com- 
panies, 362, 363,  366-8 ; amalgamation 
at +,),P nom~anies,  370,  377-81 ; views  of 
"."*A-..- 
Adam smith on the company, 449,  450 
East India Company (Dutch), 121,  154,242, 
284: comparison with Engllsh company, 
146;  147,258,  303 
---  (French), 399,  419 
-  -  trade,  293; Spain's  revenue  from, 
99  ;  proposed  Scottish  company,  147, 
148 
Eastland company, 17,  169 ;  foundation, 9  ; 
export of  broad-cloths by, 307 
Edinburgh,  277;  treaty  of, 28 
Edward I.,  2 
Edward  VI.,  13,  25 
Elbe,  river,  237 
Elizabeth, Queen,  16,  21, 37, 39,  40,  109, 
113-15,  118,  119,  130,  134,138,  153,  171, 
179;  finance, 23-33,  48,  50,  52-5,  64,  65, 
82, 83,  89-101, 187;  her  share in the 
African  company,  30; dificulties  with 
Mary  of  Scotland,  47; takes  charge  of 
Philip's  treasure,  50,  53,  55, 64;  con- 
fiscates merchandize of  Spanish subjects, 
51 ;  interest paid by,  54,  55 ;  royalty from 
the Mines Royal,  58;  loan to  the Mines 
Royal, 67;  loan to the Levant  company, 
70;  assists the Low  Countries, 72,  81; 
share in privateering expeditions, 74,  98; 
share  in  the  African  Adventurers  and 
Frobisher'svoyages, 75 ;  interest in Drake's 
voyage, 80,  86,  87  ; her share of  his cap- 
ture, 81,  82;  defence of  her prerogative 
as  to  monopolies,  105, 106;  gives  the 
farming  of  tin-mines  to  Raleigh,  112; 
revenue  of, 134;  love of  personal  adorn- 
ment, 135 ;  expenses of  her funeral, 136; 
punctual in meeting her engagements, 187 
Ellys, John, buys  the starch patent,  115 
Emden,  Merchant  Adventurers at,  32 
England, rumoured  Spanish invasion,  55 ; 
industrial  development  of,  64;  thriving 
condition  of,  65;  contest  with  Spain in 
the reign  of  Elizabeth, 72,  73;  effect  of 
Drake's  captures  in, 83;  causes of  pros- 
perity, 84;  views of  a Spanish spy on the 
trade  depression  in, 88;  financial  diffi- 
culties in opposing  the Armada,  89-92; 
estimate of  national  wealth,  129, 264, 
315, 316,  337,  457 
Enelish  Channel,  privateering  in, 49,  72,  . - 
66,  193,  197 
-  Copper  Miners,  company  of,  330, 340, 
355. 369.  376. 418,  419,  421,  433,  434; 
capital,  336; clause  as  to  calls,  343; 
fluctuation  425, 426  of  shares,  346; account  of, Index  Index 
Equivalent debentures,  433 
Essex, county of, 109;  distress in, 240 
-  Earl of,  rebellion  of,  106 
Exchange,  Sir Thomas Gresham's  method 
of  dealing with the, 25-7; rates of, 347; 
adverse to London, 442 
-  Alley,  366; stockbrokers  migrate  to, 
RGn  --v 
-  House offices, 383 
Exchequer, 134;  stop of  the, 287,  288,  466, 
469,  h70 
-  Bills,  349; circulation by  the Bank  of 
England, 385-7 
Exeter,  122; cloth-makers'  dispute  with 
Merchant  Adventurers,  268 
Exports, prohibition of, 108  ;  decline in, 181 
Fairfax, General, outlay onhis  army,  234,235 
Famines,  influence  on  trade  crises,  465, 
466,  468,  469 
'LFarming," successes  and dangers  of  the 
system,  59,  66,  67,  138 
Fellowshia. its use in company titles,  40  -  - 
~irthin~men,  7 
Feudal  privileges,  income  from, 24 
Fforwardmanni,  7 
Filles,"  shares in Law's  scheme,  401 
Financial crises, 385,  386,  463,  464 
Fines,  farming of,  138 
Fire,  Great  Fire,  276, 292; estimate  of 
damage, 277,278;  influence on trade, 466 
Fire-engine, Loftingh's invention, 330 
Fire Insurance,  314,  327,  344; beginning 
of, 282;  Barbon's  office,  299 
Fisheries, injury to by the Iteformation, 35; 
the industry in Scotland,  133,  282,  327, 
336;  profits  of,  203;  supply of  salt for, 
210  ;  vessels seized on the east coast, 261 ; 
recommendations  of  the  Committee  of 
Trade, 267 
Fishery  company  (Grand), 406,  420  - -  (Royal),  267, 270, 280, 302, 332, 
339, 406, 413,  417, 420, 447; capital, 
336; peculiar  use  of  capital, 344 
-  ~ocietv.  203. 217. 224, 225,  227, 228; 
i& iaifire,,,446, 447 
'<Fish Pool,  premium  paid,  418,  421 
Flanders, 49,  90,  95,  99  ; payment  of  debt 
to,  25; influence  of  its  troubles  on 
England, 48;  effect of  war on the wool 
trade, 51,52  ;  crown debt in, 52,55  ;  trade 
with, 53;  embargo on English  goods  re- 
moved. 55:  interruption of trade to, 465,  ,  . 
469 
Flax, monopoly of  cultivation, 110;  company 
for growing, 419,  420 
Foreign exchange, Sir Thos. Gresham's way 
of  dealing with, 25-7 ;  rates, 347,  422 
-  trade,  266; conditions  in  the  17th 
century,  120-8,  236 ;  organization,  129; 
monopolies for, 179,  236;  losses of, 186; 
estimate  of, 266,  361 ;  question  of  privi- 
leged  companies  for,  271-3;  growth  of, 
316,  317 
Forest  of  Dean,  216;  iron  smelting  com- 
pany  in, 254 
Forfeited estates, company for purchase of, 
368,  406 
Forfeitures,  farming  of,  138 
Fortifications,  outlay on, 24 
Fortrey,  Samuel,  statement  for  an open 
trade,  271 
Fowke  (Thomas) and Company,  247 
Framework-knitters,  416,  421 
France,  65;  threatens  Scotland,  27, 28; 
religious  wars  in,  48; trade  with,  88; 
ope;ations  in, 95  ;its  trading companies, 
121 ;  extension of  its trade, 263 ;  subsidy 
from,  289, 296; its war  with  Holland 
affects  English  trade,  293, 306; trade 
with  prohibited,  306-8, 466;  war  with, 
317; effect  on  trade,  327; fears  of  a 
French invasion  affect trade, 366;  peace 
with, 388,  425;  financial speculation in, 
398-405, 407 
Freke, John, his stock and share lists,  392 
Friendly  Society, 315 
Frobisher's  Voyages,  70,  71,  75, 78,  153; 
capital outlay, 76,  77;  failure of  the last 
vojage, 85 
Fuller's  gild  of  Lincoln,  3 
Fund of  Credit,  389,  463; growth  of  the 
idea, 3968 
Funerals, company for furnishing, 410,  420 
Galleons, disadvantage of their great size, 73 
Gambia,  179 
Gardiner. S. R..  on the revenue of  James I., 
134,  135  ' 
General Insurance company, 418,  419,  421, 
425 
Genoa, 13;  Bank  of  St George at, l;  debt 
of,  20;  bankers of,  50,  51,  64;  debts to 
bankers at, 55;  slave-trading undertaking 
at, 121 
George  I.,  accession,  391 
"German  Balls,"  company for making, 331 
Germany,  91;  shares  owned  in,  39,  57; 
futile attempt to  borrow  money  in,  53; 
loss  of  cloth trade to, 88;  exclusion  of 
English  traders,  98  ; Merchant  Adven- 
turers  expelled from, 100; condition  of 
Protestants in, 172;  position  of  English 
merchants  in,  181, 182; company  to 
trade to,  410 
Gherardi,  Simon,  2 
Gift coal,  219 
Gilbert, Humphrey, proposed expedition to 
America, 71  ; colonization by, 86 
-,  Sir John, his successful privateering, 101 
Gilda  mercatoria,  account of,  5,  6 
Gilding  company,  333 
Gilds,  19; their  influence  on  joint-stock 
companies, 2,  3,  4;  their organization, 4; 
administration, 7;  traces of  gild  life in 
companies,  152 
Glasgow, woollen manufactures in, 361 
Glass,  patent  for  drinking  glasses,' 117; 
progress  of  the industry, 203;  invention 
for making, 294;  Scotch glass works, 327, 
333 
-  companies,  327,  331,  414 
Glass  Makers of London,  335,  339 
-  patent,  141, 174,  1.75,  178 
Globe Theatre, owned by a syndicate, 155 
Gloucester, trade crisis in, 97,  167  ; decline 
in woollen industry, 309 
Godolphin,  Lord, on  the  farming  of  the 
Customs, 290 
Godolphin's  Award,  378 
Gold,  34,  78; import,  23, 41; Scottish 
mining  company,  36, 39; company  to 
import, 248  ; Captain  Welby's  company, 
421. 425 
Goldskiths,  commence  banking  business, 
238,  239 
Gold-thread monopoly,  114,  176,  177,  218 
Gorges,  Sir Fernando,  criticism  by  House 
of Commons,  183 
Governor,  origin  of  the  term,  7, 20 
Graceman,  a  gild  oificer,  4 
Grain, 56,  64,  89,  240,  263,  264;  price  of, 
100,  170,  180,  2'22, 239,  261;  scarcity of, 
32;  see also Harvests 
Grand Dispensary,  416 
-  Fishery,  406,  420 
Granville,  Sir Richard,  death of,  102 
Green  Cloth,  Board  of,  296 
Greenland  company,  200,  217, 225, 242, 
269,  838,  454;  enquiry by  Committee for 
Trade, 248-50  ;  capital, 336  ;  constitution, 
339 ; voting rights, 340 
-  trade,  success of,  192 
Green-wax patent,  131 
Gresham,  Sir Thomas,  28-30,  32, 54;  his 
exchange operations,  25-7; on  the cap- 
tured  Spanish  treasure,  51;  attempt  to 
borrow  money  in Germany,  53 
Guberrmto~es, 7, 9 
Guernsey  ~inen  and  Paper  company,  339 
Guiana, attempts  to  occupy,  130 
-  company,  156,  192,  202 
Guinea,  248 ; Portuguese  in,  21; trade 
with, 34 
-  company,  151, 339, 342; see  also 
African  companies 
Gunpowder,  production  in  England,  31 ; 
grants for  its manufacture,  113,  114;  a 
crown monopoly, 207  ;  company to manu- 
facture, 331 
Guns, see  Cannon 
Hair,  for  wig  making, 416 
Hamburg, 52,  88;  debts to merchants in, 
55;  price  of  money  at, 65;  company  to 
trade  to,  418,  420 
Hampshire, depression in cloth trade in, 194 
Hampstead  Aqueducts,  341,  342,  353,  355, 
435;  foundation, 332,  333,  364;  capital, 
335 ;  constitution, 339  ; voting rights, 340 
Harris,  Christopher, 80 
Hartlepool, Merchant Adventurers at, 268 
the slave trade, 34;  his voyages, capital, 
41, 42 ;  profits  of  his  expeditions,  43; 
third voyage unfortunate, 50  ;  expeditions 
to the West Indies, 66  ; on  the wealth of 
England, 81  ; his death, 102 
Hearne,  Sir Joseph,  his mining company, 
330 
Hearth  money,  264, 274, 312; collectors 
driven  out, 278 
Heathcote, Sir Gilbert, his profitable share 
dealing, 381 
Hector, ~r,  his wool license,  109 
Hemp, monopoly in sowing, 110;  company 
for growing, 416 
Henrietta  Maria,  dowry of,  190 
Henry VIII., 7,  25,  64;  his extravagance, 16 
Henry  of France,  debt  to  England,  136 
Herring,  salting  of,  313 
Herring-fishery,  fleets harassed by privateers, 
193  ; success of  the Dutch, 203 
Heyners, 7 
Hide, Laurence, his bill against monopolies, 
107 
Hill,  Aaron,  his beech  oil process,  435 
Hispaniola, Spanish plate ship salved near, 
326.  327.  345 
~ollaAd,  &3-128,  251;  merchants  of,  9; 
trading companies  of, 121;  indebtedness 
to England, 136,  142;  repayment of  debt, 
149,  169;  war  with,  252,  253,  260,  263, 
276;  cost  of the war,  278,  289;  levy  on 
cloth exported to, 268;  effect  of  war with 
France  on  English  trade,  293; trade 
affected by  peace with,  306 
Holland, John, association with the Hamp- 
stead Aqueducts, 333 ;  companies founded 
bv. 341 
d,  --- 
Holy  Cross, gild  of, at Birmingham, 3;  at 
Stratford-on-Avon, 4 
-  Island  salt company,  419, 420 
-  Trinity,  gild  at Lancaster, 4 
Honorarium, custom of  voting,  163 
Horn Sound, monopoly by  Greenland com- 
pany, 250 
Horses,  used  for  pumping  by  the  York 
Buildings company, 333 
Horth  (Thomas) and Partners,  248 
Host-men of  Newcastle, privileges  of,  178; 
their monopoly, 208,  209,  219 
Houghton,  John, 305, 360;  his  stock and 
share list, 329;  his Collections,  359;  on 
the  manner  of  establishing a  company, 
337. 338 
Houses, valuation  by  Sir Wm.  Petty, 264 
Hudson's Bay company, 284,  293,  302,  317, 
321, 336, 394,  436, 447;  incorporation, 
282 ;  dividend  paid, 318;  value of  stock, 
320,  321,  324,  325 ;  fluctuations of  shares, 
352; capital,  371; Adam  Smith's  view 
of. 4.51 
Harvests,  years  of  bad  harvests,  89; 180,  ~u~;e&ts,  support  by  Elizabeth, 29,  49;  193,  244, 372,  465-7  ; influence on  cost  importance of their immigration, 313,314; 
of  living,  239;  on  tradt:  crises, 468  utilization of  their skill, 441  Hatton,  Sir Christopher, 80  Hull,  122  ;  branch  of  Merchant' Adven. 
Havre,  expedition  to,  29,  32  turers at, 268 
~awliins,  Sir  John,  72,  249 ; embarks in  -  Company or Hull Adventurers, 2  L7 Index 
Margins, 358;  act to prevent  dealings on 
margin,  360 
Marine insurance, 420;  growth of, 315, 406 
Market  tolls,  175 
Marshall, Edward, his paper-mill, 116, f 17 
Martyn,  Sir  Richard,  danger  of  farmlng 
system shown by his action, 58, 59 ;  his 
large holding of  shares,  61 
Mary, Blessed  Virgin,  gild  of,  3 
-  Queen. 21,  31:  disasters at end of  her  .  . 
reign, 23  --  of  Scots. 27 :  owwosition to  Elizabeth, 
47 ;  marriage  ivhh' kothwell, 48;  execu- 
tion of,  89 
Maryland,  plantation  of,  201 
Massachusetts Bay company,  201,  224 
Masts, import  of,  19, 416 
Matthews, Eliza, monopoly granted to, 111 
Mediterranean,  69,  159;  pirates  in the, 
123; trade to,  253 
Mendoza,  Spanish ambassador, 69;  on  the 
Levant company, 70;  on Drake's success, 
78, 79;  on the finances of  Elizabeth, 82 
Merchant Adventurers,  17,  106, 122,  124, 
228, 236;  foundation, 8,  9; charter, 10; 
value of  woollen  shipment, 22;  financial 
help to Elizabeth, 25;  foreign exchange 
transactions,  26,  27 ; their  mart  re- 
moved to Emden, 32; shipment of  cloth, 
42;  plot  to  capture their fleet,  52; ex- 
pelled  from  Germany,  100;  amount  of 
their  exports,  142 ; their  re-establish- 
ment,  145,  169;  attitude of  Parliament 
to,  181-3;  refusal  to export cloth, 192; 
Charles I. asks for a loan, 237; loan to 
Parliament,  238 ; financial  embarrass- 
ments, 267,  268,  307  -  -  (New), 143,  168, 181, 199 
-  of  Exeter,  137 
"  MBres,"  shares in Law's  scheme,  401 
Middlesex,  county, 109 
-  Treasurer,  proceedings  against,  187 
Middleton,  Hugh,  his silver-mining com- 
pany,  193 
Millbank  water  company, 333 
Milled-lead  adventure,  294, 416, 434 
Million  Bank, 353,  355,  392-5,  397,  413, 
420,  430,  460;  origin  of,  331;  capital, 
336,  371 ;  constitution,  339 ;  voting 
rights, 340; limited  liability, 344 
Mine Adventurers, 369, 376, 377. 381, 384. 
394, 434,447, 452; establishment of, 364; 
365 ;  capital, 371; perilous position,  374 
-  royal, privilege of, 39 
Mineral  and Battery Works,  61,  62,  104, 
108,  151,  155, 161, 164,  193,  202,  228, 
282,  327,  332,  334,  342,  355,  376,  406, 
410,  434,  435,  440,  451;  incorporation, 
40;  government  and  capital,  41,  42; 
early  gains,  43,  44;  farming  system 
adopbed,  58;  its  dangers  shown,  59; 
success and drawbacks  of  the  farming 
system, 66, 67; number of  quorum, 163; 
affected by  the Civil  War,  242 
Mines,  company for  digging and working, 
338,  339 
Mines Royal, 13, 39, 45, 59-62,  66,124,'131, 
151,  152,  155,  164, 193,  202,  225,  227, 
228,  282,  327,  332,  334,  338,  341,  342, 
410,  434,  435,  440;  proposed  dividend 
in bind,  6;  foundation, 18; incorpora- 
tion,  government and capital,  40-6;  no 
profit  in early  years,  43,  44;  effect  of 
trade crisis, 57, 58, 104 ;  borrow  money 
of  Queen Elizabeth, 65 ; progress  of, 67, 
68 ; collapse  of  subsidiary  companies, 
89;  charter, 163; influence of  Civil War 
on,  242  -  Act, 355 
- -  of  Merioneth and Cardigan,  282, 285 
Mining,  development  of,  332 
Mint,  closed  by  Charles  I., 238 
Misselden,  Edward,  incident  concerning, 
228 
Molesworth, Lord, 424 
Molley, -,  his justification  of  interest, 54 
Mompesson,  Sir  Giles,  his  gold-thread 
scheme,  177 
Monasteries, economic effects of  the disso- 
lution of,  23,  84 
Money,  amount coined,  298 
Monmouth rebellion,  effect  on trade, 309, 
R10 
 onm mouth shire, iron mines and works in, 
40,  104; wire-works in, 6G 
Monopolies,  104, 149,  207-23 ;  discussion 
of,  35,  105-28;  enquiry into,  173;  pro- 
cedure  of  the  Commons  against.  178: 
cause rise in prices,  214,  231;  revenue 
from, 215,  219;  condemnation  of,  236 ; 
grants  of,  338;  justifiention  of,  453; 
Adam  Smith's  view  of,  455;  influence 
on trade, 466 
Montgomery, Earl of, interest in the glass 
industry, 174 
Montserrat,  plantation of,  201 
Moor,  Sir John,  Lord Mayor,  305 
Moore,  Francis,  on  monopolies,  107 
Morea  adventurers,  269 
Mosquito Islands, captured by the  Spaniards, 
226 
- -  company,  192,  201, 224, 227,  228 
Mountjog,  46 
Murford,  Nicholas,  his salt works  at Yar- 
mouth, 209,  210 
"  Mysterie," use in titles of  companies, 40 
Nantes,  revocation  of  the Edict of,  313 
Narva,  capture of, 23;  efiect on the Russia 
company, 35,  36;  trade to,  36,  38,  128 
Navigation  Act,  250,  276,  313,  466;  cou- 
siderations  concerning,  251,  271,  272, 
307;  effects  of,  252 
-  company (River Douglas),  419,  421 
Navy,  outlay on, 24, 90, 135,  254;  its im- 
portance  in  the  war  with  Spain,  99; 
Pepys on the condition of,  277 
-  debt, 285 
-  estimates,  349 
Neale,  Thomas,  promoter  of  lotteries, 341 
Negroes,  trade in, 41,  249;  price  of,  271 
Netherlands, 53, 55, 81,91; Philip of Spsin 
Index 
jn  the,  28,  32, 48, 72, 81; Duke  of  Alva 
In,  499  51;  war  in,  on  woollen 
industry, 65; money lent $0 Protestants 
in by Elizabeth, 82; loan raised  by, 89; 
Outlay  Queen Elizabeth in, 90; cost 
of  in, 95;  manufactnre of  cloth 
in,  position  of English  merchants 
in, 181, 182; expedition to,  186;  settle- 
ment  of the  Walloons in,  204 
Newca~tle-on-T~ne,  122,  268 ; Merchant 
Adveflturers of, 11 ; merchants of,  98 ; 
condltlon of  the coal trade at, 278;  water 
company at, 300, 327, 335;  company for 
coal trade at, 410 
New  Draperies,  sealing  grant  to  Duke  of 
Lenuox.  138 
-  England.  441  - -  Eomp&ny, 130, 183; capital,  156 
- -  council,  capital of,  184,  l85 
Newfoundland, 413 ;  English fisheries near, 
203.  332 
~ewhaveu  expedition,  cost  of,  33 
New  Jersey,  plantation  of, 332 
-  Merohaut Adventurers,  143,  168,  181, 
199 
~ewmills  company, 244,327,361 ;  dividends 
paid in kind, 6 ;  peculiar organization of 
the company, 300-2;  payment of  mana- 
gers, 343 ;  dividend paid,  365 ;  advances 
to shareholders, 372 ; property sold, 376 
New  Plymouth  adventurers,  183,  201 ; 
capital,  184,  185 
Newport, Capt., reported capture of  treasure 
ships by,  101 
New  River,  141 
- -  company,  151,  155,  163,  217,  225, 
275, 327,  333,  334,  336, 435;  James I. 
associated  with,  132,  133;  progress  of, 
294;  capital, 335,  341 
-  Scotland  company,  130,  184, 192 
Night  engine,  330, 333 
Norfolk,  Duke of,  insurrection  of,  52, 465,  .- 
Orcy,  3 
Ordnanoe,  expenses of,  90;  license  to ex- 
port,  2.70  137; Dockwra's  ordnance company, 
Orihky Fishing company,  418-20 
Orleans, Duke  of,  399 
Orphans' Bank, 331,  335,  459 
Osborne,  Sir Thos.,  see Danby,  Earl of 
Osmond Iron, 40 
Overing,  John, his diving machine,  330 
Oxford,  Earl of, 112 
packington,  Sir John, acquires the starch 
patent, 115 
pallavicino,  91;  loan  from,  188 
Palmers,  gild  of,  at Ludlow,  3 
Paper,  account  of  the paper  paten!,  116; 
manufacture  of,  314 ; companies  for 
making, 317, 330, 331, 416;  White paper 
company,  327,  330,  335,  338,  340,  345, 
346, 354, 359 ; Blue paper company, 331, 
369 ;  Scottish white paper company, 333, 
336 
papillon,  Thos.,  opposition  to  Sir  Josia 
Child,  321,  322 
Paris, speculation during Law's  operations, 
403-5,  422  --- 
Parliament,  64;  summoned  by  Elizabeth, 
33,  53; money  grants by,  101,  194 
Paste-board, company  for making,  416 
Paterson, Wm., associated with the Hamp- 
stead Aqueducts, 333 ;  companies founded 
by, 341. 342:  connection with the Darien 
company, 343 
Pauperism, decline  of,  186 
Pearls,  78;  undertakings  for  seeking, 
Pedlars,  patent for  registering,  173 
Pembroke,  Lord,  46 
Pennsylvania,  plantation  of,  332 
-  company,  420 
Penny Post, establishment  of,  299 
Pepper,  Charles I. seizes  the stock of 
332 
the 
4ti9  Kast  India  company,  224,  466 
Norman  Conquest,  3,  5  -  loan,  242 
North, Dudley,  290  -  monopoly,  140 
-  Sea, 8, 69; in command of  the Dutch,  Pepys, Samuel, on the engines for pumping 
279  Thames water, 275 ;  on the condition of 
North-West  Passage.  164  the Na-,--  - .."J,  a,, 
Norway,  merchants  trading  to,  9;  com-  Persia,  Russia company's  expeditions, 68- 
pany  to trade with,  413  70;  trade to,  127; spice from,  164 
Norwegians,  attack English shipping  101  Persian  Voyages,  193,  195,  196, 225,  227, 
Norwich,  122,  268;  trade  depression  at,  229 
194  Peruzzi,  Stephanus, 2 
--  stage-coach coml,any,  333, 335  "Petites-filles,"  certain  shares  in  Law's 
Nottingham.  brass  factorv at.  40  scheme  Afil 
Nova  ~cotia;  441;  baronet  of,  184 
--  company,  130,  184, 192 
Nutz,  capture of,  88 
O'Doharty rebellion,  140 
Oil, company for  melioration  of  (Long's), 
419,  420 
Oppenheim,  Mr,  on  the  importance  of 
treasure  ships to Spain, 99 
Options,  358 
Orange,  Prince  of,  50 
, L"& 
Petty,  Sir William,  estimate  of  national 
wealth, 264, 295, 315, 316; revenue from 
customs estimated, 290 
Philip of  Spain, 23,  53,  81,  84,  90,  100; 
threatens  Scotland,  28 ; prohibits  im- 
ports  from  England,  32;  aid  to  Mary 
Queen of  Scots, 47 ;  hostility to Elizabeth, 
48; negotiates a loan, 49 ; rate of  interest 
paid on loans by, 65; supports the Irish 
insurrection,  72,  80 ;  his  embarrassed 
finances,  85;  sided  by  the  Pope,  89; Index 
Italian bankers  pledged  to,  91;  depen- 
dence  on  America  for resources,  99 
Phipps, William, his salving company, 326 
Phoenix  Insurance company, 369 
Pickering  (James) and Company,  247 
Piracy  in  the Mediterranean, 123 
Pitch, import  of,  416 
Plague,  64,  102,  129, 130,  180, 166,  193, 
217, 231, 276-8,  280,  292, 465, 466, 468, 
469;  introduced  from  Havre,  32;  in- 
fluence on trade, 33,  102, 180, 277, 278, 
280, 468,  469 
Plantation companies,methods of procedure, 
153,  154;  effect of  trade depression  on, 
183, 184 
Plate-glass companies,  331, 416 
Playing-card  monopoly,  114, 119, 207, 216 
Plymouth,  condition  of  trade  at, 278 
Poland, 132; exclusion of  English traders, 
98 
Poor  rate,  rise  at Shoreditch,  367 
Popish  plot,  296;  see  also  Catholics 
Portato~,  11 
Portugal, 88; English traders excluded, 97, 
91;  company to trade with, 413 
Portugal voyage, cost  of, 95 
Portuguese established  in Guinea,  21 
Postal service, 202;  development  of,  275, 
299;  receipts  settled  on  the  Duke  of 
York,  313 
Potash,  use  in soap industry,  211, 212 
Potosi,  silver  from,  99 
Poverty, caused  by  trade depression,  241 
Povey, Charles, his insurance schemes, 383 
Powder  Mills,  247;  see  also Gunpowder 
Poyntz, Capt., his draining engine, 330,332 
Prague,  battle of,  172 
Precious  stones, 78 
Press, effect  of  its improvement on  trade, 
471  -.- 
Press-gang, 273,  276 
Price,  Sir  Carberry,  his  lead  mines,  336, 
347,  355, 364 
Prices raised  by  monopolies,  221,  222 
Printing licenses,  110 
Privateering, 69, 70, 250, 361, 440;  in the 
reign  of  Elizabeth, 47-9;  success of, 66, 
192;  raids  on  Spanish commerce,  72; 
organization  of  the  expeditions,  73-5 ; 
outlay,  76-8 ;  England's  prosperity 
ascribed to, 84 ;  later voyages of  Drake, 
86,  87 ;  effect on  trade, 88; decline  in, 
98, 99, 102; revival of, 101, 188; injury 
to shipping in the Channel, 186 ;  activity 
of  the Dunkirk privateers,  193 
Privy Council, 70, 71, 79, 80, 114, 116, 118, 
144, 149,192, 209,315, 445;  of  Scotland, 
313 
-  Seal, Letters of,  190 
-  Seals,  loans on,  32, 91, 92,  171, 187 
Promoters, profits  of,  342 
Protectorate, 267,  272;  financial difficulties 
of,  258;  discharge  of  its debts, 263 
Protestants, assistance sent to the Nether- 
lands,  82;  condition  in Germany,  172; 
immigration  from the Continent, 313 
Prussia, merchants  trading to,  8,  9 
Puckle's  machine gun,  420 
Pumping-engines,  patents  for,  294,  314 ; 
devices used  by  the London water  com- 
panies,  333 
Put and  Call  Options, early knowledge of, 
443 
Pym,  John,  260;  on  the  rise  in  prices, 
222;  on  the  depression  in  the  cloth 
trade,  231 
Quincampoix,  street  in Paris,  360 
Quorum, in various  companies,  163, 339, 
340 
Rags, collection for paper-making, 116, 117 
Raleigh,  Sir Walter,  colonization  by,  86, 
103;  on the profits  of  privateering,  87; 
on  the decay  of  trade,  98;  grants  to, 
111-13;  his  expedition  in  1602,  129; 
attempt to  occupy Guiana,  130 
Ram,  Stephen, insurance company,  406 
Rape-oil, use in soap industry, 211 
Reading, distress of  clothiers in, 307 
Reformation, 65 ; effect on capital, 15, 16 ; 
injury to  fishing trade, 35 
Regulated  companies,  10-12,  17,  70,  123, 
442 ; organization  of,  10 ;  comparison 
with  joint-stock  bodies,  152,  153,  243, 
273, 308, 443-5 
Rent,  fluctuation  of,  100, 261;  estimated 
value  in seventeenth century, 265,  298 
Restoration,  264;  followed  by  a  revival  in 
trade,  263 
Revenge,  loss of  the,  102 
Rh& Isle of, operations at,  186 
~hine,  river,  88 
Rivers, George, buys the starch patent, 115 
Roherts,  Lewis, account  of  the division  of  . 
the Soanish treasure,  81 
Rock  Salt  company,  338,  416,  420 
Rope and Cordage, import  of,  19, 69, 126; 
monopoly of  Russia company, 35 ; manu- 
facture in Scotland,  334,  336,  356 
Rose  Insurance company,  418,  420 
Rotterdam,  trade of,  293 
Royal  African  company,  see  African  com- 
pany  -  Burghs, subscription to the Linen  Cor- 
poraGon,  344  - 
-  Exchange,  brokers expelled from, 360 
-  -  Assurance,  406,  410,  418,  419,  421, 
425.  427.  429.  430,  432,  434  ,  . 
-  Fishery company, see  Fisheries 
-  Household,  payment  by  tallies,  29G; 
salaries  in arrear,  386 
Rum, distillation  of,  334 
Rupert, Prince, 249;  his fleet a danger to 
commerce,  240;  his  interest  in  the 
Hudson's  Bay  company,  452 
Rushworth,  John,  on  the financid  panic 
of  1667,  279 
Russell.  Sir William, his soap monopoly, 
211 
Russia, 164, 171; trade with,  22, 23, 34-8, 
62, 84;  company  to trade with,  413 
Russia company, 40, 66, 122-4,  151-3,  157, 
162,  164,  166, 197, 199, 225,  253,  307, 
439,  446, 447,  451,  454,  466;  ceremony 
at funeral  of  a  member,  5; foundation 
and  charter,  17-20;  capital,  22,  42; 
services  to  the  State,  29,  30,  34-6; 
estimated  profits,  37;  trade  prohibited 
by  the  Czar,  38;  periods  of  prosperity 
and depression,  43, 44,  68, 69, 111, 192, 
241,  269;  new  stock  proposed,  56;  ex- 
ploration  by,  71 ;  second  joint-stock 
wound  up, 89; loss of  ships,  101; effect 
of  Spanish  war  on,  103;  its  privileges 
and  position,  127,  128;  success  of  the 
whaling voyages, 130, 145; affairs  before 
the  House of  Lords,  179-50;  governor 
imprisoned,  238 
-  leather  company,  330,  333 
Ryswick, peace of,  352, 447 
Sadlers'  Hall  Insurance,  409,  410;  pur- 
chased by the Royal Exchange assurance, 
432 
Sagadahoc,  settlement,  184 
Sail-cloth,  69;  manufacture  in  Scotland, 
334;  company  for  making,  416;  Irish 
company,  420 
St Bartholomew,  massacre of,  55 
St Christopher,  201 
St George, bank  of,  at Genoa, 1, 16,  20 
St Jean de Luz, Spaniards  defeat Hawkins 
at, 50 
St John, feast  of,  8 
St John (Henry) and Company,  247 
St Paul's  Cathedral,  damage by  the Great 
Fire. 277 
~alisbir;; Lord, see  Cecil,  Sir Robert 
Salt  companies,  332,  410 
Salters,  corporation of,  222 
-  Society of,  222 
Salt-makers, Society of, 210 ;  revenue from 
the monopoly,  216 
Salt-monopoly, 119, 209, 210, 217, 221,  227 
Salt-pans at Shields,  219 
Saltpetre,  118,  217;  how  obtained,  113, 
114 
-  company,  335,  410,  419,  421;  con- 
stitution, 339;  voting  rights,  340 
Saltpetre-patent, 137 
Salt water, patent  for  making  into fresh. 
315,  327 
Sainhrooke, East India company's returns, 
159-60 
--V  "- 
Sandy~,  Sir Edwin,  his  "Instructions  for 
Free  Trade,"  120,  121,  151,  152,  197; 
opposition  to  the Russia  company,  127, 
128; on  the decay of  trade,  172 
Sawing company,  333 
Scotland,  cost  of  operations in, 24,  254; 
financial  assistance  given  by  Elizabeth, 
27;  a  possible  base  for  a  catholic  in- 
vasion,  47;  subsidies  to Protestants  in, 
48;  James  1.  on  union  with  England, 
132 ;  fishing industry in  133  steps for 
reducing  imports  from, ' 172 1  religious 
troubles  in,  217;  war  in,  240,  244; 
revival  of  industry,  244;  increase  of 
manufactures,  282 ;  company  methods 
compared  with  English,  300,  301 ; en- 
courages immigration  of  skilled workers, 
313 ;  companies  established,  327,  333, 
334,  361 ; little affected by  the crisis of 
1697, 354, 356 ;  capital invested in joint- 
stock companies, 371 ;  commercial  crisis 
in,  372,  373;  effeot  of  the  Union  on 
trade,  375,  376;  tension  with England, 
385,  467,  470 
Scots Linen Manufacture, see  Linen 
Scottish  Iloyal Fishery  Co.,  see  Fisheries 
Sea-crab, patent  for raising  wrecks,  327 
Seals,  use  by  Gilds,  3 
Seeds, grants relating  to sowing,  110 
Senegal,  179 
-  Adventurers,  122, 250 
-  company  (French), 399 
Severn,  river,  trade on the,  278 
Seville,  news  of  Drake's  success  received 
from, 79 
Sewers,  pumping  power  obtained  from, 
333 
Shadwell  water-works,  300,  327,  339,  435 
Shakespeare at the Globe Theatre,  155 
Shale's  Insurance,  406 
Shares,  comparison  of  early  and  modern 
systems, 44, 45, 46;  arrangement of, 56; 
increase  of  sales,  161;  early  transfers, 
442,  443,  453, 454 
"  Shares, the,"  creation  of,  363 
Sherry, price  of,  227 
Shields,  salt pans  at, 219 
Shipbuilding,  English  and  Spanish  com- 
pared,  73 
Ship-money,  97,  206,  207 
Shipping,  69;  capture  of  English  ships, 
98,  100-2,  327;  diversion  of  carrying 
trade,  170;  losses  during  the  Spanish 
war, 260,  261 ; Sir Wm. Petty's  estimate, 
2G4;  cost  of  English  and foreign  com- 
pared, 271, 272;  growth of  the industry, 
283; inventions relating to, 294;  revival 
in British shipping, 306, 361 ;  number of 
ships in the  Clyde,  393;  losses  in  the 
Dutch war,  466 
Ships,  inventions  for  preserving,  298; 
co~npanies  for  building  or  buying,  410, 
421 
Shoreditch, rise  in the poor-rate at, 367 
Short annuities, 395 
Shreds, export  of,  108 
Silk, industry encouraged by James I.. 133: 
company to encourage the growth of  ra; 
silk, 409 
Silver,  39,  78,  104; found  in  Wales,  131, 
103,  225;  scarcity  of,  222 
Silver-thread monopoly, 114, 176, 177, 218 
Skevins,  7 
Slave trade,  34, 41,  249,  271;  undertaking 
at Genoa,  121 
Smalt, patent  for making,  178 
Smelting, invention for, 298;  company for 
smelting lead with pit coal, 331 
Smith, Adam, 250, 251;  value  of  his work Index 
on companies, 448,449 ; views on foreign- 
trading companies, 449-58 
Smith,  Thomas,  mining  operations  at 
Keswick,  68;  collapse  of  his  mining 
company,  89 
-  Thomas, cabinet maker, his patent, 314 
-  Sir Thomas, his copper company,  63 
Smythe,  Sir Thomas,  honorarium  to,  163 
soap,  415 :  monopoly  of  manufacture,  -  - 
2ii-14  . 
Soap-boilers,  their  struggle  against  the 
Soapers  of  Westminster,  212-14;  they 
secure the monopoly,  218 
Soaperie (Scotland), 282, 327, 334, 336,356 
Soapers, society of  (Westminster), 212-16, 
218,  226, 236 
Soap-makers of  London,  218 
Societas, 2,  12, 40 
-  Bardorum,  2 
-  Pcruzzormn~,  2 
-  Riezardorurn,  2 
Society,  use  of  the  term  as  applied  to 
companies,  40,  151, 227 
Somersetshire, calamine in, 40 
Somers  lslands  company,  150,  151,  183, 
217,  225,  226,  462;  capital,  184,  185; 
dissolution  of,  311 
Southampton,  122 ;  African  expedition 
from,  18 ; gild  merchant  of,  137 
-  Earl of,  129 
South  Sea  company,  372,  392,  394,  412, 
415,  433,  440 ; foundation of,  388, 389; 
compared  with  French  companies, 398, 
401, 408; conversion of  the Lottery loan, 
407;  procures  the  suppression  of  rival 
companies, 411 ; inflation of  shares, 417, 
419 ;  collapse  of  the  boom,  422-30; 
parliamentary enquiry, 429 ;  edect of  the 
collapse on other  companies, 430-6 ;  re- 
djustment of  its affairs,  431;  cause of 
the panic, 432 
Southwark water  company,  333, 435 
Spain,  23,  55,  65;  fleet  defeated  in the 
Mediterranean,  28;  engaged  in  the 
Netherlands,  48 ;  fleets  attacked  by 
English privateers, 72-4  ; trade with, 84, 
125,  126;  precautions  against  English 
privateers,  85 ; trade  with  affected  by 
privateering, 88 ;  her enemies subsidized 
by  Elizabeth,  89 ;  increased  taxation 
owing to war with,  93 ; effect of  war  on 
trade,  97,  263;  exclusion  of  English 
traders  from,  97,  98,  102;  dependence 
upon  treasure ships, 99; import  of  wool 
from, 109 ; national wealth  affected  by 
war with, 129; war with, 186, 188, 256; 
effect of  war  on  commerce,  260;  un- 
certainty of  succession affects trade, 366 ; 
threatened hostilities with, 395; company 
to trade to, 410 
Span~sh  Armada,  73,  77,  85,  105;  ships 
collected,  89 ; delay in sailing, 91 ; cost 
of its defeat, 92; its political importance, 
93 ; defeat of, 99 
-  felts,  109 
-  treasure,  ships  driven  into  English 
ports, 49; taken in charge by  Elizabeth, 
50, 53, 55, 64, 66, 72;  amount of  treasure 
in the Tower and its disposal, 55, 79, 81, 
82 
spine, Lapo  Ughi,  2 
Spices, trade in, 34,  69, 142, 164 
Spilman, John, his paper  grant,  116, 117 
Spinola,  Benedick,  46,  91;  loan  to Queen 
Elizabeth, 58 : loan to the State, 64, 65 
Stage coach' company, 333, 335 ; dividends 
for charity, 344 
Stanhope, Michael,  his  wool  license,  109, 
110 
Staple, Merchants of  the, 8, 17, 110, 149; 
invited to contribute a loan,  28 
Star Chamber, prosecution  of  soap boilers, 
R1  R  -+- 
Starch,  company  for making,  416 
Starch-makers, monopoly of, 208, 215, 219 
-  patent,  account  of,  115,  116, 137 
Steel,  export  of,  108;  efforts  to  establish 
manufacture  in  England,  109;  patent 
for,  117;  production  in England,  118; 
oompany for making Venetian steel, 333 ; 
companies for maklng, 416 
Steele, Ilichard, company promoted by, 418 
Steelyard, merchants of  the,  65 
Stock, early use of  the term, 59-62, 75, 158 
Stockbrokers,  measures  for  their  control, 
360 
Stock  Exchange, development  of  business, 
345 
Stock-jobbing,  condemnation  of,  357-61; 
legislation  against, 369 
Stockton,  268 
Stow's  Survey  quoted,  32 
Stratford-on-Avon, gild  of  the Holy  Cross 
nt  4  W-,  - 
Street-lighting  companies,  315,  327,  335, 
341, 355,  356,  371,  394 
Subsidies, manted by Parliament, 53,54,82, 
83, 97,  129, 138 
Sucking-worm  engine,  330 
Suevia,  132 
Sugar, Scottish refinelies established, 282, 
327,  334,  336,  356;  company  for  pro- 
duction  of,  416 
Sun Fire  OEce,  383,  390,  394,  420,  432, 
433 
Surrey,  patent  for brewing  in, 109 
Sweden, merchants  trading to, 9 
Sword Blade company, 331, 354, 376, 398, 
459;  constitution,  339,  340;  clause  in 
charter as to calls, 343;  charter used for 
another  enterprize,  368 ;  capital,  371 ; 
suspends payment,  428 
TallieB, payment by,  296-8;  issue of, 349, 
350, 362 
Tanning,  patent  for,  108, 314 
Tapestry,  revival  of  the English industry, 
331 
-  Makers,  354,  369 
Tar, import  of,  416 
Tartars, suggested interference with Russia 
aompany's trade by,  69 
Taunton  115  213 
Ulster, settlement  of, 141; New Plantation 
TaxatioJ  129, 139,  in 150, 151 
T~~~~~,  bir Wi;lianl,  letter to the Merchant  Union or Double Hand in Hand Fire Office, 
Adventurers  307 
390 
Temple Brass'Mills,  419,  421,  425,  434  United  Mines,  434, 435 
Terminable  ventures,  disadvantages  of,  Usury,  6,  15; statute of,  54 
462 
Thames,  river,  water  used  for  supplying 
London,  131,  333;  pumpIn$  of, 275; 
l)utch  sail up, 276,  279,  46b 
Theft, company  to insure  agalnst thefts of 
servants;  416 
Timber,  import  of, 19, 416 
Tin, 127 ; export of, 108; farming of, 216 
- mining,  332 :  farming  granted  to 
Haleigh,- 110-12' 
Tinned plate, foundation of  the trade, 414, 
434 
Tobacco, Sir Edwia Sandy8 and the mono- 
poly  of,  121,  172 ;  efforts to  exclude 
Spanish, 182 
Tobacco-monopoly, 207, 217,  399 
Tobago,  plantation  of, 332 
Tonnage and Poundage, 191, 193, 194, 204, 
224 
Tortuga,  Island  of,  plantation,  201 
Tower of  London, 51, 53; Spanish treasure 
in, 55, 79, 80, 82 
Townshend,  H.,  117 
Tractator, 11 
Trade, activity in,  29,  31, 33, 65, 84, 130, 
141,  192, 194,  199,  202,  281,  282, 298, 
300, 315, 361, 390, 393 ;  consideration of 
independent traders,  36, 37 ; periods  of 
depression,  52,  54-7,  66,  97, 98,  100-2, 
105,  110,  129,  166, 224,  230,  240,  260, 
287,  288,  352,  372,  390,  391,  395,  463, 
464;  Spanish view  of  the depression  in 
England, 88; trade affected by  the Great 
Fire  and  Plague,  102, 180,  276-8,  280, 
465,  466;  Sandys'  work  on  free  trade, 
120, 121; organization of  foreign trade, 
123 ;  foreign trade entitled to a monopoly, 
124, 125;  effect  of  war  between France 
and Holland, 293 ;  influence of Protestant 
refugees on, 313;  estimates of, 328, 383, 
389, 390,393 ; table showing fluctuations 
of, 465-7;  causes of  crises, 468-71 
Train  oil,  monopoly  for  its manufacture, 
111;  use in soap making,  212 
Tramp  steamer,  comparison  with  early 
traders,  36 
Transport, improvements in England, 361 
Treasure-seeking  companies, 326, 327, 345, 
353, 354 
Treasury,  fraudulent  bankruptcy  amongst  -  - 
officiils,  53 
Tremayne,  Edmund,  79,  80 
Trinity,  gild  of,  at Worcester, 3 
-  House.  erection  of  beacons  by.  175  ", 
Turkey,  &ade with,  71,  88 
Turks,  hostility  of,  69 
Tweed, river,  356 
Tyne,  river,  209,  278 
Tyzack, John, inventor and promoter, 360; 
hi8 burglar alarm, 330 
Vassal1  (Samuel) and  Company,  247-9 
Venetian  steel,  company  for  making,  333 
Venice,  13 
Villiera,  Sir  Edward,  attitude  to the wire 
workers,  177 
Vinegar,  substitute for,  116 
Viners,  a  firm  of  bankers,  279 
Violet,  Thomas,  on  the  waste  of  public 
money,  235 ; attitude  to  the  export  of 
bullion,  267 
Virginia,  colony in, 201 
-  oompany,  151, 151, 160, 342, 441, 462; 
admission  of  members,  163 ; capital, 
156,  184,  185;  price  of  shares,  162; 
method  of  voting,  163;  dissolution  of, 
183 
--V 
Volga, river,  68 
Voting,  methods  of,  163,  228 ; rights  in 
various companies, 270,  340 
Wages paid to miners, 113; to weavers, 167 
Wales,  132; right of  mining in,  104; dis- 
covery  of  silver  in, 131,  193, 225 
TValloons, emigration of, 204 
Wall-papers, conipany for manufacture  of, 
331,  354 
Walpole, Sir Robcrt, on the panic of  1720, 
437;  his conversion scheme, 467 
Walsingham, Sir Francis,  79; on England 
in 1588, 92 
Watches,  company  for  making,  416 
Water engine, 414,  421 
Water-supply, progress  of,  131, 275,  294, 
300,459,460 ;  new companies established, 
332, 333 ;  companies survive the crisis of 
1697, 355 ; capital of  companies, 371 
Wattes,  John,  alderman,  his  privateering 
syndicate,  101 
wax,  trade  Russia  in, 69  compauy'~ monopoly,  35 ; 
Wealth,  national  wealth  of  England  and 
Wales  in 17th century,  264,  265 
Weavers,  wages  of,  167;  number  of  un- 
employed,  180;  distress  of,  231;  emi- 
grntion  to  the Netherlands,  232 
Welby,  Capt.,  his  gold  mining  company, 
418.  421 
welsh  copper  company,  418,  421,  433; 
account  of, 425 ; fluctuation  of  shares, 
346 
W;&-  Indies,  251;  slave  trade  held  by 
Spain,  34;  expeditions  of  Sir  John 
Hawkins  to,  66;  Spain's  revenue  from, 
99  in ;  the,  colonies  256  in, 201 ; conflict with Spain 
Westley's  Actions,  420 
Westminster,  109 
-  Soapers, see  under  Soapers 
Weyuouth ships captured  by  Spain,  260 Index 
Whale-oil used  in soap manufacture,  211 
Whaling,  127,  164-6,  179, 180,  203,  313, 
332,  420;  undertaken  by  the  Russia 
company,  103, 130,  143; conlp'tition  of 
the Dutch, 141  ; Scottish companies, 282, 
334, 454; attempt to revive the industry, 
xn9 
~i;uea~,  56,  64,  89,  240,  263,  2G4 
Whigs,  defeat  of,  385,  386 
Whips,  company  for  making  whalebone 
whips,  333,  335 
White lead,  company  for  making,  416 
-  paper  company, 327, 330, 335, 338, 340, 
345, 346,354,359; Scottish company, 333 
-  Sea,  69 
Widows and orphans, society for assurance 
of,  364, 369 
Wig-making, company to trade in hair for, 
416 
William III., 314,  321 
Wiltshire,  trade distress in,  97 
Wine-monopoly,  137,  219,  221,  226,  227 
Winter,  Sir William,  27 
Winterton  Ness, liglithouse at, 175 
Wire-workers,  brutality to,  177 
Wire-works,  farming  of,  39,  40,  44,  58, 
66, 104 
Woad, monopoly for sowing, 110 ; company 
for growing, 415 
Wood, import  of,  19, 416 
Wood, George, his linen-printing monopoly, 
176 
-  William, inventor of  a smelting process, 
435 
Lvood-sawing,  patent for, 314; company for, 
333 
Wool,  import  and  export  of,  109,  110; 
farmers dependent on sale of, 170; price 
of,  222;  companies  for  production  and 
sale of,  415 
TVool-cards, mailufacture  of,  39,  40,  282, 
327,  334;  importation  forbidden,  104 
Woollen  industry, 40,  293; value  of  ahip- 
ments,  22;  injured  by  the  war  in 
Flanders,  51,  52,  65 ; fluctuations  in, 
100,  10'2,  180,  186,  194, 199, 231,  232, 
309;  effect  of  soap  monopoly  on,  216; 
influence  of  the  Union  on  the Scottish 
industry,  393 
Worcester,  gild  of  the Trinity at,,  3 
Wrecks, companies for raising and recovery 
of  treasure from, 295,  326, 327 
TVroth,  Sir l'lobert, his list of  monopolies, 
108 
Wyamba,  struggle  of  rival  con~panies  at, 
249 
Yarmouth,  132,  193,  268;  gild  admini- 
stration  at,  7; salt works at, 209,  210 
Yarranton,  Andrew,  his  banking  scheme, 
293 
York, 122, 268;  gild  of Corpus Christi at, 
2  4  ->  - 
York  Buildings  company,  327,  333,  406, 
418,  419,  421,  427,  429,  430,  433; 
c:~p~tal,  335 ; constitution,  339 ; account 
of, 425,  420 
Yorkshire,  cloth-trade  depression  in,  261 
Young  Scholars,  gild  of, 4 
Zante,  158 
Zealand, merchants of,  9 
Zinc, search for in England,  39 
-  ore, 31, see  also  Calamine 